1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 KLARA GIANNA GALLUSZ, Case No.: 25-CV-885 JLS (BLM)

11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 13 LPP MORTGAGE, INC. f/k/a LPP DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S MORTGAGE LTD, 14 COMPLAINT Defendant. 15 (2) DENYING MOTION TO 16 COMPEL PRODUCTION OF ORIGINAL PROMISSORY NOTE, 17 FOR SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 37, 18 AND FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF LACK OF 19 STANDING, AND 20 (3) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 21 TO STRIKE REDACTED EXHIBITS 22 AND DEFECTIVE ASSIGNMENTS

23 (ECF Nos. 15, 18, 20) 24 25 Presently before the Court are Defendant LLP Mortgage, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss 26 Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 15), Plaintiff Klara Gianna Gallusz’s Opposition 27 thereto (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 19), and Defendant’s Reply in Support thereof (“Reply,” ECF 28 1 No. 28). Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Original 2 Promissory Note, for Sanctions under Rule 37, and for Judicial Declaration of Lack of 3 Standing (ECF No. 18) and Motion to Strike Redacted Exhibits and Defective Assignments 4 (ECF No. 20). 5 Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1-3 Ex. A), 6 the Parties’ Motions, the Parties’ arguments, and the law, the Court (1) GRANTS 7 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 15); (2) DENIES 8 Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Original Promissory Note, for Sanctions under 9 Rule 37, and for Judicial Declaration of Lack of Standing (ECF No. 18); and (3) DENIES 10 AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Redacted Exhibits and Defective Assignments 11 (ECF No. 20). 12 BACKGROUND 13 On April 10, 2025, Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a Complaint titled “Verified 14 Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief: Bill in Equity Ex Parte Hearing for 15 Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Due to Lack of Article III Standing” in the 16 Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego. See generally Compl.2 In her 17 Complaint, Plaintiff indicated the real property located at 3050 Rue D Orleans, Unit #410, 18 San Diego, California 92110 (the “Property”), was “the subject of a threatened non-judicial 19 foreclosure sale scheduled for April 16, 2025, at 10:30 AM, to take place at the entrance 20 of East County Regional Center, 250 E. Main Street, El Cajon, CA 92020.” Id. at 3. 21 22 23 24 1 Plaintiff filed a sur-reply in connection with Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without leave from the Court. See ECF No. 30. Parties must request leave to file a sur-reply, see Tounget v. Valley-Wide 25 Recreation & Park Dist., No. EDCV 16-88 JGB (KKX),

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020), which Plaintiff did not do in this case, see generally Docket. Even if Plaintiff did so, the Court 26 finds that there is no “valid reason” to permit a sur-reply in this instance. See

(quoting Barco N.V. v. Tech. Props. Ltd.,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011)). Therefore, the Court will not 27 consider Plaintiff’s sur-reply in ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 28 2 All citations refer to the blue page numbers affixed to the top right corner of each page in the Court’s 1 Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including “a determination of legal rights, 2 and to prevent irreparable harm from unlawful foreclosure.”

3 On April 14, 2025, Defendant removed this case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then filed an Application 5 for Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 3. On April 15, 2025, the Court issued an 6 administrative stay of the April 16, 2025, Trustee Sale and directed Defendant to respond 7 to Plaintiff’s TRO Application by 5:00 p.m. on April 17, 2025. ECF No. 6. The Court 8 ultimately denied Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order and lifted the 9 administrative stay on the case on April 22, 2025. ECF No. 12 (“Order”). Plaintiff then 10 filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 24, 2025, see ECF No. 13, which the Court 11 denied on May 21, 2025, see ECF No. 27. 12 On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Renewed TRO Motion (“Renewed TRO 13 Mot.,” ECF No. 33), seeking injunctive relief in light of “materially changed circumstances 14 and newly discovered evidence” that was not previously before the Court. Renewed TRO 15 Mot. at 2. On November 6, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Renewed TRO Motion, 16 explaining that the purportedly new evidence did not change the Court’s previous analysis 17 regarding Plaintiff’s request for a TRO. ECF No. 38 at 5. 18 MOTION TO DISMISS 19 I. Legal Standard 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 21 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 22 Courts evaluate the adequacy of the claim based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), 23 which requires “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 24 to relief.” Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than 25 an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

, 678,

,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 27 Twombly,

,

,

(2007)). Put another way, 28 it is insufficient to provide a pleading that “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic 1 recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . .’” Twombly,

. 2 / / / 3 For a claim to survive a motion to dismiss it “must contain sufficient factual matter, 4 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

5 at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). A claim is facially plausible when the 6 facts pleaded “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 7 for the misconduct alleged.”

That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but 8 there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

9 Facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement 10 to relief.

(quoting Twombly,

). In conducting this type of review, the 11 Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in the light 12 most favorable to the non-movant. Hernandez v. City of San Jose,

, 1132 13 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Padilla v. Yoo,

(9th Cir. 2012)). 14 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the 15 Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

. A Court “must 16 accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in 17 favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of 18 Am.,

(9th Cir. 2014). However, the Court is not required to accept as 19 true “legal conclusions” in the complaint. Iqbal,

. If a complaint does not 20 meet the plausibility standard to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should grant leave to 21 amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with the challenged 22 pleading could . . . cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

, 23 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co.,

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). Put differently, the Court may deny leave to amend if 25 amendment would be futile. See id.; Schreiber Distrib., 806 F.2d at 1401. 26 II. Analysis 27 Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on three separate grounds: (1) 28 Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief fail because they are remedies rather 1 than standalone claims; (2) Defendant does not need Article III standing to initiate a non- 2 judicial foreclosure, nor does it need to prove its authority to foreclosure pre-foreclosure; 3 and (3) Plaintiff cannot challenge the assignments of the deed of trust.3 See generally Mot. 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint advances two “claims”: “[A] judicial declaration that 5 [Defendant] lacks standing to enforce the Note or Deed of Trust and that any actions taken 6 without standing are void” and “a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting any 7 foreclosure or collection action by [Defendant] until standing is proven.” Compl. at 7. 8 However, as Defendant points out, declaratory relief and injunctive relief are remedies 9 rather than standalone claims. Hamilton v. Bank of Blue Valley,

, 10 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, 11 and a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted.” (quoting Shell 12 Oil Co. v. Richter,

(1942))). Plaintiff’s references to what appear 13 to be new claims in her Opposition do not cure this defect. See Opp’n at 4–7; Frenzel v. 14 AliphCom,

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint 15 may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” (internal quotation 16 marks and citation omitted) (cleaned up)). Because Plaintiff does not allege independent 17 claims upon which relief can be granted, dismissal of the Complaint is warranted for this 18 reason alone. 19 Plaintiff’s Complaint also challenges Defendant’s “Article III standing . . . to enforce 20 any rights related to a purported mortgage loan concerning [Plaintiff’s] real property.” 21 Compl. at 3. Plaintiff argues that Article III standing “is a jurisdictional prerequisite in any 22 legal proceeding,” and that “[a] party cannot foreclose or enforce a security instrument 23 unless it first proves it has constitutional standing.”

Plaintiff further states that 24 Defendant is required to prove it has standing before proceeding with foreclosure.

25

26 3 Defendant requests judicial notice of evidence relating to the assignments of the Deed of Trust and 27 Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case. See generally ECF No. 15-2 (“RJN”). Because the Court does not rely on 28 these documents in reaching its conclusion below, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Request 1 Defendant argues that it does not need Article III standing to initiate a non-judicial 2 foreclosure, and that California law does not require a party to “produce the promissory 3 note or otherwise prove it holds the note” granting it the authority to initiate foreclosure. 4 Mot. at 11 (quoting Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

, 512 5 (2013)). Defendant further contends that California law prohibits preemptive challenges 6 to a beneficiary’s right to foreclosure on a deed of trust. Mot. at 11–12. Plaintiff responds 7 that Defendant’s contention it does not need to prove standing “is a misstatement of federal 8 law . . . .” Opp’n at 7. 9 Plaintiff is incorrect. Defendant does not need Article III standing to non-judicially 10 foreclose, as Article III applies to a plaintiff’s standing to bring a lawsuit. See Spokeo, Inc. 11 v. Robins,

(2016). Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to provide a “specific 12 factual basis” for challenging Defendant’s authority to initiate foreclosure, instead seeking 13 a “determination of legal rights.” Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

4th 1149, 1156 (2011); Compl. at 2. Absent a specific factual basis for challenging 15 Defendant’s authority to foreclose on the Property, Plaintiff may not bring a lawsuit to find 16 out whether Defendant possesses authority to proceed with foreclosure.

Additionally, 17 Defendant is not required to produce the promissory note it holds to non-judicially 18 foreclose on the Property. See Roque v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C-09-00040 RMW, 19

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010); Brewer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 20 16-cv-02664-HSG,

, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff 21 fails to articulate any legitimate argument as to Defendant’s lack of standing to initiate 22 foreclosure proceedings. 23 Without alleging a particular cause of action, Plaintiff next claims that Defendant 24 has “failed to provide a complete, valid, and properly recorded chain of assignments of 25 both the Note and the Deed of Trust.” Compl. at 5. Because Plaintiff does not point to a 26 particular cause of action or allege additional facts, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon 27 which relief can be granted in connection with the assignments of the Deed of Trust. See 28 Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

). 1 / / / 2 / / / 3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 4 Complaint (ECF No. 15). 5 PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS 6 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Production of Original Promissory Note, for 7 Sanctions under Rule 37, and for Judicial Declaration of Lack of Standing (ECF No. 18) 8 and a Motion to Strike Redacted Exhibits and Defective Assignments (ECF No. 20). As 9 to Plaintiff’s first Motion (ECF No. 18), Plaintiff’s request to compel production of the 10 promissory note is improper because discovery has not yet begun in this case; therefore, 11 the Court DENIES this aspect of the Motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Plaintiff further 12 seeks sanctions against Defendant to the extent Defendant does not produce the promissory 13 note and a judicial declaration that Defendant lacks Article III standing to enforce the 14 promissory note. ECF No. 18 at 4. Because Plaintiff’s underlying request to compel is 15 improper, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. Additionally, 16 as the Court has already rejected Plaintiff’s arguments as to Article III standing in granting 17 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s request for a 18 judicial declaration that Defendant lacks standing. Because the Court finds that dismissal 19 of the Complaint is warranted and did not rely on documents submitted by Defendant in 20 determining so, the Court likewise DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s second Motion (ECF 21 No. 20) requesting the Court strike these documents. 22 CONCLUSION 23 In light of the foregoing, the Court (1) GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 24 Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 15); (2) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production 25 of Original Promissory Note, for Sanctions under Rule 37, and for Judicial Declaration of 26 Lack of Standing (ECF No. 18); and (3) DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike 27 Redacted Exhibits and Defective Assignments (ECF No. 20). The Court DISMISSES 28 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-3, Ex. A). Given Plaintiff’s 1 || pro se status, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Within forty-five (45) days 2 entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint curing the pleading 3 || deficiencies noted above. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the 4 ||original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County,

(9th Cir. 2012). Any 5 ||amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference to Plaintiff's 6 || original Complaint; claims not realleged in the amended complaint will be considered 7 || waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey,

(noting that claims dismissed 8 || with leave to amend that are not realleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 9 || waived”). If Plaintiff fails to amend within the time provided, the Court will enter a final 10 || order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. Herrera,

(9th Cir. 11 |}2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a 12 district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire 13 || action.”). 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: December 19, 2025 tt 16 ja Janis L. Sammartino 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28