Gevorg Muradyan v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA GEVORG MURADYAN, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00063-CAB-AHG 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION [Doc. No. 1] CENTER, Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Gevorg Muradyan’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”)]. On January 14, 2026, Respondents filed a return to the Petition. [Doc. No. 14.] On January 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse. [Doc. No. 15.] The Court finds Petitioner’s motion suitable for determination on the papers. See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND Petitioner is a native of Armenia who arrived in the United States on December 1, 2024. [Doc. No. 14 at 1.] Shortly after arrival, he was referred for a credible fear interview, and an asylum officer made a positive reasonable fear determination. [Id. at 1–2.] On December 12, 2024, Petitioner was charged as an immigrant not in possession of a valid entry document. [Id. at 2.] On January 24, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal. [Id.] On September 30, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed but granted a withholding of removal to Armenia. [Id.] The removal order became final that day. [Id.] 4 Since Petitioner’s final order of removal, he has spent almost four months in detention. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has been looking for a third country to effect Petitioner’s removal since October 2025. [Doc. No. 14. at 2.]

7 Respondents do not have a travel document for Petitioner but assert that “ICE continues to diligently seek to identify a third country for Petitioner’s removal and believes there is a significant likelihood of removal to a third country in the reasonably foreseeable future.”

10 [Id.] II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he is in illegal custody.

20 See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJCBJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).

22 III. DISCUSSION 23 A. Jurisdiction 24 Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. [Doc. No. 14 at 3.] The Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas squarely contradicts this argument. There, the Supreme Court rejected the application of § 1252 to limit judicial review of indefinite post-removal-period detentions under § 1231(a)(6) and held “that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 2 678, 687–88 (2001). This Court is thus satisfied of its subject matter jurisdiction and proceeds to the merits.

4 B. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Continued Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 5 Petitioner asserts that his detention is unlawful under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas. [Petition at 7.] Respondents argue that (1) ICE has the authority to detain Petitioner to effectuate his order of removal; (2) Petitioner’s case is premature as the six- month presumptively reasonable removal window has not passed; and (3) Petitioner cannot show that there is not a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future as required under Zadvydas. [Doc. No. 14 at 4–6.] The Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner is in the presumptively reasonable removal window.

12 As relevant here, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) provides a 90-day removal period that begins when the order of removal becomes administratively final. Petitioner was ordered removed on September 30, 2025, and because he waived his right to appeal, [Doc. No. 14 at 2], his order of removal became administratively final the same day. See 8 C.F.R. § 16 1003.39; 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.

17 The Petitioner has the initial burden to show that he has experienced post-removal order detention for more than Zadvydas’ six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Given that Petitioner has been in detention for less than six months, Petitioner does not meet his burden. See Khalilova v. Smith, No. 25-CV- 2140 JLS (DDL), 2025 WL 3089522, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (finding habeas petition was unripe for review where Zadvydas six-month period had not expired).

23 C. Petitioner’s Medical Care 24 Regarding Petitioner’s complaint about medical care, the Supreme Court has stated that “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action” rather than a habeas petition which is meant for “[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration[.]” Muhammad v. Close, 540 1 749, 750 (2004). The Court thus finds Petitioner’s argument that he should be released || for alleged insufficient medical care unavailing.

3 CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus || WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Petitioner remains in detention after the six month || presumptively reasonable window has passed, Petitioner may file a new petition.

7 It is SO ORDERED.

8 ||Dated: January 23, 2026 € Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 10 United States District Judge