Upon the former appeal in this case (96 Cal. 33) it appeared that the Carrington mine was a single claim held by the defendant Gillis, of which he had sold a portion to the plaintiff, and it was held that by virtue of his deed to the plaintiff Gillis was es-topped from questioning the right of his grantee to all of the gold found within the surface lines of the deed, irrespective of the depth below the surface at which it was found. After the case went down to the superior court for another trial the defendants amended their answers, presenting issues to the effect that the tract of ground which was sold to the plaintiff was known as the Pine Tree claim, and was distinct from that known as the Carrington claim, which was retained by Gillis, and had been located subsequent to the location of the Carrington claim; that upon these facts they were entitled to the gold found at the place of intersection of the Rice vein and the West vein, although that place of intersection was within the surface lines of the grant to the plaintiff. Upon the issues thus presented, the court found that for nearly fourteen years prior to the sale to the plaintiff the mining ground held by the defendant Gillis, including that sold to the plaintiff, as well as that retained by himself, had been held and claimed by him as a single mining claim, and was known and designated, as the “ Carrington” claim, and that during this time no Pine Tree mine or claim had existed; that prior to the sale and conveyance to the plaintiff, Gillis had pointed out to him the boundaries of the Carrington claim, and told him that the ground so sold and conveyed was a part of that claim; that before the execution of the deed Gillis and the plaintiff went together upon the ground and marked off and agreed upon the' *87portion of the claim to be sold to the plaintiff, and established visible monuments at each of the four corners, and agreed upon the dividing line between the portion to be sold to the plaintiff and the portion to be retained by the defendant, and established and agreed upon permanent monuments marking said dividing line; that the ground was conveyed according to these monuments, and in the conveyance to the plaintiff was designated as the Pine Tree mine for the purpose of distinguishing it from the remaining part of the Carrington claim retained by Gillis. In 1854 the Carrington claim was located for one thousand feet in length, and one hundred feet on each side of the vein, and in 1859 or 1860 T. E. Carrington, then being in possession of the Carrington claim, posted notices on the Pine Tree vein, adjacent thereto on the east, claiming three hundred feet along said vein. Carrington remained in possession of this property until some time in 1870, when he moved away from the county, leaving the whole of the mining ground in charge of one Stoker, and instructed him to do the assessment work thereon. Stoker took possession of the entire ground in which the Carrington and Pine Tree veins lay, and held it for Carrington as one claim until June, 1872; and during this time the entire ground was held and known as the Carrington claim, and all the assessment work that was done upon the ground was done as and for the Carrington claim. In June, 1872, Carrington sold to the defendant Gillis his interest in the mining ground—including in the deed of conveyance claims on all sides of the Pine Tree mine, but not mentioning any claim or mining ground by that name—and upon the execution of this deed Stoker turned over to Gillis the possession of all the ground that he had been holding for Carrington; and Gillis remained in possession thereof until his conveyance to the plaintiff in 1886. Upon these facts the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants have appealed.

We are of the opinion that the additional facts presented upon this appeal do not take the case out. of the *88principles under which the decision of the former appeal was given. The mining ground held by Carrington, of which Gillis took possession under his deed of June, 1872, must be considered as a single claim, irrespective of the original locations of the different parts of the claim. Whatever distinction may have been at one time observed between the original location of the Carrington mine and that of the Pine Tree mine, it was disregarded by Carrington duriiíg a large portion of the time these claims were held by him, and after he left the county the entire mining ground, which included them both, was treated as one claim, not only while Stoker held them, but also during all the time that Gillis held them until his conveyance to the plaintiff. That conveyance did not purport to be made in accordance with the lines or claim of any previous location, but was a conveyance of a tract of mining ground carved out of another tract known as the “ Carrington” claim by metes and bounds agreed upon between the parties, and which they both treated as a part of the Carrington claim, but which, for the sake of convenience, was designated in the conveyance as the Pine Tree claim. Under these facts the conveyance from Gillis to the plaintiff must have the same effect as though the entire ground held by him previous to the conveyance was held by mere possession, or under a patent from the United States, or as if the two veins were a part of the same location. At the former appeal herein it was held that if the locator of a mining claim should convey a portion of his claim without any reservation in his deed of conveyance, his grantee would be entitled to all the gold that might be found within the ground conveyed in any vein whose apex was within the surface lines of his deed; so, if a locator should convey to A the east half of his claim, and afterward should convey the west half to B, each of his grantees would in the same manner be entitled to all of the gold found in any vein which was entirely within the surface lines of his conveyance; and, on the same principle, if the proprie*89tor of a tract of mining ground which has been derived through several locations should dispose of the same in parcels irrespective of the lines of such locations, the rights of his grantees would be measured by the terms of their deeds. In such cases section 2336 of the Revised Statutes of the United States has no application. That statute was not intended to limit or define the rights of a person in mere possession of a tract of mining ground where there is more than one vein, or to prescribe the effect of a conveyance by the locator of a claim of a portion of his location containing one of such veins. The object of the statute was to supplement the provisions of section 2332, and to prescribe rules under which different locations by different proprietors should be held, and to determine the rights of such proprietors in case of intersecting veins. At the date of the passage of that act, May 10, 1872, the Carrington claim was and had for many years been held as a single claim, without any adverse claim thereto, and it continued so to be held until the conveyance by Gillis to the plaintiff in 1886. The position of the proprietor of a mining claim who conveys a portion thereof, and retains the remainder, is analogous to the position of the United States after it has issued its patent for a location. As the United States, as well as a subsequent locator, holds the unpatented claim subject to the prior rights of the patentee, as prescribed by section 2336, so the grantor of a portion of his claim, in the absence of any reservation in his deed, or proof of mining customs, holds the ungranted portion subordinate to the rights of his grantee in the ground conveyed.

The effect of the deed from Gillis to the plaintiff was to estop him and those claiming under him from questioning the title of the plaintiff to all the gold that might be found in the West vein, within the surface lines of his deed. The gold in controversy was found within the surface lines of this deed, and it was also found within the limits of the two walls forming the West vein, although the place at which it was found - is *90also within the lines of the walls which form the Rice vein. This latter circumstance does not. however, relieve Gillis from the estoppel of his deed, for, as the deed contains no reservation, and as there was no evidence at the trial of any mining customs, effect must be given to the deed according to its terms, by holding that the entire West vein within the surface lines, even though intersected by another vein, passed to the plaintiff. In thus holding, we concede that, when mining ground is conveyed by deed without express limitation, the grantee takes subject to the characteristics of mining property given to it by prevailing customs and laws, and not with the absolute dominion which flows from a conveyance in fee of ordinary land. The mining land thus granted is still subject to all mining laws and customs which are applicable, but the provision of section 2336 that, when two veins intersect, “ priority of title shall govern, and such prior location shall be entitled to all ore or mineral contained within the space of intersection,” cannot possibly be applied to the case where A conveys part of his mining claim to B, for in such a case there is no “prior location.” Therefore, in such a case, the ordinary rules which govern grants of land must of necessity apply; and, if the intersection takes place on part of the claim conveyed, the grantee takes all the mineral within the space of intersection.

Whether the plaintiff would have been entitled to follow the West vein into the ground retained by Gillis, and to claim the gold found therein, or whether Gillis would have been entitled to any of the gold that might be found in the Rice vein, within the ground conveyed to the plaintiff, are questions which are not involved in this appeal, and upon' which we do not express any opinion. All that we hold is that, inasmuch as the gold in question was within the ground conveyed by Gillis to the plaintiff, and in a vein whose apex was within the surface lines of that ground, it belonged to the plaintiff.

Certain rulings of the court upon the admission of *91evidence to show the boundaries of the lands described in the deed from Gillis to the plaintiff are assigned as error; but we are of the opinion that the rulings were correct. The description in the complaint follows that in the deed from Gillis to the plaintiff, and, in addition to giving the length of each side of the ground, designated certain monuments as the corners of the tract conveyed. If these monuments can be ascertained, they will prevail over the designated measurements, and the evidence offered was for the purpose of pointing out upon the surface of the earth the monuments which had been agreed upon in the sale, and which were named in the conveyance. For this purpose the court was authorized to receive parol evidence in order to show the identity of the land so conveyed with that upon which the trespass had been committed.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

McFarland, J., and Van Fleet, J., concurred.

While I. do not think the decision in this case upon the former appeal is at all conclusive, as to the questions raised by the present appeal, still I concur in the judgment upon the ground that the facts do not bring the case within the provisions of section 2336 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. And when that statute does not apply, and there is no other law or mining custom applicable to the facts, I think the grantee of the surface ground must be held to take all the mineral at the point of intersection.