A.R.C.M.1 v. Tonya Andrews, et al.
Trial Court Opinion
9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA A.R.C.M.1, 13 Petitioner, No. 1:25-cv-02071-TLN-JDP 15 v. ORDER Tonya Andrews, et al., Respondents.
19 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner A.R.C.M.’s (“Petitioner”) Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Motion for TRO is GRANTED and Respondents are ordered to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.
23 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a citizen of Peru and an asylum applicant in the United States. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) In August 2022, Petitioner sought to enter the United States and was detained by immigration authorities. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Petitioner also filed a Motion to Proceed Via Pseudonym. (ECF No. 3.) After reviewing Petitioner’s motion and finding good cause, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion.
1 (“DHS”) determined Petitioner was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and released him into the United States, under the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”), requiring Petitioner to comply with certain conditions of release. (Id. at 8, 10.) Petitioner asserts that for nearly three years, he complied with all the conditions of his release. (Id. at 8.)
5 Petitioner has never been arrested and has no criminal history. (Id. at 10.) This year, Petitioner earned his High School Equivalency Certificate. (ECF No. 2-6.) He is also a primary caretaker for his elderly parents. (ECF No. 2-1 at 1.)
8 On May 25, 2025, Petitioner submitted a routine photo for ISAP reporting, in the same manner as he always reported. (ECF Nos. 2 at 10; 2-1 at 2.) That same day, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officer contacted Petitioner and said there was an error with the photo he submitted earlier and instructed him to report to the Stockton ICE office the next day. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) On May 26, 2025, Petitioner duly reported to the ICE office where Petitioner was arrested and handcuffed. (Id. at 11.) ICE officials told Petitioner he was being detained because he had violated the conditions of his release, but they did not specify how. (Id.) 15 While in detention at Golden State Detention Center, Petitioner reports overcrowding, illness, lack of sleep, insufficient resources, unsanitary conditions, delay in medical care — e.g., a two-month wait on a prescription for his autoimmune condition — and constant lockdowns, including for COVID and scabies outbreaks. (Id.; ECF No. 2-1 at 3.) Petitioner has not received any hearing relating to his custody, neither pre- nor post-detention. (ECF No. 2 at 11.)
20 Petitioner’s asylum application was denied on November 21, 2025, but he timely appealed. (ECF Nos. 2 at 8; 2-4; 2-5.) His appeal is currently pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (ECF No. 2 at 8.) Petitioner faces the prospect of significant additional time in detention while he awaits a decision on his appeal. (ECF No. 2-2 at 4.)
24 Petitioner has been detained over seven months without a hearing. (ECF No. 2 at 8.)
25 Petitioner now challenges the constitutionality of his civil detention and seeks release. (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.)
27 /// /// 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW 2 For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 7 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35.
15 III. ANALYSIS2 16 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 17 Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on his claim that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.3 The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of the United States, regardless of immigration status.
2 The Court finds Petitioner has met the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order without notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner has filed the requisite affidavits and notified Respondents via email that he would be filing the motion and served copies of the documents. (See ECF No. 2-8.) See R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same).
27 3 Petitioner alleges both substantive and procedural due process violations of the Fifth Amendment. (See ECF No. 2.) Because the Court finds a violation of procedural due process sufficient to grant the requested relief, the Court need not address substantive due process.
1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94.
3 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.”).
9 i. Liberty Interest 10 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has established a protectable liberty interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D.
12 Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original)). “Accordingly, a noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 20 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D.
24 Cal. Sept 9, 2025).
25 Here, Petitioner gained a liberty interest in his continued freedom after he was released from custody in 2022. Under Morrisey, this release implied a promise that he would not be re- detained, during the pendency of his immigration proceedings, if he abided by the terms of his release. For three years, Petitioner complied with the conditions of his release, reporting to ICE appointments, submitting ISAP photographs, and answering supervision calls. (ECF Nos. 2 at 8; 2-1.) Also in that time, Petitioner complied with all laws and has never been arrested for a crime.
3 (ECF No. 2-1 at 1.) Moreover, for approximately three years, Petitioner built a life in the United States. (Id.) He earned his High School Equivalency Certificate (ECF No. 2-6) and cared for his elderly parents along with his sister (ECF No. 2-1 at 1). As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts in this district when confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in his continued freedom. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 8 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest).
10 Petitioner’s liberty interest is not defeated because an Immigration Judge initially denied his asylum application. Petitioner timely appealed and is pursuing the process available to him.
12 Thus, he retains his liberty interest as he awaits a decision on his appeal.
13 ii. Procedures Required 14 As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has established his due process rights were likely violated.
21 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. As discussed above, Petitioner was out of custody for approximately three years and had built a life and community in California and cares for his elderly parents. Despite that, Petitioner has now been detained for over seven months without being afforded an opportunity to be heard, inflicting hardship on him and his family. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV- 01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly).
28 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received any hearing, either pre- or post-deprivation, nor did he receive notice of the reasons for his detention. Petitioner does not know why he was detained. (See generally ECF Nos. 2; 2-1.)
3 Petitioner asserts that he complied with all conditions of his release and has never been arrested.
4 (ECF No. 2-1.) Despite Petitioner’s routine compliance — including submitting a photograph on May 25, 2025, answering ICE’s call on May 25, 2025, and reporting as requested to the ICE office on May 26, 2025 — Petitioner was told by an ICE official that he was being detained for violating his conditions. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was not given an explanation, a notice, nor a hearing at any time over the course of his seven-month detention. (See ECF No. 2 at 11.) Thus, the Court finds there is a serious likelihood Petitioner was erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Without any procedural safeguards to determine whether his detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4.
13 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Prior to an actionable final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 (“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”) (cleaned up).
22 At the time Respondents detained Petitioner, he did not have a final order of removal.
23 (See ECF No. 2-4.) Additionally, DHS had determined in 2022 that Petitioner was not a danger to the community nor a flight risk and, in the subsequent three years, Petitioner complied with all laws and conditions of his release. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) Indeed, Petitioner’s arrest is evidence of his compliance: it resulted from his routine photo submission, answering ICE’s call, and reporting to an ICE appointment with less than 24-hour’s notice. (ECF No. 2-1 at 2.) Therefore, Respondents had no legitimate interest in detaining Petitioner when they arrested him on May 26, 2025. Petitioner’s order of removal six months into his detention does not alter this finding.
2 Respondents cannot cure their procedural due process violation by detaining Petitioner until their interest ripens. In any event, the order of removal is stayed pending the outcome of Petitioner’s appeal, thus, without a finding of danger or flight, Respondents still do not have a legitimate interest in detaining Petitioner until the order is actionable.
6 Additionally, the cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Notice and custody determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents. Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time to provide notice and a hearing would be minimal. Indeed, it would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioner home to await a determination on his immigration proceedings than to continue to detain him. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.”).
13 Petitioner argues that Respondents are required to provide notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. (ECF No. 2 at 20–21.) This Court agrees. The United States Supreme Court “usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). The Court describes post-deprivation remedies as the “special case” where those are “the only remedies the State could be expected to provide.” Id. at 129. Here — where Petitioner has substantially complied with the conditions of his release, has been determined not to be a flight risk or a danger, has never been arrested, and removal is not reasonably foreseeable — the Court finds pre-deprivation notice and hearing are routine, possible, and valuable to preventing erroneous deprivation of liberty.
23 On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner was entitled to pre-deprivation notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents did not provide either. Nor did they provide any post-deprivation process. Accordingly, with respect to his procedural due process claim, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits.
28 /// 1 B. Irreparable Harm 2 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO.
3 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to [family.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Petitioner has been detained for over seven months. While in detention he is unable to care for his elderly parents, his autoimmune condition is exacerbated, and he is suffering from emotional distress.
9 (ECF No. 2-1 at 3.) Without relief, Petitioner faces the prospect of significant additional time in detention and continued harm to him and his family, while he awaits a decision on his appeal.
11 (See ECF No. 2-2 at 4.) Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus, Petitioner has established irreparable harm.
15 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 16 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 18
24 Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). Any burden imposed by requiring Respondents to release Petitioner from unlawful custody and refrain from re-detention unless and until they comply with constitutionally required process is both de minimis and clearly outweighed by the substantial harm Petitioner will suffer if he continues to be detained. In sum, these last two factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor.
3 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s request for a TRO and orders Petitioner’s immediate release on the same terms as he was released prior to his detention on May 26, 2025.
5 See Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”).
7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 9 1. Petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is 10 GRANTED.
11 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner A.R.C.M. from custody.
12 Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on him, unless such restrictions 13 are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing.
14 3. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 15 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice 16 and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: 17 (a) material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s 18 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and 19 convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At 20 any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present.
21 4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not issue a 22 preliminary injunction continuing this Order. Respondents shall file responsive papers by 23 January 7, 2026. Petitioner may file a reply, if any, by January 12, 2026. The parties 24 shall indicate in their briefing whether they waive a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3).
25 The Court will consider any stipulation and proposed order filed by the parties if they 26 agree to a less demanding briefing schedule.
27 5. Petitioner is ORDERED to immediately serve this Temporary Restraining Order and 28 Order to Show Cause on Respondents by emailing: [email protected].
1 6. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or 2 dissolution of the TRO on two days’ notice to Petitioner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4).
3 7. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 4 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 5 (9th Cir. 2011).
6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
7 | Date: December 31, 2025 7, 8 TROY L. NUNLEY 9 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.