Peo in Interest of WB
Peo in Interest of WB
Peo in Interest of WB
Opinion
21CA0468 Peo in Interest of WB 10-21-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0468
Fremont County District Court No. 19JV81
Honorable Stephen A. Groome, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of W.B., a Child,
and Concerning T.B.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
Román and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 21, 2021
Brenda L. Jackson, County Attorney, Nicole L. Bartell, Assistant County
Attorney, Cañon City, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kris P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
1
¶ 1
T.B. (father) appeals the judgment terminating the parent-
child legal relationship with W.B. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2
The Fremont County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect regarding the then-one-month-
old child. The Department alleged that father was incarcerated.
¶ 3
The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for father.
¶ 4
The Department and the guardian ad litem later moved to
terminate father’s parental rights.
¶ 5
Over a year after the petition was filed and following a hearing,
the magistrate granted the motion. Father petitioned for district
court review of the magistrate’s termination judgment. The district
court affirmed the magistrate’s decision.
¶ 6
Father appeals.
II. Standard of Review
¶ 7
A district court reviewing a magistrate’s decision under C.R.M.
7(a) may not alter the magistrate’s factual findings unless clearly
erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9). Our review of the district court’s
decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and, like
2
the district court, we must accept the magistrate’s factual findings
unless clearly erroneous. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637, 638-39 (Colo. App. 2011).
III. Termination of Parental Rights
A. General Law
¶ 8
The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2020; People in Interest of
C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 9
Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
3
¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts — including its conclusion that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and
reunify the family under section 19-3-604(2)(h). See S.R.N.J-S., ¶
10.
B. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 10
Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
he could not become fit within a reasonable time. In particular, he
asserts that he was not given a reasonable amount of time to
comply with his treatment plan. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 11
An unfit parent is one whose condition or conduct renders him
or her unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in
Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable
parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide
nurturing and protection adequate to meet the child’s physical,
emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of A.J., 143
P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 12
In determining whether a parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider whether any
changes occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding,
4
the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of
the parent’s conduct or condition. D.P., 160 P.3d at 353. A
reasonable time is not indefinite, and must be determined by
considering the child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs. A.J., 143 P.3d at 1152.
¶ 13
Periods as short as five to nine months have been held to be
sufficient time to comply with a treatment plan. Id.
¶ 14
Here, the juvenile court found that father was unfit and there
was no likelihood that he would become fit within a reasonable
time. In doing so, the court found that father had approximately
eleven months, which was “a substantial and reasonable period of
time,” to complete his treatment plan. The court next found that
father had an opportunity to participate in services and visits when
he was not in custody, but he refused to engage with the
Department, enroll in services, or consistently attend visits. The
court also found that father had “demonstrated little to no change
in behavior or insight into the problems which exist[ed] and that
must be remedied to parent the child effectively and safely.”
¶ 15
The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. Father had
approximately eleven months from the time the treatment plan was
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adopted until the termination hearing to work on his treatment
plan. During that time, he was in and out of custody. When he
was out of custody, father could have completed a substance abuse
and mental health assessment, provided urinalysis (UA) samples,
and visited the child. He did not complete the assessment. His
UAs were positive for controlled substances or “dilute,” which is
considered a positive result. He missed several visits and, when he
attended, he was not alone.
¶ 16
The caseworker testified that father had approximately three
months to engage in services and visits before the treatment plan
was adopted. Yet, in the past fourteen months, father had made
very little progress.
¶ 17
Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual
findings, we will not disturb them or the court’s legal conclusions
on appeal.
C. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 18
Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Specifically, he argues that the Department failed to provide visits
while he was incarcerated. We discern no basis for reversal.
6
¶ 19
In determining whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the Division made reasonable efforts to
reunify the family. § 19-3-604(2)(h), (k)(III); see also §§ 19-3-100.5,
19-3-208, C.R.S. 2020 (requiring the state to make reasonable
efforts to reunite the family when appropriate).
¶ 20
Among the efforts required under section 19-3-208 are
screening, assessments, and individual case plans for the provision
of services; home-based family and crisis counseling; information
and referral services to available public and private assistance
resources; visitation services for parents with children in out-of-
home placement; and placement services including foster care and
emergency shelter. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶ 21
The reasonable efforts standard is deemed met if services are
provided in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(89),
C.R.S. 2020; People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.
App. 2007). The parent is responsible for using those services to
obtain the assistance that he or she needs to comply with his or her
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011).
7
¶ 22
The juvenile court found that the Department had made
efforts to engage father. As relevant here, the court found that the
“difficulties in creating a parenting time opportunity during his
periods of incarceration are the result of father’s lack of
responsibility and engaging in criminal conduct that resulted in his
incarceration.” The court further found that father “created the
impediments to parenting time, not the Department.”
¶ 23
The record shows that the Department devised a treatment
plan for father; referred him to a substance abuse and mental
health assessment and sobriety monitoring; coordinated visits;
provided transportation; and facilitated placement services for the
child. Therefore, the Department met the reasonable efforts
standard.
¶ 24
It is true that father did not have visits while he was
incarcerated. The caseworker testified that she had not asked
about visits when she contacted the facilities where father was
being held in custody. But, during the times that father was not in
custody, he did not consistently attend visits. caseworker testified
that father had canceled or no-showed at several visits. And, in the
8
month before the termination hearing while father was out of
custody, he had attended only two out of three scheduled visits.
¶ 25
Given this evidence, we cannot say that the Department failed
to make reasonable efforts. Because the record supports the
juvenile court’s factual findings, we will not disturb them or its legal
conclusions on appeal.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 26
We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE YUN concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.