Peo v. Jones
Peo v. Jones
Peo v. Jones
Opinion
19CA0551 Peo v Jones 10-07-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 19CA0551
City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CR5447
Honorable Shelley I. Gilman, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael Jones,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Fox and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 7, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Shelby A. Krantz, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Robin M. Lerg, Alternate Defense Counsel, Montrose, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
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¶ 1 Defendant, Michael Jones, appeals his conviction for robbery,
contending there was insufficient evidence to support it. We
disagree and affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 After meeting codefendant Carla Garnier at a bus stop, Jones
decided to spend the day with her while she ran errands. They
ultimately ended up at a different bus stop where the “regulars” she
knew said that the man who had robbed her a week earlier was
present. As Jones watched, Garnier confronted the victim and
demanded that he “give [her her] fucking money back.” The
“regulars” began hitting the victim as Garnier continued to demand
her money. When the victim refused her demand, Garnier held him
by the waist and attempted to take his wallet. The victim broke
free and ran across the street. Garnier chased after him while
Jones remained at the bus stop.
¶ 3 Shortly thereafter, Jones walked to the street corner while
pushing a man in a wheelchair. Garnier chased the victim across
the street again to where Jones was standing. When the victim
reached the street corner, Jones stepped off the curb and stuck out
his arm. The victim hit Jones’ arm and fell to the ground. While
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the victim was still on the ground, Garnier rummaged through his
pockets and took his wallet
¶ 4 Garnier and Jones then walked away and got on a bus. They
left the bus, however, when they saw the victim speaking to the bus
driver. Instead, they boarded a different bus and left the scene.
¶ 5 The State charged Jones with robbery under a complicity
theory of liability. At trial, defense counsel argued that Jones did
not know Garnier had planned to rob the victim and, therefore, he
could not have intended to help her with the robbery. The jury
disagreed and convicted him as charged.
II. Sufficiency of Complicitor Liability
¶ 6 Jones contends the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence of knowledge and intent to support his robbery conviction
under a complicity theory of liability. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 7 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review de novo “whether the relevant evidence, both
direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to
support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is
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guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clark v. People,
232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010) (quoting People v. Bennett, 183
Colo. 125, 130, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973)). In making this
determination, the reviewing court may not re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, the weight of testimony, or the adequacy of
a defendant’s defense. People v. Nunez, 9 P.3d 261, 267 (Colo.
1991). The reviewing court “is not permitted to act as a thirteenth
juror and set aside a verdict just because it might have drawn a
different conclusion had it been the trier of fact.” People v. McIntier,
134 P.3d 467, 471-72 (Colo. App. 2005); People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d
154, 163 (Colo. App. 2001).
¶ 8 As relevant here, a person commits robbery when he
“knowingly take[s] anything of value from the person or presence of
another by the use of force, threats, or intimidation.” § 18-4-301,
C.R.S. 2020. A person acts “knowingly” “with respect to conduct or
to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when
he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such
circumstance exists.” § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2020.
¶ 9 Complicity is a legal theory of liability in which “[a] person is
legally accountable as [a] principal for the behavior of another
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constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or
facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets,
advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing
the offense.” § 18-1-603, C.R.S. 2020; see also People v. Childress,
this theory, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted
with
(1) the intent, in the commonly understood
sense of desiring or having a purpose or
design, to aid, abet, advise, or encourage the
principal in his criminal act or conduct, and
(2) an awareness of those circumstances
attending the act or conduct he seeks to
further that are necessary for commission of
the offense in question.
Childress, ¶ 29. The phrase “circumstances attending the act or
conduct” is defined as “those elements of the offense describing the
prohibited act itself and the circumstances surrounding its
commission, including a required mental state, if any.” Id.
¶ 10 A complicitor need not possess the same mental state required
for the underlying offense; he only needs to “act with an awareness
the principal is or would be acting with that required mental state.”
Id. And a defendant’s mental state can be proven by circumstantial
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evidence rather than direct evidence. People v. Collie, 995 P.2d 765,
773 (Colo. App. 1999) (“Evidence of a defendant’s intent can ‘rarely
be proven other than by circumstantial or indirect evidence.’”
(quoting People v. Valenzuela, 825 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Colo. App.
1991))). The jury may infer a defendant’s mental state from his
conduct and other evidence, including the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. People v. Grant, 174
P.3d 798, 812 (Colo. App. 2007); People v. Yascavage, 80 P.3d 899,
902 (Colo. App. 2003), aff’d, 101 P.3d 1090 (Colo. 2004).
B. Analysis
¶ 11 Contrary to Jones’ contention, we conclude that the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence of Jones’ knowledge,
based on the following evidence:
• Testimony that Jones was with Garnier when the
“regulars” told her that the man who had robbed her the
week prior was at the same bus shelter.
• Testimony that Jones witnessed Garnier confront the
victim and demand that he “give [her her] fucking money
back.”
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• Surveillance video showing Jones watching Garnier grab
the victim by the waist and chase after him.
¶ 12 As well, we conclude that the prosecutor presented sufficient
evidence of Jones’ intent to aid or abet Garnier, based on the
following evidence:
• Surveillance video showing Jones step off the curb, hold
his arm out, and cause the victim to fall to the ground.
• Surveillance video showing Jones stand by as Garnier
rummaged through the victim’s clothing to take his
wallet.
• Surveillance video showing Jones and Garnier walk away
together, board a bus, leave the bus, and eventually leave
the scene on a different bus.
¶ 13 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones committed
robbery under a complicity theory.
III. Conclusion
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.