Piro v. ICAO
Piro v. ICAO
Piro v. ICAO
Opinion
21CA0893 Piro v ICAO 10-21-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0893
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 19707-2020
Vincent Piro,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Division of
Unemployment Insurance, Quality Control/BAM,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
J. Jones and Freyre, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 21, 2021
Vincent Piro, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondents
1
¶ 1
In this unemployment benefits case, claimant, Vincent Piro,
seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel). The Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision that Piro is
not eligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) because
he had sufficient qualifying wages to file a state unemployment
insurance claim. We affirm the Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶ 2
After Piro applied for PUA benefits, a deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) issued a decision disallowing
Piro’s PUA benefit claim from March 29, 2020, to March 27, 2021.
The deputy determined that Piro did not qualify for PUA benefits
because he had sufficient qualifying wages from the state of Florida
to file a state unemployment insurance claim.
¶ 3
Piro appealed the deputy’s decision. After a hearing, the
hearing officer affirmed the deputy’s decision. The hearing officer
concluded that Piro was eligible for regular state unemployment
benefits because he had more than $2,500 in qualifying wages in
his base period. In support of that conclusion, the hearing officer
made the following findings of fact:
2
The effective date of Piro’s PUA benefit claim was March
20, 2020.
Piro’s weekly benefit amount was $618.
Based on the filing date, Piro’s base period was the fourth
quarter of 2018 to the third quarter of 2019.
In the first and second quarters of 2019, Piro had
$47,163.50 in W-2 wages paid by Davidson Hotel
Company, LLC (Davidson), which were reported to the
state of Florida.
Piro’s remaining earnings in 2018 and 2019 were paid to
him as an independent contractor.
¶ 4
Piro appealed the hearing officer’s decision with the Panel. On
review, the Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
II. Preliminary Matters
¶ 5
Before we address the merits of his contentions, we note that
Piro attached several documents to the notice of appeal and another
document to the opening brief. However, our review is limited to
the evidence the parties presented to the hearing officer at the
administrative hearing. See Goodwill Indus. of Colo. Springs v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 862 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Colo. App. 1993).
3
Because Piro did not introduce those documents at the
administrative hearing, we may not consider them on appeal. See
id. Similarly, we may not consider the new factual assertions in
Piro’s opening brief because he did not make them at the hearing.
III. Analysis
¶ 6
On appeal, Piro appears to challenge only the advice he
received when he contacted the Division and the state of Florida in
applying for PUA benefits and, liberally construing his pleading, see
Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 10, whether Piro had
sufficient qualifying wages to file a state unemployment insurance
claim. But the latter was the only issue before the hearing officer
and the Panel.
¶ 7
Because our review is limited to the issue that was before the
hearing officer and the Panel, we do not address Piro’s other
contentions. Instead, we limit our consideration to whether there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing
officer’s findings about Piro’s qualifying wages for a state
unemployment insurance claim and the Panel’s legal conclusions
on that issue. After reviewing the record evidence and applying our
4
applicable standard of review, we conclude that we cannot disturb
the hearing officer’s findings or set aside the Panel’s order.
¶ 8
We review de novo the Panel’s legal conclusions. See Cath.
Health Initiatives Colo. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2021 COA 48,
¶ 14. As relevant here, we may only set aside the Panel’s decision if
it is not supported by the record or if it is erroneous as a matter of
law. See § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2020.
¶ 9
Moreover, we may not disturb a hearing officer’s factual
findings if they are “supported by substantial evidence or
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” Yotes, Inc. v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 10; see also
§ 8-74-107(4) (a hearing officer’s factual findings are conclusive
when they are supported by substantial evidence).
¶ 10
A “covered individual” under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act is one who “otherwise would not qualify for
regular unemployment or extended benefits under State or Federal
law or pandemic emergency unemployment compensation.”
15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II). An unemployed individual is eligible
to receive Colorado unemployment compensation benefits if he has
been paid wages during his base period that are “not less than forty
5
times such individual’s weekly benefit amount or [$2,500],
whichever is greater.” § 8-73-107(1)(e), C.R.S. 2020.
¶ 11
There is substantial record evidence supporting the hearing
officer’s findings that Piro had sufficient qualifying wages to apply
for a state unemployment insurance claim. Indeed, a representative
for the Division explicitly testified to each of the above-referenced
factual findings made by the hearing officer.
¶ 12
Further, Piro confirmed that he had (1) filed for PUA benefits
on March 29, 2020; and (2) received “47,000 and change” in W-2
income from Davidson in 2019.
¶ 13
Based on these facts, Piro was eligible for Colorado
unemployment insurance benefits under section 8-73-107(1)(e)
because he had sufficient qualifying wages during his base period.
That is, Piro was paid wages during his base period ($47,163.50)
that were not less than his weekly benefit amount of $618
multiplied by forty ($24,720). Because he was eligible to apply for
regular unemployment benefits, Piro was not eligible for PUA
benefits. See 15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II).
¶ 14
Although Piro testified that he changed his status to an
independent contractor with Davidson in February or March 2019,
6
and the majority of the income he received from them was 1099
income, the fact that he also received 1099 income that exceeded
the amount of his W-2 income does not change the result. Nor does
the fact that Piro paid Colorado state income tax on his earnings
from Davidson. The statute only requires that Piro have a certain
amount of qualifying wages during his base period to be eligible for
state benefits.
¶ 15
Because the hearing officer’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record, we may not disturb them on
review. See Yotes, ¶ 10. Under these circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the Panel’s order was legally erroneous or
unsupported by the factual findings. Thus, we may not set aside
the Panel’s order on review. See § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 16
The Panel’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE FREYRE concur.
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