San Jose Gas Co. v. January
Cases that cite this one
32 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Bank of California v. City & County of San Francisco (Cal. 1904)
- Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. County of San Diego (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
- Roehm v. County of Orange (Cal. 1948)
- County of Los Angeles v. Southern California Telephone Co. (Cal. 1948)
- Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev. (10th Cir. 1942)
- San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Merced County (Cal. Ct. App. 1906)
- Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (Cal. 2017)
- Marin Municipal Water District v. City of Mill Valley (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
- East Bay Municipal Utility District v. County of Contra Costa (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)
- State of California v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. (Cal. 1941)
- Southern California Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. Ct. App. 1941)
- Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Welch (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)
- In re Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Okla. 1934)
- Pleasant v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (10th Cir. 1933)
- Wores v. Imperial Irrigation District (Cal. 1924)
- Southern California Hardwood & Manufacturing Co. v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. Ct. App. 1920)
- Ensenada Estates, Inc. v. Hill (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1916)
- Ensenada Estates, Inc. v. Hill (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1916)
- Kern River Co. v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. 1913)
- Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. 1912)
- Hotchkiss v. Hansberger (Cal. Ct. App. 1911)
- City of Los Angeles v. Western Union Oil Co. (Cal. 1911)
- Lake City Electric Light Co. v. McCrary (Iowa 1906)
- Couts v. Cornell (Cal. 1905)
- Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. City of San Antonio (Tex. App. 1903)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Concurring Opinion
I concur in the judgment upon the ground first stated by Mr. Justice Myrick.
Opinion of the Court
The appeal in this case was taken from an order dissolving a temporary injunction, and from a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, the demurrer of defendant to plaintiff’s complaint having been sustained, and judgment rendered upon plaintiff declining to answer. The case is, therefore, to be considered as the same is presented by plaintiff in its complaint, which, in brief, is this:
Plaintiff is, and was on the 10th of March, 1880, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and selling of gas to the city and inhabitants of San José, and to the town of Santa Clara, and adjacent places in Santa Clara County. Its capital stock was §600,000, divided into 6,000 shares, which were owned by stockholders, and not by the corporation. The corporation owned taxable property in Santa Clara County; viz., real es
The duty of making the valuation was cast upon the assessor. The method of arriving at the valuation, the process by which his mind reached the conclusion (in case where, as here, it is not pretended that he acted fraudulently or dishonestly), is matter committed to his determination. In fixing a valuation upon the mains, it was entirely competent for him to take into consideration the cost, as estimated by himself, of digging the trenches, laying the pipes, and making the connections. It was competent for him to determine that mains laid in the ground were of more value, as so laid, for the purposes for which they were laid, than would be the pipes in the warehouse of the dealer, or than would be the crude iron at the foundry. If he erred in his judgment, the remedy was by application to the board of equalization, and the courts will not revise the judgments of these officers upon such questions.
This disposes of the case, because the tax upon the entire valuation of the mains was not paid nor offered to be paid. If a»uy part of the tax complained of be legal, that part must be paid before a party will be heard to complain of an illegal portion.
2. The appellant argues, that under § 19, art. xi, of the Constitution, a franchise for using public streets, and laying pipes for supplying a city with gas and water, has no value. A sufficient answer to that is, the appellant admits (which it could not deny) that the right of laying down and maintaining pipes in the streets of a city, by means of which gas or water is to be conveyed, is a franchise; and by § 1, art. xiii, of the Constitution, franchises are declared to be property for the purposes of taxation. The method of assessment, and by whom, was to be and was provided for by law. Therefore it does not rest with the plaintiff or with the courts to determine that its franchise had no value. In a pecuniary sense, the value of franchises may be as various as the objects for which they exist, and the methods by which they are employed, and may change with every moment of time; but that franchises are property, and are to be taxed in some method in proportion to value, is a part of the paramount law of this State.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.