Hefner v. Herron
Hefner v. Herron
Opinion of the Court
This action was instituted by the plaintiff as assignee of the estate of the Wah Sang Yen Company, insolvent debtors, to recover possession of six tons of dried fruit, or the value thereof.
At the trial, no evidence was introduced on either side, and it was stipulated that the only question to be determined by the court was whether the taking of the property, as alleged in the complaint, and as explained and justified in defendant’s answer, was wrongful or not
On September 24th, the creditors of the Wah Sang Yen Company filed in the superior court of said county their petition, praying that the said company, and each of the members thereof, be adjudged and declared to be insolvent debtors under the provisions of the Insolvent Act of 1895. A receiver was thereupon appointed, and, on October 14th, an order and adjudication was duly made and entered in said court, whereby the said com
As a conclusion of law from these facts the court found that the plaintiff, as assignee of the estate of the "Wall Sang Yen Company, was entitled to have and recover of and from the defendant possession of the property described in the complaint, to wit, six tons of dried fruit, less five hundred and eighty pounds, or the sum of two hundred and thirteen dollars, the value thereof, in case a delivery could not be had, without costs; and judgment was accordingly so entered, from which the defendant appealed.
Section 21 of the Insolvent Act of 1895 reads as follows: “As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and persona^ of the debtor, with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon which the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property and estate, both real and personal, in the assignee, although the same be then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve any attachment made within one month next preceding the commencement of the insol
The object sought to be accomplished by this statute is not very evident, nor does its language very clearly express the intention of the legislature. In addition to providing that the assignment in insolvency shall dissolve any attachment “ made” within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, it provides that whenever such a result shall follow, the assignment shall also vacate and dissolve any judgment or execution entered or levied in any action or proceeding against the debtor commenced subsequently to the action in which the attachment is dissolved. The dissolving of an attachment is the condition upon which the insolvency proceedings can produce any effect upon a judgment or execution. Two things, therefore, must occur before any judgment is vacated or any execution is dissolved, or a levy thereunder set aside, viz., an attachment must have been dissolved in the prior action, and the judgment and execution must have been had in an action commenced subsequently to the one in which the attachment was dissolved. If an attachment issued in some action or proceeding against the defendant had been already dissolved at the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, although levied within one month prior thereto, the judgment and execution in the subsequent action would not be affected. On the other hand, if the action had been' commenced more than a year before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, but an attachment had not been levied until within one month prior thereto, the judgment and execution in the subsequent
Under the facts presented in the present case there is no ground for the application of the foregoing section of the Insolvent Act. Prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency the suit of Burgan had passed into judgment, and the defendant held the property in question by virtue of a levy under an execution issued upon that judgment. The attachment previously issued therein was no longer in existence, or capable of being dissolved, and whatever lien or claim the defendant had upon the property was by virtue of the execution. The section does not provide for dissolving a lien existing by virtue of final process, except in the one enumerated instance. In the absence of any statutory provision, a levy upon property by virtue of an attachment or execution creates an interest in the property superior to the rights of the assignee in insolvency, and only an express provision to that effect will make the proceedings in insolvency paramount to such lien. (Vermont Marble Co. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. 579.)
As there was no existing attachment to be dissolved, the judgment and execution in the action of Herron could not be affected by the proceedings iix insolvency.
The defendant, therefore, had the right, as against the claim of the plaintiff, to retain and dispose of the property under the execution by virtue of which he had taken it, and the judgment against him is erroneous.
The judgment is reversed, with directions to the superior court to enter judgment upon the findings in favor of the defendant.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- C. F. HEFNER, Assignee, etc. v. H. S. HERRON
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published