Lyles v. Perrin
Lyles v. Perrin
Opinion of the Court
This is an action for damages; the jury returned a verdict in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, for which amount judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff; and from the judgment and order denying a new trial the defendant appeals.
Plaintiff purchased a tract of land from defendant, together with a certain water right appurtenant thereto; and it is averred in the complaint that afterward, and before the deed was recorded, which defendant made to plaintiff of the land and water right, the defendant sold and granted away said water right, and had it canceled and severed from the land; and damages are asked for these acts. It is averred that the defendant did “cause the water right on said lands to be canceled, and did sell and convey the same away from plaintiff, to his great damage”; and that this was done “willfully, without any right whatsoever, from wanton motives, with reckless disregard to the rights of plaintiff and without plaintiff’s consent and knowledge, and under circumstances of great hardship and oppression to plaintiff.” It
Temple, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- E. C. LYLES v. E. B. PERRIN
- Cited By
- 11 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Purchase op Land and Water Right—Improper Transfer and Cancellation op Water Right by Vendor—Action for Damages—Instructions as to Punitive Damages.—In an action for damages for the improper transfer and cancellation of a water right by the defendant, after plaintiff had purchased from defendant a tract of land with such water right appurtenant thereto, and had received a deed therefor, but prior to its recordation, where the complaint avers that the acts of the defendant were done “willfully, without, any right whatever, from wanton motives, and without plaintiff’s consent and knowledge, and under circumstances of great hardship and oppression to plaintiff,” and the answer averred that they occurred inadvertently and without any intent to oppress plaintiff or maliciously injure him, and the evidence was conflicting as to the actual damage suffered, the question whether or not plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages is material; and where the court instructed the jury that “in any action for the breach of an obligation not arising upon contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, m addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant,” the defendant is also entitled to have the jury fairly instructed as to the general principle of law governing the matter of punitive damages, upon his theory of the case, and though not entitled to an instruction that there was no evidence which would warrant any punitive damages, nor to any instructions containing too narrow a statement of the principle Upon which punitive damages may he given, he is entitled to have the jury instructed that “a tort committed by mistake, in the assertion of a supposed right, or without any actual wrong or intention, and without any such recklessness or negligence as evinces malice or conscious disregard of the rights of others, will not warrant the giving of punitive damages,” and a refusal to give such instruction is ground for reversal.