Peo in Interest of LRS
Peo in Interest of LRS
Peo in Interest of LRS
Opinion
23CA1971 Peo in Interest of LRS 07-03-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1971
Arapahoe County District Court No. 20JV540
Honorable Michelle A. Amico, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.R.S., a Child,
and Concerning G.L.A.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Román, C.J., and Richman*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2024
Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Tamra White, Assistant County Attorney,
Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Alison A. Bettenberg, Sheena Knight, Guardians Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
1
¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, G.L.A. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with L.R.S. (the child). She contends that the juvenile
court erred when it entered a disposition of no appropriate
treatment plan. We perceive no basis for reversal and therefore
affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In October 2020, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect after mother
brought the one-year-old child into the hospital with a broken tibia,
bruising on and swelling of his genitalia, bruising on his back and
over his left eye, and two other healing fractures. The child’s liver
function was also impaired. Mother could not adequately explain
the injuries and claimed that the child’s father had harmed him.
The child was removed from the home, and the Department set up
supervised family time between mother and the child.
¶ 3 The child was adjudicated dependent and neglected in
January 2021, and the juvenile court entered a dispositional order
that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised for mother.
Mother appealed. Noting that no termination hearing had occurred,
2
a division of this court dismissed mother’s first appeal for lack of a
final, appealable judgment. See People in Interest of L.R.S., (Colo.
App. No. 21CA0432, Nov. 18, 2021) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶ 4 While mother’s first appeal was pending, the judge who
entered this case’s initial orders resigned. After the resignation, the
parties stipulated to a new adjudicatory and dispositional hearing,
vacating the previous orders. Mother entered an admission to the
petition in January 2022.
¶ 5 After a hearing, a second judge found that the Department
and guardian ad litem (GAL) had proven that the child had been
subjected to an incident of serious bodily injury (SBI) under
sections 19-3-604(1)(b)(II) and 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2023
(including experiencing “breaks” and “fractures”). Nevertheless, the
court determined that the Department and GAL did not present
evidence that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised to
address mother’s unfitness. On the basis of the court’s findings,
mother moved for a directed verdict, asserting that the Department
and GAL had failed to meet their burden at the dispositional stage.
The court granted mother’s motion.
3
¶ 6 The Department and GAL jointly petitioned the Colorado
Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21, challenging the juvenile court’s
order (joint motion). The supreme court reversed the order granting
mother’s motion. See People in Interest of L.S., 2023 CO 3M, ¶ 29
(“[T]he legislature intended to allow trial courts to find that a parent
is unfit and no appropriate treatment plan can be devised if the
state shows that the child has suffered a ‘single incident resulting
in serious bodily injury [SBI].’ The state need not also show that . .
. no treatment plan can be devised to address the parent’s conduct
that caused the SBI.”) (emphasis omitted). The case, which had
been assigned to a third judge after the second’s recusal, then
returned to the juvenile court.
¶ 7 In November 2022, mother pleaded guilty to misdemeanor
child abuse with regard to the child’s injuries. Six months later,
the Department moved for a finding and ordered that no
appropriate treatment plan could be devised to address mother’s
unfitness. After a seven-day hearing (no treatment plan hearing),
the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion (no treatment
plan order).
4
¶ 8 The Department then moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights, which the court granted. In making its termination decision,
the court relied on (1) expert testimony by the child’s physician
from the no treatment plan hearing, (2) radiology images of the
child’s broken bones that were described by the physician, and (3)
“the entire [no treatment plan order].”
II. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
¶ 9 Following adjudication, the juvenile court must consider a
disposition that will serve the best interests of the child and the
public. §§ 19-3-507(1)(a), -508(1), C.R.S. 2023. When the proposed
disposition is not termination of parental rights, the court must
approve an appropriate treatment plan for the parent. § 19-3-
508(1)(e)(I). In limited circumstances, however, the court may find
that no appropriate treatment plan can be devised. See § 19-3-
604(1)(b). As relevant here, when determining the basis for
unfitness, the court may find that there was a single incident
resulting in SBI or disfigurement of the child. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(II).
A court may conclude based solely on the evidence of SBI that no
appropriate treatment plan can be devised, or it may accept
additional evidence before deciding. L.S., ¶¶ 29, 32.
5
¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. But we review de novo the court’s legal conclusions based on
those facts. See id.
III. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding at
termination that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised.
She asserts that her participation in voluntary services and expert
testimony indicate a treatment plan could be created for her. We
perceive no error.
¶ 12 During the no appropriate treatment plan hearing, the juvenile
court found, with uncontroverted record support, that the child had
suffered SBI. The court qualified a physician, who had been
consulted with regard to the child’s injuries, as an expert in
emergency medicine with an emphasis in child abuse pediatrics.
6
The physician opined that the child’s injuries — including his
previously broken bones — were nonaccidental and consistent with
abuse. Despite this evidence of SBI, the court “elected to afford the
opportunity for additional evidence to be presented” on the question
of whether mother could be rehabilitated through an appropriate
treatment plan. The court pointed out, however, that “the proof of a
single incident of SBI” “carries significant weight in viewing the
totality of the evidence.” After hearing the evidence, it concluded
that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised to render
mother fit to parent the child. The court, adopting its findings and
order from the no treatment plan hearing, later found that
termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests. The record supports the court’s findings.
¶ 13 To be sure, the record shows that mother experienced some
success in voluntary treatment and treatment through her
probation while this case was pending. For instance, mother’s
probation officer testified that mother was in regular phone and
email contact, sometimes more than once a month. After mother
moved to another county, she had another baby while this case was
underway; the prevention caseworker in that county testified that
7
mother “practice[ed] every safety measure that she needed to” with
that baby.
¶ 14 Nonetheless, the record also shows that mother’s assertions
about her success in treatment were sometimes inaccurate or
incomplete. For example, the record supports mother’s assertion
that she completed many parenting courses. Mother’s probation
officer testified that mother had provided proof that she had
completed the classes. However, the probation officer also testified
that these classes — which mother admitted she actually completed
before L.R.S.’s birth — did not address L.R.S.’s injuries “or
accountability around this particular offense.”
¶ 15 Similarly, while mother’s assertion that the child was content
during her in-person visits with him is supported by the record,
other evidence suggests that the visits harmed the child. A family
time supervisor testified that she observed that, during virtual
visits, the child would cry excessively, hit his foster parents, rock
back and forth, bang his head, and pull his own hair. The foster
parents reported the same behaviors after visits with mother. At
the termination hearing, the same caseworker identified these
8
behaviors as “trauma effects” related to the child’s interactions with
mother.
¶ 16 The probation officer and mother’s therapist both confirmed
that mother was engaged in mental health treatment. The therapist
testified that she had worked with mother for the past nine years,
and that mother was on time for, and engaged during, their
appointments. However, the therapist also testified that mother
has “an underlying lack of trust with adults.” And the caseworker
pointed out during her testimony that mother’s years of therapy
had not prevented mother from abusing the child.
¶ 17 Finally, mother’s expert, whom the juvenile court qualified as
an expert in social casework, child welfare, bonding and
attachment, and development of treatment plans, opined that an
appropriate treatment plan could be created for mother. But the
expert did not consult mother or the current caseworker before
making this claim. And the expert repeatedly admitted that mother
would have “a lot of work to do.”
¶ 18 But the juvenile court may accept or reject expert testimony.
See People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 24. And in this
case, the caseworker, also court-qualified as an expert in social
9
work with an emphasis in child protection, challenged mother’s
expert’s opinion. The caseworker opined that no appropriate
treatment plan could be created. She testified that the child
sustained multiple injuries at different times and mother “did not
take accountability or responsibility as a parent.” At termination,
she continued to opine that no appropriate treatment plan could be
created for mother.
¶ 19 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s findings and
it was within the court’s purview to consider, weigh, and resolve
evidentiary conflicts, we will not disturb the court’s legal
conclusions. See id.
IV. Disposition
¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.
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