Peo v. Amonette
Peo v. Amonette
Peo v. Amonette
Opinion
19CA1778 Peo v Amonette 10-07-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 19CA1778
Garfield County District Court No. 10CR402
Honorable James B. Boyd, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Phillip Michael Amonette,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 7, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Phillip Michael Amonette, Pro Se
1
¶ 1
Defendant, Phillip Michael Amonette, appeals the district
court’s order denying his “Motion to Re-Hear Motion for Return of
Property.” We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2
A jury found Amonette guilty of first degree assault of a peace
officer and criminal mischief. People v. Amonette, slip op. at 2
(Colo. App. No. 12CA2329, Mar. 31, 2016) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(f)). The charges stemmed from evidence that Amonette
shot a police officer who had responded to a domestic dispute
between Amonette and his girlfriend. Id. at 1. The trial court
sentenced him to twenty-nine years in prison on September 25,
2012. A division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction
on direct appeal. Id.
¶ 3
Nearly seven years later, Amonette filed a motion requesting
that property “taken upon his arrest” be returned to his “next of
kin.” He listed the property as (1) a Leatherman SuperTool with
case; (2) a Zippo brand lighter with case; (3) a Bic lighter with silver
and turquoise case; (4) a small Kershaw pocket knife; (5) a leather
belt; (6) a pair of leather work boots; and (7) a “‘small amount of
currency’ (in bills) and change.” In his motion and reply in support
2
of his motion, he argued that the court had ancillary jurisdiction to
consider his request under People v. Hargrave, 179 P.3d 226 (Colo.
App. 2007).
¶ 4
The prosecution responded, relying on People v. Chavez, 2018
COA 139, and People v. Wiedemer, 692 P.2d 327 (Colo. App. 1984),
for the proposition that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
Amonette’s motion because it was filed after he was sentenced. The
prosecution further asserted that, even if the district court declined
to follow Chavez and Wiedemer, it lacked authority under Hargrave
because “[t]here is a dispute as to whether the property is subject to
return,” and resolving that inquiry would involve substantial new
factfinding proceedings. See Hargrave, 179 P.3d at 229-30
(describing the limited nature of the proceedings).
¶ 5
Relying on Chavez and Wiedemer, the district court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on Amonette’s motion. Amonette
filed a “Motion to Re-Hear Motion for Return of Property.” The
district court denied this motion too, concluding that its “original
order correctly applied the law.” Amonette appeals from the denial
of this second motion.
3
II. Jurisdiction
¶ 6
Divisions of this court have differed on whether a district court
retains jurisdiction in a criminal case to consider a motion for
return of property after sentencing.
¶ 7
In Wiedemer, the division held that “[a] trial court loses
jurisdiction upon imposition of a valid sentence except under the
circumstances specified in Crim. P. 35.” 692 P.2dat 329. Thus,
the division concluded, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the defendant’s motion for return of property after
sentencing because such a motion is not cognizable under Crim. P.
35 and “[t]he rule does not embrace ancillary proceedings.” Id.; see
also People v. Galves, 955 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1997) (“A final
judgment includes, among other things, entry of a judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence. Following the entry of a final
judgment, the court retains subject matter jurisdiction only over
matters that may be raised pursuant to Crim. P. 35.”).
¶ 8
In Chavez, another division followed the reasoning in
Wiedemer and concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the defendant’s motion for return of property after
sentencing. Chavez, ¶¶ 12-13. The division stated that “once a
4
valid sentence is imposed, apart from the limited claims described
in Crim. P. 35, a criminal court has no further jurisdiction.” Id. at
¶ 13 (citation omitted).
¶ 9
Conversely, in Hargrave, another division concluded that a
trial court may have ancillary jurisdiction to consider a motion for
return of property after sentencing if a four-part test is met. 179
P.3d at 229-30. The test requires, among other things, that “the
ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new
factfinding proceeding.” Id.
¶ 10
Amonette asks us to follow Hargrave and conclude that the
trial court had ancillary jurisdiction to rule on his motion for return
of property filed nearly seven years after sentencing. We agree with
the reasoning in Chavez and Wiedemer and conclude that the
district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Amonette’s
motion.
¶ 11
First, Hargrave requires a court to engage in a multi-part test
to determine its jurisdiction. We agree with Chavez that it is
“cumbersome and anomalous to condition a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction on multi-part factual inquiries.” Chavez, ¶ 13 n.4.
Likewise, we agree that, because Colorado district courts are courts
5
of general jurisdiction, “there is no need to borrow the federal
court’s use of ancillary jurisdiction” as Hargrave did. Id. at ¶ 11
n.3.
¶ 12
But even assuming, without deciding, that we should follow
Hargrave instead of Wiedemer and Chavez, we cannot say that the
court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction.
¶ 13
Unlike Hargrave, the prosecution here did not confess
disputed whether the property was subject to return and asserted
that substantial new factfinding would be required. And, given the
age of the case, we are hard pressed to conclude that the parties
had “mutually shared knowledge” of the pertinent circumstances of
the case. Id. That is, because the case was seven years old, we
cannot conclude — as the Hargrave division did — that ancillary
proceedings would be “perfunctory,” “straightforward,” or “brief.”
¶ 14
Finally, the supreme court’s recent decision in Strepka v.
People, 2021 CO 58, doesn’t persuade us otherwise. Strepka
answered “a different and much narrower question” than the one
posed in Chavez, Wiedemer, and Hargrave — namely, “How does a
6
person, whose property was unlawfully obtained by the government,
get that property back after all the charges against him or her are
dismissed?” Strepka, ¶ 17 (emphasis added). The supreme court’s
jurisdictional analysis is directly tied to the time provided to appeal
the merits of the case, holding that “trial courts retain jurisdiction
to address motions for return of property under Crim. P. 41(e) so
long as such motions are filed before the appeal deadline expires.”
Id. at ¶ 26. Here, the deadline to appeal expired years before
Amonette filed his motion seeking return of his property.
¶ 15
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Amonette’s motion. Notwithstanding
our conclusion, Amonette isn’t without a remedy: he may file a civil
action to seek the return of his property, although “we express no
opinion regarding the elements, available defenses, or merits of any
such claim.” Chavez, ¶ 14 n.5; see also People v. Rautenkranz, 641
P.2d 317, 318 (Colo. App. 1982).
III. Conclusion
¶ 16
The order is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
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