1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PREM S.,

12 Petitioner, No. 1:25-cv-01869-TLN-SCR

13 14 v. ORDER WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 15 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY et al., 16 Respondents.

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Prem S.’s (“Petitioner”) Motion for a 19 Temporary Restraining Order1 (“TRO”). (ECF No. 1.) Respondents filed an opposition.2 (ECF 20 No. 6.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED. 21

22 1 On December 15, 2025, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 23 (ECF No. 1.) Based on the substance of the petition and the relief requested therein, the Court liberally construed the petition as a motion for a TRO. (ECF No. 3.) See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

(2007).

25 2 Respondents were ordered to file an opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for TRO and provide the Court with copies of all referenced/relevant portions of Petitioner’s A-File and any 26 and all available records related to Petitioner’s allegations. (ECF No. 3 at 1–2.) Despite Court 27 order and an extension of time for the purpose of submitting such documents (ECF Nos. 4, 5), Respondents did not provide any copies of the referenced and relevant portions of Petitioner’s A- 28 File or any records related to Petitioner’s allegations. (See generally ECF No. 6.) 1 2 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 Petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the United States on December 16, 2022. 4 (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 6 at 2.) Petitioner was later apprehended, processed, placed into 5 removal proceedings, and released shortly afterwards. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) Petitioner states he has 6 no criminal history and complied with all of his immigration requirements –– he attended his 7 hearings and U.S. Immigration and Custody Enforcement (“ICE”) visits. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 8 Respondents do not contest this. (See generally ECF No. 6.) On July 29, 2025, Petitioner went 9 to his scheduled check-in with ICE at their Fresno, California office and was detained. (ECF No. 10 1 at 6.) Petitioner states he is an asylum seeker. (Id.) 11 Petitioner has now been detained for nearly five months without a hearing. (Id.) On 12 December 15, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) Based on 13 the substance of Petitioner’s petition and the relief requested therein, the Court construed the 14 petition as a motion for a TRO. (ECF No. 3.) 15 II. STANDARD OF LAW 16 For a TRO, courts consider whether Petitioner has established: “[1] that he is likely to 17 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 18 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 19 interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008). Petitioner must “make a 20 showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh 22 petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach.

A stronger 23 showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner 24 shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows 25 that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”

26 Simply put, Petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were 27 raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to 28 succeed in a request for a TRO.

at 1134–35. 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 3 Petitioner seeks release arguing his detention is unlawful under the Fifth Amendment Due 4 Process Clause. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Respondents make three threshold arguments in 5 opposition, which the Court addresses briefly before evaluating Petitioner’s due process claim. 6 First, Respondents contend Petitioner’s detention is lawful because he is an “applicant for 7 admission” who is subject to mandatory detention under

(b)(2)(A). (ECF No. 6 at 8 2.) Respondents concede that until recently, the government interpreted § 1226(a) to be 9 applicable to noncitizens present in the United States who had not been admitted or paroled and 10 had been placed into removal proceedings. (Id. at 4.) However, Respondents contend that due to 11 “legal developments” the government determined that § 1225 is “the sole applicable immigration 12 detention authority for all applicants for admission.” (Id.) This Court, along with other courts 13 nationwide have resoundingly rejected this argument. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25- 14 CV-01640-TLN-EFB,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this 15 Court’s reasons for taking this position). Even on an imperfect record, absent further argument 16 from Respondents, the Court finds Petitioner is not an applicant “seeking admission” subject to 17 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is 18 therefore entitled to the process that statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. 19 Second, Respondents request the Court hold its ruling on the merits in abeyance pending 20 the Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding the appeal in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock,

1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). (ECF No. 6 at 4.) The Court denies this request. As discussed below, 22 the Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim and the Court will not 23 delay injunctive relief on the prospective chance a pending appeal could change this outcome. 24 Finally, Respondents argue the Court should dismiss the petition or stay proceedings 25 based on Petitioner’s purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Id. at 4–6.) 26 Specifically, Respondents contend Petitioner’s request for release on bond has not been heard by 27 either an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and “this Court likely 28 would benefit from an IJ’s and the BIA’s expertise interpreting the situation.” (Id. at 5.) The 1 Court fundamentally disagrees. First, it is clear any immigration judge and the BIA would accept 2 § 1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner given the BIA’s recent decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 3

(BIA 2025), which upheld the legal interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) that 4 Respondents put forth. Therefore, and in line with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court will not 5 subject Petitioner to a fruitless exercise where this a predetermined outcome. See Vasquez- 6 Rodriguez v. Garland,

, 896 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We will excuse a failure to exhaust if it 7 is very likely what [the Board’s] result would have been.” (internal quotation and citation 8 omitted).) Second, contrary to Respondents suggestion, any purported value from an immigration 9 judge or the BIA’s review is minimal given the statutory interpretation question at issue here must 10 be resolved by a judicial decision on the merits. See Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-02304 11 CAS (BFM),

, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (citing Loper Bright Enters. v. 12 Raimondo,

(2024)). As such, the Court declines to dismiss the petition or stay 13 proceedings based on exhaustion grounds. 14 Having dispensed with Respondents threshold arguments, the Court turns to Petitioner’s 15 due process claim. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation 16 of an individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872

(9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the 18 borders of the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis,

, 19 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, 20 including noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 21 permanent.”). These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings.

at 693–94. 22 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 23 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 24 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 25 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson,

(1989); 26 Morrissey v. Brewer,

(1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 27 the question remains what process is due.”). 28 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has raised serious questions as to whether 1 he has a protectable liberty interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2

, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a 3 person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under 4 the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he government’s decision to release an individual from custody 5 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be 6 revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem,

Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (quoting Morrissey,

) 8 (modifications in original).). “Accordingly, a noncitizen released from custody pending removal 9 proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. 10 Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC,

, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To 11 determine whether an individual’s conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty 12 interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case before them with the 13 liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 14 01141-KES-SKO,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 15 Here, Petitioner gained a liberty interest in his continued freedom when ICE elected to 16 release him shortly after he entered the United States on December 16, 2022. Under Morrisey, 17 this release implied a promise that he would not be re-detained, during the pendency of his 18 immigration proceedings, if he abided by the terms of his release. Petitioner states he has 19 complied with all the conditions of his release, and he has no criminal record. Respondents do 20 not contest this. Additionally, Petitioner has been released for the past three years, which 21 strengthens his liberty interest. As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts 22 in this district when confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in his 23 continued freedom. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra,

, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) 24 (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five 25 years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). 26 As to the second step – what procedures or process is due – the Court considers three 27 factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 28 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 1 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 2 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 3 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge,

(1976). As set 4 forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has established his due process rights were likely violated. 5 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. As 6 discussed above, Petitioner has lived in the United States for the past three years and has built a 7 life outside of detention. Despite that, Petitioner has now been detained for approximately five 8 months without being afforded a hearing. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding 9 Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 10 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC),

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding 11 similarly). 12 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received 13 any bond or custody redetermination hearing. “Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive 14 in purpose and effect is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the 15 community.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC),

, at 16 *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court finds there is a 17 serious likelihood Petitioner will be erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Moreover, 18 without any procedural safeguards to determine whether his detention was justifiable, the 19 probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M.,

, at *4. 20 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 21 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- 22 TLN-SCR,

, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). As this Court stated recently, it 23 would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioner home 24 to await a determination on his asylum petition than to continue to detain him. 25 On balance, the Court finds the Matthews factors demonstrate Petitioner is entitled to due 26 process – a hearing to determine whether his detention was warranted. Accordingly, with respect 27 to his due process claim, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits. 28 /// 1 B. Irreparable Harm 2 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. 3 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration 4 detention,” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result 5 of detention[.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Petitioner has been 6 detained for approximately five months, suffers from allergies, and has difficulty keeping his 7 turban clean which he wears every day as a member of Sikhism. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner 8 further states he is uncomfortable and in a state of constant stress. (Id.) Even if this was not 9 sufficient to establish irreparable harm, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of 10 constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns,

(1976)). 12 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 13 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 14 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross,

Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell,

, 1092 16 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in the 17 Government’s favor, because the Government faces no hardship. First, it is clear on this record 18 that the balance of equities tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot 19 reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from 20 constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv.,

(9th Cir. 21 1983). Second, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 22 constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized 23 that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25- 24 CV-05071,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). 25 In sum, these last two factors also weigh in Petitioner’s favor. Therefore, the Court 26 GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion for a TRO. 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 3 1. Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED; 4 2. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 5 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer,

, 1015 6 (9th Cir. 2011); 7 3. Petitioner Prem S. shall be RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from Respondents’ custody. 8 Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this provision of the Court’s 9 Order by 8:00 p.m. on December 24, 2025; 10 4. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 11 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice 12 and a hearing before a neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: (a) there are material 13 changed circumstances which demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of 14 Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate 15 by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a 16 flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 17 5. Respondents are ordered to SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not convert this 18 temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction requiring Respondents to 19 continue to abide by this Court’s order. Respondents shall file responsive papers by 20 Monday, January 5, 2026. 21 6. The Appointing Authority for the Eastern District of California/Office of the Federal 22 Defender has requested an extension until January 8, 2026 to locate counsel in this case. 23 The Court GRANTS the extension. By January 8, 2026, the appointing authority shall 24 identify counsel and send counsel’s contact information to Michele Krueger, Courtroom 25 Deputy for Chief Judge Troy L. Nunley, via email at [email protected], who 26 shall update the docket to reflect counsel’s appointment. The Clerk of Court shall serve a 27 copy of this Order on the Federal Defender, Attention: Habeas Appointment. 28 7. The matter is not set for a hearing, though the Court may set one should it later be 1 determined that a hearing is necessary. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 | Date: December 24, 2025 7, 4 5 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28