Peo v. Eddins
Peo v. Eddins
Peo v. Eddins
Opinion
18CA0734 Peo v Eddins 11-24-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0734
Jefferson County District Court No. 16CR7364
Honorable Christie A. Bachmeyer, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Scott Alexander Eddins,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
Grove and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 24, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Carty, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Victor T. Owens, Alternate Defense Counsel, Parker, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
1
¶ 1
Defendant, Scott Alexander Eddins, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of burglary
and felony menacing. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2
In October 2015, the victims were awoken in the night by
three armed intruders, some of whom wore masks. The victims
fought with the intruders; during the fight, one had his mask pulled
off, dropped some items, and fired a shot. As the intruders fled, one
aimed a gun at the victims who were giving chase.
¶ 3
The Lakewood police collected the items dropped by the
intruders. Based, in part, on DNA evidence collected from those
items, the police identified Eddins as one of the intruders.
¶ 4
Eddins was charged with two counts of first degree burglary
and four counts of felony menacing. See §§ 18-4-202(1), 18-3-
206(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2021. A jury found him guilty as charged. The
trial court merged the burglary convictions.
II. Motion to Suppress
¶ 5
Eddins contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress his statements to police. He argues that he was
in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
2
when he made the statements but he did not receive Miranda
warnings. We discern no error.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 6
We draw the following facts from the undisputed evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, the redacted version of the
police detective’s recorded interview with Eddins that was admitted
at trial, and the trial court’s order. The unredacted recording of the
interview was played at the hearing and is the basis of some of the
court’s findings, but it is not in the appellate record. We presume
any missing portions of the record support the court’s order. People
v. Montgomery, 2014 COA 166, ¶ 22.
1. The Police Interview
¶ 7
Detective Karen Turnbull investigated the home invasion.
After identifying Eddins as a potential suspect, the detective
interviewed him at the Denver County Jail, where he was being held
on an unrelated case.
¶ 8
The detective met Eddins in the jail’s locked interview area.
The interview room had one entrance and a table with two chairs,
and it was large enough for only two people to sit at the table.
3
¶ 9
Eddins was called to the interview room, but he was not
escorted by jail staff or handcuffed. He sat across from the
detective, who was not armed and did not block the door. The door
was left open at the start of the interview but was closed shortly
thereafter due to noise outside the room.
¶ 10
After introducing herself, the detective informed Eddins that
she wanted to discuss the October 2015 incident. The detective
asked, “Do you know anything about that case?” Eddins answered,
I’d be willing to tell you a little bit about that
because I do know a little bit about it — but
um, I was under duress — uh, somebody had
threatened my family — and then I seen that
person, you know, shooting people. And uh,
I’d be willing to share that information, and uh
— but I’d like to have some amnesty involved
in that case.
The detective told him that she could not make any promises
regarding amnesty.
¶ 11
Then the detective said, “Because you’re not free to leave, I’ve
got to advise you of your rights; not because you’re locked up on
this thing, but because you’re locked up on something else.” (The
detective did not specify whether she was referring to Eddins’s
4
freedom to leave the jail or the interview room.) Before the detective
could give the Miranda advisements, however, Eddins interjected,
I’ve already talked to the detect — or to the
officer, and I told them about these people.
Little bit about what’s going on. And I told
them I wanted to speak to, you know, a
detective about some things that I’d seen —
someone shot and some things go down that
was not cool at all — and that’s got me scared
for my family.
¶ 12
The detective gave him the Miranda warnings. She also
informed Eddins that he did not have to answer any questions and
that, if he decided to answer some questions, he did not have to
answer all of them. The detective asked Eddins if he would be
willing to talk to her about the case. He said he would like to have
an attorney, and the detective told him that she would arrange for
him to have an attorney present. Eddins said he understood but
went on to say,
I’m not admitting any — any part of what went
down. And let me please tell you, I’m not —
I’m not trying to be hard or difficult with you
because I’m willing to share information. I just
want to make sure that, um, I’m not, uh,
thrown in to the — to the wolves because I was
under duress for my family and everything was
threatened . . . .
5
The detective interrupted Eddins, told him that they could not talk
any further, and ended the interview.
2. The Court’s Ruling
¶ 13
Defense counsel argued that Eddins’s statements in the
interview should be suppressed because he was in custody and the
detective failed to give him Miranda warnings before the statements.
¶ 14
In a written order, the trial court denied Eddins’s suppression
motion on the ground that he was not in custody for Miranda
purposes during the interview. Given this conclusion, the court did
not address the prosecution’s argument that Eddins’s statements
after he received Miranda warnings were spontaneous, rather than
the result of interrogation.
B. Miranda and Related Principles
¶ 15
Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a
mixed question of law and fact. People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 9.
We defer to a trial court’s findings of fact so long as the record
supports them. People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348, 353 (Colo. 2003).
We review de novo the legal determination of whether a person is in
custody. Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 873 (Colo. 2010). We
6
may consider undisputed facts in the record, in addition to the trial
court’s factual findings. People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 16.
¶ 16
A person subjected to custodial interrogation by law
enforcement must first receive an advisement of their Fifth
Gonzalez-Zamora, 251 P.3d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 2011). A suspect
may waive their rights and make a statement to police but must do
so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently before the statement
may be used against them in a criminal proceeding. See Gonzalez-
Zamora, 251 P.3d at 1074.
¶ 17
Miranda protections apply only when a suspect has been
subjected to both custody and interrogation. Effland, 240 P.3d at
873. Interrogation refers to express questioning, as well as any
words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980).
¶ 18
To determine if a person was in custody, we normally ask
whether a reasonable person in the same position would have
believed their freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree
associated with a formal arrest. People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453,
7
464 (Colo. 2002). This is an objective test based on all the
circumstances. Minjarez, 81 P.3d at 353.
¶ 19
The traditional test for custody, however, does not apply to a
prison or jail setting because it would lead to the conclusion that all
prison questioning is custodial given that a reasonable person
would always believe they could not leave the prison freely. People
v. Parsons, 15 P.3d 799, 801 (Colo. App. 2000); see People v.
Denison, 918 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1996). So a person is not
necessarily in custody for Miranda purposes if they are questioned
also Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511-12 (2012).
¶ 20
To assess whether an inmate is in custody for Miranda
purposes, a court must consider whether there has been “a change
in the surroundings of the prisoner that results in an added
imposition on his freedom of movement.” Denison, 918 P.2d at
1116. Relevant factors include (1) the language used in summoning
the inmate; (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation;
(3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his
guilt;, and (4) any additional pressure exerted to detain him. Id.
Because these factors are not exhaustive, a court may also consider
8
[t]he time, place, and purpose of the
encounter; the persons present during the
interrogation; the words spoken by the officer
to the defendant; the officer’s tone of voice and
general demeanor; the length and mood of the
interrogation; whether any limitation of
movement or other form of restraint was
placed on the defendant during the
interrogation; the officer’s response to any
questions asked by the defendant; whether
directions were given to the defendant during
the interrogation; and the defendant’s verbal or
nonverbal response to such directions.
J.D., 989 P.2d at 768 (citation omitted).
C. Analysis
¶ 21
We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying
Eddins’s motion to suppress. To some extent, we reach this
conclusion on different grounds from those articulated by the trial
court. See People in Interest of K.D.W., 2020 COA 110, ¶ 32.
¶ 22
First, as for Eddins’s statements made before the detective
said he was not free to leave, we conclude that he was not in
custody. According to Eddins’s comments in the interview, he
expressed interest in speaking to a detective before the interview.
And he was not escorted to the interview room. These facts suggest
that the jail staff did not exert additional pressure on him to speak
with Detective Turnbull. During the interview, Eddins was not
9
handcuffed, the detective’s tone was conversational, she was not
armed, she did not block the exit in the interview room, no officers
were just outside the room, and the door to the room was initially
left open but was later closed due to outside noise.
¶ 23
We conclude that these circumstances did not amount to an
added imposition on Eddins’s freedom of movement. See, e.g.,
Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116-17 (no custody where tone was not
accusatory, defendant was not handcuffed, and door to interview
area was open); Parsons, 15 P.3d at 802-03 (no custody where
interview was conducted in conference room, the investigators’ tone
was conversational, and they were not armed). Further, Eddins
was not confronted with evidence of his guilt. Rather, he was asked
an open-ended question: “Do you know anything about [the home
invasion]?” See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1117 (open-ended questions,
as opposed to evidence of guilt, do not support a custody
determination); Parsons, 15 P.3d at 802-03 (defendant was not
confronted with evidence of his guilt).
¶ 24
Second, we assume without deciding that, after the detective
said Eddins was not free to leave, a reasonable inmate in his
position would have believed himself to be in custody. The
10
statements he made immediately after the detective’s comment,
however, were not the product of interrogation. Rather, after the
detective informed Eddins that he was not free to leave and that she
was going to advise him of his rights — but before she could read
him his rights — he spontaneously said he had previously
requested to speak to an officer regarding what he had seen, that he
had seen some things “go down,” and that he feared for his family.
A court need not suppress custodial statements that were not the
result of police questioning. See People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010,
1015 (Colo. 2008) (holding that the defendant’s custodial
statements were admissible where the detective had not asked any
questions likely to elicit an incriminating response).
¶ 25
After the detective gave Eddins the Miranda advisement and
asked if he was willing to talk with her, he requested a lawyer. The
detective said one would be provided so Eddins could decide what
he wanted to do in this case. He then volunteered a few more
statements. We conclude that all his statements made after the
Miranda warning were admissible because they were not the
product of interrogation and indicated a waiver of his rights as to
those statements. See People v. Leyba, 2019 COA 144, ¶¶ 16, 26-
11
30, aff’d, 2021 CO 54, ¶¶ 18-19, 23-25; People v. Banuelos, 674
P.2d 964, 966 (Colo. App. 1983).
¶ 26
In sum, the record supports the trial court’s denial of the
motion to suppress Eddins’s statements to Detective Turnbull.
III. Alternate Suspect Evidence
¶ 27
Eddins next contends that the trial court erred by excluding
evidence that an alternate suspect — David Mascarenas —
committed the charged crimes instead of Eddins. We conclude that
the court acted within its discretion.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 28
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the intruders
in the home invasion were Eddins, David Martinez, and Sharon
Bateman. Defense counsel initially sought to show that the police
investigation was inadequate and should have focused more on
Martinez and his alleged associate, Mascarenas.
¶ 29
Later, in response to defense counsel’s questions, Detective
Turnbull testified that she was aware that Martinez was dangerous.
Defense counsel then attempted to ask about the facts of one of two
earlier robberies that Martinez and Mascarenas had allegedly
committed together. The prosecutor objected, and a somewhat
12
confusing colloquy ensued. The trial court attempted to discern
whether, despite the defense’s earlier arguments about why this
evidence was relevant, defense counsel now sought to elicit the facts
of the other robberies to show that Mascarenas was an alternate
suspect in the crimes charged here. Defense counsel ultimately
argued that the evidence she sought to elicit would show that
Mascarenas was a possible alternate suspect in this case.
¶ 30
After hearing arguments about the proffered evidence, the
court explained that “under [CRE] 701, [the detective] is not even a
perceiving witness. Any information she had would be hearsay.”
Following further discussion, the court ruled that the alternate
suspect evidence was inadmissible under People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO
53. The court also reiterated that the detective’s testimony about
the alternate suspect evidence (i.e., the details of the other
robberies) would be hearsay. But the court allowed defense counsel
to ask the detective “whether or not Mascarenas was known to
associate with Mr. Martinez in these criminal offenses.”
¶ 31
When the cross-examination resumed, defense counsel asked
the detective whether Mascarenas’s name had come up in her
investigation. She said she did not recall. Counsel followed up
13
with, “In your investigation of David Martinez, did you become
aware that David Martinez and David Mascarenas committed
serious crimes together?” The detective answered, “I heard that
name David Mascarenas afterwards, after I finished the
investigation, just through the court proceedings. I wasn’t aware it
[sic] before then.”
¶ 32
Defense counsel asked whether Martinez was involved in
another case (the Littleton case), and the detective said she did not
know anything about the Littleton case. Then, in response to
counsel’s question whether “the only thing you know about the
Littleton case is that David Martinez and David Mascarenas did this
crime together,” the defective testified, “I don’t even know that.”
B. Relevant Principles
¶ 33
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA
178, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion if, among other things, its
ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.
¶ 34
To be admissible, alternate suspect evidence must be relevant
under CRE 401 and not excludable under CRE 403. Elmarr, ¶¶ 31-
32. To be relevant, alternate suspect evidence must establish a
14
non-speculative connection or nexus between the alternate suspect
and the crime charged. Id. at ¶ 23. Where the evidence concerns
the alternate suspect’s other acts, a court must decide whether all
the similar acts and circumstances, taken together, support a
finding that the same person probably was involved in both the
other act and the charged crime. Id. Where alternate suspect
evidence concerns out-of-court statements, the evidence must also
satisfy the rules governing hearsay. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 41.
¶ 35
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Hearsay is
inadmissible except as provided by statute or rule. CRE 802.
C. Analysis
¶ 36
We need not decide whether the excluded evidence was
relevant alternate suspect evidence because we conclude that the
trial court reasonably excluded it as hearsay.1
¶ 37
Detective Turnbull testified that she learned of Mascarenas
after her investigation was completed, through unrelated court
1 Given our disposition, we do not reach the People’s claims that the
alternate suspect issue was waived and the alternate suspect
evidence was irrelevant.
15
proceedings. She said she knew very little, if anything, about
Mascarenas’s and Martinez’s participation in other crimes. So, to
the extent she would have testified about the details of other crimes
committed by Mascarenas and Martinez, her testimony would have
been hearsay (i.e., based on out-of-court statements she heard or
read). See People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 777 (Colo. App. 1990)
(affirming the trial court’s exclusion of alternate suspect evidence
offered via a police officer’s testimony where “the officer did not
possess first-hand knowledge of the [other] robbery and his
testimony was therefore hearsay”); CRE 701.
¶ 38
Nonetheless, Eddins contends that “the alternate suspect
evidence showing Martinez and Mascarenas committed similar
robberies to the home invasion in this case was not produced to
prove the matter asserted.” The relevance of alternate suspect
evidence concerning the suspect’s other acts, however, depends
entirely on the truth of the matter asserted in the evidence — that
the alternate suspect actually committed the other acts. See
Elmarr, ¶ 23. In other words, the detective’s testimony about the
other crimes would have been relevant alternate suspect evidence
only if the out-of-court assertions inherent in the testimony (that
16
Mascarenas and Martinez committed the other crimes) were true.
Hence, the detective’s testimony would have been hearsay.
¶ 39
Eddins also says the detective’s testimony about Martinez’s
and Mascarenas’s other robberies would not have been hearsay
because it was offered (1) to show that the detective failed to
conduct an adequate investigation given that the other robberies
had “distinctive similarities” to the crimes charged here; and (2) to
connect Martinez to the other robberies. But those purposes of the
evidence also depend on the truth of the matter asserted in out-of-
court statements — that the other robberies occurred and were
committed by Martinez and Mascarenas. Thus, the trial court
reasonably ruled that the proffered evidence was hearsay. See, e.g.,
People v. Zubiate, 2013 COA 69, ¶ 16 (affirming the trial court’s
ruling excluding evidence as hearsay where “the statement was only
relevant if it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted”), aff’d,
2 As an additional reason why the proffered alternate suspect
evidence was relevant, Eddins says it demonstrated the violence
often inflicted by Martinez and thus would have helped the jury
understand why Eddins “was experiencing duress and afraid of the
other people involved in the home invasion.” We discern three
problems with this theory of relevance: (1) Eddins did not assert a
17
¶ 40
Finally, we reject Eddins’s contention that the alternate
suspect evidence was admissible hearsay under the business record
exception. Because he did not raise this claim below, we review it
for plain error. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.
¶ 41
Under the business record exception, a record kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity is admissible
under certain circumstances. See CRE 803(6). Eddins, however,
did not seek to admit any such record. Rather, Eddins sought to
admit testimony from a witness who, Eddins argues, might have
learned about the other incidents from a police report. But he cites
no authority holding that a witness may testify about the contents
of an alleged business record that has not been admitted into
evidence. In the cases Eddins cites, the document itself was
admitted. See People v. Warrick, 284 P.3d 139, 143-44 (Colo. App.
2011) (police booking sheets); People v. Carrasco, 85 P.3d 580, 583-
84 (Colo. App. 2003) (charging document); Lannon v. Taco Bell, Inc.,
duress defense; (2) this theory does not relate to an alternate
suspect because Martinez was an actual suspect, along with
Eddins, in the crimes charged here; and (3) this theory depends on
the truth of the matter asserted in out-of-court statements (that
Martinez committed the other crimes).
18
708 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Colo. App. 1985) (police offense reports),
aff’d, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987). Consequently, we do not discern
error, much less plain error, in the court’s failure to admit the
proffered testimony under CRE 803(6).
¶ 42
Because the proffered testimony about an alternate suspect
would have been inadmissible hearsay, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. For this reason,
the court’s ruling did not violate Eddins’s confrontation rights. See
People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶¶ 68-69.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 43
The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.
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