People v. Bonney
People v. Bonney
Opinion of the Court
J. concurring.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree. His counsel assigned several errors, which we shall consider in their order.
1. The first is, that three of the trial jurors separated from their fellows after the jury had retired, and before the return of their verdict. This assignment seems to rest on the fact that these jurors retired for a few moments to a privy, and the Under Sheriff who accompanied them testifies, that during their absence from the jury room, they held no correspondence with any one, nor with each other. The case of the People v. Backus (5 Cal. 275) is relied on ; but that case—which goes to the verge of the true rule, if not beyond—does not support the assignment; for the Court say, the correct rule is to grant a new trial on account of the separation, if it were such as that the jury might have been improperly influenced. Here the facts show that the jurors were in the custody of the officer, and not only is there no probability, from the circumstances, of any improper interference, but express proof, uncontradicted, that there was none. (See People v. Lee, 17 Cal. 78.)
2. It is assigned that the jury should not have been permitted to view the scene of the alleged murder, except in the presence of the prisoner, this view being a part of the trial, in the theory of the ‘ counsel, and the prisoner required to be present during the entire progress of it; and,
3. That the jury were permitted to see the buggy, as to which testimony was given. We see nothing in these two points requiring a detailed notice. The Court had the discretion to permit the jury to view these physical objects; and this was neither in contemplation of the act or otherwise any part of the trial. It was rather a suspension of the trial to enable the jury to view the ground, etc.,
4. It is next urged, that the Court erred in telling the jury orally to return when they brought in a general verdict of guilty—as it is said—and “ to find ” in what degree “ or the degree.” It is said that this direction was a charge, and ought to have been in writing. We think not. Their answer was not a finding, but a failure to find. The duty of the jury remained undischarged. They were still under the control of the Court. The Court did not direct them as to the law of the case ; it only told them that they must act— that they, in other words, must find a verdict on the issue, which was, whether the defendant was guilty, and if guilty, in what degree. This was no more a charge than if the Court, immediately after the argument, had told them to retire and consider of their verdict.
5. It was not error for the Court to permit a witness to be sworn for the prosecution, because his name was not marked on the indictment. It often happens that the necessity for introducing particular witnesses arises on the trial; and justice would be greatly impeded if the rule invoked were affirmed, while no corresponding advantages would accrue from it.
6. The last objection is, that the Judge erred in sundry particulars in assuming the guilt of the prisoner, or assuming for proven certain disputed points of fact. There is no statement of facts; and it would be difficult for us to say that the Court erred in its assumption; for all presumptions are in favor of the correctness of the acts and rulings of the Judge. We only interfere to correct an erroneous instruction on appeal where the facts are not stated, when under no imaginable state of facts could the ruling of the
Judgment affirmed, and the Court will fix a time for the execution of the sentence.
Reference
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- THE PEOPLE v. BONNEY
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- Whebe defendant was convicted of murder, and on motion for new trial, it appeared that three of the trial jurors, after their retiring but before verdict, went for a few moments to a privy, accompanied by the Under Sheriff, who testified that during their absence from the jury-room they had no communi- . cation with any one, nor with each other: Held, that the separation of the three jurors from their fellows was not cause for new trial. The People v. Bachus (5 Cal. 275) on this point goes to the verge of if not beyond the true rule; but that case does not conflict with the decision here. Where, under section two hundred and ninety of the Criminal Practice Act the jury, during a trial for murder, are permitted to viero the scene of the alleged crime in custody of the Sheriff, without the presence of the prisoner: Held not to be error; and that this “ view ” is not any part of the trial within the meaning of the statute requiring the presence of the prisoner on such trial. Held, further, not to be good reason for setting aside the verdict, that the Court permitted the jury during such trial to withdraw to the front of the Court House in custody of the Sheriff, and without the presence of the prisoner to view a “ buggy ” as to which a witness was testifying, and in which the prisoner and deceased drove off together on the day of the alleged murder, particularly as the prisoner neither objected to the “ view,” nor asked permission to accompany the jury. It is discretionary with the Court to permit the jury to make this “view,” and possibly the Court would grant the prisoner the same right. Where, on trial upon an indictment for murder, the jury returned into Court and said they had agreed upon a verdict, which, on being read by the Judge, was found to be: “We, the jury, find the prisoner guilty as charged in the bill of indictment,” and the Judge thereupon, without communicating to the prisoner or his counsel the nature of the verdict—they being present and demanding it—told the jury verbally that their verdict was not in proper form, and that they must retire and designate in their verdict in which degree they found the prisoner guilty, and the jury then retired and shortly returned with a verdict specifying that they found the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree : Held, that this verbal direction to the jury to retire, etc., was not a charge necessary to be in writing; that it amounted to nothing more than a direction to the jury that they must act—must find a verdict on the issue, which was whether defendant was guilty, and if so, in what degree. It is not error for the Court to permit a witness to be sworn for the prosecution, although his name was not indorsed on the indictment. Where, in a criminal case, it is objected to the charge of the Court, that it, in some parts, assumes the guilt of the prisoner, or assumes as proven certain disputed points of fact, and there is no statement of facts in the record, the Supreme Court will not interfere unless the ruling of the Court below cannot be maintained under any imaginable state of facts. In such case, all presumptions are in favor of the correctness of the acts and rulings below. But in this case the charge of the Court is not objectionable in the respects claimed by appellant. (See his point.)