Peo v. Cejudo-Arredondo
Peo v. Cejudo-Arredondo
Peo v. Cejudo-Arredondo
Opinion
18CA0482 Peo v Cejudo-Arredondo 10-07-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0482
El Paso County District Court No. 16CR6534
Honorable Marcus S. Henson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ramon Cejudo-Arredondo,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Freyre and Tow, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 7, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ryan A. Crane, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Chelsea E. Mowrer, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Ramon Cejudo-Arredondo, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of various
charges of sexual assault on a child and sexual assault on a child
(position of trust) and a number of sentence enhancers. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 Cejudo-Arredondo’s wife provided child care for a number of
children, including the victims in this case, sisters L.V. and H.V. At
the time, L.V. was eight years old and H.V. was six years old.
¶ 3 Shortly after L.V. and H.V.’s mother stopped taking her
daughters to “Nana,” as she was known to the girls and their
mother, L.V. and H.V. told their mother that Cejudo-Arredondo,
whom they knew at “Tata,” had sexually abused them on many
occasions while they were in his house and van.
¶ 4 The victims’ mother contacted law enforcement. A forensic
interviewer, Deborah Paton, interviewed L.V., and a different
forensic interviewer, Beth Kirk-Small, interviewed H.V. Following
an investigation, the People charged Cejudo-Arredondo with
numerous sex crimes.
¶ 5 Both victims testified at trial, as did the forensic interviewers,
investigating officers, the victims’ mother, a forensic medical
2
examiner, and a “cold” (or “generalized,” see People v. Cooper, 2021
CO 69, ¶ 1 n.1) expert in “victim-offender dynamics,” Gayle
Christensen. Cejudo-Arredondo’s theory of defense was that L.V.
and H.V. had made up their allegations because they didn’t want to
be in day care.
¶ 6 A jury convicted Cejudo-Arredondo of most, but not all, of the
charges.
II. Discussion
¶ 7 Broadly stated, Cejudo-Arredondo makes two contentions on
appeal: (1) certain testimony by the forensic interviewers and the
cold expert impermissibly bolstered the victims’ credibility and (2)
the prosecutor said things in opening statement and closing
argument that ran afoul of various limitations on prosecutorial
conduct. Cejudo-Arredondo also argues that even if none of the
errors individually warrants reversal, they do cumulatively. We
reject all of these contentions.
A. Expert Testimony
¶ 8 A witness may not testify that another witness told the truth
on a particular occasion. People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1081
(Colo. 2009). This prohibition applies, of course, to cases involving
3
alleged sexual assaults on children and to “both direct and indirect
implications of a child’s truthfulness.” Venalonzo v. People, 2017
CO 9, ¶ 32.
¶ 9 With respect to expert testimony in such cases, Colorado
appellate courts have distinguished between testimony about
typical or at least not uncommon behavior of children claiming to
have been sexually assaulted — which is permissible to educate
jurors, particularly with respect to conduct that might seem
counterintuitive — and testimony that, even by implication, conveys
the expert’s opinion that the child was telling the truth about
having been assaulted — which is impermissible. Compare People
v. Fasy, 829 P.2d 1314, 1315-17 (Colo. 1992) (expert’s testimony
that sexual assault can cause post-traumatic stress disorder and
the child suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder was
admissible), and People v. Short, 2018 COA 47, ¶¶ 13-20 (testimony
of a cold expert who answered hypothetical questions matching the
circumstances of the case was admissible), and People v. Rail, 2016
COA 24, ¶¶ 59-72 (cold expert’s testimony about certain behavior of
child victims that matched circumstances of the case was
admissible), and People v. Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 3-5 (Colo. App.
4
1999) (cold expert’s testimony about various aspects of sexual
abuse and a hypothetical that matched the facts of the case was
admissible), with Venalonzo, ¶¶ 35-36 (forensic interviewer’s
testimony that the alleged victims’ behavior was common to that of
other child assault victims she had interviewed and that some
forensic interviews had led to the dropping of charges was
that an eight-year-old child is unlikely to hyper-report sexual abuse
allegations for the purpose of being seen as a victim was
inadmissible), and People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 16-19 (Colo.
1999) (expert’s testimony that child’s report of a sexual assault was
“sincere” was inadmissible), and People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081,
1083, 1086-88 (Colo. 1989) (expert’s testimony that child’s
description of events was “very believable” was inadmissible;
distinguishing cases involving expert testimony that the victim
behaved in a way typical of sexual assault victims), and People v.
Snook, 745 P.2d 647, 648-69 (Colo. 1987) (social worker’s testimony
that children tend not to fabricate stories of sexual abuse was
(doctor’s testimony that child had suffered sexual abuse was
5
(therapist’s testimony that children rarely lie about having been
sexually abused by an adult, and that, in her experience, children
lie about such things only in two particular circumstances was
inadmissible).
¶ 10 Sometimes it is relatively easy to determine when an expert’s
testimony about child sex assault crosses the line. Sometimes it
isn’t. It may be particularly difficult to make that call when the
testimony is by an expert who testifies as to both the typical (or
perhaps not uncommon) behavior of children alleging sexual
assault and how the victim in the case behaved. What is clear is
that an expert’s testimony in this regard isn’t inadmissible merely
because it inadvertently bolsters the child’s credibility. Relaford, ¶
30. Nor is testimony that (1) victims typically behave in certain
ways and (2) the alleged victim behaved consistently with such
behavior necessarily inadmissible. Glasser, 293 P.3d at 78. And
even more clearly, testimony about the typical behavior of child sex
assault victims isn’t inadmissible merely because the alleged victim
exhibited such typical behavior. Were the rule otherwise, testimony
6
about typical victim behavior would never be admissible. That
obviously isn’t the law.
¶ 11 In this case, Cejudo-Arredondo challenges various parts of
Paton, Kirk-Small, and Christensen’s testimony, none of which his
trial counsel objected to. We conclude that the district court didn’t
abuse its discretion, see Venalonzo, ¶ 15, by admitting any of that
testimony, for, as they pertain to the particular aspects of the
challenged testimony, one or more of the following reasons.
• Much of the challenged testimony was about the typical
behavior of children whom the witnesses had
interviewed.
• The fact the victims displayed behavior typical of children
claiming sexual assault, either in their interviews —
which were shown to the jury — or their trial testimony,
didn’t render the experts’ testimony inadmissible.
• The experts spoke in terms of children whom they had
interviewed, without characterizing them all as victims.
• None of the experts said or implied that they believed L.V.
or H.V.
7
• Some of the testimony simply related what the experts —
and therefore the jurors — saw in the video-recordings of
the forensic interviews. That wasn’t expert opinion.
• Some of the testimony was merely about the children’s
responsiveness and demeanor during the interviews (for
example, that L.V. was able to describe well how she felt
during the alleged assaults).
• Cejudo-Arredondo mischaracterizes or takes out of
context some of the challenged testimony.
¶ 12 In sum, though there is a line that experts may not cross, we
aren’t persuaded that any of the three experts crossed that line.
Though their testimony may have incidentally buttressed L.V. and
H.V.’s credibility, that isn’t enough for us to conclude that their
testimony was inadmissible.
1
1
We also conclude that, given the murkiness of some of the case
law on this question and the nature of the challenged testimony,
there was no obvious error. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14
(plain error must be obvious).
8
B. Prosecutor’s Statements
¶ 13 We assess a prosecutor’s alleged improper statements in two
parts. First, we determine whether the statements were improper,
taking into account the totality of the circumstances. Wend v.
People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010). Second, if any statement
was improper, we determine whether it warrants reversal, applying
the appropriate standard of reversal. Id. In this case, because
defense counsel didn’t object to any of the statements challenged on
appeal, that standard is plain error.
¶ 14 Cejudo-Arredondo contends that during opening statement
and closing argument, the prosecutor offered his personal opinions
as to the evidence and Cejudo-Arredondo’s guilt, attempted to
inflame the jurors’ passions against him, misstated and shifted the
burden of proof, suggested knowledge of information not in
evidence, and denigrated the defense.
¶ 15 We tend to agree with Cejudo-Arredondo’s argument that the
prosecutor’s suggestion that L.V. and H.V. would continue to
disclose additional details of the assault for “the rest of their li[ves]”
was likely improper. As well, the prosecutor perhaps said
something unsupported by the evidence when he said, “What
9
[children are] really lacking is usually the ability to come up with
some complex evil scheme and motive.” But aside from these two
arguably improper remarks, we don’t see anything improper in the
statements Cejudo-Arredondo challenges. With respect to the
remainder of the challenged statements, Cejudo-Arredondo takes
them out of context, they are comments based on evidence (and
reasonable inferences therefrom) introduced at trial, Cejudo-
Arredondo mischaracterizes and twists them, and/or they are
permissible rhetorical flourish. See People v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71,
¶ 61 (a prosecutor has wide latitude to argue based on facts in
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts); People
v. Allee, 77 P.3d 831, 837 (Colo. App. 2003) (within limits, a
prosecutor may employ rhetorical devices and engage in oratorical
embellishment and metaphorical nuance).
¶ 16 Assuming the two instances of improper statements were
obvious, we aren’t persuaded that they so undermined the
fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the
reliability of the convictions. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.
The remarks were fleeting and the jury acquitted Cejudo-Arredondo
10
of some counts, indicating that the jury wasn’t swayed to decide the
charges on some improper basis.
C. Cumulative Error
¶ 17 To reverse based on cumulative error, we would have to
conclude that “the cumulative effect of [multiple] errors and defects
substantially affected the fairness of the trial proceeding and the
integrity of the fact-finding process.” Howard-Walker v. People,
2019 CO 69, ¶ 24. As discussed above, we don’t believe the two
possibly improper remarks meet that standard.
III. Conclusion
¶ 18 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE TOW concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.