1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 PETER COLOMBO, Case No. 24-cv-00909-NC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 AND DENYING IN PART v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR 13 SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL ORDER DENYING 14 DISTRICT, and others, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 15 Defendants. JUDGMENT 16 Re: ECF 192, 196, 199

17 18 Plaintiff Peter Colombo alleges Defendants Palo Alto Unified School District 19 (PAUSD) and three District officials violated his procedural due process rights and 20 retaliated against him following an allegation that Plaintiff raped a middle school student. 21 Before the Court are (1) Defendants Trent Bahadursingh and Don Austin’s Motion 22 for Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants PAUSD and Lisa Hickey’s Motion for Summary 23 Judgment; and (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 24 For the reasons below, the Court: 25 • GRANTS Bahadursingh and Austin’s Motion for Summary Judgment; 26 • GRANTS in part and DENIES in part PAUSD and Hickey’s Motion for Summary 27 Judgment; and 1 • DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.1 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 A. Factual Background 4 The following facts are undisputed. On January 28, 2022, PAUSD received an 5 email alleging that Plaintiff had raped a former Jordan Middle School student during the 6 2001–2002 school year. PAUSD reported the allegation to local law enforcement and 7 placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave. 8 On June 15, 2022, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office charged 9 Plaintiff with felony aggravated sexual assault of a child. PAUSD placed Plaintiff on an 10 unpaid leave of absence. During that time, the California Commission on Teacher 11 Credentialing (CTC) suspended Plaintiff’s teaching credentials. In June 2023, the Santa 12 Clara District Attorney’s office dismissed the case against Plaintiff. PAUSD returned 13 Plaintiff to paid administrative leave, pending an internal investigation. The CTC 14 informed PAUSD that Plaintiff’s credentials had expired, prompting PAUSD to return 15 Plaintiff to an unpaid leave pending renewal of his credentials. The CTC also notified 16 Hickey that it was reviewing Plaintiff’s conduct and requested information. Hickey 17 responded that Plaintiff was “on paid administrative leave and [PAUSD] intends to 18 conduct our own investigation, but that has not been complete yet, therefore there is not 19 currently a Statement of Charges or Intent to Dismiss/Suspend.” ECF 196 at 12. 20 In August 2023, PAUSD initiated an independent investigation into the allegations, 21 overseen by an independent third-party investigator. In October 2023, Plaintiff’s 22 credentials were renewed and he was returned to paid administrative leave. In May 2024, 23 the investigation concluded and did not substantiate the allegations. For the 2024–2025 24 school year, PAUSD placed Plaintiff in a teacher on special assignment position, which is 25 a certified teaching position. The special assignment position did not alter Plaintiff’s 26 1 Plaintiff requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that Defendants failed 27 to timely disclose evidence to support their affirmative defenses. See ECF 199. This 1 seniority, tenure, or compensation, and he remained a certified teacher. In his special 2 assignment position, Plaintiff’s responsibilities included, for example, running committee 3 meetings, planning professional development days, and developing PE lesson plans. There 4 were no PE teaching positions available then because (1) due to lower enrollment, Greene 5 Middle School offered only two, instead of three, PE teaching positions, and (2) there were 6 already two PE instructors assigned to Greene. For the 2025–2026 school year, Plaintiff 7 worked as a PE teacher at another District middle school. 8 B. Procedural Background 9 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on February 15, 2024, a first amended 10 complaint on July 10, 2024, and a second amended complaint on October 9, 2024. ECF 1; 11 ECF 37; ECF 86. Plaintiff then filed a third amended complaint (TAC) on January 6, 12 2025. ECF 113. 13 After the Court granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the third amended 14 complaint, ECF 128, the following claims remain: 15 • First Claim (

): (A) procedural due process claim against 16 Defendants Don Austin, Lisa Hickey, and Trent Bahadursingh, based on Plaintiff’s alleged 17 property interest in a position similar to his tenured teaching role. And, (B) stigma-plus 18 procedural due process claim against Defendants Austin and Hickey. 19 • Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for retaliation against the District under Title 20 VII, FEHA, and Title IX. See Dkt. 110 (Order denying motion to dismiss retaliation 21 claims against District in Second Am. Compl.) and Dkt. 128 (Order on motion to dismiss 22 Third Am. Compl.). 23 Defendants moved for summary judgment. ECF 192, 196. Plaintiff opposed. ECF 24 204, 205. Defendants replied. ECF 208, 209. Plaintiff moved for partial summary 25 judgment. ECF 199. Defendants opposed. ECF 206. Plaintiff replied. ECF 207. 26 The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF 7, 11, 59.

27 II. LEGAL STANDARD 1 Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 2 resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 3 material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton,

(2014); Celotex 4 Corp. v. Catrett,

(1986). A fact is material when, under governing 5 substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 6

(1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is 7 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 9

, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 11 discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 12 Celotex,

. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 13 party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 14 specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 15 Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n,

(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Steckl v. 16 Motorola, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 17 must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan,

(citing Liberty Lobby,

). 19 III. THE COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER PLAINTIFF’S NEW MALICIOUS 20 PROSECUTION THEORY 21 As an initial matter, Plaintiff attempts to present a new legal theory in his 22 Oppositions to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and his Cross Motion for 23 Summary Judgment that Defendants should be liable under a § 1983 claim for malicious 24 prosecution. See generally ECF 199, 204, 205. 25 The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s request to assert this malicious prosecution 26 theory in response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF 124. Plaintiff cannot now 27 assert this claim without the Court’s permission and in contravention of its prior order. 1 claims”). Moreover, it is improper to assert a new legal theory for the first time at the 2 summary judgment stage. Corona v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 13-cv-5521-PSG- 3 VBKX,

, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2014) (collecting cases in the Ninth 4 Circuit finding that parties cannot assert unpled theories for the first time at the summary 5 judgment stage). 6 Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment by referencing evidence and arguing 7 about a claim which is not operative. Plaintiff flooded the Court with over 2,700 pages of 8 exhibits and multiple briefings on a claim which he was expressly prohibited from 9 asserting, which is disrespectful of the Court’s time and the interests of judicial economy. 10 Freeman Inv. Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Frank Russell Co.,

, 591 (9th Cir. 2018) 11 (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles.”) (citations omitted). Should Plaintiff 12 continue to violate court orders, this Court will consider whether sanctions are appropriate. 13 Accordingly, the Court bars the malicious prosecution argument and admonishes Plaintiff 14 to strictly adhere to the Court’s orders. 15 IV. DISCUSSION 16 Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey contend qualified immunity bars the entirety of 17 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim under both his procedural due process property right and stigma- 18 plus theories. ECF 192 at 26; ECF 196 at 21. PAUSD argues Plaintiff cannot establish a 19 causal retaliatory nexus. ECF 196 at 26. 20 Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey establish the absence of a genuine dispute of 21 material fact—and Plaintiff fails to rebut—that (a) Defendants were not involved in, or had 22 a causal connection to, appointing Plaintiff to the special assignment role, and (b) Austin 23 and Hickey’s comments caused the denial of a constitutional right. As a result, the Court 24 GRANTS Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey qualified immunity and summary judgment 25 as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim under both theories.2 26

27 2 Because the Court grants qualified immunity to Austin and Bahadursingh, their Motion 1 However, as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, PAUSD has failed to proffer a non- 2 retaliatory reason for the prolonged duration of its internal investigation. Accordingly, the 3 Court DENIES PAUSD and Plaintiff summary judgment as to the retaliation claim. 4 A. The Court Grants Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey Summary Judgment on 5 Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Because Qualified Immunity Applies 6 “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly 7 established constitutional right.” Stampfli v. Susanville Sanitary Dist., No. 2:20-cv-01566 8 WBS DMC,

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Stampfli v. 9 Stump, No. 23-15346,

(9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2024) (quoting Pearson v. 10 Callahan,

(2009)). “In determining whether a state official is entitled to 11 qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court first determines ‘whether the evidence 12 viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a 13 constitutional right.’”

(quoting Sandoval v. Cnty. of S.D.,

(9th Cir. 14 2021)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The court then determines ‘whether the right 15 was clearly established such that a reasonable official would [have] known that he was 16 engaging in unlawful conduct.’”

(quoting Levine v. City of Alameda,

, 17 906 (9th Cir. 2008)). “If the right was clearly established, the court evaluates whether a 18 reasonable person in the position of the defendant would know that the conduct at issue 19 violated that right.”

(quoting Saucier v. Katz,

, 202 (2001), overruled on 20 other grounds by Pearson,

); Levine,

. 21 “The court has the discretion to decide which of qualified immunity’s two prongs to 22 address first and, if analysis of one prong proves dispositive, the court need not analyze the 23 other.” Debeaubien v. California, No. 2:19-cv-01329-WBS-DB,

, at *4 24 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2022) (citing Pearson,

). The Court will begin with 25 qualified immunity’s first prong: whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 26 violation of a constitutional right under Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against individual 27 Defendants Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey. 1 1. Plaintiff Presents Insufficient Evidence to Show a Violation of a 2 Constitutional Right 3 a. Procedural Due Process Right to Property Claim 4 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to procedural due process based 5 on his property right in a position of the same nature and ranks as his tenured teaching role 6 by appointing him to the special assignment position. Defendants argue that none had a 7 role in placing Plaintiff in the special assignment position. ECF 192 at 16, 20–21, 29; 196 8 at 14, 22. Defendant Hickey further contends that she was not a District employee when 9 Plaintiff was given the special assignment role. ECF 196 at 16. Plaintiff’s opposition 10 briefs do not address Defendants’ arguments. See generally ECF 204, 205. 11 “A supervisor may be liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only if there 12 is either (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient 13 causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 14 violation.” Bryant v. City of Berkeley, No. 21-cv-08169-AGT,

, at *5 15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (citing Hansen v. Black,

(9th Cir. 1989)). “A 16 sufficient causal connection requires that the supervisor either set in motion or knowingly 17 refused to terminate acts by others which she knew or had reason to know inflict 18 constitutional injury.”

(quoting Starr v. Baca,

, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 19 2011)). 20 Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the individual Defendants had a role in, 21 or causal connection to, appointing Plaintiff to the special assignment position which 22 deprived him of his property right in a position of the same nature and ranks as his tenured 23 teaching role. See generally ECF 204, 205; Herrera v. City of Fremont, No. 18-cv-02843, 24

at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019) (granting summary judgment where a 25 plaintiff failed to “identif[y] any evidence that would support a finding that [the defendant] 26 was personally involved in or had any causal connection to the constitutional violations 27 alleged”). Moreover, Plaintiff concedes this argument because he failed to address it. See 1 *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2025) (granting summary judgment where party failed to contest 2 argument). 3 Because the first prong of the analysis as to the procedural due process right claim 4 proves dispositive and Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence or even a responsive 5 argument, the Court need not evaluate the second prong. Debeaubien,

, 6 at *4 (“. . . if analysis of one prong proves dispositive, the court need not analyze the 7 other.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS qualified immunity as to Austin, 8 Bahadursingh, and Hickey as to Plaintiff’s procedural due process right to property claim. 9 b. Stigma-Plus Claim 10 To satisfy the stigma-plus test, “a plaintiff must show the public disclosure of a 11 stigmatizing statement by the government, the accuracy of which is contested, plus the 12 denial of ‘some more tangible interest[ ] such as employment,’ or the alteration of a right 13 or status recognized by state law.” Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S. F.,

(9th 14 Cir. 2002) (alteration in original). 15 Austin argues the statements at issue are not substantially false and instead are 16 partial excerpts of quotes taken out of context. ECF 192 at 23. Plaintiff contends the 17 statements are inflammatory and create stigma. ECF 204 at 27. The Court need not 18 address the falsity or truth of the statements because, even assuming the statements are 19 stigmatizing, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that “the defamation by the government was 20 ‘accompanied by an injury directly caused by the government, rather than an injury caused 21 by the act of some third party.’” Haley v. Gotshall, No. C 15-1079 WHA (PR),

631944, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (citing Paul v. Davis,

(1976)) 23 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues, after Austin’s statements, he was placed on 24 involuntary leave, appointed to the special assignment position, and placed in a PE 25 teaching role at Fletcher Middle School instead of Greene. ECF 204 at 27. In support, 26 Plaintiff cites to the transcript from a Palo Alto Unified School District Board meeting. 27 ECF 205-1, Exh. 40. This evidence does not establish how Austin’s statements directly 1 whether Austin himself directed the leave or assignments. It “is not the Court’s 2 responsibility to root through the record to establish the absence of factual disputes . . . or 3 to look for evidence on the nonmoving parties’ behalf.” CZ Servs., Inc. v. Express Scripts 4 Holding Co., No. 18-cv-04217-JD,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020). 5 Plaintiff’s evidence as to Hickey’s statements similarly falls short. Hickey argues 6 her statement to the CTC does not constitute a public disclosure. ECF 196 at 20. Plaintiff 7 does not address this argument so concedes it. Deckers Outdoor Corp.,

8 at *6. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s concession, mere notification of alleged criminal actions 9 to other public agencies does not constitute public disclosure. Millman v. Inglish, 461

(9th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Grewal, No. 24-cv-05344-JSC,

4859194, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2024) (concluding plaintiff’s failure to show how the 12 defendant’s CTC letter was publicly disclosed was fatal to claim). 13 Even assuming Hickey’s statement was publicly disclosed, stigmatizing, and 14 Plaintiff had not conceded this argument, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how Hickey’s 15 statement caused the denial of a tangible interest. Plaintiff contends the CTC report makes 16 him “unemployable outside the District” (ECF 205 at 27) and again points to the transcript 17 from a Palo Alto Unified School District Board meeting and an expert report. ECF 205-1, 18 Exh. 40; ECF 205-3 at 168–170, Exh. 173. However, Plaintiff fails to explain how this 19 evidence demonstrates that Hickey’s CTC letter made him “unemployable outside the 20 District” and thus deprived him of a constitutional right. Loss of “future employment 21 opportunities” without more “do[es] not rise to the level of a deprivation of a 22 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.” Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of 23 Regents,

(9th Cir. 2010); see also Blantz v. California Dep’t of Corr. & 24 Rehab., Div. of Corr. Health Care Servs.,

(9th Cir. 2013) (“Stigmatizing 25 statements that merely cause reduced economic returns and diminished prestige, but not 26 permanent exclusion from, or protracted interruption of, gainful employment within the 27 trade or profession do not constitute a deprivation of liberty.”) (internal quotations 1 Because Plaintiff has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right, the Court 2 GRANTS Austin and Hickey qualified immunity to Plaintiff’s stigma-plus claim. 3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to 4 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim under both the due process and stigma-plus theories and DENIES 5 Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on those claims. 6 B. The Court Denies PAUSD Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim 7 In the Ninth Circuit, courts analyze Title IX and FEHA retaliation claims under a 8 burden-shifting framework. See Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. Co.,

, 1002 9 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

(1973)). 10 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case.

To make out a prima facie case of 11 retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his 12 employer subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists 13 between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Henderson,

, 14 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); see Day v. Sears Holdings Corp.,

(C.D.

). 16 If established, the prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of unlawful 17 retaliation. Weil,

. The burden of production, but not persuasion, then 18 shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its action. 19

(quoting McDonnell Douglas,

); see Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. 20 of Trs.,

(9th Cir. 2000). Whether a defendant has met its burden 21 involves “no credibility assessment” at this stage. Hittle v. City of Stockton,

616722, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

502, 509 (1993)); see Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2004). 24 If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears. 25 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507. The plaintiff must then produce “sufficient 26 evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered 27 nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. 1 the plaintiff “need produce very little evidence to overcome an employer’s motion for 2 summary judgment . . . because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved 3 through a searching inquiry—one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, 4 upon a full record.” Chuang,

(internal quotation marks and citation 5 omitted). 6 The Court finds that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation. First, 7 the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when he filed the 8 Complaint in this action.3 ECF 196 at 26 n.1. Second, Plaintiff suffered adverse 9 employment actions—the delayed investigation which necessitated his extended leave, the 10 failure to release the investigation report’s findings exonerating Plaintiff, and the 11 appointment to the special assignment role. Adetuyi v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

, 761 13 (1998)) (“A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment 14 status, such as . . . reassignment with significantly different responsibilities”); Lelaind v. 15 City and Cnty. of S.F.,

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining adverse 16 actions for Title VII retaliation claims are “not limited to workplace-related or 17 employment-related acts and harm”). These actions can be said to be “reasonably likely to 18 deter the [employee] from engaging in protected activity.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242–43. 19 Finally, it is undisputed that (a) Plaintiff filed the operative complaint in February 20 2024; (b) PAUSD’s investigation began in August 2023 and concluded in May 2024; (c) 21 PAUSD did not disclose the investigation report upon completion in May 2024; and (d) 22 PAUSD assigned Plaintiff the special assignment role in May 2024. “Causation may be 23 established based on the timing of the relevant actions.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson 24 Consumer Prods., Inc.,

, 507 (9th Cir. 2000). “Specifically, when adverse 25 employment decisions are taken within a reasonable period of time after complaints of 26

27 3 PAUSD argues that Plaintiff’s resisting early retirement does not separately constitute 1 discrimination have been made, retaliatory intent may be inferred.” Id. Here, the adverse 2 actions were taken within six months of Plaintiff’s protected activity, which is close 3 enough to suggest a causal link. See Flores v. City of Westminister,

(9th 4 Cir. 2017) (“[D]epending on the circumstances, three to eight months is easily within a 5 time range that can support an inference of retaliation.”) (internal citation and quotation 6 omitted); Brown v. Potter,

(9th Cir. 2011) (five months in 7 between the filing of a second amended complaint and when plaintiff was discharged 8 “[did] not follow directly on each other’s heels, but are closely enough linked to suggest a 9 causal connection”). Plaintiff has met his burden to show causation and establish prima 10 facie retaliation, so PAUSD must articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its 11 actions. 12 PAUSD has proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for withholding its 13 investigative report and appointing Plaintiff to the special assignment role. First, PAUSD 14 explains that, because the investigation was not governed by internal district regulations or 15 Title IX policies, there was no requirement to release the investigation’s findings. ECF 16 196 at 10–11. Second, PAUSD demonstrates that Plaintiff was offered the special 17 assignment position because it lacked an available PE teaching position for that school 18 year. ECF 196 at 13, Exh. T. However, PAUSD has failed to demonstrate a legitimate 19 reason for the length of its internal investigation, which lasted approximately from August 20 2023 through May 2024.

As PAUSD has failed to demonstrate a legitimate, non- 21 retaliatory reason for the investigation’s duration, the Court DENIES summary judgment 22 on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 23 V. CONCLUSION 24 Accordingly, the Court: 25 • GRANTS Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey qualified immunity as to 26 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim under both the due process property right and 27 stigma-plus theories; 1 Judgment as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim; 2 e DENIES PAUSD’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's 3 retaliation claim; and 4 e DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 5 Therefore, Austin, Bahadursingh, and Hickey are dismissed from this lawsuit. 6 || Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiff's sole remaining claim is for 7 || retaliation against PAUSD solely on the theory that the duration of the internal 8 || investigation was retaliatory. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 || Dated: December 18, 2025 □ f{eee— NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 13 United States Magistrate Judge

14

15 (16

© 17

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28