People v. Nichol
People v. Nichol
Opinion of the Court
The instructions given on hehalf of the people are mainly taken from the statute in relation to murder, and the more recent decisions of this Court. They seem to have been prepared with unusual care, and in all respects adapted to the circumstances under which the homicide was committed. They are not even obnoxious to criticism.
If the Court erred in refusing the first two instructions asked on behalf of the defendant, the error was without prejudice. The refusal was to instruct the jury that under the peculiar terms of the indictment they could not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. Having been found guilty of murder in the second degree only, the defendant was not prejudiced by the refusal. But we do not desire by this to be understood as implying that the refusal was error. As we held in the case of The People v. King, 27 Cal. 507, it is not the province of the Grand Jury to determine the degree of the murder. That duty is, by the statute, expressly cast upon the trial jury, and the designation of the degree by the Grand Jury is, therefore, as idle as a recommendation to the mercy of the Court appended to a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. If the Grand Jury undertake to designate the degree, such designation is to be disregarded. The trial jury may, notwithstanding, find the defendant guilty in the first degree, if, in their judgment, the testimony is sufficient.
. Hor do we think the Court erred in refusing the eighth instruction, asked in behalf of the defendant, as to the importance to be attached to the threats previously made by him. "While it may contain some matter not objectionable, yet as a whole we think it was more calculated to mislead than to enlighten the jury. It is evidently founded upon
Mr. Justice Rhodes expressed no opinion.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- THE PEOPLE v. H. F. NICHOL
- Cited By
- 33 cases
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- Published
- Syllabus
- Instructions.—Where, on the trial of a defendant under an indictment charging him with murder in the second degree, the Court refused certain instructions, asked by the defendant, to the effect that he could not, under said indictment, be found guilty of murder in the first degree, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree : held, that the defendant was not prejudiced by such refusal; and this, whether the refusal was error or not. Indictment for Murder—Province of Grand Jury.—It is no part of the province of the Grand Jury to determine the degree of murder, and a declaration thereof by their indictment will be disregarded. Degree of Murder—Duty of Trial Jury.—The duty of determining the degree of murder is, by the statute, cast on the trial jury; and where the indictment charged murder in the second degree, only, they might, nevertheless, according to the nature of the proofs, find the defendant guilty of murder in the first or second degree. Instructions.—On the trial of a defendant for murder, it was not error for the Court to refuse instructions, asked by defendant, founded on the idea that the question as to the degree of murder of which he could be convicted was not before the jury. Test of Sufficiency of Indictment.—An indictment for murder will be deemed sufficient if it can be readily understood therefrom that, under such circumstances as show a felonious intent, a mortal wound was inflicted by the defendant upon the deceased—a human being—of which wound he died within a year and a day from its infliction. Test to distinguish between Murder in First and Second Degrees.—Where the killing of a human being is intentional, deliberate, and premeditated, it is murder in the first degree; and if not, then it is murder in the second degree. Idem.—By the statute two classes of murder are declared to be in the first degree, to wit: 1st. When effected by means of poison, lying in wait, or torture ; and, 2d. Where the killing is done in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary; in which cases the means employed or the circumstances attending the killing, as the case may be, are, by the mandate of the law, made conclusive of the degree of the crime, and the trial jury are without discretion, except in determining said facts. In all other cases of murder the jury must determine the degree from the circumstances of the killing, when the test is : if it be done intentionally, deliberately, and premeditatively, it is in the first degree ; otherwise, in the second degree. Idem—Time a*d Degree of Deliberation.—To constitute murder in the first degree, it is only necessary that the act of killing be preceded by and the result of a concurrence of will, deliberation, and premeditation on the part of the slayer. There need be no appreciable space of time between the intention to kill and the act of killing; they may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. Drunkenness of One Accused of Homicide.—In all cases of murder, except those committed by means of poison, torture, or lying in wait, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, the fact and degree of drunkenness of the slayer at the time of the killing may properly be the subject of proof at the trial and for the consideration of the jury, but with a view, solely, to determine the condition of the mind of tho slayer at said time, whether or not it was thereby rendered incapable of forming the intention, if exercising the deliberation and the premeditation which are essential to the existence of murder of the first degree; as between murder in the first degree and manslaughter the drunkenness of the slayer forms no legitimate matter of inquiry.