Williams v. Price
Williams v. Price
Opinion of the Court
1. The Probate Court erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition of the legatee.
2. The Probate Court erred in making the order of the fourth of June, 1858.
Latham & Sunderland for Respondent.
Terry, C. J., concurring.
It is not necessary to consider many of the questions made at the bar. The petition itself shows no grounds for the relief asked. The accounts having been settled by the executor and Price, with the approbation of the Court, and a final decree had, the accounts could not be reopened upon the showing made by the petition. The legatee having been notified, and appearing by his counsel, must be held concluded by the settlement and decree, even if he would not otherwise have been bound by the judgment; and this before the Probate Court as well as any other, and on the concession that the Probate Court, after this final decree and settlement, had jurisdiction of the subject. It would not be sufficient in an ordinary case of a bill for a new trial, to aver that the party thus represented was ignorant at the time of the trial (or settlement) of the facts. The bill must go further, and show that he could not with the use of due diligence, unmixed with any negligence on his part, have made himself acquainted with, or ascertained the existence of the facts. It is never tolerated to a party that he may go on and take his chances of a trial, and after it has gone against him, move to set it aside on grounds which he might have availed himself of by the exercise of a proper degree of diligence. Litigation would be endless if this were so, and a party encouraged in supineness and negligence.
It is true, the petition states that petitioner could not with any dili
The judgment of the Probate Court is reversed, and the petition dismissed.
Reference
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- WILLIAMS v. PRICE
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- Syllabus
- A legatee who has been represented by counsel at the allowance of accounts against the estate will not be allowed, after a lapse of time, to come in and have the allowance set aside on a mere general averment of newly discovered evidence. In such a case, it is not sufficient to allege ignorance at the time of allowance, but the plaintiff must go farther, and show that he could not, with the use of due diligence, unmixed with any negligence on his part, have made himself acquainted with, or ascertained the existence of the facts. A general averment of such diligence will not do. The bill should state how and why the facts could not have been discovered at the time.