City of San Francisco v. McGinn
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. State Tax Commission (Utah 1977)
- San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad v. City of Los Angeles (Cal. 1914)
- Louisville Garage Corporation v. City of Louisville (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) 1946)
- Outer Harbor Dock & Wharf Co. v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. Ct. App. 1920)
- Outer Harbor Dock & Wharf Co. v. City of Los Angeles (Cal. Ct. App. 1920)
- Cryan v. Wardell (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 1920)
- City of Oakland v. Albers Bros. Milling Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1919)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is a tax suit, the defendant claiming that no taxes on the property can be recovered of him. The city and county of San Francisco, in 1875, under the Act of March 30, 1875, leased to defendant a portion of the school lot belonging' to the city and county, located at the corner of Market and Fifth streets. The defendant took possession of the leased land, and made improvements and erected a substantial four-story frame building, with brick foundation, attached to the soil; For the fiscal year 1881-82 the building and improvements were assessed to defendant, and this suit is to recover the taxes. The defendant insists that he is not liable for the taxes, because, hé says, first, the city and county owns the realty, the improvements and building are portion of the realty, and therefore not his property; and second, section 3887 of the Political Code, as in force at the date of the lease, declared that the “lessor of real estate is liable for the taxes thereon,” and the city and county, being liable, cannot recover of him.
It is not necessary to follow and answer in detail the various reasons given by defendant why he should not be held liable; it is sufficient to say that, for the purposes of revenue, the legislature of this State has observed a distinction between real estate and improvements, and that distinction has been recognized by this court.
We are of opinion- that, for the purposes of revenue, the defendant was the owner of the property assessed, and that he is liable for the taxes.
Order affirmed.
Sharpstein, J., and Thornton, J., concurred.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.