Peo in Interest of GCI
Peo in Interest of GCI
Peo in Interest of GCI
Opinion
20CA0751 Peo in Interest of GCI 01-20-2022
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 20CA0751
Weld County District Court No. 17JD322
Honorable Thomas J. Quammen, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of G.C.I.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
ORDER VACATED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Richman and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 20, 2022
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
1
¶ 1 G.C.I., a juvenile, appeals the district court’s order imposing
restitution. We vacate the restitution order.
I. Background
¶ 2 G.C.I. pleaded guilty to sexual assault on a child. The district
court imposed a two-year deferred adjudication.
¶ 3 The People filed an amended notice of restitution asking the
district court to order G.C.I. to pay $3,861.00 in restitution based
on restitution reports from the local crime victim compensation
board (CVCB). The CVCB’s reports, which were admitted into
evidence at the restitution hearing, categorized the payments to the
victim, S.M., and her mother. For S.M., the CVCB report listed the
following:
• medical services — $2539.00; and
• therapy — mental health — $410.00.
For S.M.’s mother the CVCB report listed the following:
• economic support — wages — $912.00.
¶ 4 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution relied on the CVCB
reports and called the CVCB coordinator as its only witness. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the district court ordered $3,861.00 in
restitution.
2
¶ 5 G.C.I. appeals. He asserts that the prosecution presented
insufficient evidence to establish the amount of restitution claimed.
Because we agree with this contention, we do not need to address
G.C.I.’s other arguments — that the district court erred by denying
his motion to review the CVCB records in camera and that his due
process rights were violated.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 6 We review de novo whether evidence was sufficient to support
a restitution award. People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25. In
doing so, we evaluate “whether the evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant caused that amount of loss.” Id.
¶ 7 Criminal defendants must “make full restitution to those
harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2021.
Restitution “means any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .
proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be
reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2021.
3
¶ 8 The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the
victim’s loss and the restitution amount owed. People v. Henry,
2018 COA 48M, ¶ 15. “Proximate cause in the context of restitution
is defined as a cause which in natural and probable sequence
produced the claimed injury and without which the claimed injury
would not have been sustained.” People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272,
1274 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 9 Crime victims and their relatives may seek compensation from
a CVCB for losses caused by criminal conduct, including, as
relevant here, medical expenses, mental health counseling, and loss
of earnings. §§ 24-4.1-102(10), -108, -109(1), C.R.S. 2021. When a
CVCB pays a victim compensation claim, it is a “victim” for
purposes of the restitution statute. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV).
Therefore, “[i]f a CVCB awards compensation to a victim or other
qualifying person, the CVCB is eligible to seek and obtain
restitution from a defendant in [a] criminal proceeding.” People v.
Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶ 13.
¶ 10 The restitution statute creates a rebuttable presumption that
“the amount of assistance provided and requested by the [CVCB] is
4
presumed to be a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct
and must be considered by the court in determining the amount of
restitution ordered.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a), C.R.S. 2021; see
Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20. The rebuttable presumption shifts the
burden to the defendant to present evidence to show that the
amount paid was not the direct result of his criminal conduct.
Henry, ¶ 19. “[I]f that burden is not met, [the presumption]
establishes the presumed facts as a matter of law.” Id. at ¶ 17
(quoting Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150, 1154 (Colo. 2009)).
However, in order to trigger the rebuttable presumption, the
prosecution must establish the amount of assistance provided.
Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20.
¶ 11 The restitution statute prescribes two alternative ways of
establishing this amount: “[a] list of the amount of money paid to
each provider;” or “summary data reflecting what total payments
were made for” medical and dental expenses, funeral or final
disposition expenses, mental health counseling, wage or support
losses, or other expenses. § 18-1.3-603(10)(b). However, the
second method of establishing the amount provided may only be
5
used “[i]f the identity or location of a provider would pose a threat to
the safety or welfare of the victim.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(II).
B. Analysis
¶ 12 G.C.I. contends that the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence to prove that he was liable for the amount of restitution
claimed because the prosecution relied on CVCB summary data to
establish the amount of assistance provided without disclosing the
identity or location of any provider but failed to demonstrate (or
even assert) that disclosing the identity or location of any provider
would pose a threat to the safety or welfare of S.M. We agree.
¶ 13 As a threshold matter, the People argue that G.C.I. failed to
preserve this issue because he did not raise the failure to produce a
list of the amount of money paid to each provider at the restitution
hearing. But, at its core, G.C.I.’s claim is that the statute
establishes the evidentiary threshold for proving the amount of
restitution owed in this context and the prosecution’s failure to
comply with the statute means that evidentiary threshold was not
met. In other words, even couched in this manner, G.C.I.’s
argument is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. See
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 34 (holding that unpreserved
6
sufficiency of the evidence claims are reviewed de novo “even if
consideration of the issue involves a preliminary question of
statutory construction”). Thus, we review G.C.I.’s claim de novo.
¶ 14 The prosecutor relied exclusively on the second method of
proving the amount of assistance provided by the CVCB —
“summary data reflecting what total payments were made.” See
§ 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(II). As noted, the restitution statute only
permits the use of summary data to establish the amount of
assistance provided by the CVCB “[i]f the identity or location of a
provider would pose a threat to the safety or welfare of the victim.”
Id. The prosecutor did not assert that the location or identity of the
providers would pose a threat to the safety or welfare of S.M., nor
did she present any evidence to that effect. See Martinez-Chavez,
¶ 20.
¶ 15 In the absence of such evidence, the statute permits only one
way to establish the amount of assistance provided by the CVCB:
“[a] list of the amount of money paid to each provider.”
§ 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(I). But, as noted, the prosecutor did not provide
such a list. Consequently, we conclude that the prosecution did not
present sufficient evidence to establish the amount of assistance
7
provided. See Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20 (holding that the prosecution
failed to establish the amount of assistance provided because it “did
not provide a list of providers nor did they even argue that
disclosure of such a list would pose a threat to the safety or welfare
of any victim”). In other words, the evidence was insufficient to
support the amount of restitution claimed.
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 The district court’s restitution order is vacated.
JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE GROVE concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.