COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 14CA2167 Arapahoe County District Court Nos. 12JD798, 13JD76, 14JD476 & 14JD508 Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of D.Z.B.,

Juvenile-Appellee,

and Concerning Arapahoe County Department of Human Services,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division VI Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE LOEB Furman and Terry, JJ., concur

Announced February 23, 2017

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellee

Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Michael Valentine, Deputy County Attorney, Danielle Newman, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the

Department) appeals the juvenile court’s order placing D.Z.B., a

juvenile offender, in a Department-managed residential child care

facility in lieu of bond while the juvenile’s adjudication was pending.

The Department does not appeal D.Z.B.’s final adjudication as

delinquent or his ultimate sentence to the same residential facility.

Instead, the Department asserts that the court did not have the

authority to place D.Z.B. in the facility preadjudication and in lieu

of bond over the Department’s objection. Because we conclude that

the Department lacks standing, we dismiss the Department’s

appeal and express no opinion on the merits of the Department’s

appeal.

I. Background

¶2 The Department requested that the juvenile court certify the

court file for D.Z.B.’s juvenile proceedings for appeal, but did not

request any relevant transcripts. Thus, the facts below are taken

from the records in the court file.

¶3 D.Z.B. had a complex history with the Department and the

juvenile court beginning in 2012. Prior to the history recited below,

the juvenile court placed D.Z.B. in the care of the Department in

1 lieu of bond on multiple occasions. He repeatedly violated the

court-imposed conditions of his bond, and the juvenile court placed

him in increasingly supervised services (i.e. from in-home care, to

nonresidential treatment, to foster care, etc.).

¶4 As relevant here, in early 2014, D.Z.B. pleaded guilty in two

delinquency cases. The juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent

and sentenced him to probation that included a placement at

Jefferson Hills, a residential child care and treatment facility

managed by the Department. Apparently, this was the first time

D.Z.B. had been placed in a residential treatment facility. D.Z.B.

entered Jefferson Hills in February 2014, and he was diagnosed

with significant mental health and developmental issues during

that stay.

¶5 D.Z.B. subsequently began treatment and therapy and did well

at Jefferson Hills. He was successfully discharged from the facility

into the care of his father and, despite the recommendation from

Jefferson Hills, D.Z.B. received no in-home services following his

release.

¶6 Within two months of his release from Jefferson Hills, D.Z.B.

was charged with three additional delinquent acts. D.Z.B. was still

2 on probation at this time and, consequently, the prosecution sought

to revoke or modify probation in his two prior cases. D.Z.B. was

appointed a public defender and a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for his

pending delinquency and probation revocation matters. The public

defender requested that the Department investigate treatment and

confinement options for D.Z.B. at a pretrial conference on August,

12, 2014.

¶7 At a hearing on September 5, 2014, the GAL and defense

counsel argued for residential treatment both prior to adjudication

and as a sentence if D.Z.B. was adjudicated delinquent.1

¶8 At the same hearing, in response to defense counsel’s earlier

request for treatment options, the Department stated through

counsel that D.Z.B. had been accepted to four residential child care

facilities. However, at that time, the Department objected to D.Z.B.

being placed in one of the child care facilities in lieu of bond and

recommended that he be placed in the Division of Youth

Corrections if he were ultimately adjudicated delinquent. The

Department further argued that the juvenile court did not have the

1 Due to the lack of transcripts, we do not know what, if anything, the prosecution may have stated regarding its position on bond and, later, sentencing.

3 authority to order the Department to place D.Z.B. in a residential

child care facility prior to his adjudication when the Department

objected to such a placement.

¶9 The juvenile court ordered briefing on the issue of the court’s

authority to place D.Z.B. in a residential child care facility

preadjudication over the Department’s objection. The GAL, defense

counsel, and the Department filed briefs with the juvenile court one

week later on September 12. The prosecution apparently took no

stance as it did not file a brief.

¶ 10 On September 17, the juvenile court held a hearing regarding

preadjudication placement. The minute order in the record reflects

that the juvenile court allowed those present (the district attorney,

defense counsel, the GAL, and counsel for the Department) to make

a record regarding their respective views on placement. As

previously noted, the transcripts from the court’s hearings are not

part of the record on appeal. However, we assume that the

Department, D.Z.B., and the GAL made arguments consistent with

their briefs. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court

issued a minute order that “placement would be in lieu of bond to

4 [the Department] at an appropriate residential child care facility as

soon as placement is available.”

¶ 11 On September 19, the juvenile court signed a temporary

custody order, referencing its placement and bond order from

September 17, and placed D.Z.B. in the custody of the Department

effective on September 22, 2014, when placement at Jefferson Hills

was predicted to become available.2

¶ 12 At some point, the Department requested a written order from

the juvenile court regarding the court’s ruling that it had the

authority to order placement with the Department in lieu of bond.

The court issued a detailed written order on September 22, 2014,

concluding that it had the statutory authority to place D.Z.B. in lieu

of bond despite the Department’s objection; finding that it was in

the best interests of D.Z.B. and the community to order such a

placement; and placing D.Z.B. in Jefferson Hills in lieu of bond.

¶ 13 On October 16, the juvenile court adjudicated D.Z.B.

delinquent and sentenced him to probation on the condition that he

continue treatment at Jefferson Hills.

2The record is not clear as to who had legal and physical custody of D.Z.B. from September 17 through September 22.

5 ¶ 14 The Department now appeals the juvenile court’s September

22 written order concluding that the court had the authority to

place D.Z.B. in Jefferson Hills prior to adjudication and in lieu of

bond over the Department’s objection.3

II. Discussion

¶ 15 Because of the procedural posture of this case, the public

defender’s office is defending the juvenile court’s September 22

order even though the outcome of this appeal will have no practical

effect on D.Z.B.

¶ 16 In its answer brief, the public defender proffers five threshold

issues that it asserts necessitate the dismissal of this appeal:

mootness; untimeliness of the Department’s appeal; an insufficient

record for appeal; the lack of a final appealable order; and the

Department’s lack of standing to prosecute the appeal.

¶ 17 Because we agree that the Department lacks standing, we do

not address the remaining threshold issues. We also express no

opinion on the merits of the Department’s appeal, and do not

address those issues as well.

3 The Department concedes that the juvenile court has the authority to place a juvenile in a residential child care facility in lieu of bond when the Department does not object to the placement.

6 A. Standard of Review

¶ 18 A court does not have jurisdiction over a case unless the

plaintiff has standing to bring it. E.g., First Comp Ins. v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Office,

(Colo. App. 2011).

Therefore, we must first determine whether the Department has

standing before we can address the merits of its appeal. See

If

the Department does not have standing, we must dismiss the

appeal.

¶ 19 Standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that can be raised

at any time. Ainscough v. Owens,

(Colo. 2004);

Wibby v. Boulder Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs,

.

¶ 20 Standing is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.

E.g., Hawg Tools, LLC v. Newsco Int’l Energy Servs., Inc.,

.

B. Law

¶ 21 To establish standing, an appellant must demonstrate that (1)

it suffered injury in fact and (2) the injury was to a legally protected

interest. First Comp Ins.,

.

¶ 22 An injury that is overly indirect or incidental to the action is

not sufficient.

Instead, the injury prong of the standing

7 analysis requires a “concrete adverseness which sharpens the

presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.”

(quoting

Ainscough,

).

¶ 23 “Whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury was to a legally protected

interest ‘is a question of whether the plaintiff has a claim for relief

under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or

regulation.’” Barber v. Ritter,

(Colo. 2008)

(quoting Ainscough,

).

¶ 24 When, as here, an appellant brings a claim under a statute,

the standing inquiry turns on whether the statutory provision “can

properly be understood as granting persons in the [appellant]’s

position a right to judicial relief.” Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble

Living Trust,

(Colo. App. 2011) (quoting

Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp.,

(Colo. App. 2002)).

¶ 25 There are three factors to consider when determining whether

a statute confers standing to a particular plaintiff: “(1) whether the

statute specifically creates such a right in the plaintiff; (2) whether

there is any indication of legislative intent to create or deny such a

right; and (3) whether it is consistent with the statutory scheme to

imply such a right.” First Comp Ins.,

(quoting

8 Olson v. City of Golden,

(Colo. App. 2002)); see

also Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.,

.

¶ 26 Under certain circumstances, a nonparty to a civil action can

have standing to prosecute an appeal. See, e.g., People in Interest of

C.A.G.,

(Colo. App. 1995). Generally speaking,

a nonparty must still have suffered an injury in fact, and the injury

must be related to a legally protected interest. See, e.g., First Comp

Ins.,

. Further, “[i]f, following entry of final

judgment, it appears that the non-party was substantially aggrieved

by the disposition of the case in the trial court, a non-party has

standing to appeal.” C.A.G., 903 P.3d at 1233 (emphasis added);

see also Miller v. Clark,

,

(1960).

¶ 27 The word “aggrieved” refers to a substantial grievance such as

the denial to the party of some claim of right, either property or

person, or the imposition upon him or her of some burden or

obligation. AMCO Ins. Co. v. Sills,

(Colo. App.

2007). Thus, not every nonparty that is simply adversely affected

by a judgment is substantially aggrieved, and, thus, every nonparty

9 who has a grievance does not necessarily have standing to appeal.

C. Analysis

¶ 28 In its opening brief, the Department anticipated that standing

would be an issue on appeal and stated that although it was not a

party to the delinquency proceedings, it had standing to prosecute

the appeal because “the order granting legal custody of D.Z.B. to

the Department and requiring the Department to place D.Z.B. in

lieu of bond, thereby incurring the costs of placement, creates

sufficient cognizable interest to allow the Department to seek review

of the [juvenile court] order.” The Department thus appears to

argue that the cost of preadjudication placement is the injury in

fact or substantial grievance that gives it standing. In support of its

argument, the Department heavily relies on C.A.G.,

,

for the proposition that a custody order in favor of a county

department of human services confers standing on the Department.

¶ 29 We disagree with the Department’s contentions and conclude

that, on the record and under the circumstances here, the

Department does not have standing to prosecute this appeal. In

10 reaching this conclusion, we distinguish the facts here from those

described in C.A.G.

1. The Department Was a Nonparty

¶ 30 Although not dispositive, we start with the Department’s

concession that it is not a party to the delinquency actions against

D.Z.B. It appears from the minute order on September 5, 2014,

that the Department only appeared at the hearing because defense

counsel requested that it consider preadjudication placement

options for D.Z.B. It had no other role or interest in the outcome of

the delinquency actions against D.Z.B.

¶ 31 Even after filing a brief in support of its position that the

juvenile court did not have authority to place D.Z.B. over the

Department’s objection prior to adjudication, the Department was

not a party to the delinquency action and continued to have no

interest in the outcome of the case.

¶ 32 To have standing, the Department must, therefore, show that

any injury it sustained as a result of the juvenile court’s actions

was not a mere adverse effect, but a substantial grievance. See

AMCO Ins. Co.,

.

11 2. Injury in Fact

¶ 33 The Department’s alleged injury, the cost of placing D.Z.B. in

Jefferson Hills for less than one month, is, in our view, incidental to

D.Z.B.’s adjudication. See First Comp Ins.,

(for a

party to have standing, its injury in fact cannot be indirect or

incidental to the action).

¶ 34 The Children’s Code requires the state department of human

services (DHS) to oversee the administration of juvenile programs

and the delivery of services for juveniles. § 19-2-202, C.R.S. 2016.

In the juvenile justice context, the Children’s Code also requires

DHS to establish and operate facilities necessary for the care,

treatment, and rehabilitation of juveniles legally committed to its

custody. § 19-2-403, C.R.S. 2016. The Department is equally

tasked with these responsibilities because county departments of

human services are agents of DHS and are charged with the

administration of programs in their respective counties in

accordance with DHS’s rules and regulations. § 26-1-118(1), C.R.S.

2016 (“The county departments . . . shall serve as agents of [DHS]

and shall be charged with the administration of public assistance

and welfare and related activities in the respective counties in

12 accordance with the rules and regulations of [DHS].”). In other

words, as a county department of human services, the Department

is a “functional division[] of [DHS] for the convenient administration

of the state program and [is] not [an] independent entit[y] separate

and distinct from the state.” Wigger v. McKee,

(Colo. App. 1990) (quoting Nadeau v. Merit Sys. Council,

,

(1975)).

¶ 35 Therefore, the cost of placing D.Z.B. at Jefferson Hills while

his adjudication was pending directly arises from the Department’s

statutory functions under the Colorado Children’s Code, sections

19-1-101 to 19-7-103, C.R.S. 2016, and the Colorado Human

Services Code, sections 26-1-101 to 26-23-105, C.R.S. 2016. The

obligation and cost of caring for D.Z.B. at Jefferson Hills is

incidental to his delinquency action because the Department has a

statutory duty to care for and house children removed from their

homes in delinquency actions. See AMCO Ins. Co.,

-

76 (when a judgment exposes a nonparty to obligations not created

by the judgment, the nonparty does not have standing); cf. People v.

Padilla-Lopez,

(El Paso County Department of

Human Services is not a victim, for purposes of restitution, in a

13 child abuse case; the county department was not “aggrieved” by

“having to provide foster care and counseling” to the child victim

because “those costs are suffered by [the county department]

because of [the county department]’s statutory duty to provide

‘necessary shelter, sustenance, and guidance’ to dependent and

neglected children.” (quoting § 26-1-201(1)(f), C.R.S. 2011)).

¶ 36 Moreover, the Department has not shown an injury here. The

record does not provide any information as to the costs associated

with D.Z.B.’s preadjudication placement in Jefferson Hills. For

example, we do not know how Jefferson Hills is funded (i.e.

payment per client, payment for a certain number of beds

regardless of occupation, payment in a monthly rate assuming

100% occupancy, etc.); we do not know how much it cost, if

anything, to house D.Z.B. in Jefferson Hills for less than one month

(September 22 to October 16) before he was adjudicated and

sentenced. And, significantly, we do not know if the Department,

DHS, or some combination was responsible for paying for D.Z.B.’s

preadjudication placement. Thus, the Department’s allegation that

it was “significantly aggrieved” by the costs incurred by placement

is a conclusory statement and devoid of support in the record. And,

14 even if the costs were proven, costs of temporary placement are

hardly the type of injury that “sharpens the presentation of issues,”

First Comp Ins.,

(quoting Ainscough,

), in an adjudication action because such costs had no bearing

on the outcome of the final adjudication or the sentence and

treatment that D.Z.B. received as part of his adjudication.

3. Injury to a Legally Protected Interest

¶ 37 Even if the Department had shown an injury in fact that was a

substantial grievance directly related to this delinquency action, we

conclude the injury was not to a legally protected interest.

¶ 38 The Department argued below and argues on appeal that the

juvenile court did not have authority under the Children’s Code to

order a preadjudication placement with the Department in lieu of

bond over the Department’s objection. Thus, it is making a

statutorily based argument allegedly supported by the Children’s

Code. When a plaintiff makes a claim based on a statute, that

statute must confer standing upon the plaintiff to do so. See

Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., ¶15; Barber,

; First Comp

Ins.,

. We, therefore, must consider whether the

Children’s Code can properly be understood to grant the

15 Department, a county human services agency, a right to judicial

relief in a delinquency action. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., ¶ 15;

Vickery,

. In making that determination, we

consider whether the Children’s Code specifically confers standing

to the Department, whether the Children’s Code gives any

indication of legislative intent to create or deny standing to the

Department, and whether it would be consistent with the statutory

scheme to infer the Department’s standing. See First Comp Ins.,

.

¶ 39 First, the Children’s Code does not expressly confer standing

to the Department or DHS to intervene in a juvenile court’s

determination for preadjudication placement. As the Department

points out, the Children’s Code rarely references county human

services departments. Moreover, any such references are in the

context of custodians of juveniles after adjudication and sentencing.

See, e.g., § 19-2-906.5, C.R.S. 2016.

¶ 40 Second, the legislative intent of the Children’s Code is, among

other things,

[t]o secure for each child subject to these provisions such care and guidance . . . as will best serve his welfare and the interests of

16 society; . . . [t]o remove a child from the custody of his parents only when his welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be endangered . . .; and [t]o secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.

§ 19-1-102(1)(a), (c), (d), C.R.S. 2016. Moreover, the General

Assembly has stated that “the juvenile justice system shall take into

consideration the best interests of the juvenile, the victim, and the

community in providing appropriate treatment to reduce the rate of

recidivism in the juvenile justice system and to assist the juvenile in

becoming a productive member of society.” § 19-2-102(1), C.R.S.

2016 (emphasis added). These goals emphasize the best interests

and care of the juveniles; they do not indicate any intention to

create or deny standing for human service agencies such as the

Department and are, to the contrary, silent as to the Department’s

role in implementing the Children’s Code.

¶ 41 Also, the Children’s Code provisions regarding preadjudication

placement, for example, sections 19-2-508 and -509, C.R.S. 2016,

do not directly implicate the Department. Section 19-2-508(1)

provides for the care of the juveniles in shelters, detention facilities,

17 or temporary holding facilities who have been removed from their

homes as a result of a delinquency action. The statute specifically

provides that a juvenile court can hold a juvenile without bond and

place him or her in a preadjudication service program established

pursuant to statute. § 19-2-508(3)(a)(IV)(E), C.R.S. 2016.4 It is

silent as to the role of a human services agency despite the fact that

said agencies are charged with managing detention and holding

facilities. Similarly, under section 19-2-509(2), the juvenile court

has the authority to place a juvenile in a preadjudication service

program in lieu of bond without mention of the role, if any, of

human services agencies such as the Department. Specifically, the

statute is silent as to whether the Department may essentially veto

a preadjudication placement by an objection.

¶ 42 Each of these statutes provides for the protection, care, and

treatment of the juvenile; they do not indicate any legislative intent

4 Because we are concerned with whether the statute confers standing on the Department, we do not consider the merits of the Department’s argument that the juvenile court lacked authority because Jefferson Hills was not a “preadjudication service program” contemplated in this statute. Such an argument has no bearing on whether the intent of the statute was to confer standing on the Department.

18 to create or deny standing to the Department under the

circumstances here.

¶ 43 Third, as previously mentioned, the Children’s Code does not

provide protections for the Department. Rather, it provides for the

protection, care, and treatment of juveniles subject to its provisions

and, as relevant here, children removed from their homes for

delinquent acts. We have found no statute, and the Department

does not cite any, that indicates that conferring standing on the

Department to interfere with a juvenile court’s decision regarding

preadjudication placements is consistent with the framework of the

Children’s Code. The General Assembly’s own legislative

declarations make it clear that the Children’s Code was established

for the protection and rehabilitation of children, not the protection

of a human services agency’s interests.

¶ 44 Thus, we conclude that the Children’s Code does not confer

standing on the Department to challenge a juvenile court’s ruling

regarding preadjudication placement. As a result, the Department

does not have standing to prosecute this appeal.

19 4. C.A.G. is Distinguishable

¶ 45 As noted earlier, the Department relies on C.A.G. for its

argument that it has standing despite being a nonparty to the

delinquency action. But the Department’s reliance on that case is

misplaced.

¶ 46 In C.A.G., a division of this court concluded that a county

department of human services (the county department) had a

legally cognizable interest sufficient to prosecute an appeal of an

adjudication order finding the juvenile delinquent and ordering the

county department to provide certain services to C.A.G. and to

provide him with an “appropriate education.” C.A.G.,

. The division emphasized that the county department

had legal custody of the juvenile and that the juvenile court ordered

the county department to provide the juvenile an “appropriate

education” while not in the physical custody of the county

department.

¶ 47 The Department argues that the temporary custody order

placing D.Z.B. in its legal custody, specifically at Jefferson Hills, is

analogous to the custody order and order for educational services in

20 C.A.G. and, therefore, it has standing to prosecute the present

appeal.

¶ 48 We conclude that C.A.G. is distinguishable. To the extent that

C.A.G. includes language broad enough to confer standing on the

Department and other county human services agencies generally in

every case in which they were granted temporary custody, we

respectfully disagree. E.g., People in Interest of S.N-V.,

, 914 (Colo. App. 2011) (one division of the court of appeals is

not bound by a decision of another division).

¶ 49 The division in C.A.G. explicitly restricted its conclusion that

the county department had a “legal cognizable interest sufficient” to

prosecute the appeal to the circumstances of that case. C.A.G.,

(“We conclude that, under the circumstances present

here, . . . .”). The division’s ultimate holding on standing thus

reflects a limitation that a legal custody order does not always

confer standing: “the burden imposed by [a legal custody] order

may obviously ‘substantially aggrieve’ the person upon whom it is

placed.”

(emphasis added). This limited holding is

consistent with the law in Colorado that a nonparty who is

adversely affected by a judgment is not necessarily substantially

21 aggrieved and, thus, does not necessarily have standing. AMCO Ins.

Co.,

.

¶ 50 In our view, the determinative circumstances in C.A.G. were

that the county department was appealing from a final adjudication

order that placed legal custody with the county department and

ordered the county department to provide an appropriate education

for the juvenile while he was not in the county department’s

physical custody. Moreover, the adjudication order required the

county department to file with the court a plan describing how it

proposed to meet the unique obligations that the juvenile court had

imposed.

¶ 51 The circumstances with D.Z.B. were notably different from

those in C.A.G. Unlike in C.A.G. where the county department was

contesting the final adjudication order, here the Department is

appealing from a temporary order placing D.Z.B. in its custody

while he awaited final adjudication. The fact that the county

department in C.A.G. was appealing the final adjudication order is

significant because the cases cited by the division in C.A.G. hold

that nonparties can have standing to appeal final judgments when

the disposition substantially aggrieved the nonparty. C.A.G., 903

22 P.2d at 1233 (citing Maul v. Shaw,

(Colo. App. 1992);

Robert-Henry v. Richter,

(Colo. App. 1990)). Here,

the Department is not contesting the final judgment or disposition,

only the temporary order for preadjudication placement. The

Department does not argue that it was substantially aggrieved by

the final disposition of the case, only that it was substantially

aggrieved by the cost of D.Z.B.’s temporary placement at Jefferson

Hills during the pendency of the adjudication proceeding.

¶ 52 Moreover, as explained above, we think it significant that the

Department was not ordered to do anything that it was not already

required to do by statute — house D.Z.B., a juvenile removed from

his home in a delinquency matter, in one of its facilities. In

contrast, the division in C.A.G. was concerned with an adjudication

order that required the county department to undertake a task that

it was ill-equipped to do — educate the juvenile when it did not

have physical custody of him.

. The juvenile court in

C.A.G. recognized the uniqueness of the situation because it

ordered the county department to present a written plan as to how

it would accomplish the tasks the court ordered.

. In

this case, by contrast, there was no such onerous or unique burden

23 imposed on the Department, and the Department was not required

to present a plan to the juvenile court for successful completion of

its obligations under the preadjudication order. There was no

question of successful completion because all the Department had

to do to fulfill the order was transport D.Z.B. to Jefferson Hills and

house him there until his final adjudication.

¶ 53 Hence, the only way that the Department could have been

aggrieved was, as it alleged, by paying for D.Z.B.’s short stay at

Jefferson Hills prior to his adjudication — a grievance that fell

within its statutory duty to provide services to juveniles and, in our

view, did not cause the Department to be “substantially aggrieved.”

§§ 19-1-102, 19-2-102, 26-1-118(1); AMCO Ins. Co.,

; C.A.G.,

.

¶ 54 We also note that C.A.G. is distinguishable from this case

because of the difference in the basis of the agencies’ arguments.

In C.A.G., the county department was objecting to the adjudication

order on the grounds that the county department was not properly

equipped to provide an “appropriate education” while C.A.G. was in

his parents’ home rather than in the physical custody of the county

department. C.A.G.,

. The division in C.A.G.

24 emphasized that legal custody was with the county department only

because the county department, as C.A.G.’s legal guardian, was

required to act as a de facto parent, and its objection to the court’s

order requiring appropriate education was based on that parens

patriae status.

. While the county department in C.A.G.

also mentioned the lack of funding for such an undertaking and

argued that the juvenile court did not have the authority to order

educational services while the juvenile was not in its physical

custody, the agency’s underlying concern was how it could

successfully carry out such an order for the benefit of C.A.G.

¶ 55 Here, by contrast, the Department did not base its argument

on the best interests of D.Z.B. or whether it could have been

successful in housing D.Z.B. prior to adjudication. Indeed, this

appeal will not affect D.Z.B.’s adjudication, treatment, or probation

at all. The Department’s argument, instead, was based solely on

the alleged expense of D.Z.B.’s preadjudication confinement, an

expense routinely incurred by the Department as a result of its

required statutory functions as an agency of DHS. Thus, although

the Department may have been “adversely affected” by the court’s

September 22 order, it was not substantially aggrieved because the

25 obligation of housing D.Z.B. when he was removed from his home

preadjudication arose from the Department’s statutory duties under

the Children’s Code. AMCO Ins. Co.,

.

III. Conclusion

¶ 56 Because the Department lacks standing, we dismiss its

appeal.

JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE TERRY concur.

26