Sweet v. McGlynn
Sweet v. McGlynn
Opinion of the Court
— This is a motion to set aside a judgment, and to be allowed to answer, under the sixty-eighth section of the Practice Act.
The complaint was filed in one of the district courts in the city of San Francisco on the tenth day of October, 1872, and on the same day summons and attachment were taken out and duly served on the defendant in that city. On the twenty-fourth day of October judgment was entered against the defendant by default, and on the first day of November he obtained an order that the plaintiff show cause why the judgment should not be set aside. The motion was heard upon affidavits filed by both parties, and denied.
There is some little conflict in the affidavits, but, on the whole, we think it sufficiently appears that the defendant did not intend to let judgment go against him by default, but that he thought he had a good defense, and intended and expected to have it made.
We are of the opinion that the showing was sufficient to authorize the court to set aside the judgment, and that it ought to have done so, the defendant paying all the costs of the case 'up to that time.
Order reversed and cause remanded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- M. P. SWEET v. HUGH McGLYNN
- Status
- Published