Powers v. Board of County Commissioners
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision. The 12 that cite it most often are listed here.
- American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. v. Meyer (10th Cir. 1997)
- Crocog Co. v. Reeves (10th Cir. 1993)
- Bolling v. City of Denver ex rel. McNichols (10th Cir. 1986)
- Gale v. City and County of Denver (10th Cir. 2020)
- Gale v. City and County of Denver (10th Cir. 2019)
- Stone v. Department of Aviation (10th Cir. 2006)
- Stone v. Department of Aviation (United States District Court for the District of Colorado 2003)
- Robert W. Stamm v. United Airlines, Inc., a Delaware Corporation (4th Cir. 1995)
- Givan v. City of Colorado Springs (Colo. App. 1994)
- Crocog Company v. Reeves (10th Cir. 1993)
- Cucharas Sanitation & Water District v. Mounsey (Colo. App. 1990)
- Wilson v. Town of Avon (Colo. App. 1987)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
Petitioner, Melba Powers, sought certio-rari review in the trial court under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) after the Board of County Commissioners of Larimer County (Board) determined that her parcel of land was not a separate and distinct lot under county and state subdivision regulations. Since a residence had already been built on the adjoining lot, the subject lot was rendered unusable by the Board’s action. Powers appeals the trial court’s refusal to permit amendment of her petition and its decision in favor of the Board. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The record reveals the following facts. The subject property is described as “Lot 3” on a plat which was prepared prior to 1966 *464 but never recorded. Following a series of conveyances of this lot and the adjacent lot, Powers purchased Lot 3 and petitioned the Board to determine that it was separate and distinct from the adjacent lot for purposes of development. The Board denied her petition.
Powers timely filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) petition with the trial court alleging that the Board had abused its discretion. After the Board had filed a responsive pleading, Powers moved to amend her petition by adding a claim for declaratory relief which challenged the constitutionality of the applicable state and local subdivision regulations. She contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend. We agree.
A petitioner’s constitutional and statutory challenges must be litigated in one action governed by the time limits of C.R.C.P. 106(b). Snyder v. City of Lake wood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975). When a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action is timely filed, public policy requires the joinder of all of the petitioner’s claims in one action. Norby v. City of Boulder, 195 Colo. 231, 577 P.2d 277 (1978). Thus, since Powers was not merely permitted but was required to bring her declaratory relief claim in the same action as her C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim, the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend.
In view of our disposition of the amendment issue, we need not consider Powers’ other contentions of error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to grant Powers’ motion to amend her complaint.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.