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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JUAN TOVAR DELEON, Case No. 1:22-cv-00591-CDB (SS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON STIPULATION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 13 v. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT,

(d) 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (Doc. 26) 15 Defendant. ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S 16 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

17 (Doc. 25)

18 19 Pending before the Court is the stipulated request of Plaintiff Juan Tovar Deleon (“Plaintiff”) 20 for the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

2412(d), in the amount of $6,300.00 to counsel for Plaintiff, Jonathan O. Peña.1 (Doc. 26). 22 The parties agree that an award of attorney’s fees to counsel for Plaintiff should be made 23 payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a 24 federal debt, then the Commissioner shall cause the payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made 25 directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Jonathan O. Peña.

. 26 On September 19, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 27

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all 1 remanded the action pursuant to sentence four of

(g) to the Commissioner for further 2 proceedings. (Doc. 23). Judgment was entered the same day. (Doc. 24). After filing a motion for 3 the award of attorney’s fees on December 18, 2025 (see Doc. 25), Plaintiff filed the pending 4 stipulation for attorney’s fees as a prevailing party. (Doc. 26). See Shalala v. Schaefer,

292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. 6 § 405(g) is a prevailing party). Plaintiff’s filing is timely. Van v. Barnhart,

(9th 7 Cir. 2007). 8 The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees to private litigants who both prevail in civil 9 actions (other than tort) against the United States and timely file a petition for fees.

2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party unless it 11 finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make such 12 an award unjust.”

Here, the government did not show its position was substantially justified 13 and the Court finds there are not special circumstances that would make an award unjust. Moreover, 14 the Commissioner does not oppose the requested relief. (Doc. 26). See Sanchez v. Berryhill, No. 15 1:16-cv-01081-SKO,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (finding position of the 16 government was not substantially justified in view of the Commissioner’s assent to remand); 17 Knyazhina v. Colvin, No. 2:12–cv–2726 DAD,

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014) 18 (same). 19 Plaintiff requests an award of $6,300.00 in EAJA fees as authorized by

(d). 20 (Doc. 26). The Ninth Circuit maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by 21 the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, on its website.2 See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 22

(9th Cir. 2005). Even assuming Plaintiff’s counsel seeks the median of the 23 published maximum rate associated with the years (2022 through 2023) during which he engaged 24 in services in this case (which the Court computes as $239.79), the requested award would amount 25 to approximately 26 hours of attorney time (not accounting for any paralegal time expended). The 26 Court finds this reasonable and commensurate with the number of hours an attorney would need to

27 2 Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice, available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited December 29, 1 | have spent reviewing the certified administrative record in this case (approximately 713 pages; Doc. 2 | 12) and preparing a motion for summary judgment that includes seven pages of argument (Doc. 17 3 | at 19-25) and a reply that includes four pages of argument (Doc. 21 at 1-4). With respect to the 4 | results obtained, Plaintiff's counsel obtained a favorable judgment remanding the case for further 5 | proceedings. (Docs. 23, 24). 6 EAJA fees, expenses, and costs are subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset 7 | Program (“TOP”), as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff,

(2010). If the Commissioner 8 | determines upon effectuation of this order that Plaintiff's EAJA fees are not subject to any offset 9 | allowed under the TOP, the fees shall be delivered or otherwise transmitted to Plaintiffs counsel. 10 Conclusion and Order 11 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 12 1. Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees (Doc. 25) is denied as MOOT; 13 2. Plaintiffs stipulated request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA (Doc. 26) is 14 GRANTED; and 15 3. The Commissioner is directed to pay to Plaintiff as the prevailing party attorney’s fees in 16 the amount of $6,300.00, pursuant to the terms set forth in the parties’ stipulation. (Doc. 17 27). Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury 18 determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the 19 payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made directly to Plaintiffs counsel, as set forth 20 in the stipulation. 21 [T IS SO ORDERED. 22] Dated: _December 29, 2025 | ) Ww Me D R~ 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28