Peo in Interest of OLPA
Peo in Interest of OLPA
Peo in Interest of OLPA
Opinion
21CA0325 Peo in Interest of OLPA 10-21-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0325
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 17JV1110
Honorable Pax L. Moultrie, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of O.L.P.A., a Child,
and Concerning M.R.A.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Navarro and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 21, 2021
Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Barry Meinster, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
1
¶ 1
M.R.A. (father) appeals the judgment terminating the parent-
child legal relationship with O.L.P.A. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2
The Department of Human Services of the City and County of
Denver filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the
then-four-year-old child and her half-siblings based on lack of
parental supervision and an unsanitary home. The Department
alleged that father was on parole and not living with the child.
¶ 3
The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected. The court also adopted a treatment plan for father.
¶ 4
The Department later moved to terminate father’s parental
rights. Almost four years after the petition was filed and following a
hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
A. General Law
¶ 5
The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
2
parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2020; People in Interest of
C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 6
Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts. See id.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 7
Father contends that the juvenile court erred by terminating
his parental rights. Specifically, he asserts that the court erred by
finding that he was an unfit parent who could not become fit within
a reasonable time. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 8
Here, the juvenile court found that father had not reasonably
complied with his treatment plan; he was unfit; and his conduct or
condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. In
3
doing so, the court found that father had not consistently visited
the child, completed a parent-child interactional assessment (PCI),
or established stability. The court noted that father had moved to
Texas during the case without telling the professionals involved in
his case. The court found that the primary issue was that father
did not have and had not built a relationship with the child. The
court next found that father did not understand the importance of
the child’s relationship with her half-siblings or her mental health
needs. The court further found that father was “unable to offer
nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet [the child’s] needs”
or show “an ability to be consistent in her life.”
¶ 9
The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. Father’s
attendance at the therapeutic supervised visits with the child was
inconsistent; he did not complete a PCI to learn more about his
relationship with the child; and it was unclear whether he had
stable housing or income. Three months before the termination
hearing, the Department discovered that father had moved to Texas.
Father did not tell the Department or other professionals that he
was moving out of state, so there was no plan in place as to how to
let the child know.
4
¶ 10
The record shows that father and the child had limited
contact, and therefore, they did not have a strong relationship. The
child’s therapist testified that the child “hasn’t had enough time
with [father] to establish that rapport to feel safe to live with him.”
There were times when the child did not want to engage with father
during visits or attend visits. The caseworker testified that the
child had reported that she wanted contact with father but she did
not want to live with him.
¶ 11
The record further indicates that there were concerns that
father did not understand the child’s mental health needs and her
need to maintain a connection with her half-siblings. The child’s
therapist and the caseworker testified that the child had a strong
bond with her half-siblings and they had an “unbreakable sibling
connection.” The therapist and the caseworker also testified that it
would be “detrimental” to separate the child and her half-siblings.
The caseworker testified that father had not acknowledged “what
the sibling connection means for [the child] and her sisters.”
¶ 12
Lastly, the caseworker opined that father was unfit and would
not become fit within a reasonable time. In particular, the
caseworker testified that father lacked consistency, stability, and an
5
understanding of the child’s mental health needs and sibling
connection. The caseworker also testified that the case had been
open for almost four years and father had a reasonable amount of
time to become fit.
¶ 13
Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual
findings, we will not disturb those findings or the court’s legal
conclusions on appeal.
III. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 14
Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. Specifically,
he argues that the court could have allocated parental
responsibilities to the paternal great aunt or the foster family. We
discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 15
The juvenile court must also consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal
relationship. People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo.
App. 2008). In considering less drastic alternatives, the court bases
its decision on the best interests of the children, giving primary
consideration to their physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
6
¶ 16
Here, the juvenile court found that there were no less drastic
alternatives to termination. The court considered the paternal great
aunt but found that she had withdrawn her request for placement.
The court found that the child’s relationship with her half-siblings
had “been a significant stabilizing factor” and that she had moved
back and forth between family members during the case. The court
also found that the child needed stability and permanency that
adoption could provide.
¶ 17
The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The case
had been ongoing for almost four years, and the child needed
permanency. The child’s therapist testified that the child needed
“to know that her everyday needs [were] going to be met.” And
when, as here, the child is less than six years old when a petition in
dependency and neglect is filed, the expedited permanency planning
provisions apply. § 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020. The guidelines in
effect at the time of the termination hearing required the juvenile
court to place the child in a permanent home “as expeditiously as
possible.” § 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2020. At the time of the
termination hearing, the child had been in several placements. The
caseworker testified that the case had been open for a long time
7
because the Department was exploring various family members and
a possible allocation of parental responsibilities (APR).
¶ 18
The record also indicates that the Department and the foster
family preferred adoption over an APR. The caseworker testified
that the child and her half-siblings had been in a foster-to-adopt
home for the past six months. According to the caseworker, the
child wanted to be adopted with her half-siblings.
¶ 19
As to the paternal great aunt, the record shows that an
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children home study was
initiated for her. But the home study was denied because the aunt
reported that her apartment was not big enough and she did not
have the financial means to care for the child and her half-siblings.
¶ 20
Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual
findings, we will not disturb those findings or the court’s legal
conclusions on appeal.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 21
The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE GROVE concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.