California Supreme Court, 1875

Dubbers v. Goux

California Supreme Court · Decided July 1, 1875

51 Cal. 153

Cases that cite this one

23 later published cases cite this decision.

Chatten v. Martell (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
Alvez v. Toprahanian (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)
Hallett v. Larcom (Idaho 1897)
Wilson v. Kiesel (Utah 1894)
Skews v. Dunn (Utah 1882)
Phoenix of Hartford Insurance v. Colony Kitchens (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
Robinson v. Smith (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)
Vick v. Grasser (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
Klopstock v. Superior Court (Cal. 1941)
Vere de Garcés v. District Court of San Juan (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1939)
Ramón Morán & Co. v. District Court of San Juan (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1939)
Vere de Garcés v. Corte de Distrito de San Juan (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1939)
Ramón Morán & Co. v. Corte de Distrito de San Juan (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1939)
González v. White Star Bus Line, Inc. (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1938)
González v. White Star Bus Line, Inc. (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1938)
Anderson v. Star-Bair Oil Co. (Wyo. 1926)
Cox v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1917)
Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1915)
In re Nagao (United States District Court for the District of Alaska 1913)
Sears v. Dunbar (Or. 1907)
Hackett v. Van Frank (Mo. Ct. App. 1906)
Franklin v. Conrad-Stanford Co. (8th Cir. 1905)
Flanders v. Lyon & Healy (Neb. 1897)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

By the Court:

The court erred in permitting Mrs. Dubbers to be substituted for her husband as plaintiff. It is not pretended that she had succeeded to any interest held by her husband pending the action, nor that she had any joint interest with him in the subject-matter. On the contrary she was substituted as plaintiff on the theory that she was the only-party in interest at the commencement of the action, and had ever since continued to be so. She was permitted to *155become the sole plaintiff, not to prosecute the same cause of action stated in the complaint, on the ground that she had succeeded to it, but another and distinct cause of action in her separate right. In effect, it was permitting her to prosecute a new suit, for another cause of action, by merely substituting her as sole plaintiff in the former action. It is scarcely necessary to say that section four-hundred and seventy-three of the Code of Civil Procedure affords no warrant for such a proceeding.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.