Marriage of Renninger
Marriage of Renninger
Marriage of Renninger
Opinion
20CA1199 Marriage of Renninger 10-21-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 20CA1199
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19DR30890
Honorable Peter F. Michaelson, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Georgia Renninger,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
and
Larry Gene Renninger,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE ROMÁN
Berger and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 21, 2021
Lass Cooper & Ramp, LLC, Patricia A. Cooper, Katharine Elena Lum, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Kumpf Charsley & Hansen, LLC, Robert E. Wells, Englewood, Colorado, for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee
1
¶ 1
In this legal separation proceeding, Larry Gene Renninger
(husband) appeals and Georgia Renninger (wife) cross-appeals the
district court’s declaratory order that interpreted the terms of their
1991 prenuptial agreement. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Facts
¶ 2
Wife petitioned for a legal separation from husband in 2019.
Along with his response to the petition, husband put wife “on
notice” that he intended to assert the validity of their prenuptial
agreement. Thereafter, the parties submitted a joint motion seeking
declaratory relief of their rights under the agreement and,
specifically, its application to premarital retirement accounts.
¶ 3
The court requested briefing by the parties. After considering
their positions, the court reached the following relevant
conclusions:
2. The Court concludes that the Agreement
states a valid exception to the marital property
rule and, therefore, served a valid purpose.
3. The Court concludes that the exception to
the rule is that in this marriage assets and
appreciation to retirement and benefit
accounts which existed at the time of marriage
are the sole property of each party upon
dissolution.
2
4. The Court further concludes that
contributions during marriage to any and all
retirement accounts, and appreciation related
to those contributions during marriage are
marital property.
5. The Court concludes that benefits such as
pension benefits which created, conferred, or
accrued prior to marriage are separate
property.
6. The Court concludes that different benefits
such as new pension benefits which did not
exist prior to marriage but were created,
conferred, or accrued after marriage are
marital property.
¶ 4
Wife moved under C.R.C.P. 59 for the court to clarify what it
meant by “new pension benefits” and “different benefits.” The court
clarified that the expression “new pension benefits” reflected its
“intention that only new pension plans in which a party enrolls
after a marriage are marital property.” It otherwise denied wife’s
post-trial motion.
¶ 5
The court certified its declaratory order as a final judgment
pursuant to the parties’ joint request under C.R.C.P. 54(b).
II. The Appeals
¶ 6
The parties appeal the district court’s interpretation of the
agreement, but for different reasons. Husband disagrees with the
court’s conclusion that post-marriage contributions to premarital
3
retirement accounts are marital, and wife disagrees with the
conclusion that only those retirement accounts and benefits
established after the date of the marriage are marital. Resolving
these arguments requires us to review the following four relevant
paragraphs of the agreement:
4. The parties agree and stipulate that all
property and assets presently belonging to the
Prospective Wife, including proceeds of sale,
income, earnings and/or interest therefrom
and appreciation thereof, shall remain the
Prospective Wife’s . . . . Furthermore, all such
property and assets shall be considered and
treated as “Separate Property” pursuant to
C.R.S. Section 14-10-113 in the event of
dissolution of the parties’ marriage.
5. The parties agree and stipulate that all
property and assets presently belonging to the
Prospective Husband, including proceeds of
sale, income, earnings and/or interest
therefrom and appreciation thereof, shall
remain the Prospective Husband’s . . . .
Furthermore, all such property and assets
shall be considered and treated as “Separate
Property” pursuant to C.R.S. Section 14-10-
113 in the event of dissolution of the parties’
marriage.
. . .
7. The parties agree and stipulate that all
property and assets acquired by them after the
date of their marriage (other than with the
proceeds of the sale or other disposition of a
4
party’s separate property . . .), including
proceeds of sale, income, earnings and/or
interest thereon or appreciation thereof, shall
be the marital property of the parties.
. . .
9. The parties agree and stipulate that any and
all retirement accounts and benefits by
whatever name or designation which either one
owns when they get married, together with all
appreciation and earnings thereafter, shall
remain the sole and separate property of the
party who owned it when they married. Any
and all retirement accounts and similar
benefits which are created, conferred or
accrued after the parties get married, together
with all contributions to any retirement
accounts and all appreciation and earnings on
any sums contributed after they get married
shall be marital property, as defined elsewhere
in this agreement. It is the intent of this
paragraph that all sums currently in the
parties’ existing retirement accounts, including
appreciation or internal earnings thereon after
the date of marriage, shall be the separate
property of the party owning same on the date
of their marriage.
A. Relevant Law
¶ 7
A marital agreement is a contract between the parties to a
marriage prior to its incorporation into a dissolution decree. In re
C.G.G., 946 P.2d 603, 606 (Colo. App. 1997). We construe marital
agreements in the same manner as other contracts, In re Estate of
Gadash, 2017 COA 54, ¶ 40, meaning that we consider the contract
5
as a whole and give effect to every provision, if possible, Vallagio at
Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2015 COA
65, ¶ 19, aff’d, 2017 CO 69.
¶ 8
We interpret contracts based on the plain and generally
accepted meaning of the words employed. Gadash, ¶ 40. The
parties’ disagreement as to the meaning of the terms of a contract
does not create an ambiguity. See also People ex rel. Rein v. Jacobs,
2020 CO 50, ¶ 44. Where the contract’s terms are unambiguous,
we determine the parties’ intent from the language of the
instrument itself. Id. Complete, clear, and unambiguous contracts
will be enforced as written. In re Marriage of Christen, 899 P.2d
339, 344 (Colo. App. 1995).
¶ 9
Interpreting a written contract and determining whether it is
unambiguous are questions of law on which we need not defer to
the district court. In re Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 860
(Colo. App. 2003).
B. Husband’s Appeal
¶ 10
Husband contends that the agreement unambiguously
provides that all increases in value of a retirement account owned
on the date of the marriage, no matter the source of the increase,
6
are separate property. He thus argues that the court erred by
concluding that “contributions during marriage to any and all
retirement accounts, and appreciation related to those
contributions during marriage are marital property.” We disagree.
¶ 11
This argument turns on the interpretation of the second half of
the second sentence of Paragraph 9 in the parties’ agreement: “[A]ll
contributions to any retirement accounts and all appreciation and
earnings on any sums contributed after they get married shall be
marital property, as defined elsewhere in this agreement.”
¶ 12
The word “any” generally means “all.” Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172
P.3d 437, 447 (Colo. 2007). In turn, the word “all” “means the
whole of, the whole number or sum of, or every member or
individual component of, and is synonymous with ‘every’ and
‘each.’” Hudgeons v. Tenneco Oil Co., 796 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. App.
1990). These are unambiguous words.
¶ 13
Hence, Paragraph 9 unambiguously states that each and every
contribution made to each and every retirement account after the
date of the marriage, and the whole of the appreciation and
earnings on those contributions, is marital property. Put another
way, this sentence signifies the parties’ intent that post-marriage
7
contributions to their premarital retirement accounts would be
considered as marital property.
¶ 14
Husband stresses that (1) Paragraphs 4 and 5 clearly state
that assets and property owned on the date of the marriage and all
related increases in value are separate; and (2) Paragraph 7 clearly
states that assets and property acquired after the date of the
marriage and related increases are marital. He thus argues that
the agreement as a whole shows that the retirement accounts and
related appreciation are either separate or marital based on their
date of acquisition, but they cannot be both. We disagree.
¶ 15
While Paragraphs 4, 5, and 7 define and distinguish separate
property from marital property depending on whether property was
owned before or after the date of the marriage, Paragraph 9 is
specific to the parties’ retirement accounts and similar benefits. “In
resolving conflict between terms of an agreement, specific
provisions prevail over general provisions.” Crowder, 77 P.3d at
861. The inclusion of Paragraph 9 demonstrates that the parties
had different intentions when it came to the characterization of
their premarital retirement accounts. Thus, Paragraph 9 prevails
8
over Paragraphs 4 and 5 as it concerns retirement accounts and
related increases.
¶ 16
Recognizing that Paragraph 9 specifically pertains to and
treats retirement accounts differently than other assets or property
does not render Paragraphs 4, 5, or 7 meaningless. See Rein, ¶ 43
(we interpret the contract in its entirety, seeking to harmonize and
give effect to all of its provisions so that none will be rendered
meaningless). Those paragraphs still apply to other forms of assets
and property, such as those listed in the exhibits attached to the
agreement. Further, Paragraph 9 is consistent with Paragraphs 4
and 5 by verifying that premarital retirement accounts and related
increases are separate, like other forms of property. The only
difference is that Paragraph 9 carves out an exception to the
characterization of post-marriage contributions to premarital
retirement accounts.
¶ 17
Husband also argues that post-marriage contributions must
be considered separate because Paragraphs 4 and 5 declare that
“all” forms of increase in separate assets and property are separate.
Yet Paragraph 9 specifically discusses the characterization of
retirement accounts and related increases and prevails over the
9
more general Paragraphs 4 and 5 in this regard. See Crowder, 77
P.3d at 861. Therefore, we conclude that the parties did not intend
for “all” forms of increase to premarital retirement accounts,
regardless of their source, to be considered as separate property.
¶ 18
Finally, husband points out that the first and third sentences
of Paragraph 9 confirm that premarital retirement accounts, the
sums in those accounts on the date of the marriage, and related
appreciation or earnings on those accounts are separate. However,
we find the inclusion of the second sentence of Paragraph 9
significant, because it plainly expresses the parties’ intent that
retirement accounts owned before the date of the marriage are
separate but the parties’ contribution to those accounts made after
the date of the marriage is marital. Once more, this sentence
makes clear that the parties intended to treat post-marriage
contributions to retirement accounts differently.
¶ 19
Accordingly, we conclude that the agreement unambiguously
states that post-marriage contributions to the parties’ premarital
retirement accounts, and related appreciation and earnings, are
marital property.
10
III. Wife’s Appeal
¶ 20
Wife contends that the court erred by concluding that “new
pension plans in which a party enrolls after a marriage are marital
property.” She argues that the word “accrued” as used in
Paragraph 9 means that the parties intended to treat as marital
those premarital pension benefits that increased in value during the
marriage. We agree that the court erred and therefore reverse its
conclusion.
¶ 21
Once more, this argument turns on the second sentence of
Paragraph 9. This time, we look to the meaning of the words
“created,” “conferred,” and “accrued.” Because the agreement does
not define these words, we may look to the dictionary for guidance
in determining their plain and ordinary meanings. See Weitz Co. v.
Mid-Century Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 309, 312 (Colo. App. 2007)
(“Dictionaries may be used to assist in the determination of the
plain and ordinary meaning of words.”).
¶ 22
The word “accrued” means “to come into existence as an
enforceable claim: vest as a right,” and the word “create” means “to
bring into existence: make out of nothing for the first time.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 13, 532 (2002). The
11
word “confer” means “to grant (something) as a gift, benefit or
honor; bestow.” Black’s Law Dictionary 371 (11th ed.).
¶ 23
The three words are joined by the word “or.” See Bledsoe Land
Co. v. Forest Oil Corp., 277 P.3d 838, 846 (Colo. App. 2011) (we give
effect to every word of a contract and render none superfluous).
Generally, we presume the disjunctive use of the word “or” marks
distinctive categories. See Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc.,
187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008).
¶ 24
The word “or” as used in the second sentence of Paragraph 9
indicates that “conferred,” “created,” and “accrued” convey three
different things. The words are not, as husband argues,
synonymous with one another. The sentence clearly states that
retirement accounts or similar benefits that are brought into
existence for the first time (“created”), granted or bestowed
(“conferred”), or vest as an enforceable right (“accrued”) after the
date of the marriage are marital.
¶ 25
Of course, the premarital retirement accounts themselves, as
well as any appreciation and accrued interest on those accounts,
will remain separate property per Paragraphs 4, 5 and 9. But new
contributions to the premarital retirement accounts that postdate
12
the marriage and all appreciation on those contributions are marital
property.
¶ 26
Therefore, we reverse the court’s conclusions that only “new
pension plans” not in existence at the time of the marriage, or those
plans in which a party enrolls after a marriage, are marital
property. Under Paragraph 9, retirement benefits owned before the
date of the marriage may be considered marital to the extent they
“accrued” after the date of the marriage.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 27
The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE YUN concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.