Estate of Moxey
Opinion of the Court
The applicant is the son in law of the respondent, whom he charges with incompeteney under the statute, alleging that she is over the age of fifty-six years, a resident of San Francisco, and mentally incompetent to manage her property, and that by reason of disease and weakness of mind she is unable unassisted to properly manage and care for herself and her property, and by reason thereof would be likely to be deceived and imposed upon by artful and designing persons, and that she has been so deceived and imposed upon by certain' persons named answering that description. The circumstances recited in support of this allegation are that some time prior to the month of May, 1902, respondent was the owner of a redwood timber ranch in Mendocino county, two thousand four hundred acres in area, worth about $24,000, and also a parcel of land and improvements thereon in Boston, Massachusetts, valued at $200,000; she being then a resident of San Francisco as an unmarried woman, being the divorced wife of one Harrison F. Hawkes; that at about this time she met one John D. Hoover, who was conducting an establishment in this city known as the Hoover University of Physical Culture, and in whose employ was one Oliver N. Moxey, an unmarried man, twenty-six years of age, these two persons having classes for the teaching of physical culture and being the professors in the institution mentioned; that respondent undertook to receive instruction therein, and in that way she made their acquaintance ; that they, learning of her mental weakness and material wealth, with design of defrauding her, and by deceiving and imposing upon her to acquire her property, conspired, confederated and combined in that behalf, and, in the execution of their purpose, it was agreed upon between them that Moxey should pretend to pay his attention to her with the view of marriage, and that he should induce her to voluntarily con
Such is the situation in epitome as described in the applicant’s petition.
It is objected that this testimony is too remote for consideration in this inquiry; but in such cases personal history of the subject and her hereditary, temperament and diathesis are taken into account to enable an intelligent appreciation to be had by the investigator, whose judgment must be instructed as to effect or defect by searching for cause, howsoever far back it may seem necessary to trace it. What alienists denominate the etiology of the ease is of value in reaching a conclusion, where mere casual observation of a condition so obscure in its
This is not an inquisition in lunacy, but an inquiry as to mental competency to manage one’s property. “Insane" and “incompetent" are not necessarily convertible terms. A person may be incompetent by reason of insanity, or from some other cause incapable of caring for his property. The statute speaks of the “insane or incompetent" person and is here quoted at length:
“When it is represented to the superior court, or a judge thereof, upon verified petition of any relative or friend that any person resident of the county is insane, or from any cause mentally incompetent to manage his property, such court or judge must cause a notice to be given the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the case, not less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced on the hearing": Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1763.
A subsequent section undertakes to define the terms used by declaring that the phrase “incompetent," “mentally incompetent," and “incapable," shall be construed to mean any person who, though not insane, is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or from any other cause, unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care of himself or his property, and by reason thereof would be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons: Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1767.
The intention is plainly benevolent in the expression of this statute, and it is not too laudatory of the law to say that it represents the most advanced and enlightened legislation upon
In the Matter of Barker, 2 John. Ch. 232, the great Chancellor Kent said that the difficulty which arose with him was as to the extent of his jurisdiction, for the suggestion was that the respondent’s mind was so worn out by old age so as to render him incapable of managing his property, and that thereby he stood in absolute need of the protection of the court against his own acts, and against the practices of evil and designing men, and the chancellor remarked that the case as stated was deeply interesting to humanity, and presented a strong appeal to the powers and justice of the court, but he had misgivings as to his authority to interfere in the premises, for mere imbecility of mind, not amounting to idiocy or lunacy, had not until a then very recent date (1816) been considered in England- as justifying an interference with the liberty of a person over himself and property. Indeed, prior to the Revolution no case had gone so far. Lord Hardwiclce disclaimed any authority over mere weakness of mind, yet Kent thought it certain that when a person became mentally disabled, from whatever cause the disability might have arisen, he was equally a fit and necessary object of guardianship and protection, and the court of chancery was the constitutional and appropriate tribunal to take care of those who were incompetent to take care of themselves, and without such a power, there would be a deplorable failure of justice. The object is protection to the helpless, and no matter what causes the condition, sickness, vice, casualty or old age, when it is evident to the court that the person is reduced to mental weakness and disqualified for the ordinary management of his affairs, it becomes a case for equitable interposition and is within the reason and necessity of the trust. The inquiry is, however, peculiarly delicate, in most cases, because it concerns the character of the party, and his natural rights, and
It is important, in this inquiry, to consider the value and character of the property belonging to the respondent, and also to regard the persons by whom she is and has been surrounded, and whether they are not seeking to profit by her mental weakness and to obtain advantages which in other circumstances she might resist; and it is furthermore important to ascertain whether or not the alleged incompetent has in fact been overreached and imposed upon, and whether she
The property over which respondent had power of disposition, and which she transferred by deeds to Moxey, is estimated to be worth over $200,000, consisting of valuable lands in California and town property in Boston, improved city lots well rented. Respondent gave this property to Professor Moxey, to use her own words, because she loved him. The timber lands were deeded to him after her engagement and before their marriage, and the Boston lots on the day of that event, but prior to the ceremony. The recipient of this token of affection she first met in January, 1902, at Hoover Hall, a school of physical culture, where she was introduced to him by one of the class in which she was taking instruction and where he was an instructor. She was then about fifty-five years of age, born in 1847; he was about twenty-nine, born in 1873—a disparity of about twenty-seven years. In a short time the teacher became attentive to his pupil, and in the space of less than a month, on the 22d of February, 1902, while they were out at the ocean beach, sitting on the sand, they became betrothed. She had been married before, when she was twenty-two or twenty-three years old, to one Harrison F. Hawkes, with whom she lived for about twenty-one years and from whom she was divorced in 1894 in California by default; she came here for the purpose of obtaining a legal separation, leaving her husband behind without information as to her intention ; she had been in this state prior to that time, and, indeed, was an extensive traveler, having, after her residence in the Channing Home in 1886, spent a year in a tour of Europe and Egypt and subsequently crossing the continent to the Pacific coast on her own account. Besides the property mentioned she has a life interest in a trust created by her
Mr. Moxey was a bachelor at the time of the betrothal, and had no means save his income from his occupation or profession as a physieulturist. His own story of his struggles and success is not an unusual recital. Born in England, he spent there the greater part of his youth—at school from five to fifteen years of age and then working on a farm until coming to America, when seventeen; hiring out as a farm hand for about two years until he started for this state, and, on reaching here, engaging at first in farming in Santa Cruz county and continuing thereat for about six months; after that he spent about two months in San Benito county, thence to San Jose on an initial visit, where he remained two or three months; he was not employed at anything worth remembering during this interval, but upon leaving San Jose he went to work for the railroad company all along the Coast Division for about twelve months, when he undertook a scholastic course at the Garden City Business College, pursuing his purpose in that institution for about two years, going thence to a clerkship in the freight office of that city for several months; after that he was engaged in book canvassing in various towns and soliciting for commercial orders, for a health food under the auspices of the Hoover Health Club, and he assisted Mr. Hoover in the way of physical culture at first in San Jose, and, finally, he brought up in San Francisco about three years since in the employ of Mr. Hoover as a teacher of physical culture in what is called the Hoover University of Physical Culture, at 1319 to 1327 Market street. It was in this place while so occupied that he met respondent some time in January, 1902, when he was introduced to her by a Mrs. Shipman, to whom he had introduced himself at an earlier hour on the same day in the same hall. Respondent joined his class and took lessons several times a week, coming to the hall every day, sometimes twice a day, and the two increased in the intimacy of their acquaintance until their engagement, which occurred on Washington’s Birthday. The day was not set at that time for the ceremony, but subsequently, about six weeks or two months prior to that date, July 14th was agreed upon for the event. Mr. Moxey is not an adept in dates; he himself says
Professor Hoover denies absolutely and in detail this statement, but admits that he spoke to Mrs. Turman of a Mrs. Phillips, another person, a wealthy woman living on Van Ness avenue, near St. Luke’s church, whom it was desirable to secure for a pupil. He says that he was not in the classroom or hall while any part of the exercises was in progress during the period of January to June 2, 1902, although he had his private office in the building and received the accounts there, and occupied apartments where he dwelt in the same edifice, but he attended to very little business connected with the institute and did not know who composed the class and rarely visited the hall itself.
In comparing these statements there is an element of probability in that made by Mrs. Turman, arising from the admission of Mr. Hoover and from the circumstance of his proximity to the place and person whom the conversation concerned. Hoover admits enough to throw doubt upon his denial of the substance of the story, which in itself is circumstantially probable. His statement that he did not know the names of the members of his school at that time may be consistent with his position as the head of the institution, but it seems he knew some and was presumed by Mrs. Ruthie, his pupil, to be acquainted with all, as is inferable from her surprise that he did not know what everyone in the class knew— that is, that Mrs. Phillips was Moxey’s sweetheart. The other Mrs. Phillips, to whom he alludes, as being desirous of securing as a pupil, is rather nebulous, except as her points of age and wealth and interest in physical culture coincide with the respondent. It seems, from what he says, that Mr. Hoover did give to Mrs. Turman names of persons to call on who were interested in his science, and that he preferred pupils of the description which embraced both this respondent and her
It was close to this time, to wit, on May 23d, 1902, that the redwood transaction took place. As to the first deed, she says it occurred this way: She and Moxey were lunching at the Techau Tavern when she said to him, “I am going to deed my redwoods to you to-day.” She had not previously communicated her intention to him; she had said nothing to him at all on that subject, although she had been thinking about it; it was a surprise to him and so intended by her; this was about the hour of noon; immediately after luncheon they went to the law office of Mr. Delmas, a lawyer whom neither of them knew, except as everyone knows him because of his eminence in his profession, to seek his services to draw this deed, and there in that office in the Call building a young man was found alone, whom Moxey asked to make out the paper. She did not know whether this young gentleman was Mr. Delmas or his clerk; no introduction took place; no recognition was had, for neither knew the other. Moxey entered and simply said, “I want you to make out a deed,” and the gentleman consented. Then she said, “I am going out; after the deed is made out I will come back and sign it,” and she went out, remaining away about an hour, then returned and signed it and then went downstairs and acknowledged it before a notary in the same
As to her narrative of what transpired when she told Moxey of her purpose to present him with this valuable estate in timber lands, it is worth while to compare his version with hers. Moxey relates that they were at lunch at the Teehau Tavern when she said she was going to give him the redwoods; they had been speaking about these redwoods—about the tan-bark— and she said she was going to give it to him that day, May 23, 1902; he had previously seen the land, and had gone up there at her instance in regard to cutting the tan-bark, and, she explained afterward, she Avanted to see how he would like the redwoods, he meant the tan-bark. After lunch they went to the office of Mr. Delmas and had the deed made out; it was signed in that office. When he went in he asked the gentleman if he could make out a deed to some property and he said he could do so. Moxey had the description of the prop
It would appear from this that Moxey’s mind was in a receptive condition for the surprise so suddenly sprung upon him by her at luncheon, as she had some time before sent him up to the redwoods to see how he would like them; and it appears, also, from the testimony in this controversy that two days before he was so surprised he called on William Thomas, who had been the attorney for respondent, to inquire in regard to the condition and value of her Mendocino property; this was on May 21, 1902. Thomas asked Moxey what he could tell him about it, and Moxey said he would like to know what it was worth. Thomas asked him if he was a purchaser of the property or contemplated purchasing; he replied no, that he was a friend of Mrs. Phillips and wanted to handle it. Thomas told him that he did not know the value of the lands, as the matter was in charge of Mr. Smith, an attorney, clerk in the office, but that he had been assured that the tract was some of- the most valuable redwoods in the state, but he could not give an exact idea as to the valuation. Moxey then asked Thomas to show him some of the papers, which he said, “I understand are in your office.” Thomas asked, “What papers?” Moxey said, “I would like to see the description of the property, the map, and tax receipts.” Thomas replied that before he could accede to this request he would require
Where the excess expended came from does not appear in this record. Respondent herself testified that she raised $10,-000 last year (1902) from January 1st to September 1st, all of which had been spent by the latter date, $5,000 by her husband in cutting the tan-bark and $5,000 she had consumed on herself, and she never gave Moxey a dollar before their marriage, which took place on the 14th of July, 1902, in the afternoon, in San Jose. It was on the morning of that day that she requested Professor Hoover to make out a deed of her property in Boston: “I told him that I wanted him to make it out for my Moxey”; she said she was going to surprise him on his wedding day; Moxey was present then and there when this surprising statement was made; this was about 10 o’clock or half-past; she could not remember exactly; “I was going to surprise him because we were going to be married that day.” All she could tell Hoover about the description was the street and the height of the building and the granite front; she did not know the depth nor the width of the building; that had to go back to Boston and be filled in. After she told Hoover to draw the deed, she went down to the Nevada Bank for her mail and from there she went to the Palace and there met Moxey by appointment and had lunch with him at that hotel; after that meal they went to the office of Justin Gates, notary, where they found Mr. Hoover, according to arrangement, as she had told him when he had the deed ready to inform her at what time to meet him and she would come and sign; he had made it out, she supposed, on Monday morning, but she did not know; he made it out and she went and signed it when it was ready; in the notary’s office she said, “Do not have that put on record until it is filled out; if you do it won’t be legal; have it filled out before it is put on record”; she said this to Moxey; nothing else was said; she went out; was in that office but five or ten, perhaps fifteen, minutes; no writing was done except signing the deed; Hoover did not sit down and write while she was there; he did
As to the antenuptial events of the morning of the wedding day, Justin Gates, the notary, testified that Hoover came to his office and asked him if he had any warranty deeds; the notary said “Yes”; he had blanks of that kind; this was about half-past 11 or quarter to 12 o’clock. Hoover then requested the notary to remain in his office a few minutes; this was just before the lunch hour and he consented to defer luncheon until Hoover returned, which was in about ten or fifteen minutes, when he brought with him a lady and gentleman. Gates gave Hoover the form of. a deed and the latter asked him if the instrument could not be executed in blank, the former said he thought it would not be legal to do so, and that some sort of description should be given, that it would not be proper to sign first and fill in the description subsequent to the execution; the lady who gave her name to the notary as Mrs. Gage H. Phillips gave the description, such as it was, that was inserted by Hoover, who wrote the matter, filling in the blank so far as she gave the material, “Lots No. 122, 124, and 126 situated on Summer street, ’ ’ and from that on as now written in that blank was not in there prior to execution nor was it inserted at all in his office or in his presence; the lady made no remark only in response to Hoover that she did not know the description except so far
The circumstances of the evolution of the Boston deed call for criticisms similar to those applied to the Mendocino document. In neither case was she advised by her own adviser, and in the latter she was without the aid even of a practicing lawyer of any kind, but sought the service of a person not known to possess the skill requisite for a transaction involving real estate worth $200,000; the alleged reason for this singular act was that the lawyer who drew the first deed made a mistake in the description, and, therefore, she desired to have so solemn a document drawn by a man who was not a professed conveyancer, and who made out an instrument more defective than the other.
It is noteworthy that each time the deeds prepared in haste were characterized by like faults fatal to their validity. It must, however, be observed here that, although Professor Hoover .did not claim to be a lawyer, nor prac
The clerk of the registry of deeds, Frank J. Glancy, deponed that he remembered a person coming into his office in Boston some time in July with reference to a deed of Mrs. Moxey; a man of about five feet ten inches, light eomplexioned, about one hundred and fifty pounds, heavy, athletic build. The first Glancy noticed of him he was down in the record hall; he was talking with one of the young ladies there, and she being busy sent him up to the clerk's desk and he came and he said he wanted some one to run a title for him, and then they together ran the records back until they found a deed of property situated on Summer street, which went to Gage H. Hawkes, or Gage H. Phillips. This man then started to make a copy of the description, but, thinking it would take too long, accepted the clerk’s suggestion to have a typewritten copy made, and he waited for it; it was then near noon—he came in between 10 and 11 o’clock. The clerk went to his dinner at 12, and told the man, whom he left behind, that one of the other clerks would give him the copy. Glancy did not see the man again until nearly 4 o’clock that day, when he came in and gave the clerk a deed and he was told it would cost $1.85 to record it; the man paid the fee and the clerk recorded the paper; the man asked him if he could record the deed and return it so that he could take a train to New York that night; the clerk said that the best he could do was to have it ready next day at 12 o ’clock; when he took the paper this man gave his name as Young; when he came in the next day and the paper was recorded Glancy
The singular circumstance, common to the two deeds and their development, demand consideration from the court in connection with the main and controlling issue in this case, the competency of the respondent, and atone for the lack of brevity in their discussion. It must be borne in mind throughout that respondent by her acts denuded herself of every particle of property over which she had control, and placed herself entirely in the power and at the mercy of a young man, scarcely half her years, 'practically impecunious—certainly from his own report of slender resources and comparatively precarious prospects—with whom she had after a few days’ or weeks’ acquaintance become betrothed, and to whom she conveyed all her possessions, leaving herself not a modicum of her vast wealth; and all this without adequate or any advice from competent counsel or disinterested friend, and prior to her marriage. If it be said that, being betrothed to him, it was natural that she should bestow her fortune upon this youth to whom she had given her heart in troth, it may be answered that there was all the more reason for securing safeguards in the mode of transfer; for, as a learned judge has said, there is perhaps no relation in life in which more unbounded confidence is reposed than that existing between parties engaged to each other. Especially does the woman place the most implicit trust in the truth and affection of him in whose keeping she is about to deposit the happiness of her future life; from him she has no secrets—she believes he has none from her. To consider such persons as in the same category with buyers and sellers, and to say that they are dealing at arm’s-length, is the acme of absurdity. If these transactions were honest in conception and execution, and not
Inherent in these affairs are certain elements that may be considered as tending to establish the accusations of the petition. The fact that these deeds recite a false consideration, and purport to be deeds of bargain and sale, conveying the premises described therein for a pecuniary consideration, whereas none passed, is regarded by the law as a strongly suspicious circumstance; especially is this the case when regarded in connection with an alleged gift between persons holding relations mutually confidential and when the donor is suspected of mental weakness. The secrecy of the acts, so far as the persons upon whom the respondent would naturally rely for advice are concerned, is a suggestive feature. In all eases of this kind the element of secrecy is dwelt upon as affording strong ground for suspicion. The haste in which each instrument was prepared and executed; the excessiveness of the gift; the lack of opportunity for calm consideration and reflection, and want of time for deliberate perusal, in a matter so mo
The counsel of respondent, in commenting on the evidence, said that every act of hers was exaggerated, and mountains were made out of molehills, and he called attention to the lady herself and her conduct in court and on the stand, and her testimony exhibiting memory, will, understanding and power of concentration, reasoning capacity, coherence, clearness of explanation, tests of competency, all of which she manifested when under examination to an uncommon degree; and counsel further alluded to the characteristics of insanity or incompetency, as shown in external appearances—voice, face, eyes, motions and other phenomena, in none of which was she eccentric, or out of the orbit described for rational beings. In reference to this comprehensive claim of counsel, allusion may be made to the episode in the trial in which the name of Mrs. A. Lloyd Smith figured, and the total failure of memory on the part of respondent when first interrogated as to the matter. In answer to the question at first put to her about this person, she said she did not know a Mrs. Smith or a Mrs. Jones; there had been no allusion by the examiner to the latter name; she said she had never met a Mrs. Lloyd Smith who lived at the Palace Hotel; she did not remember going to
According to Moxey’s account of this interview, these were shares of oil stock, Mrs. Smith said, that she could sell for $12 a share immediately on arriving in New York, whither she was going, and she was anxious to have this Mrs. Dr. Turman show her ability, Moxey did not think that Mrs.
In relation to Moxey’s narrative of this episode, we must consider the account of the same rendered by Mrs. Dr. Turman, whom he introduced into it as the occasion for his visit to Mrs. Lloyd Smith. Mrs. Turman testified that she knew Mrs. Smith in the month of April, 1902, and that during thaf month, or in May, she had a conversation with Moxey concerning that lady who had oil stock to sell and who wanted her to handle it. This conversation with Moxey was in Hoover Hall, in the main office. Mrs. Turman told him that she had a lady friend at the Palace Hotel who was interested in stocks, and she herself thought they were good, but as she was ignorant of such matters, she would like to have him talk with this lady himself. Moxey said he had a friend who had money and would possibly buy, and he would bring this lady and introduce her to the other; he did not mention the name at the time. Mrs. Turman then arranged to introduce him first to Mrs. Smith, which was done, and they had two meetings before his friend was brought forward a day or two later. In the first interview when Moxey was introduced to Mrs. Smith at the Palace he said he had a friend who might buy oil stock and that he would like to bring down the following day. After that initial interview Mrs. Turman had another talk with Moxey and another after his lady friend had called at the Palace and had seen Mrs. Smith; the talk was with regard to this lady; she asked him what her name was and he said it was Mrs. Gage; he did not tell her it was Mrs. Phillips. At still another talk Mrs. Turman asked Professor Moxey if this lady was going to buy the stock and he answered “No”; that her lawyer advised her against it. Several weeks later on, some time in the early part of June, 1902, another talk was had with him and Mrs. Turman said to Moxey, “Pro
This episodical phase of the controversy as to the competency of respondent may be closed with a summary of the testimony of Mrs. A. Lloyd Smith, who was the central figure in the proceedings for a brief space. Mrs. Adelaide Lloyd Smith called San Francisco her home, when she deponed at Seattle, where she was found with her trunk packed ready to go east; she was not living anywhere then, but traveling, and just then staying in the northern city, detained on account of the deposition. Mrs. Smith said that she had stopped at the Palace Hotel in April and May, 1902, for about four weeks, and she had met Mrs. Moxey there on the 12th or 14th of April; it was from the 10th to the 15th, between these last dates in 1902; she was introduced by Mrs. Dr. Turman; it was Easter morning and Mrs. Smith had not met Dr. Turman for about a year or a year and a half. Mrs. Smith told the doctor that she intended to go east and was waiting to obtain the services of some one to accompany her as secretary and business manager, and Dr.
In the afternoon, at about 3 o ’clock, Moxey came again and brought a lady with him, whom he introduced to her as Mrs. Gage. Mrs. Smith never saw the person before nor after, and he said that he wanted her to speak to Mrs. Gage about any investment that she might have to make as she had some money to invest. Mrs. Gage, as Moxey called her at the time, was present when this remark was made; then he sat down to one side and did not have any more to say during the interview, and Mrs. Smith says she proceeded to present the proposition for investment, and this Mrs. Gage said she would consider the matter and would let her know the next day whether she would invest or not, and then she said she would rely upon Mr. Moxey’s advice, because she thought he was a fine business man and that he had good judgment. Mrs. Gage uttered this compliment herself, to which Mrs. Smith responded, “Yes,” and that she herself would be very glad to engage Mr. Moxey’s services as her own business adviser, as she thought that he was honest and energetic, which he did seem to her to be, and to that extent she spoke in good faith ¡ and she added that she would be pleased to have him go east with her in that capacity, and Mrs. Smith turned to Mr.
Mrs. Smith’s own impression as to the respondent and Moxey was that she did not think they had ten cents; she thought this woman was poor and did not have any money; she was dressed very plainly and she looked as if she were a book agent or something like that; withal she impressed her as a good, sound business woman; she did all the business with her. It was purely a business deal, and the colloquy was entirely between respondent and Mrs. Smith, Moxey. taking no part in this conversation, but sitting apart. This business deal did not amount to anything, for the lady left,
A queer business deal this, and surely a strange basis for a judgment of commercial competency. The fact is too plain for paltering, that throughout this incident respondent was the dupe of Moxey, and Mrs. Smith was used, more or less unwittingly, to act as an accomplice, he playing each against the other. If this incident is to be taken as a test of respondent’s memory, will, understanding, power of concentration, reasoning capacity, coherence and clearness of explanation, it fails in every particular to exemplify these elements of competency. She had no memory whatever on the witness-stand of Mrs. Smith or the interview until Moxey, before she again came to testify, prompted her, and readily, at his suggestion, she recited as if by rote what he told her of the occurrence. Moxey furnished her with a memory as to all the particulars that he wanted her to recollect; even then, it appears she had no volitional power, but went to see a woman whom she did not know, to talk about buying stocks that she did not want; all in obedience to the masterful spirit of a man who had secured complete dominion over such measure of mind as
The marriage of respondent to Moxey followed hard upon the execution of the Boston deed; with all her worldly goods she him endowed before the knot was tied, and they hied them, each separately, to a country town fifty miles from their legal residence to be married by a squire in presence of witnesses who were strangers to them. When they returned they spent the night at his room in the Hoover hall. She swears they began to live together on the first night of the marriage, July 14, 1902; that a few days after their marriage her husband and she went to the Manhattan Hotel, on Market street, and remained there until October 1, 1902, when they went east; they went to the hotel August 1st, and between the date of marriage and. that day, the 1st of August, she used to go down to her husband’s room at the Hoover hall, and they lived continuously together except while he was at the redwoods. During the time that she testifies she was cohabiting with him the record shows that she was ostensibly living in July, 1902, at the Pendleton private hotel, and beginning with August 1, 1902, at the Manhattan, at each place known by the name ■ of Mrs. Phillips, and at the latter registering in her own hand, “Mrs..Gage Phillips, Boston, Mass.,’ assigned to room 103-B, the latter letter meaning “breakfast,” and the proprietor testified that two or three weeks later she interpolated “Moxey” above the name ‘ ‘ Phillips. ’ ’ Moxey never boarded during this period in the house, nor registered there, nor spent a night there as a guest, unless he did so unknown to the proprietor, but he took his meals at the St. Nicholas and roomed at the Hoover hall, across the street, opposite the hotel, and she did
Moxey swore that during the whole of the time after their marriage while he was stopping at the Manhattan he stayed there with her, slept there, but did not eat there; he did not register, nor state to the hotel people that he was occupying a room there, nor speak to anyone in that hotel; he would go in there after class hours, about 10 o’clock, or later, and leave at 8 or 9 in the morning. She was not known by any other name than Phillips at the hotel nor at the Hoover hall, nor anywhere else, nor did he live with her where it was openly known that she was his wife, nor did he publicly acknowledge her as such, prior to the institution of these proceedings, when he was forced to come out into the open; before that only Hoover knew of the fact and, perhaps, one or two others; he could not name one other with certainty. How long this secrecy would have continued we may conjecture. He had all her available property and her good name was in his keeping, which he was, by his furtive visits to her sleeping apartment after nightfall, emerging therefrom each morning, endangering, while he was indefinitely postponing the publication of her lawful relations to him.
Marriage is in itself such an honorable institution that the chief magistrate of this republic denounces the man or woman who deliberately avoids it as a criminal against the race, who should be an object of contemptuous abhorrence by all healthy people. Why, then, should Moxey, the man, subject this respondent, the woman, who had given everything of value she possessed, to the reproach of clandestinely contracting and then conniving at the concealment of so sacred an obligation and so dignified a relation ? Was it not due to her name and fame, to every sentiment of honor and sense of propriety, that it should be made known at once and universally? The first person, and the only person, to whom it was revealed was Hoover. Not one of the other familiar friends of respondent was informed of it until the exposure of the lawsuit. No sound reason has been given for the secrecy characterizing this marriage. Naturally, the woman, if free to exert her will, would be proud to proclaim her change of status, if it were true, as asserted in this case, that it was a love match.
Such marriages are abhorred in equity, and not favored otherwise where the surroundings point to an unworthy motive and- the conduct of the party who is pecuniarily benefited suggests insincerity or bad faith, and indicate that he has taken an undue advantage of the other’s weakness of will or confidence in him, springing from intimacy of relation.
Censorious comment in a judicial opinion is deprecable, unless the censure is called for imperatively by the facts, and when so demanded no court should refuse to respond to the challenge of its duty and impress its stamp of condemnation upon the conduct of the male party to this marriage in subjecting the female, whom he said he loved, to the hazard she ran while receiving him privily in her bedroom in a hotel where she was registered and known as a single woman. The respondent, always anxious, apparently, to shield her beloved, says that he did not eat at the Manhattan because he did not like the proprietor; but he came there to sleep. Why he did not like the proprietor does not appear; but it might be surmised if the worthy boniface found him slipping out of her room in the morning, his dislike would have been intensified. If his motive were not mercenary and merely to fasten his grip upon her wealth by keeping her mind and will in servient subjection until he should have completely accomplished his purpose of acquisition, why did he live this life of duplicity and deception and impose upon her, whom he had promised to love, cherish and protect, the ignominy and humiliation of being suspected as a wanton or detected as a deceiver. She was an honest woman, and obeying her impulse, if she had had control of her will, could never have submitted to this condition of concealment and deception; but “because she loved him” and confided in him absolutely, she was prevailed upon to act a lie every day until the climax came. On his part every legitimate inducement would seem to spur him to immediate announcement of an event so fraught with his own welfare and her happiness; an event which ex
This was their duty to themselves and their obligation to the State. So far as the immediate interest involved is concerned, it matters little compared with the interests of organized society; for marriage is more than a contract—it is a status; it is an institution of society and its foundation; it does not come from society, but contrariwise; it is the parent of society, and it is supremely important that its stability shall be secured, and that its contraction should be surrounded with safeguards and its sanctity upheld; and every solemnization of marriage should be in the face of the public; there should be no secrecy either in ceremony or in connubiation; and, in this case, there is no excuse, morally or legally, for a variation from the rule thus stated and approved by the courts of this land and every civilized country. The paltry subterfuge that this young husband did not eat with his elderly wife at the Manhattan Hotel because the keeper was obnoxious may have deceived the simple soul of the trusting spouse, but it cannot be accepted as sufficient by anyone less credulous and confiding. Moxey says that he frequently took meals at the Palace with her and that they both liked the living at that hotel. Why, then, did he not take up his abode there with her? Certainly the tariff was not beyond
In attempting to account for the transfer of her property to Moxey, it is argued that, in addition to her affection for him, she was alienated from her daughter because of the latter’s conduct, and that the disposition of this only child is shown to be unfilial and to justify her mother’s action; that this unnatural trait is exhibited in the deposition of the daughter taken in Boston, containing reflections upon her mother. It is true that the mother’s lack of judgment and the fact that she was always considered peculiar and odd about home, and the incident of an apparent attempt at suicide, when the daughter was a child of six—that is, about twenty-one years ago—at the time the respondent threw herself out of her carriage on the Floating bridge into the river, when the coachman pulled her out by the hair of her head, and the visits to the sanitarium, where her mother was confined for five years, and certain instances of improvident and aimless purchases, and other incidents manifesting strange caprices and inconsistencies and eccentric conduct at meals, which in a woman of almost abstemious habits were hard to reconcile with reason, are dwelt upon in the deposition, yet there is nothing intemperate in the recital of the deponent, and no adequate warrant for accusing her of unnatural feelings or of malice toward her mother. So far as her agency in the promotion of this proceeding is concerned, this court conceives that it was her bounden duty, for her own sake and that of her child, to set on foot an investigation as to the facts in the case and the condition of her mother’s mind and the character of the people constituting her environment when she parted with all her possessions and married the man who had previously absorbed her property.
In the course of her testimony the respondent stated that it was not through love or care for her that this inquest was instituted, but that the object was simply to secure her property for the ultimate benefit and enjoyment of her daughter, as her sole heir. If the daughter were actuated alone by a motive
Respondent in her letters to her daughter expressed herself in an affectionate strain toward both the son in law, Mandeville, and his wife, whose former husband was not then so well regarded as now by the mother in law. These letters may be read in connection with the testimony of respondent, and tend to sustain the theory that her present state of mind was either the result of a delusion developed after this controversy began, or she consciously falsified in her explanation of her feelings toward her daughter, and that this was due to the malign influence unduly exercised over her mind by Moxey; and it is, in itself, evidence of mental weakness. It appears that, prior to these proceedings, she had entertained strong sentiments of regard for Mandeville and wife, and no great liking for the latter’s first husband, which is shown by an extract from one of those letters, in which she advises her daughter of her fear that Fred Olsson might kill Harry in case they attempted to secure the child Thorwell, the son of the first marriage, from him. Respondent in this letter says to her daughter: “You and Harry live for each other; you have a- pretty little home and Harry loves you. Now live
As to these newly made acquaintances, counsel for respondent remarks that the conduct of Hoover with regard to the Boston deed was fair and open, and that the transaction in the notary’s office was above board. It seems to this court that the testimony of the notary bears all the earmarks and indicia of truth, and his recital of the occurrences in his office is credible. Professor Hoover did not impress the court as a frank and candid narrator of incidents and events in which he was so intimately concerned as to call for the utmost fairness and openness. The court has no concern with his career, except as it is connected with this case, but his failure to recollect at first so -important a matter as how he came to be admitted to the bar and his confusion of memory or knowledge as to state and federal courts in the place of his admission, and the obscurity surrounding that incident in his life, occurring so recently as May 5, 1898, which took place without any previous examination as to qualifications in any court is, to say the least, remarkable in a man holding so many degrees and diplomas which should import the possession of understanding and memory more than is allotted to common mortals; but his testimony generally was not characterized by candor, nor by ordinary powers of recollection.
His own account of the fabrication of the Boston deed is neither clear nor consistent with itself, nor with the statements of the others connected with it; it is in utter and irreconcilable conflict with the account of the notary, who took the acknowledgment, as to -what occurred in that office. Although Hoover secured a blank from Gates, he does not remember where he obtained it; he does not know why he obtained a warranty deed; he failed totally to recall where he wrote out the deed,
Other items might be cited to show that he was either evasive in his recital or infirm in his memory. He was effusive in his comment upon the competency of respondent, who was one of the brightest women he ever knew, and thoroughly competent, in his opinion, yet he says she told him twenty times, at least, on the morning after the execution of the instrument, and in the notary’s presence, to be sure and fill out the deed before placing it on record. He dwells upon the frequency of this admonition, as if it were proof of her great intelligence; but there is an incident to be explained at this point: The deed was executed on July 14th, at about noon. Moxey gave Hoover the instrument and he says he placed it among that person’s papers; but on that very evening Hoover was to take the train for the east; he said he had been preparing to go ever since November, 1901, but he was not ready until this date; he missed the train; whether or not he had the deed in his pocket which she had admonished him about he does not say; but he succeeded in starting next day, the 15th, with fresh cautions from her not to forget to fill it out before recording and to adopt an assumed name in Boston. The story of Hoover’s adventures in Boston, as told by himself, is sufficient to show that he has no high estimation of the virtue of veracity; it was not, as counsel for respondent argues, fair and open; it was all through the reverse; it was disingenuous and deceitful; and his own statements on the stand impressed the court unfavorably as to his candor and directness. He admits that he was evasive and equivocating in his conversation with Phillips, the nephew of respondent'; he evaded giving any name to him, and told a falsehood as to the purpose for which he pretended to want the Summer street stores; he gave a false name to the clerk, Glancy, in the recorder’s office; he hid himself in a by-street to keep out of view of respondent’s relatives; in his evidence he invents a man named “Young,” who was his guide around the city of Boston, and whose description in almost every respect corresponds to his own—his counterpart or double, as it were. Glancy described the man, who gave him the paper and took it away, to fit Hoover, and he says there was only one man,
Many minor matters might be alluded to, to connect Hoover and Moxey with the common design to fleece respondent and to demonstrate that they were acting in concert, but this opinion has attained to dimensions that call for curtailment, necessary as it has been to deal in detail with the more important features of the case.
There is but one topic left, and that is what is usually termed opinion evidence, the least worthy, in the estimation of those who are engaged in the examination of witnesses and who are charged with the duty of weighing and determining their testimony, of any species of proof. The counsel for respondent claims credit for the class of witnesses produced by her, intelligent and responsible citizens, such as Val. Schmidt, Henry Boyle, Mrs. Pendleton, George A. Woolrich, banker; Adolph Hirschman, jeweler; Mrs. Irene D. Reeves, and others of equally high character, all of whom agree in their conclusion as to her competency; and counsel contrasts these ladies and gentlemen with the astrologers, palmists, fortune-tellers, bellboys and other local habitants who had testified to peculiarities and acts of this lady which to them signified incompeteney. Of course not all of the witnesses who testified that they thought respondent was incompetent were subject to this invidious and diminishing discrimination, for some were quite up to the standard raised by counsel, such as Mr. Carothers, of Ukiah, a lawyer of good standing, and long and intimately acquainted with respondent, knowing her professionally and socially for years; Mr. Horr, of the same place, and others here and there whose observations and opinions are entitled to equal consideration with the very worthy persons named; but no matter how numerous on either
The claim in this case is that the respondent is incompetent; that she is incapable of taking care of herself and her property, and likely to be imposed upon by artful and designing persons, and that claim is, in the judgment of this court, fully made out.
Petition granted.
FINDINGS.
The above-entitled cause, having been regularly tried before the court, sitting without a jury, no jury having been demanded by either of the parties thereto, upon the verified petition of Harry Lester Mandeville, hereinafter designated as the plaintiff, for the appointment of a guardian of the person and estate of the above-named Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, as an incompetent person, hereinafter designated as the defendant, and upon the answer of said defendant to said petition, the said plaintiff appearing by his counsel, Messrs. Bishop, Wheeler & Hoefler, L. M. Hoefler, William Rix, E. M. Rea and C. W. Cobb, and the said defendant having been produced at the said trial and hearing and
FINDINGS OP PACT.
The said court finds the facts in said cause to be:
1. That the said plaintiff, Harry Lester Mandeville, is the son in law of the said defendant, Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey.
2. That the said defendant, Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, is, and at all the times mentioned in these findings was an incompetent person, over the age of fifty-six (56) years, and residing at and in the city and county of San Francisco, and mentally incompetent to manage her property, and incapable of taking care of herself and of managing her property, and is, and at all of said times was, by reason of disease and weakness of mind, unable unassisted to properly manage and care for herself or her property, and that, by reason thereof, she, the said defendant, Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, would be, and at all the times aforesaid was, and now is, likely to be deceived and imposed upon by artful and designing persons, and in truth has been deceived and imposed upon by artful and designing persons as in findings 3, 4, 5,- 6 and 7 herein more particularly set forth.
3. That some time prior to the month of May, 1902, the said defendant being then the owner in her own right of certain real property situated in the county of Mendocino, in the state of California, consisting of about two thousand four hundred (2,400) acres of redwood timber, worth about twenty-four thousand dollars ($24,000); and also of a parcel of land in the city of Boston, in the state of Massachusetts, upon which was erected a four-story granite front store, and*420 known as Nos. 122, 124 and 126 on Summer street, Boston, of the value of two hundred thousand ($200,000) dollars, was residing in the city and county of San Francisco in said state of California, as an unmarried woman, being the divorced wife of one Harrison F. Hawkes.
4. That at the time last aforesaid, to wit, some time prior to the month of May, 1902, one John D. Hoover, was conducting in the said city and county of San- Francisco, the Hoover University of Physical Culture, and had in his employ one Oliver N. Moxey, an unmarried man of the age of twenty-nine (29) years, or thereabouts; that the said Hoover and the said Moxey then and there conducted classes for the teaching of physical culture in said city and county of San Francisco, in the university aforesaid, and were professors thereof, teaching pupils therein, and that the said defendant at said time last mentioned, to wit, some time prior to the month of May, 1902, began to take lessons in physical culture in the said Hoover University of Physical Culture, and thereby then and there met and formed the acquaintance of the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey.
5. That the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey, after the said defendant had formed their acquaintance as aforesaid, learning of her (the defendant’s) mental weakness aforesaid, and learning also that she (the said defendant) was possessed of large means and was the owner of the real property in finding 3 herein described, with the design and intent of deceiving and imposing upon the said defendant and of acquiring her (the said defendant’s) real property, and of defrauding her out of the same, and intriguing, contriving and designing to take undue and unlawful advantage of the said mental weakness of the said defendant, and to defraud her (the said defendant) out of her said property, as aforesaid, confederated and combined together to effect their said purpose, and in carrying out their said scheme and. design proceeded as follows, to wit: That it was agreed upon between them, the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey, that the said Oliver N. Moxey should pretend to pay his attention to the said defendant with the view of marriage, and that he, the said Oliver N. Moxey, should induce her, the said defendant, to voluntarily convey to- him, the said*421 Oliver N. Moxey, as a gift, the real property aforesaid; that, thereafter, to wit, on or about the twenty-third day of May, 1902, the said Oliver N. Moxey, having become engaged to marry the said defendant, induced and persuaded her, the said defendant, to deed over to him, the said Oliver N. Moxey, without consideration, the said real property situated in Mendocino county, California, as in finding 3 herein set forth, and thereupon and on the said twenty-third day of May, 1902, he, the said Oliver N. Moxey, caused to be prepared a certain deed of that date, conveying to him, the said Oliver N. Moxey, the said last-mentioned property for the purported consideration of ten dollars ($10), gold coin of the United States; that in fact no money or other good or valuable consideration whatever passed from the said Oliver N. Moxey to the said defendant; that the said defendant, acting under the influence and control of the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey, and not otherwise, then and there signed and acknowledged said deed of said last-mentioned premises; that thereupon the said Oliver N. Moxey caused said deed to be recorded in the office of the county recorder of said Mendocino county, and thereafter exercised full control over the said property so conveyed to him by said deed, and shortly thereafter mortgaged the same for the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000),- gold coin of the United States, which he, the said Oliver N. Moxey, appropriated to his own uses; that thereafter, in further pursuance of said scheme and conspiracy to defraud the said defendant, the said John D. Hoover, confederating and combining with the said Moxey as aforesaid, prepared in his, the said John D. Hoover’s, own hand a deed of said Boston property, described in said finding 3, purporting to convey said last-mentioned property from the said defendant to the said Oliver N. Moxey, in consideration of the sum of twenty dollars ($20), in gold coin of the United States, but, in truth, no good or valuable consideration whatever passed from the said Oliver N. Moxey to the said defendant; that with the said deed so prepared by the said John D. Hoover, he, the said John D. Hoover, accompanied the said Oliver N. Moxey and the said defendant to the office of a notary public at and in the said city and county of San Francisco, and thereupon the said defendant, acting under the*422 influence and control of the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey, and not otherwise, signed and acknowledged said last-mentioned deed to said Boston property, and delivered to said John D. Hoover the said deed so signed and acknowledged; that thereafter on the same day, the said Oliver N. Moxey accompanied the said defendant to the city of San Jose in said state of California, and was then and there married before a justice of the peace in said city of San Jose, solely with the intent on the part of the said Oliver N. Moxey, acting in conjunction with the said John D. Hoover, of perfecting the scheme, plan and design theretofore formed between the said Oliver N. Moxey and the said John D. Hoover for the purpose of obtaining the property of the said defendant, described in said finding 3, and of defrauding her, the said defendant, of her said property as aforesaid, which said property constituted the entire property of said defendant subject to her control; that after the marriage aforesaid, the said John D. Hoover took said last-mentioned deed to the said city of Boston and caused the same to be there recorded in the public records.
6. That at all times after the said defendant formed the acquaintance of the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey, as heretofore in these findings set forth, the said John D. Hoover actively promoted the pretended suit of the said Oliver N. Moxey for the hand of the said defendant by impressing upon her, the said defendant, the great love and affection which the said Oliver N. Moxey professed for her, the said defendant and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and to carry out the design and purpose of the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey, heretofore in these findings set forth, they, the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey sought to impress upon the mind of the said defendant the great advantages to her, the said defendant, of a marriage with the said Oliver N. Moxey.
7. That all the conduct of the said John D. Hoover and the said Oliver N. Moxey in bringing about the marriage in finding 5 herein referred to, and in inducing the said defendant to sign the deeds heretofore in these findings mentioned, was for the purpose of deceiving and imposing upon the de*423 fendant, and of defrauding her, the said defendant, of the said real property in finding 3 herein described.
8. That the said defendant is still the lawful owner of all the real property in finding 3 herein described, and that the said property needs the care and attention of some fit and proper person, and that proper proceedings and suits ought to be commenced for the cancellation of the deeds mentioned in said finding 3, and for the quieting of said defendant’s title to said property.
9. That it is necessary that a guardian of the person and estate of the said defendant should be appointed.
10. That the said defendant has one child, to wit, a daughter named Alice Mandeville, who is the wife of the said Harry Lester Mandeville, the plaintiff herein.
CONCLUSION OP LAW.
And the court finds as a conclusion of law from the foregoing facts:
1. That the prayer of the amended petition herein for the appointment of a fit and proper person as guardian of the person and estate of the said defendant, Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, should be, and the same is hereby, granted.
DECREE AND ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN.
The above-entitled cause, having been regularly tried before the court, sitting without a jury, no jury having been demanded by either of the parties to said cause, upon the verified amended petition of Harry Lester Mandeville for the appointment of a guardian of the person and estate of Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, therein alleged to be an incompetent person, and upon the answer of the said Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, to said amended petition, the said Harry Lester Mandeville, petitioner herein, appearing by his attorneys and counsel, Messrs. Bishop, Wheeler & Hoefler, L. M. Hoefler, William Rix, E. M. Rea and C. W. Cobb, and the said Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, the alleged incompetent aforesaid, having been produced at the hearing and trial and having appeared personally, and by her attorneys and counsel, Messrs. Truman
Now, therefore, it is by the court hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said alleged incompetent, Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, is, and at all the times mentioned in the amended petition aforesaid was, an incompetent person, and at all of said times was mentally incompetent to manage her property, and incapable of taking care of herself and managing her property, and that by reason of disease and weakness of mind the said Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, is, and at all the times aforesaid was, unable unassisted to properly manage and care for herself and her property, and by reason thereof would be, and at all of the said times was, and now is, likely to be deceived and imposed upon by artful and designing persons, and, in truth, has been deceived and imposed upon by artful and designing persons, as in said amended petition set forth; and it is by the court further hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the prayer of said amended petition for the appointment of some fit and proper person as the guardian of the person and estate of the said Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, ought to be, and is hereby, granted.
That said Harry Lester Mandeville be, and is hereby, appointed guardian of the person and estate of the said Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey; that the said Harry Lester Mandeville be, and hereby is, required forthwith to execute and deliver to the said Gage H. Phillips, also known as Gage H. Moxey, a bond in the sum of $100,000, with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the judge of said court, conditioned that he, the said Harry Lester Mandeville, as such guardian, will faithfully execute the duties of his
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.