This case comes up on the findings, and there is, therefore, no controversy as to the facts; the only question being, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the facts found. The facts necessary to a correct understanding of the only question of law in the case are, that a mercantile firm in New York sold certain merchandise on credit to a similar firm in San Francisco, and shipped the same in the usual course of business, by railway, to the vendees as consignees, under bills of lading in the usual form. The bills of lading were received at San Francisco by the consignees before the goods arrived; and while the merchandise was in transit, in the custody of the defendant as a common car*349rier, the consignees failed, and became insolvent, and thereupon the vendors notified the defendant in writing that they stopped the goods in transitu; that the vendees had become insolvent, and the goods were not paid for, and that they must not be delivered to the consignees, but to the vendors. The plaintiffs then were, and for many years had been, auctioneers and commission merchants, doing business in San Francisco, and had been in the habit of receiving from the consignees bills of lading, and goods under them, for sale on commission. About two hours after the notice of stoppage in transitu was served upon the defendant, the consignees indorsed and delivered the bills of lading to the plaintiffs, who, on the faith thereof and of the goods named therein, “ advanced a sum of money to the consignees in the usual course of business;” and the sum so advanced was to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the goods, which were to be sold at auction by the plaintiffs. At the time of the indorsement and transfer of the bills of lading to the plaintiffs, they had no notice that the consignees were in failing circumstances, or had failed, or that any notice of stoppage in transitu had been served upon the defendant. While the goods were still in the possession of the defendant as a common carrier, the plaintiffs, as holders, exhibited to the defendant the bills of lading, tendered the charges, and demanded a delivery of the goods, which was refused, and the action is to recover their value.

The question involved being one of great practical importance, it has been discussed by counsel, both orally and in printed arguments, with learning and ability. But after the most careful research, they have failed to call to our attention a single adjudicated case in which the precise question under review has been decided or discussed. There are numerous decisions, both in England and America, to the effect that where goods are consigned by the vendor to the vendee, under bills of lading in the usual form, as in this case, an attempt by the vendor to stop the goods in transitu will be unavailing as against an assignee of the bill-of lading, who took it in good faith, for a valuable consideration, in the usual course of business, before the attempted stoppage. *350The leading case on this point is Lickbarrow v. Mason (2 Term R. 63), the authority of which has been almost universally acquiesced in by the courts and text-writers, in this country and in England. There being little or no conflict in the authorities on the point adjudicated in that case, it would be useless to recapitulate them here. But it is important to ascertain the principles which underlie these decisions, that we may determine to what extent, if at all, they are applicable to the case at bar. The first, and, as I think, the controlling point determined in these cases, is, that by the bill of lading the legal title to the goods passes to the vendee, subject only to the lien of the vendor for the unpaid price; which lien continues only so long as the goods are in transit, and can be enforced only on condition that the vendee is or becomes insolvent while the goods are in transit.

On the failure of each of these conditions, the right of stoppage is gone, and the lien ceases, even as against the vendee. But it is further settled by these adjudications, that if the bill of lading is assigned, and the legal title passes to a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration before the right of stoppage is exercised, the lien of the vendor ceases as against the assignee, on the well-known principle that a secret trust will not be enforced as against a bona fide holder for value of the legal title. In such a case, if the equities of the vendor and assignee be considered equal (and this is certainly the light most favorable to the vendor in which the transaction can be regarded), the rule applies that where the equities are equal the legal title will prevail. But in such a case it would be difficult to maintain that the equities are equal. The vendor has voluntarily placed in the hands of the vendee a muniment of title, clothing him with the apparent ownership of the goods; and a person dealing with him in the usual course of business, who takes an assignment for a valuable consideration, “without notice of such circumstances as render the bill of lading not fairly and honestly assignable,” has a superior equity to that of the vendor asserting a recent lien, known, perhaps, only to himself and the vendee. (Brewster v. Sime, 42 Cal. 130.)

These being the conditions which determine and control *351the relative rights of the vendor and assignee, where the assignment is made before the notice of stoppage is given, precisely the same principles, in my opinion, are applicable when the assignment is made after the carrier is notified by the vendor. Notwithstanding the notice to the carrier, the vendor’s lien continues to be only a secret trust as to a person, who, in the language of Mr. Benjamin, in his work on Sales, section eight hundred and sixty-six, takes an assignment of a bill of lading “ without notice of such circumstance as renders the bill of lading not fairly and honestly assignable.” The law provides no method by which third persons are to be affected with constructive notice of acts transpiring between the vendor and the carrier; and in dealing with the vendee, whom the vendor has invested with the legal title and apparent ownership of the goods, a stranger, advancing his money on the faith of this apparently good title, is not bound, at his peril, to ascertain whether, possibly, the vendor may not have notified a carrier—it maybe on some remote portion of the route—that the goods are stopped in transitu. If a person, taking an assignment of a bill of lading, is to encounter these risks, and can take the assignment with safety only after he has inquired of the vendor, and of every carrier through whose hands the goods are to come, whether a notice of stoppage in transition has been given, it is quite certain that prudent persons will cease to advance money on such securities, and a very important class of commercial transactions will be practically abrogated. In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Mr. Chief Justice Wallace did not express an opinion.