1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 TYGHE JAMES MULLIN, Case No. 5:25-cv-02191-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING THIRD 9 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT

10 CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, [Re: ECF No. 75] CALIFORNIA, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Tyghe James Mullin’s 14 Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). ECF No. 75 (“Mot.”); ECF No. 80 (“Reply”). Mr. Mullin 15 opposes the motion. ECF No. 78 (“Opp.”). The motion is suitable for decision without oral 16 argument; the hearing set for March 26, 2026, is VACATED. See Civ. L.R. 7-11(b). 17 The motion is GRANTED. The TAC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 On March 3, 2025, Mr. Mullin initiated this action and moved to proceed in forma 20 pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1. Shortly thereafter, he filed a first amended complaint as of right, 21 asserting § 1983 claims for (1) unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 22 Amendment, (2) deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 23 (3) municipal liability for violation of these constitutional rights under Monell v. Department of 24 Social Services,

(1978). ECF No. 7 at 2. 25 On April 7, 2025, the Court granted Mr. Mullin’s IFP application and screened and 26 dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to

(e), finding that the § 1983 claims 27 were deficient because they did not allege sufficient facts to explain the circumstances giving rise 1 state law claims. ECF No. 17 at 2. 2 Mr. Mullin filed the second amended complaint on April 25, 2025, in which he clarified 3 that his three federal claims arise from what he characterizes as Defendant police officers’ illegal 4 entry, search, and seizure of his rental storage unit, which led to his state law convictions for 5 burglary and identity theft. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 12–26. Mr. Mullin also asserted a fourth § 1983 claim, 6 alleging that Defendants deprived him of his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for 7 protected activity. Id. ¶¶ 56–60. On June 6, 2025, the Court screened the second amended 8 complaint and found that these additional factual allegations were sufficient to pass the initial 9 screening under

(e). ECF No. 39. 10 On September 24, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the 11 first three claims were barred by the Heck doctrine and that the fourth retaliation claim failed to 12 plausibly allege that Defendants were motivated by or even had knowledge of Mr. Mullin’s 13 alleged protected activities. ECF No. 53. The Court dismissed the claims barred by the Heck 14 doctrine with prejudice due to the futility of amendment but allowed leave to amend as to the 15 retaliation claim. 16 Mr. Mullin filed the TAC on October 30, 2025. ECF No. 65 (“TAC”). In the TAC, 17 Mr. Mullin alleges that Defendants have engaged in a retaliatory campaign of confiscating and 18 refusing to return his personal property and withholding records necessary for legal redress to 19 punish him for litigating federal civil rights actions against Defendants.

at 10–11. Mr. Mullin 20 also alleges that these actions were intentional and aimed at chilling his protected activities, urging 21 that “[m]ultiple acts occurred within days of Plaintiff sending police accountability notices and 22 filing CPRA inquiries, demonstrating temporal proximity suggesting retaliatory motive [sic].”

23 at 15. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 26 claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force 27 v. Salazar,

, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation 1 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

, 3 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable 4 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

5 Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court “must construe the pleadings liberally” and 6 afford the plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt.” Boquist v. Courtney,

, 774 (9th Cir. 7 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A liberal construction of a pro se 8 complaint, however, does not mean that the court will supply essential elements of a claim that are 9 absent from the complaint.”

10 Upon granting a motion to dismiss, a court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 11 complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 12 appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence 13 Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2003). In deciding whether to grant 14 leave to amend, the Court considers the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 15

(1962), and discussed at length by the Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital. The Ninth 16 Circuit in Eminence Capital identified several factors to consider, including (1) undue delay, 17 (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment, (4) undue 18 prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) futility of amendment. See

. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Defendants argue that the TAC fails to state a claim for four independent reasons, urging 21 that (1) Mr. Mullin improperly lumps Defendants and others who may be parties in other lawsuits 22 together in contravention of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), (2) Mr. Mullin fails to plead 23 actionable adverse actions, (3) the retaliation claim is also barred by the Heck doctrine and 24 qualified immunity, and (4) Mr. Mullin fails to allege requisite retaliatory motivation or causal 25 connection. Mot. at 5–9. The Court agrees that the first and fourth arguments warrants dismissal 26 of Mr. Mullin’s claim and need not decide whether the claim fails to plead actionable adverse 27 actions or is barred. 1 Defendants, ranging from withholding access to his vehicle to refusing to turn over administrative 2 records, which “seem[s] to implicate police officers and administrators, as well as personnel 3 involved with litigation and responses to public records act requests.” Mot. at 5. “As a general 4 rule, when a pleading fails ‘to allege what role each Defendant played in the alleged harm,’ this 5 ‘makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for individual Defendants to respond to 6 Plaintiffs’ allegations.’” Adobe Sys. v. Blue Source Grp. Inc.,

(N.D. Cal. 7 2015) (quoting In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-md-02250-LHK,

, at *8 8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)). Such is the case here—while it is permissible to allege retaliatory 9 conduct at a modest level of generality, it is simply impossible here to parse out which conduct is 10 ascribed to which Defendant, and Mr. Mullin’s repeated failure to even allege particular acts with 11 any particularity fails to clear Rule 8’s relatively low threshold. See, e.g., Gen-Probe, Inc. 12 v. Amoco Corp.,

(S.D. Cal. 1996). 13 Relatedly, Defendants argue that Mr. Mullin again fails to sufficiently plead factual 14 allegations from which retaliation or even causation could be inferred. Mot. at 9. Mr. Mullin 15 virtually concedes that the TAC does not allege the requisite knowledge to state a claim for First 16 Amendment retaliation, stating that “Plaintiff does not allege causation definitively” but that “the 17 record suggests that the timing may reflect retaliatory motive.” Opp. at 4. Merely alleging that 18 Defendants took alleged adverse actions against him (which are primarily administrative in nature, 19 to boot) after he engaged in alleged protective activity is insufficient to state a claim for First 20 Amendment retaliation. See, e.g., Wood v. Yordy,

(9th Cir. 2014) (“We have 21 repeatedly held that mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.” 22 (citations omitted)). Mr. Mullin’s failure to allege causation is made doubly clear by his allegation 23 that Defendants in completely unrelated capacities have retaliated against him for his protected 24 conduct in investigating purported misconduct in state agencies and departments that have nothing 25 to do with them. See, e.g., TAC at 12–13. 26 Mr. Mullin has already had the opportunity to amend his complaint three times in this 27 action, and the Court agrees with Defendants that further amendment would be futile. The IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: the motion to dismiss is 2 GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 3 4 Dated: December 19, 2025

6 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 5 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12

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