Peo in Interest of GM
Peo in Interest of GM
Peo in Interest of GM
Opinion
21CA0465 Peo in Interest of GM 01-20-2022
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0465
Mesa County District Court No. 19JV198
Honorable Lance P. Timbreza, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of G.M. and A.M., Children,
and Concerning B.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN
Tow and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 20, 2022
Todd Starr, County Attorney, Jeremy Savage, Chief Deputy County Attorney,
Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Garrett Forsgren, Guardian Ad Litem
Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
1
¶ 1 B.M. (father) appeals the judgment terminating the
parent-child legal relationship with his children. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect regarding then-eleven-year-old
G.M. and then-nine-year-old A.M. (the children). The Department
alleged concerns about substance abuse, mental health, and
domestic violence. The Department also alleged that father was
incarcerated.
¶ 3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and
neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for father.
¶ 4 The Department later moved to terminate father’s parental
rights. Fourteen months after the petition was filed and following a
hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
A. General Law
¶ 5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
2
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021; People in Interest of
C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts — including its conclusion that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and
reunify the family under section 19-3-604(2)(h). See S.R.N.J-S.,
¶ 10.
B. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 7 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.
3
Specifically, he asserts that the Department failed to help him with
domestic violence treatment. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 8 In determining whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the Department made reasonable efforts to
reunify the family. § 19-3-604(2)(h), (k)(III); see also §§ 19-3-100.5,
19-3-208, C.R.S. 2021 (requiring the state to make reasonable
efforts to reunite the family when appropriate).
¶ 9 Among the efforts required under section 19-3-208 are
screening, assessments, and individual case plans for the provision
of services; home-based family and crisis counseling; information
and referral services to available public and private assistance
resources; visitation services for parents with children in
out-of-home placement; and placement services including foster
care and emergency shelter. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶ 10 Section 19-3-208 also lists other services that should be made
available if such a service is determined necessary and appropriate
by the case plan and there is adequate funding for it.
§ 19-3-208(2)(d). These include transportation, child care, in-home,
diagnostic, mental health, health care, drug and alcohol treatment,
4
after care, family support, financial, and family preservation
services. Id.
¶ 11 The reasonable efforts standard is deemed met if services are
provided in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114),
C.R.S. 2021; People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.
App. 2007). The parent is responsible for using those services to
obtain the assistance that he or she needs to comply with their
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 12 Here, the juvenile court found that the Department had made
reasonable efforts to provide services for father, but he had “not
taken advantage of those services to the extent required by his
treatment plan.”
¶ 13 The record shows that the Department devised a treatment
plan for father; coordinated letters and video visits between father
and the children; and facilitated placement services for the children.
We note that father had been incarcerated during the case and had
been released to Community Corrections approximately three
months before the termination hearing.
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¶ 14 Regarding domestic violence treatment, the record indicates
that three months before the termination hearing, father asked the
Department to pay $40 for the intake fee. The caseworker testified
that she received approval to pay for the intake and asked father to
give her “an invoice or a bill or something stating that that was the
amount of that intake.” She further testified that she emailed
father three times about an invoice, but he “did not get that back to
me, so that $40.00 was never paid.” Father testified that he had
completed the intake.
¶ 15 Later, father asked for $220 to pay for the assessment fee.
The caseworker testified that she again received approval to pay but
was told that a contract with the treatment provider was needed if
the Department was going to pay for ongoing treatment, that she
told father the Department needed to set up a contract, and that
she made several attempts to reach the treatment provider. She
further testified that she had received an email the day before the
termination hearing from the provider to arrange the contract. At
the time of the termination hearing, father had not completed the
domestic violence assessment or begun treatment.
6
¶ 16 Because the record shows that the Department would have
paid for the intake, the assessment, and treatment if father had
provided some type of documentation from the treatment provider,
we cannot say that the Department failed to make reasonable
efforts to help father with domestic violence services. Father was
responsible for providing the necessary documentation so that he
could have participated in such services; but, he did not.
¶ 17 We conclude that the record supports the juvenile court’s
factual findings, and therefore, we will not disturb them or the
court’s legal conclusions on appeal.
C. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 18 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. In particular,
he argues that the court could have allocated parental
responsibilities to the paternal aunt and uncle. We discern no
basis for reversal.
¶ 19 The juvenile court must also consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal
relationship. People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo.
App. 2008). In considering less drastic alternatives, the court bases
7
its decision on the best interests of the children, giving primary
consideration to their physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
¶ 20 Here, the juvenile court considered an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR), but found that it was not appropriate or in
the children’s best interest. In doing so, the court found that the
children needed stability and an APR would “lead to potential
instability and disruption for the children.” The court recognized
that there were no concerns with the paternal aunt and uncle but
found that the children did not have strong connections with them
and that the current placement providers had “become the
permanency [the children] know.” Entering an APR with the aunt
and uncle would have required the children to be moved from their
location in Grand Junction. The court found that moving the
children would uproot them “from their geographic area, school,
community, mother, [other] siblings, and placement.”
¶ 21 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The case
had been going for over a year and the children needed
permanency. The caseworker testified that the children needed a
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stable and consistent home with caregivers who could meet their
needs.
¶ 22 The record also shows that the Department preferred adoption
over an APR. The caseworker had concerns about an APR because
the parents had tried to manipulate the children during the visits.
Specifically, the caseworker testified that there had been several
times where the parents pressured the children during the visits
and if the visits continued through an APR, the children would
experience “emotional harm.” The foster mother testified that she
strongly opposed an APR because the parents were “volatile” and
“cannot stay within the boundaries of what they are set up with [the
Department].” The caseworker also testified that although an APR
could provide permanency, it would not meet the children’s needs
here.
¶ 23 True, the Department approved the home study for the
paternal aunt and uncle. But, the caseworker opined that removing
the children from their current placement would be “very
detrimental” and would “force them to start all over in a new
environment with people that they don’t know very well.” The
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caseworker also testified that the children were “adamant” about
wanting to stay with their current placement providers.
¶ 24 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual
findings, we will not disturb those findings or the court’s legal
conclusions on appeal.
III. Conclusion
¶ 25 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE GROVE concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.