I dissent. One year ago, in another politically sensitive case, I quoted Learned Hand as follows (People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 538 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328]): “‘When we ask what Congress [or another legislature] “intended”, usually there can be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete occasion.’ (United States v. Klinger (2d Cir. 1952) 199 F.2d 645, 648.) The distinguished justice added, ‘He who supposes that he can be certain of the result, is the least fitted for the attempt.’”

How might this salary case have been decided if each of us on the court had projected himself conscientiously into the 1964, 1969, 1972, and 1976 positions of those legislators who “uttered the words” that are contained in the legislative measures pertinent here? In 1969, for instance, what if a legislator in debate (or the Legislative Counsel, in his summary) had stated, “Interested observers have noted that (1) for incumbent appellate judges, increases based on the Consumer Price Index will irrevocably be guaranteed until those judges’ terms expire, and (2) for some incumbents the terms will not expire until 1982”?

*549What if a legislative committee chairman had advised: “For each judge you are being asked to approve an ‘employment contract’ and to endorse his or her ‘promised compensation’ [ante at pp. 538, 539], The bill as now drafted means you are about to adopt ‘agreements of employment. .. [that] are binding and constitutionally protected’ [ante, p. 538]. Its ‘full cost-of-living provision’ would require our State to pay all judges ‘the represented compensation [including full cost-of-living increases] for their terms of office’; that is, for some judges until 1982—more than 12 years from now [id.]. Further, regardless of the salaries that, in future years, laws will set for all other state officers and employees, the Legislature may never impair the contracts with judges that this bill would adopt unless there is some ‘“emergency” serving to protect “a basic interest of society”’ [ante, p. 539].”

In brief summary, I dissent here because I am persuaded that no evidence whatever suggests that the California Legislature ever intended (1) to promise judges anything, (2) to adopt any formally recognized “agreements of employment” [ante at p. 538], or (3) to preclude modification by statute of cost-of-living adjustments that demonstrably were experimental and tentative.

If this court’s 1980 views had been forecast by anyone, if slide-rule projections of the now grotesquely swollen and embarrassingly out-of-line salaries—cultured anachronically in the medium of the Consumer Price Index plan—had been reported, if the pay scales that now have won the majority’s blessing had earlier been arrayed in full Winchester Mystery House splendor,* I think it is inconceivable that the legislators would have enacted and left unchanged the pending proposals—in 1969, for unrestricted use of the Consumer Price Index and, in 1972, for rigidifying by Assembly Constitutional Amendment not only the salaries of elected state officers but also (as hindsight now seems to counsel) the unique salary-adjustment-formula for incumbent judges.

*550Finally, as will be explained, I think my colleagues have failed to answer several arguments ably set forth in the Court of Appeal opinion in this case (by Fleming, J., with Roth, P. J., and Beach, J., concurring).

I. Contractual and vested rights

Does the 1976 amendment to Government Code section 68203 impair contractual or vested rights? If so, prior to the amendment exactly what contractual rights did the section vest in the judges who took office before January 1, 1977?

The section then read, “[Ojn the effective date of the 1969 amendments to this section and on September 1 of each year thereafter the salary of each justice and judge. . .shall be increased by that amount which is produced by multiplying [etc.].” (Italics added.) The justices and judges referred to were those “named in Sections 68200 to 68202.” The names appearing in those sections were “the Chief Justice... and each Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,” the “[presiding justice or associate justice of a court of appeal division,” each “[j]udge of the superior court,” and each “[j]udge of a municipal court.” Did the Legislature mean the incumbents only? Obviously not. Those who took office after the original enactment and after amendment were included too.

However, with regard to each individual justice and judge did the Legislature express or imply any intent as to “term of office”? I think not. The statute nowhere mentions anybody’s term. Instead it specifies “each year thereafter.” Until when? I submit that “each year thereafter” meant each year until the statute was amended or repealed, with no extra years to be set by terms of office.

Public officers and employees may, of course, enter into salary and wage agreements with the state; and by statute the Legislature may articulate the terms of the agreements. But section 68203 is not that kind of statute. The majority of the legislators never would have approved the law, I believe, had they been advised that its words created a contractual right to cost-of-living increases that would survive amendment or repeal. There was no contract because there was no offer or acceptance. “[E]ach year thereafter” was designed as a legislative, not a contractual, phrase.

Salary and wage contracts that bind employers, including public employers, typically contain definite dates. Is it not startling for the *551majority here to rule that a statute referring only to “each year thereafter [indefinitely]” nonetheless creates a binding contract to pay certain salaries during particular terms of office? I believe there was no binding contract, and thus I identify no rights that could have been impaired.

Indeed, it was the absence from salary statutes of vested rights to compensation for services not yet rendered that necessitated the constitutional prohibition of reductions in elected officers’ salaries during their terms of office (art. Ill, § 4). It is neither necessary nor fitting for this court to add to that constitutional protection a judicially contrived right, purportedly contractual, that is not enjoyed by the thousands of other public officers and employees who serve indefinite tenures.

As to (1) pensioners, and (2) the judges who took office on or after January 1, 1977, I am persuaded by these excerpts from Justice Fleming’s opinion: “[T]he rights of judicial pensioners are directly tied to those of sitting judges and take the form of a floating pension proportionate to the comparable current judicial salary. We have heretofore concluded that, absent any reduction in the dollar amount of the pension, judicial pensioners’ rights are dependent upon sitting judges’ rights to salary, and, if a prospective increase in salary for sitting judges does not materialize, the pensioners have no independent grounds for complaint. Any contractual rights for future increases in judicial salary and any vested or accrued rights to future increases in judicial salary are not the rights of the pensioners. Consequently, any impairment or infringement of such rights only indirectly and secondarily affects judicial pensioners and gives them no separate cause to complain. (Cf. Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 64, 73 [82 P. 674].) The pensioner floats in water whose origin is the current judicial office, and like water his rights cannot rise above their source.

“Newly-elected Judges. Nor do newly-elected or newly-appointed judges have cause to complain of prior legislative change in the future salary of the office to which the judge has been elected or appointed. Such judges did not serve under the old dispensation and could have no legitimate expectation of the continuance of cost-of-living increases in salary under the old law, in that the law had already been changed prior to their assumption of office.”

*552II. The constitutional mandate

The next question is whether the 1976 amendment to section 68203 conflicts with the constitutional prohibition of reductions in salaries; The question is difficult. I believe that it is answered correctly in Justice Fleming’s opinion as follows: “Before discussing this constitutional issue we first note the general considerations that lead to constitutional prohibitions against reductions in the salaries of judicial officers during their term of office. The key objective is to create and maintain an independent judiciary, and the key factors thought to bring this about are security of tenure and security of subsistence. Both factors appear in the federal Constitution, which declares that judges shall hold office during good behavior and receive a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (U.S. Const., art. Ill, § 1.) As observed by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245, 252 [64 L.Ed. 887, 892, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519], in turn quoting Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 79, ‘[a] power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.’ That court further noted the constitutional premise that protection of a judge’s subsistence is not so much for the benefit of the judge as it is for the public interest in the preservation of an independent judiciary. (Evans v. Gore, supra, at pp. 248-254 [64 L.Ed. at pp. 890-893].)

“These basic constitutional premises find expression in the California Constitution, which gives judges the protection of relatively-long fixed terms (appellate judges, 12 years; trial judges, 6 years (art. VI, § 16)) and which prevents reductions in judges’ salaries during their term of office (art. Ill, § 4).

“Factually, reductions in judicial salary may come about in four different ways:

“(1) Reduction in dollar amounts of judicial salaries.

“(2) Increased specific deductions against judicial salaries.

“(3) Increased general deductions against all salaries.

“(4) Reduction in purchasing power of all salaries.

“Clearly, if the Legislature had undertaken to reduce the dollar amounts payable as salaries to judges (item 1), or had undertaken to *553deduct increased amounts from judicial salaries for pension contributions or the like and thereby brought about an absolute reduction in judges’ salaries (item 2), the constitutional prohibition against reduction in salary during a judge’s term of office would come into play. (Cf. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438, 451 [326 P.2d 484].) Neither of these events has occurred. Nor has any complaint been made of reduction in judicial salaries as a consequence of a general tax imposed on all salaries (item 3), which was the issue in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245 [64 L.Ed. 887, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519], the case which exempted the salaries of federal judges from the then newly-imposed general income tax. The reduction complained of here is related to the loss in purchasing power for all salaries (item 4). Plaintiffs do not directly complain of loss of purchasing power in judges’ salaries as a result of inflation and the depreciating value of the dollar, the issue unsuccessfully raised in Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, cert, denied (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718], but they present the point in indirect form by arguing that removal during an inflationary period of statutory protection against increases in the cost-of-living constitutes a reduction in salary contrary to article III, section 4 of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs argue that sitting judges during 1969 to 1976 had a legal expectation of annual increases in salary commensurate with increases in the cost-of-living as shown by the California consumer price index, a legal expectation that constituted a valuable part of their compensation, and that any diminution in the amount of such increases during their term of office effected an unconstitutional reduction in salary. Plaintiffs conclude that article III, section 4, which forbids reduction in salary during a judge’s term of office, likewise forbids modification of future salary increases called for under an automatic cost-of-living formula.

“Of equal general importance to this cause is another provision of the California Constitution, article VI, section 19, which authorizes the Legislature to prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record. That provision confers on the Legislature ‘the fullest measure of control, direction, ordination, and dictation over the matter of the amount and payment of judicial salaries. . . .’ (Sevier v. Riley (1926) 198 Cal. 170, 175 [244 P. 323].) Absent some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the salaries of all public employees, including judges, may be modified by legislative action. No officer or employee of the State of California has an immutable vested right to any specific salary. (Butterworth v. Boyd (1938) 12 Cal.2d 140, 150 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838]; Miller v. Kister (1885) 68 Cal. 142, 144 [8 P. 813]; *554cf. Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 813 [135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970].)

“Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the 1976 amendment to section 68203 asserts that article III, section 4, which prohibits any reduction in the salaries of elected state officers during their term of office, not only qualifies the Legislature’s plenary power to adjust current judicial salaries but prohibits legislative adjustment during a judge’s term of office in the cost-of-living formula established in 1969 by section 68203. In opposition, defendant argues that the legislative attempts in 1964 and 1969 to solve the perennial controversy over judicial salaries by adopting a cost-of-living formula to determine future judicial salaries, did not bind the Legislature to maintain indefinitely any particular cost-of-living formula for future judicial salaries. The constitutional issue posed is whether the 1976 modification of prospective cost-of-living increases in salary constituted a reduction in salaries as that term is used in the Constitution.

“A. The History of Article III, Section 4, Does Not Support Plaintiffs’ Interpretation of Its Meaning.

“Plaintiffs assert that article III, section 4, was expressly intended by the Legislature to prohibit revision of the prospective cost-of-living adjustments contained in section 68203. In support of their assertion plaintiffs submitted to the superior court materials which related to the background of the enactment of article III, section 4.

“From these materials it appears that in 1971 the then Governor attempted to prevent the 1970 cost-of-living increase for judges from coming into effect by a line-item veto of a budget appropriation which covered the increase in judicial salaries. The Attorney General gave an opinion to the Controller which concluded that ‘Section 68203 does not, of itself, appropriate funds necessary to support the increase required by Section 68203. . .,’ that although judicial salaries remained payable at the new and higher rate, they could not be paid except to the extent funds for the payment of judicial salaries had been appropriated. Thus, if the Governor were to adhere to his position, judicial salaries would be paid at the increased rates, but the funds appropriated to pay such salaries would become exhausted before the close of the fiscal year. On an annualized basis the veto would become effective to prevent full compliance with section 68203. Push did not come to shove, however, and the potential future fiscal crisis was averted when the Governor withdrew *555his line-item veto. Thereafter, the chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission personally drafted an amendment to the constitutional revision then under consideration in the Legislature, an amendment which added the second sentence to what is now section 4 of article III. ‘Salaries of elected state officers may not be reduced during their term of office. Laws that set these salaries are appropriations' (Italics ours.) This additional sentence remained in the final legislative version of the Constitution adopted by the electorate in November 1972.

“From this incident plaintiffs argue that the proponents of article III, section 4, expressly intended to prevent modification of prospective salary adjustments under section 68203—that is, to forbid future legislative modification of the automatic cost-of-living formula then contained in that section, even for future years and for future salary levels. This speculation seems wide of the mark. Plainly the proponents and draft-men of article III, section 4, meant to prevent a repetition of the line-item veto incident, a goal achieved by the second sentence of article III, section 4, which converts a salary law such as section 68203 into an appropriation and renders unnecessary a separate budget appropriation which a governor could veto. But it is one thing to view article III, section 4, as protective of salary increases that have become due and payable, and another to argue, as do plaintiffs, that it also prevents modification of all prospective salary adjustments. We find nothing in the legislative history of article III, section 4, and nothing in the 1971 veto incident to support that argument.

“Nor can plaintiffs derive support for their interpretation of article III, section 4, from the ballot arguments presented to the voters at the time of the adoption of the constitutional revision in November 1972. The arguments in the ballot pamphlet submitted to the voters were not only devoid of any disclosure of intent and purpose to prevent modification of prospective judicial salary adjustments, but to the contrary they suggested the absence of any such purpose. Insofar as they related to article III, section 4, the ballot arguments stated:

“‘A provision would be added to prohibit any reduction in the salaries of elected state officers during their term of office and to provide that laws setting those salaries are appropriations. This would eliminate the existing requirement that there be a specific appropriation enacted in the Budget Act, or otherwise, to pay salaries.'1

*556“‘The various revisions and deletions of existing language in the State Constitution proposed by this amendment will not result in any cost or revenue changes.'2

“‘Proposition 6 also protects elected State officers in all three branches of government by providing that their salaries can’t be reduced during the term for which they were elected and makes salary statutes appropriations. This will not increase the cost of government or cost the taxpayers more, but will strengthen the independence of all three branches of government.’3 (Italics added.) No reference was made to section 68203 or, indeed, to any aspect of the cost-of-living adjustment issue, other than the general statements that adoption of article III, section 4, ‘will not increase the cost of government or cost the taxpayers more’ and ‘will not result in any cost or revenue changes.’

“In short, the history of article III, section 4, indicates it was directed against a perceived evil—attempts by veto of appropriations to prevent payment of increased judicial salaries after cost-of-living adjustments had gone into effect and become due and payable. The materials before the court suggest that those who drafted article III, section 4, those who voted to put it on the ballot, and those who voted in its favor, never considered or intended that adoption of article III, section 4, would freeze into the constitutional landscape the statutory experiment in judicial cost-of-living salary adjustments set out in section 68203.

“B. Prospective Cost-of-Living Increases Are Not Salaries Within the Meaning of Article III, Section 4.

“Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 1976 amendment to section 68203 raises the question whether prospective cost-of-living increases—that is, increases which have not yet gone into effect—are salaries within the meaning of article III, section 4 of the Constitution. Two settled principles of constitutional law are relevant. The first is the presumption of constitutionality to which all legislation is entitled. (See, e.g., California *557Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594 [131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193].) The second is the canon that ‘where the Legislature has by statute adopted a reasonable construction of a constitutional provision its action has strong persuasive force and will ordinarily be followed.’ (Woodcock v. Dick (1950) 36 Cal.2d 146, 148 [222 P.2d 667]; see also Lundberg v. County of Alameda (1956) 46 Cal.2d 644, 652 [298 P.2d 1]; San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1920) 183 Cal. 273, 279 [191 P.26].) At bench, the Legislature’s implicit construction in 1976 that the word salary in article III, section 4, does not include prospective cost-of-living increases, was reasonably contemporaneous with its approval of article III, section 4, in 1972.

“Section 68203, as it existed when article III, section 4, was drafted and adopted, provided that on September 1 of each year ‘the salary of each justice or judge shall be increased’ by an amount determined by multiplying the ‘then current salary’ by the percentage increase in the California consumer price index. The use of the future tense ‘shall’ and the reference to ‘then current salary’ indicate that the Legislature did not view a prospective cost-of-living increase as part of a judge’s salary until that increase became due and was added to ‘then current salary’ to become the salary payable for the next 12 months. Likewise, salary is defined in the Judges’ Retirement Law (Gov. Code, § 75003) as ‘the compensation received by a judge as the emolument of the office of judge’ (italics added). This definition obviously does not embrace compensation payable in the future after cost-of-living adjustments have been made; clearly, under section 75003 a judge’s salary is the compensation he is currently being paid.

“In Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 69 [82 P. 674], the California Supreme Court, in a somewhat related context, refused to treat a prospective salary increase as included within the term salary. That case involved a constitutional provision entitling justices of District Courts of Appeal to the same salaries as justices of the Supreme Court. In 1905 the Legislature raised the annual salaries of Supreme Court justices from $6,000 to $8,000. However, due to the then constitutional prohibition against increases in the salaries of judges during their term of office, no Supreme Court justice was eligible to claim the higher salary until 1907, when two justices would begin to serve new terms. *558Plaintiff, a justice of a District Court of Appeal, claimed that because he had been appointed after the effective date of the 1905 increase, he was entitled to the higher salary under the constitutional provision making the salaries of District Court of Appeal justices the same as those of Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court rejected this claim stating: 'What, then, are the salaries of the justices of the supreme court to which those of the district court justices must for the present conform? Clearly not the salaries which may hereafter be payable under the amended statute when a new term of some of the justices of the supreme court shall have begun, but the present salaries now allowed and paid by them by law.’ (Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 69, at p. 72; italics added.) In other words, even though Supreme Court justices might have a future right to an increase in compensation, until the increase became effective it could not be considered salary within the meaning of the provision entitling District Court of Appeal justices to the same salary as Supreme Court justices. The salary of a Supreme Court justice was what he was then being paid. So here. The salary of an elected state officer is the amount he is presently being paid. For example, if in January 1976 the Legislature in its wisdom had passed a law making the salary of a Court of Appeal justice for the calendar year 1977 the same as that of a Supreme Court justice, and had then repealed the law in February 1976, thus returning future Court of Appeal salaries to their original amounts, under the reasoning of Harrison the prospective increase which never materialized could not be considered salary, and no reduction in salary would have occurred by reason of the repeal. Although former section 68203 provided that judges would receive annual cost-of-living increases, those future increases did not become salary within the meaning of article III, section 4, until they had become payable as current salary.

“To conclude the point, salary is present pay, not future pay.

“C. Elimination of a Prospective Increase in Salary Is Not a Reduction in Salary.

“Although no California court has decided the precise issue, three New Jersey cases have rejected the argument that elimination of a prospective increase in salary constitutes a reduction in salary. (Greenway v. Board of Education (1943) 129 N.J.L. 461 [29 A.2d 890, 145 A.L.R. 404]; Offhouse v. State Board of Education (1944) 131 N.J.L. 391 [36 A.2d 884]; Kopera v. Bd. of Ed. of Town of West Orange, *559Essex Co. (1960) 60 N.J.Super. 288 [158 A.2d 842, 846].) In Green-way, supra, a New Jersey statute prohibited local school boards from reducing teachers’ salaries. A local board’s existing teachers’ salary schedule, which provided future incremental salary increases for teachers, was repealed by the local board as an economy measure during the depression. A teacher contended that the repeal of the prospective increase by the local board constituted an impermissible reduction in salary contrary to the state statute. The New Jersey court disagreed, holding that increments do not become part of a teacher’s salary until they accrue, and that until accrual their modification does not constitute a reduction in salary. (29 A.2d at p. 891.) In Offhouse, supra, the court made the same point: ‘Only accrued increments under a valid and subsisting regulation of the local board are beyond repeal. Unaccrued increments do not take the classification of ‘salary’ within the intendment of [the statute].’ (36 A.2d at p. 887.) And in Ropera, supra, the court said: ‘The failure to receive an increase of salary does not constitute a reduction.’ (158 A.2d at p. 846.)

“Plaintiffs seek to distinguish these cases on the ground that they deal with a mere statutory prohibition against salary reductions and not with a constitutional prohibition. Such a suggestion misconceives the issue. The New Jersey statute, like the constitutional provision at issue here, prohibited salary reductions; the issue there, as here, was whether repeal by a subordinate body of prospective increases it had previously authorized constituted a reduction in salary within the meaning of the statutory prohibition. The New Jersey courts held it did not, stating: ‘Until the accrual, the modification or repeal of the rule providing for increments does not constitute a reduction of salary within the intendment of [the statute], A regulation providing for increments is a mere declaration of legislative policy that is at all times subject to abrogation by the local board in the public interest.’ (Offhouse v. State Board of Education, supra, 36 A.2d at p. 887.) The New Jersey cases thus furnish valuable precedent for resolution of the issue at bench.

“Apart from precedent, however, other fundamental considerations must be taken into account. The Constitution gives the Legislature ultimate responsibility for fixing judicial salaries (art. VI, § 19) nd for fixing other governmental salaries as well. In 1964 the Legislature first experimented with a system for automatically adjusting judicial salaries to the cost-of-living. By 1976, however, that experiment, viewed from the legislative perspective of state salaries as a whole, had produced an *560imbalance as a result of a salary structure which provided full cost-of-living adjustments for only one group of officers of only one branch of government. Obviously, the Legislature might have responded to imbalance by raising all state salaries to meet the pressures of inflation. For reasons of political economy it chose not to do so. Such concerns are the responsibility of the legislative branch, whose task in salary setting is difficult, delicate, and troublesome. The complexity of its task counsels judicial caution in construing article III, section 4 of the Constitution so broadly that any experiment with a new mechanism for determining future salary increases becomes cast in constitutional stone....

“Plaintiffs’ interpretation of article III, section 4, if accepted, would seriously cripple the power of the Legislature to take effective action in an important and sensitive area of its concern—its fixing of judicial salaries pursuant to article VI, section 19, of the Constitution. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation the Legislature would become a kind of sorcerer’s apprentice—able to turn on the money spigot but never able to shut it off. It is one thing to insist, as the Constitution does, that a present salary, once established, may not be reduced during a judge’s term of office; it is another to argue that a legislative experiment to find a better mechanism for setting judicial salaries has been transmuted into an irreversible economic grant. Our constitutional tradition, exemplified by such decisions as Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, cert, denied (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718], entrusts to the Legislature broad authority and responsibility over increases in judicial salaries. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 19.) We reject plaintiffs’ argument that article III, section 4 of the California Constitution precludes adjustment of future salary increases throughout a judge’s term of office.”

III. Disqualification of judges

Questions as to who should have adjudged this lawsuit were notably more troubling than Justice Clark’s brief discussion of the Rule of Necessity implies {ante, p. 537).

On January 16, 1978, counsel for plaintiffs (Messrs. Levit and Chernick) and defendant (Mr. Falk) stipulated as follows: “The parties waive their right to make any motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 as to judges Harry L. Hupp and Ernest J. Zack if *561this action is assigned to either of such judges but reserve their right to make any motion permitted by law if the case is assigned to any other judge.. . . ”

That reference to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 was significant. It is the section that governs the imperative challenge of a trial judge. Its potential impact was documented in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148]; cf. Martini, Legislators Urged to End Affidavit of Trial Judges, The Los Angeles Daily Journal (Dec. 12, 1979) page 1; letter from Maynard Craig, id., (Jan. 10, 1980) page 4. Since January 16, 1978 (the date the stipulation was filed), imperative challenges seem not to have been an issue in this case.

On November 22, 1978, Messrs. Levit and Chernick filed plaintiffs’ brief in the Court of Appeal. They stated: “Respondents offered to stipulate that the case be assigned to a judge pro tern (for example, a retired federal judge, a law school dean or professor, or the like) so that no judge who was affected by the litigation would be required to decide the matter. (C.T. 17-18.) Appellant declined such offer, but in any event (as Appellant concedes (C.T. 303)), under the Rule of Necessity, no California judge is disqualified from hearing this case. That rule has been uniformly recognized to operate to permit and require judges to determine causes in which all judges are financially interested in order to preserve access to the courts. In other words, if all judges are disqualified, none are.” (Italics added.)

Notwithstanding counsel’s contention that “it is not susceptible to doubt that...[the Court of Appeal, 2d District] is qualified, authorized, and required to decide the instant case,”1 Justices Lillie, Thompson, and Hanson on March 13, 1979, requested “that Division One be relieved of any and all further action in the within appeal.” (See their letter appended here as Annex A.) On March 20, an order signed by Acting Chief Justice Tobriner transferred the cause from Division One of the Court of Appeal to Division Two.

*562The Lillie-Thompson-Hanson letter (Annex A) is noteworthy because for the first time in this case, apparently, Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision 1 was mentioned. It appears to disqualify a justice or judge from sitting in any action when she or he is “a party” or is “interested.” (Because so many lawyers and judges recently seem to have discussed section 170 without evident awareness of its exact words, I append it here as Annex B.) Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to the “rule of necessity” in the code section, Justices Lillie, Thompson, and Hanson observed that it “... no doubt would permit us to sit and act on this appeal”.

On June 11, 1979, the opinion of Division Two of the Court of Appeal (Justices Fleming, Roth, and Beach) was issued; and matters pertinent to disqualification were disposed of as follows: “Members of this court may adjudicate the cause even though each is financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. Ordinarily, a justice may not pass judgment on any cause in which he has a personal interest, but when all justices in the state are, or may be, financially interested in the outcome, any of them may sit. (Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245 [64 L.Ed. 887, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519]; Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, 1035-1040, cert. den. (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718]; Caminetti v. Pac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 344, 366 [139 P.2d 908]; Brenkwitz v. City of Santa Cruz (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 812, 818 [77 Cal.Rptr. 705]; Bar-kin v. Board of Optometry (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720 [75 Cal.Rptr. 337]; Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 400, 404-405 [71 Cal.Rptr. 255].) In such instances... disqualification of all judges disqualifies none. The application of this rule has been discussed at length in Atkins v. United States, supra, a class action on behalf of all federal judges to recover additional compensation for their services as judges, and the exhaustive discussion of the issue in Atkins (pp. 1035 to 1040) makes further discussion here unnecessary. Under the rule of necessity this court, to which the cause was transferred by the California Supreme Court, is both qualified and obligated to decide the cause [italics added].”

*563Plaintiffs’ counsel then wrote the letter of July 20, 1979, to Chief Justice Bird and Justice Tobriner, that is appended here as Annex C. The next-to-last paragraph reads, “It is respectfully submitted that the above circumstances [see paragraphs 3 to 6 of the letter] suggest the appearance of possible bias and prejudice on the part of the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner with respect to the basic issues involved in this case, and that they therefore should disqualify themselves.”

Annex C first discusses Annex D here, which the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner wrote on June 16, 1978, as Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Annex C then recites that “Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Esq., the principal attorney for the defendant and appellant herein, is acting as co-counsel for the Chief Justice in a matter now pending before the Commission on Judicial Performance.” That “matter,” of course, was the 1979 partly public, partly private investigation of all seven Supreme Court justices.

In three letters dated September 24 and 26, 1979 (Annexes E, F, and G here), plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that Acting Chief Justice Manuel and Acting Justices Brown and Racanelli withdraw from the case.2 Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner, they did not recuse and, instead, participated in oral argument and in the calendar conference and have signed the majority opinion.

*564In sum, no trial judges but five appellate judges recused themselves in this case—three of them even though there was no challenge. Three others refused to recuse after challenge. An unfortunately unanswered question is whether the justices who did recuse did so for reasons regarding impartiality that in fact seem more compelling than every judge’s conceded interest concerning the amount of her or his monthly salary.

By participating in this case the seven justices here have respected the rule of necessity. Yet the majority opinion cites only Atkins, supra, 556 F.2d 1028. The most informative discussion I know of the perplexities and scope of the rule appears in section 12.04 of Professor Davis’ Administrative Law Treatise (plus his supplements) (hereafter Davis Treatise). His conclusions are etched by these introductory comments in section 12.03, which deals with “Interest”; “One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either way is disqualified by reason of interest to participate in the exercise of judicial functions. Most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to judges and to administrative adjudicators. [Fn. omitted.] The overshadowing and almost overwhelming fact about the law of disqualification for interest is that, as we shall see in the ensuing section, most of that law is largely defeated by the rule of necessity.” (Italics added.)3

Is it possible that my colleagues overlooked or ignored a corollary to the rule of necessity that might well have had a significant impact? That corollary is that judges who but for the rule would have been disqualified should exemplify a bend-over-backwards stance; that is to say, they should approach the proffered legal issues with both marked and exceptional care. (See the Davis Treatise at p. 166: “Whatever the principles . . . for ordinary cases, the extraordinary cases which impel courts to resort to the rule of necessity may often deserve extraordinary scrutiny....” See also pp. 358-359 of Davis, Administrative Law: Cases—Text—Problems (6th ed. 1977): “The easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is recognized in typical judicial opinions, for grave injustice may result from allowing disqualified officers to adjudicate cases. . . .[An] escape *565route. . .is. . .to review both more broadly and more intensively when the rule of necessity is invoked than when no bias gives rise to use of the rule of necessity.”) Is it perhaps regrettable that the words of the majority opinion disclose no honoring of that approach here?

A. For what reasons should judges be disqualified?

In California the law governing disqualification includes (1) Code of Civil Procedure sections 170 (Annex B here) and 170a to 170.8, plus a few unrelated statutes (e.g., Prob. Code, § 703; Gov. Code, §§ 11512, subd. (c) and 87101); (2) certain clauses in the state and federal Constitutions; (3) certain canons of judicial conduct and comparable rules; and (4) countless written opinions of courts and other adjudicative bodies. (A brief bibliography is appended here as Annex O; see too Annex K.)

Interestingly, counsel in Annexes C, E, F, and G do not stress that law. It is surprising that, in so many California cases where disqualification issues have arisen, lawyers and judges have proceeded to argue and decide the issues without appropriate search and citation. Disqualification law is perhaps less complex than tax law, say, or corporate securities law; but by no means is it accurately portrayed in judges’ and law professors’ folklore, news commentators’ assumptions, or lawyers’ untutored assertions. “Bias,” “prejudice,” “fair and impartial,” “interest,” and related words are like so many words in our state’s laws. For enlightenment, legal research is essential. The chances are that reliable guidance only rarely will be found in newspaper and TV editorials, speeches at bar meetings, and common catechisms.

B. Should a judge continue to sit even when she or he would like to withdraw from a case?

The oath of office requires that each judge “well and faithfully discharge the duties” of judging. That means, I believe, that none of us should recuse herself or himself merely because a litigant so requests. Nor should a judge recuse merely because she or he thinks there is too much other work to do, or wants to get off the hot seat, or is fearful that participation and relevant rulings might inspire criticism, ridicule, or political attack.

Prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 (the procedure for imperative challenges of a trial judge), this court de*566dared: “Under the Constitution of this state a superior judge has certain powers and duties to perform. Upon assuming his office he takes and subscribes to an oath that he will support the state and federal Constitutions and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of his office as a judge of the superior court to the best of his ability.... One of those duties is to hear and determine causes presented to him unless in a particular cause he is disqualified or unable to act. He may not evade or avoid that duty. In proceedings too numerous to need citation of authority a superior judge has been required to discharge that duty when no good cause appeared to justify a refusal to act.” Austin v. Lambert (1938) 11 Cal.2d 73, 75 [77 P.2d 849, 115 A.L.R. 849] (italics added).

Those words, I submit, still govern every appellate judge and, absent a proper imperative challenge, every trial judge. (See also Swan v. Talbot (1907) 152 Cal. 143, 144 [94 P. 238].)

Also pertinent are these widely known comments of Justice Rehnquist in 1972: “Every litigant is entitled to have his case heard by a judge mindful of [the federal] oath. But neither the oath, the disqualification statute, nor the practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantees a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with his understanding of the Constitution and the law. . . . ” (409 U.S. at p. 838 [34 L.Ed.2d at p. 61].) Further, “. . .1 conclude that the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualification in this case. Having so said, I would certainly concede that fair-minded judges might disagree about the matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of disqualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself simply because I do regard the question as a fairly debatable one, even though upon analysis I would resolve it in favor of sitting. [II] Here again, one’s course of action may well depend upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification. Those Federal Courts Of Appeals That Have Considered The Matter Have Unanimously Concluded That A Federal Judge Has A Duty To Sit Where Not Disqualified Which Is Equally As Strong As The Duty To Not Sit Where Disqualified.” (409 U.S. at p. 836 [34 L.Ed.2d at p. 60]; italics his, capitals mine; see Note, Justice Rehnquist’s Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum (1973) 73 Colum.L.Rev. 106; cf. Aryeh Neier’s review of The Brethren in The Nation (Feb. 2, 1980) pp. 118, 120: “At the time Douglas recused himself, my view was that he wanted to avoid casting the deciding vote upholding flag desecration while the effort to impeach *567him was still smoldering. A controversy over the flag could have ignited it again. I would have been happy to find another view in The Brethren instead of misinformation that could have been easily avoided.”4)

Concluding Remarks

Part III of this opinion reflects a hope that further discussion of recusal and disqualification may be nurtured. My intent is to imply no criticism of any judge. Like Justice Rehnquist (quoted above), I note that, “fair-minded judges might disagree.” Yet I believe strongly that the troubling issues should be aired and that precedential rulings should not be entombed in unpublished orders and other papers available only in court clerks’ offices.

I have not yet discussed procedures for disqualification. The rules are complex. Not enough is known about them or their history in California, especially as to appellate judges. Appropriate analysis requires the untangling of a morass of precedents and practices that unjustifiably would lengthen my comments here. (See the brief discussion of Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6 at the beginning of my Part III, above; cf. the 2d par. (et seq.) of subd. 5 of § 170 (Annex B here), which governs trial judges only.)

New law on the role of substitute courts and the rule of necessity that could have great procedural impacts was indorsed in Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 482 [159 Cal.Rptr. 494, 601 P.2d 1030] (“where... all the Supreme Court justices were ultimately disqualified, the Chief Justice is empowered to make the assignment [of pro tern justices] under the rule of necessity”). (Cf. Kleps, Disqualifications, *568Substitute Courts and Assigned Judges, L. A. Daily Journal (Oct. 3, 1979); and see the last paragraph of Annex P here; also Annex Q.5)

For full awareness of the innumerable rules that do affect the well and faithful discharge of judges’ duties, not only our consciences but *569also both substantive and procedural requirements will have to be searched and researched with much care. Temptations to recuse and formal motions for disqualification are likely to multiply because (1) more and more lawyers may decide to exploit challenges as newly honed weapons of advocacy, and (2) challenges inevitably will be part of the now-recognized and disturbing politicization of many judicial concerns. (Cf. fn. 3, ante-, People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 545-546 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328].) California will benefit, I suggest, if its judges respond to those problems as they do to the many other problems involving law that often confound us sorely but impede us not.

The petition of appellant Cory for a rehearing was denied May 30, 1980. Bird, C. J., and Tobriner, J., did not participate therein. Brown (G. A.), J.,* and Racanelli, J.,* participated therein. Newman, J., and Racanelli, J.,* were of the view that the petition should be granted and then rendered the following separate opinions dissenting to the denial of rehearing.

Dissenting. On May 30, 1980, five justices concluded (1) that in this case there should be no rehearing, and (2) that nonetheless their “opinion” must be modified. I set forth here (in Part I) the reasons for my belief that a rehearing is needed and also (in Part II) the modifications of my earlier opinion that, because of the majority’s modifications and because of facts and arguments that seem to me to appear only in the rehearing documents, I now regard as essential. I dissent:

Part I. Why is a rehearing needed?

The California Constitution in article VI, section 14 distinguishes between “opinions of the Supreme Court” and “[decisions of the Supreme Court.” As to opinions, the only express commands in the Constitution are (1) that the Legislature provide for prompt publication of those the court deems should be published, and (2) that the opinions so selected be available for publication by any person.

The command that affects decisions is notably more comprehensive. Whenever decisions “determine causes [they] shall be in writing with reasons stated.” There are no exceptions. Yet what has happened in this *570case, apparently, is that the majority while purporting to modify their opinion have in fact modified their decision. Have they stated any reasons? The answer is No. Therefore it seems that they have acted unconstitutionally. (See too Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(a): “. . . Where an opinion is modified without change in the judgment. . . such modification shall not postpone the time that the decision becomes final. ..; but if the judgment is modified. .. the period specified herein begins to run anew, as of the date of the modification.”)

In what critical respects has the decision here been altered? The majority now decide first, that judges serving protected terms should not get a salary that “will continue after 1 January 1977 to increase in proportion to the CPI” (see the first sentence in fn. 9 of their original opinion, which is being deleted); and second, that a judicial pensioner must suffer correspondingly (i.e., the base for his or her benefit after the expiration of a protected term may not reflect a salary that has increased in proportion to the Consumer Price Index).

Also, certain judges and pensioners will be affected by the new holding that a protected term, even when it has not expired by running its course (“in the case of trial judges, no later than the first Monday in January 1981 and, in the case of appellate justices, no later than the first Monday in January 1987”), nonetheless will be deemed terminated “by death of the incumbent, by retirement, by election or removal to another office, or by other departure from office.” (See the majority’s new fn. 10. ) Inexplicably, that is so notwithstanding the phrase “a judge elected to an unexpired term serves the remainder of the term” that appears in article VI, section 16, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.1

*571No reasons have been put forth to justify those alterations. Thus the Constitution’s command that “[decisions. . .be in writing with reasons stated” has been disregarded.

Further, this court still does not know exactly who among the judges and pensioners may adversely be affected by the alterations. Yet many of them have not been heard, within the meaning of due process requirements, because they received no notice of any intent so to modify the initial decision. To accord the opportunity to be heard is a compelling reason why rehearing should be granted. We should not pretend that the majority’s modifications are inherently or demonstrably uncon testable.2

In addition we should not pretend that the briefs and other papers received here since March 27 merely restate arguments that were considered by the court prior to issuance of the initial opinions. On the contrary the new focus on practical complexities and inequities, which indeed are troubling, requires thorough reanalysis of the majority’s original assumptions and presumptions regarding legislative intent.3

*572Part II Modifications of the dissenting opinion

1. The last paragraph commencing on page 231 of 27 Cal.3d is deleted; and these two paragraphs are added on page 234, immediately following the first two lines:

By participating in this case the seven justices here have respected the rule of necessity. Yet the majority opinion cites only Atkins, supra, 556 F.2d 1028. The most informative discussion I know of the perplexities and scope of the rule appears in section 12.04 of Professor Davis’ Administrative Law Treatise (plus his supplements) (hereafter Davis Treatise). His conclusions are etched by these introductory comments in section 12.03, which deals with “Interest”: “One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either way is disqualified by reason of interest to participate in the exercise of judicial functions. Most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to judges and to administrative adjudicators. [Fn. omitted.] The overshadowing and almost overwhelming fact about the law of disqualification for interest is that, as we shall see in the ensuing section, most of that law is largely defeated by the rule of necessity.” (Italics added.)3

Is it possible that my colleagues overlooked or ignored a corollary to the rule of necessity that might well have had a significant impact? That corollary is that judges who but for the rule would have been disqualified should exemplify a bend-over-backwards stance; that is to say, they should approach the proffered legal issues with both marked and exceptional care. (See the Davis Treatise at p. 166: “Whatever the principles. . for ordinary cases, the extraordinary cases which impel courts *573to resort to the rule of necessity may often deserve extraordinary scrutiny....” See also pp. 358-359 of Davis, Administrative Law: Cases—Text—Problems (6th ed. 1977): “The easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is recognized in typical judicial opinions, for grave injustice may result from allowing disqualified officers to adjudicate cases. . ..[An] escape route... is... to review both more broadly and more intensively when the rule of necessity is invoked than when no bias gives rise to use of the rule of necessity.”) Is it perhaps regrettable that the words of the majority opinion disclose no honoring of that approach here?

2. Footnotes 2 and 3 are inverted, and “2” substituted for “3” on p. 233.

3. The paragraphs that follow are substituted for the paragraph that introduces the opinion beginning on page 219 of 27 Cal. 3d:

I dissent. One year ago, in another politically sensitive case, I quoted Learned Hand as follows (People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 538): “‘When we ask what Congress [or another legislature] “intended”, usually there can be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete occasion.’ (United States v. Klinger (2d Cir. 1952) 199 F.2d 645, 648.) The distinguished justice added, ‘He who supposes that he can be certain of the result, is the least fitted for the attempt.’”

How might this salary case have been decided if each of us on the court had projected himself conscientiously into the 1964, 1969, 1972, and 1976 positions of those legislators who “uttered the words” that are contained in the legislative measures pertinent here? In 1969, for instance, what if a legislator in debate (or the Legislative Counsel, in his summary) had stated, “Interested observers have noted that (1) for incumbent appellate judges, increases based on the Consumer Price Index will irrevocably be guaranteed until those judges’ terms expire, and (2) for some incumbents the terms will not expire until 1982”?

What if a legislative committee chairman had advised: “For each judge you are being asked to approve an ‘employment contract’ and to endorse his or her ‘promised compensation’ [ante at pp. 538, 539]. *574The bill as now drafted means you are about to adopt ‘agreements of employment. . [that] are binding and constitutionally protected’ [ante, p. 538], Its ‘full cost-of-living provision’ would require our State to pay all judges ‘the represented compensation [including full cost-of-living increases] for their terms of office’; that is, for some judges until 1982—more than 12 years from now [id.]. Further, regardless of the salaries that, in future years, laws will set for all other state officers and employees, the Legislature may never impair the contracts with judges that this bill would adopt unless there is some ‘“emergency” serving to protect “a basic interest of society”’ [ante, p. 539].”

In brief summary, I dissent here because I am persuaded that no evidence whatever suggests that the California Legislature ever intended (1) to promise judges anything, (2) to adopt any formally recognized “agreements of employment” [ante at p. 538], or (3) to preclude modification by statute of cost-of-living adjustments that demonstrably were experimental and tentative.

If this court’s 1980 views had been forecast by anyone, if slide-rule projections of the now grotesquely swollen and embarrassingly out-of-line salaries—-cultured anachronically in the medium of the Consumer Price Index plan—had been reported, if the pay scales that now have won the majority’s blessing had earlier been arrayed in full Winchester Mystery House splendor,* I think it is inconceivable that the legislators would have enacted and left unchanged the pending proposals—in 1969, for unrestricted use of the Consumer Price Index and, in 1972, for rigidifying by Assembly Constitutional Amendment not only the salaries of elected state officers but also (as hindsight now seems to counsel) the unique salary-adjustment-formula for incumbent judges.

Finally, as will be explained, I think my colleagues have failed to answer several arguments ably set forth in the Court of Appeal opinion in this case (by Fleming, J. with Roth, P. J. and Beach, J. concurring).

*575RACANELLI, J.*—Dissenting.

I join in the separate dissenting opinion Part I of Justice Newman. The failure to grant rehearing and to permit intervention by those petitioning classes of judges and pensioners treated unequally under our original decision works a manifest injustice to such discriminated classes who have been effectively foreclosed from independently asserting their respective interests. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (b).) Moreover, the sensitive institutional policy questions raised by that decision mandate rehearing in order that such unresolved issues may be fully considered and determined.

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Opinion

Defendants, Controller of the State of California and Auditor-Controller of the County of Los Angeles, appeal from judgment declaring unconstitutional 1976 legislation purporting to place a limit on cost-of-living increases previously provided for judicial salaries.1 The statute as amended was held unconstitutional by the superior court on grounds it constitutes an impermissible impairment of vested *537contractual rights (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9) and conflicts with California Constitution, article III, section 4.2

Defendants contend that placing a limit on current provisions providing for cost-of-living increases to judicial salaries does not impair the vested or contractual rights of judges in office or of judicial pensioners. Additionally, defendants contend that the amendment to section 68203 does not reduce judicial salaries in violation of Proposition 6. We reject defendants’ contentions and affirm in part the judgment of the superior court.

In amending section 68203 the Legislature attempted in effect first to maintain judicial salaries at the 1 September 1976 level for 22 months, and then to limit prospective increases beginning on 1 July 1978 to 5 percent regardless of the actual increase in the California Consumer Price Index (hereinafter CPI). (See fn. 1, ante.) Without the amendment judges would have been entitled to a 5.327 percent increase beginning on 1 September 1977. After the defendant Controller announced he would not pay such an increase, plaintiffs—judges in office and judicial pensioners—commenced this action for declaratory relief.

Conflict of Interest

We consider first whether we may hear and adjudicate the cause, recognizing each member of this court is financially interested in the outcome. The rule of necessity provides that a judge is not disqualified from adjudicating a cause because of personal financial interest if there is no other judge or court available to hear and resolve the cause. (See Atkins v. United States (1977) 556 F.2d 1028 [214 Ct.Cl. 118].) It is immediately apparent that all California judges have at least an involuntary financial interest in this case. To disqualify one would disqualify all, depriving them and their surviving spouses of opportunity to litigate their case. This court as now constituted is qualified to hear and determine the issues before us.

Abridgment of Vested or Contractual Rights of Judges in Office

We recognize the often quoted language that public employment is not held by contract and therefore is not protected by the contract clause. (Markman v. County of Los Angeles (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 132, *538134-135 [110 Cal.Rptr. 610]; see also Butterworth v. Boyd (1938) 12 Cal.2d 140, 150 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838].) Those and other cases involve purported rights to remain in office or to continued public employment. On the other hand, we deal here with the right to compensation by persons serving their term of public office to which they have undisputed rights. “[P]ublic employment gives rise to certain obligations which are protected by the contract clause of the Constitution. ...” {Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal. 2d 848, 852-853 [179 P.2d 799]; see also California League of City Employee Associations v. Palos Verdes Library Dist. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [150 Cal.Rptr. 739].) Promised compensation is one such protected right. {Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 308-309 [152 Cal.Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1].) Once vested, the right to compensation cannot be eliminated without unconstitutionally impairing the contract obligation. {Id., at p. 314.) When agreements of employment between the state and public employees have been adopted by governing bodies, such agreements are binding and constitutionally protected. {Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 304, quoting from Glendale City Employees Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 337-338 [124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609].) In the instant case the Legislature in 1969 adopted the full cost-of-living increase provision, binding the state to pay persons employed at the represented compensation for their terms of office.

Prior to the 1976 amendment judges had a vested right not only to their office for a certain term but also to an annual increase in salary equal to the full increase in the CPI during the prior calendar year. with the 1976 amendment the state purported to withdraw that right unilaterally thus impairing a vested interest.3 *539The question remaining is whether in the circumstances of this case the impairment is in some way permissible.

In Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296 this court reiterated the four factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U.S. 398 [78 L.Ed. 413, 54 S.Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481] warranting legislative impairment of vested contract rights. Those factors are: (1) the enactment serves to protect basic interests of society, (2) there is an emergency justification for the enactment, (3) the enactment is appropriate for the emergency, and (4) the enactment is designed as a temporary measure, during which time the vested contract rights are not lost but merely deferred for a brief period, interest running during the temporary deferment. (23 Cal.3d at pp. 305-306.)

In applying these standards the enactment’s severity must be measured to determine “the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear.” (Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978) 438 U.S. 234 [57 L.Ed.2d 727, 98 S.Ct. 2716].) This court stated in Sonoma County that impairing a granted increase in wages goes to the heart of the employment contract and is therefore severe and permanent. (Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, 308-309.) Therefore the state’s hurdle in applying the four factors in the instant case is heightened because section 68203 is an impairment affecting the heart of the employment contract.

Defendants, offering no reason or justification for the state action, fail even to approach their burden of demonstrating the impairment of plaintiffs’ rights is warranted by an “emergency” serving to protect a “basic interest of society.”

A judge entering office is deemed to do so in consideration of—at least in part—salary benefits then offered by the state for that office. If salary benefits are diminished by the Legislature during a judge’s term, or during the unexpired term of a predecessor judge (see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16; Gov. Code, §§ 71145, 71180), the judge is nevertheless entitled to the contracted-for benefits during the remainder of such term. The right to such benefit accrues to a judge who served during the period beginning 1 January 1970 to 1 January 1977, *540whether his term of office commenced prior to or during that time period. “An employee’s contractual pension expectations are measured by benefits which are in effect not only when employment commences, but which are thereafter conferred during the employee’s subsequent tenure.” (Betts v. Board of Administration, supra, 21 Cal.3d 859, 866.)4

A judge who completes one term during which he was entitled to unlimited cost-of-living increases and elects to enter a new term has impliedly agreed to be bound by salary benefits then offered by the state for the different term. Thus, while a judge is entitled to a salary based on unmodified Government Code section 68203 throughout a term ending, for instance, in 1978, his salary for a new term beginning on or after the effective date of the 1976 amendment—1 January 1977—will be governed by the statute as amended. Likewise, a judge entering office for the first time on or after 1 January 1977, including a judge entering upon his Own term or upon the unexpired term of a predecessor judge, cannot claim any benefit based on section 68203 before the 1976 amendment.

As will be seen, our conclusions based on the contract clause as affecting salaries of judges in office are consistent with our conclusions regarding Proposition 6.

Abridgement of Vested or Contractual Rights of Judicial Pensioners

The 1976 amendment, in addition to impairing the vested rights of judges in office, also impairs those of judicial pensioners.5 A long line of this court’s decisions has reiterated the principle that a public employee’s pension rights are an integral element of compensation and a vested contractual right accruing upon acceptance of employment. (Betts v. Board of Administration, supra, 21 Cal.3d 859, 863; Kern v. *541City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848, 852-853.) In Betts, this court held that a former state treasurer who had served in that office from 1959 to 1967 was entitled to a pension on the basis of the law in effect at the time of his termination rather than the modified law in effect at the time of his application for pension benefits in 1976. {Id., at pp. 867-868.) The statute in effect in 1976 purported to withdraw benefits to which he had earned a vested contractual right while employed. Although an employee does not obtain any “absolute right to fixed or specific benefits... there [are] strict limitations] on the conditions which may modify the pension system in effect during employment.” {Betts v. Board of Administration, supra, 21 Cal.3d 859, 863-864.) Such modifications must be reasonable and any “‘changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages.’” {Id., at p. 864.) Since no new comparable or offsetting benefit appeared in the modified plan, we held the 1976 statute unconstitutionally impaired the pensioner’s vested rights.

In the present case the state has purported to modify pension rights with the amendment of section 68203. Between 31 December 1969 and 1 January 1977, a judicial pensioner was entitled to receive benefits based on a specified percentage of the salary of a judge holding the judicial office to which the retired or deceased judge was last elected or appointed. (Gov. Code, § 75000 et seq.) The salary for such a judicial office—if the retired or deceased judge served in office during the period 1970 to 1977—was convenanted to increase annually with the increase in the CPI. The 1976 limitation on increases in judicial salaries is, in turn, calculated to diminish benefits otherwise available to those judicial pensioners. Such modification of pension benefits works to the disadvantage of judicial pensioners by reducing potential pension increases, and provides no comparable new benefit. Again, we conclude that defendants have failed to demonstrate justification for impairing these rights or that comparable new advantages were included and that section 68203 as amended is unconstitutional as to certain judicial pensioners.

Contractually, each judicial pensioner is entitled to some fixed percentage of the salary payable to the judge holding the particular judicial office to which the retired or deceased judge was last elected or appointed. (See e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 75032, 75033.5, 75060.6, 75076, 75077, 75091, 75093, 75094, 75096, 75096.1, 75096.3.) Accordingly, a judicial pensioner cannot claim impairment of a vested right arising out *542of the 1976 amendment except when the judge holding the particular judicial office could also claim such an impairment. The resolution of pensioner vested rights, then, is dependent on the foregoing resolution of judges’ vested rights left unimpaired by the 1976 amendment.

Judicial pensioners whose benefits are based on judicial services terminating while section 68203 provided for unlimited cost-of-living increases in judicial salaries, acquired a vested right to a pension benefit based on some proportionate share of the salary of the judge or justice occupying the particular judicial office including the incumbent judge’s or justice’s unlimited cost-of-living increases.

Judicial pensioners whose benefits are based on judicial services terminating before the effective date of applicable law providing for unlimited cost-of-living increases, have no vested right to benefits resulting therefrom. Legislation providing for unlimited cost-of-living increases was first enacted in 1964 to become effective on 1 January 1965, although the statute then provided for quadrennial increases based on a different index than the CPI. (Stats. 1964, First Ex. Sess., ch. 144, p. 518, § 4.) However, it is not necessary for our purposes to determine a judicial pensioner’s right as being vested. Vested or not, a pensioner’s right entitles him or her to benefits based on the prevailing salary for the judge or justice occupying the particular judicial office, regardless of the date of termination of judicial services giving rise to the pension.6 Finally, as in the case of judges or justices who enter upon a new or unexpired term of a predecessor judge after 31 December 1976, benefits of judicial pensioners based on the salaries of such judges will be governed by the 1976 amendment.7

*543Reduction of Judicial Salaries as a Violation of California Constitution, Article III, Section 4

Judges are state officers. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 1, 16; see also Spreckles v. Graham (1924) 194 Cal. 516 [228 P. 1040].) Therefore, the prohibition against reducing state officers’ salaries includes judicial salaries. (See fn. 2, ante.)

The word “salaries” in Proposition 6 (see fn. 2, ante) must bear the same meaning in both contexts in which it appears in that constitutional provision. (See Miller v. Dunn (1887) 72 Cal. 462, 466 [14 P. 27].) Legislative history demonstrates that the provision “[l]aws that set these salaries are appropriations” was drafted in 1972 to forestall the effect of a budgetary “line-item” veto. Such a veto could not effectively eliminate funding for an existing provision of law—such as judges’ salaries including a cost-of-living increase—when the statute is an appropriation. The word “salaries” in the last sentence of Proposition 6 is thus intended to mean cost-of-living salaries because the appropriating law then provided for annual cost-of-living adjustments. It follows that the provision in Proposition 6 that “[s]alaries of elected state officers may not be reduced during their term of office” forecloses during that term any limitation on cost-of-living increases even though such increases were first provided by the Legislature during that same term. To the extent that the 1976 amendment to Government Code section 68203 contemplates such limitations it is unconstitutional.

Policies underlying Proposition 6 support our interpretation. The primary purpose of that constitutional provision is to “strengthen the independence of all three branches of the government,”8including the judiciary. Security of both tenure and subsistence are important factors in creating and maintaining an independent judiciary. These factors are *544met by insuring relatively long, fixed terms of office (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16; Gov. Code, § 71145) and foreclosing reduction in salary during term of office. Should the state arbitrarily limit the cost-of-living salary, the level of subsistence would be reduced.

Defendants rely on Atkins v. United States (1977) 556 F.2d 1028 [214 Ct.Cl. 186]. Atkins involved a claim by federal judges that Congress unconstitutionally reduced salaries by refusing to increase salary levels in the face of continuing inflation. However, the federal judges, unlike plaintiff judges, did not have the benefit of a guaranteed statutory cost-of-living provision. Moreover, no action was ever taken to place a limitation on salaries already fixed by Congress. In contrast, the Legislature has provided California judges with a cost-of-living provision as part of their established salaries.

Applicability

. Having concluded the 1976 amendment to Government Code section 68203 infringes upon constitutionally protected rights when applied to some but not to all judges, it is apparent that if so applied salary disparity among peer judges will result. While it is established that the Legislature may create different salary levels for different officers or employees performing similar duties (see Gov. Code, § 18850 et seq.; Sevier v. Riley (1926) 198 Cal. 170 [244 P. 323]; Crawford v. Payne (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 485 [55 P.2d 1240]), a further question arises whether an enactment which has immediate constitutional application in some instances but only prospective application in others, satisfies constitutional requirements.

The issue raised is not one of severability in the usual sense. No part of the enactment is constitutionally infirm and therefore no question arises as to whether part of the enactment taints the remainder so as to render the whole a nullity. (See Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 330-335 [118 Cal.Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605]; In re Blaney (1947) 30 Cal.2d 643, 655 [184 P.2d 892].) Further, the amendment to section 68203 is incapable of mechanical severance and must survive, if at all, as a wholly integrated enactment. If it does so survive, then its application to particular judges during their protected terms of office must be deferred to the end of each such term.

The issue presented has been dealt with by this court in similar factual situations. The court has concluded that when an enact*545ment suffers from a temporary constitutional defect its applicability is merely delayed until such time as the constitutional bar ceases to exist. In Busch v. Turner (1945) 26 Cal.2d 817 [161 P.2d 456, 171 A.L.R. 1063], legislation increasing salaries of public officials was confronted with a constitutional provision precluding an increase in compensation during a term in office. Before the term of one such official had expired the constitutional provision was amended and implementing legislation was enacted removing the bar to an increase in the official’s compensation. This court held that the provision for increased compensation was merely held in abeyance as to that official during the period of the statute’s constitutional infirmity, to become applicable when the constitutional bar was removed. After referring to other decisions in which constitutionally inapplicable statutes were deferred until a change of circumstances permitted applicability, the court stated: “These decisions. .. represent a specific application of the general principle that statutes will be construed, if their language permits, so as to avoid unconstitutionality. The court [in those cases] thus held, in substance, that the Legislature intended the statutes to be operative at the earliest time the Constitution would permit, but not before.. . ‘The old law stands and controls the right to compensation until the time arrives at which, by the constitution, the new law is permitted to supersede it. . . .’” (Id., at p. 820; see also Regan v. County of San Mateo (1939) 14 Cal.2d 713 [97 P.2d 231]; Galeenerv. Honeycutt (1916) 173 Cal. 100 [159 P.2d 595]; Smith v. Mathews (1909) 155 Cal. 752 [103 P. 199]; Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 69 [82 P. 674]; Kilroy v. Whitmore (1931) 115 Cal.App. 43 [300 P. 851]; Shay v. Roth (1923) 64 CaLApp. 314 [221 P. 967].)

While the bar in Busch was removed by constitutional amendment and in the instant case the running of a judge’s protected term renders the amendment applicable as to him, “[t]he reason why the prohibition ceases to operate is entirely immaterial. ...” (Busch v. Turner, supra, 26 Cal.2d 817, 821.) This court concluded in Busch that there is “no constitutional objection” to a statutory interpretation giving prospective effect to a provision constitutionally inapplicable on the stated effective date. (Id., at pp. 821-822.)

We adhere to the rule of construction in Busch and the cases on which it relies. No different rule is warranted where, as here, the enactment can be applied to different judges at different times. We conclude that the 1976 amendment to Government Code section 68203 fixes salaries of all judges—and benefits of judicial pensioners grounded on *546such salaries—except during completion of particular protected terms of office as defined above. In the absence of express legislative intent we should rely on the settled rule of construction presuming legislative intent. Thus in Busch it is stated without reference to actual legislative expression that the courts have “in substance” held that the Legislature intended statutes to be operative at the earliest time the Constitution would permit. {Id., at p. 820.) Presumed legislative intent follows in part from the recognized rule that statutes will be construed when possible to avoid unconstitutionality. The 1976 amendment is thus construed to avoid unconstitutionality by a presumed legislative intent that it be temporarily inapplicable to fix salaries of those judges to whom it cannot be constitutionally applied. The same rule of construction and presumed legislative intent is stated by this court in Smith v. Mathews, supra, 155 Cal. 752 to serve as “precedent for the construction of all future acts of the same character.” (Id., at p. 760.) Our presumption of legislative intent is bolstered by the further presumption that the Legislature in adopting the amendment to section 68203 was aware of the existing rule of construction making the amendment prospectively applicable in those instances of temporary constitutional infirmity. (See Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977 [140 Cal.Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394]; Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 65 [81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137],)9

Conclusion

We conclude that Government Code section 68203 as amended in 1976, insofar as it would limit cost-of-living salary increases as provided by section 68203 before the 1976 amendment, cannot be constitutionally applied to (1) a judge or justice during any term of office, or unexpired term of office of a predecessor, if the judge or justice served some portion thereof (a “protected term”) prior to 1 January 1977, and (2) a judicial pensioner whose benefits are based on some proportionate amount of the salary of the judge or justice occupying that office.

The salaries of judges and justices as fixed on 1 September 1976 constituted equal compensation for all judges and justices in a particular *547peer group (the “base salary”). (See Gov. Code, §§ 68200-68203.) Salaries for judges and justices never having served in a protected term are fixed by the legislative scheme to be at any time the 1976 base salaries increased annually by the percentage increase in the CPI not to exceed 5 percent, beginning on 1 July 1978 (the “statutory salary”). However, salaries for judges and justices while serving a protected term will be increased above the 1976 base on 1 September each year beginning 1977, by the percentage increase in the CPI for the prior calendar year. There will thus be a disparity in salaries within a peer group of judges or justices while any judge or justice within that group continues to serve a protected term. Such disparity will continue, in the case of trial judges, no later than the first Monday in January 1981 and, in the case of appellate justices, no later than the first Monday in January 1987. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5, subd. (a), § 16, subd. (a); Gov. Code, § 71145.)

A judge or justice who completes a protected term and voluntarily embarks upon a new term can no longer claim to serve in a protected term, and his or her compensation will thereafter be governed by the provisions of section 68203 as amended in 1976.10 While that section speaks of annual increases in the salaries of “each justice or judge” by a percentage of the then current salary of “such justice or judge,” we do not deem this to mean that the salary of a judge or justice at the end of a protected term will be the salary at which the judge or justice commences a new, unprotected term should he or she succeed himself or herself. As stated {ante, pp. 544-545), section 68203 becomes fully applicable upon expiration of a protected term and it follows that the benefits derived from constitutional protections during that term cannot be projected into an unprotected term. Thus the salary at which any unprotected term is commenced—including the salary of a judge or justice leaving a protected and embarking upon an unprotected term—is the statutory salary then paid to judges or justices of equal rank who never served during a protected term.11 Although a salary of a judge or justice serving a protected term will be decreased upon entering a new term, such a result is constitutionally permissible as such a judge or justice *548has voluntarily embarked or will voluntarily embark upon a new term for which there was or is a legislatvely designated compensation.12

The judgment is affirmed as to any judge or justice who served any portion of his term or the unexpired term of a predecessor prior to 1 January 1977, and as to judicial pensioners whose benefits are based on the salary of such a judge or justice. In all other respects the judgment is reversed. All parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.13

Manuel, Acting C. J., Mosk, J., Richardson, J., Racanelli, J.,* and Brown (G. A.), J.,* concurred.