Douglas County v. Sweet
Douglas County v. Sweet
Douglas County v. Sweet
Opinion
23CA1645 Douglas County v Sweet 07-03-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1645
Douglas County District Court No. 20CV30437
Honorable Gary M. Kramer, Judge
Board of County Commissioners of the County of Douglas, Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Renee Sweet,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Lipinsky and Bernard*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2024
Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Andrew C. Steers, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Renee Sweet, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
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¶ 1 Renee Sweet appeals the trial court’s orders related to the
enforcement of the injunction entered against her and the
associated contempt proceedings. We affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. 2020 Bench Trial, Contempt Hearing, and Initial Appeal
¶ 2 Sweet owns residential property (the subject property) in
unincorporated Douglas County. After receiving complaints about
junk and inoperable vehicles on the subject property, the Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Douglas (the County) sent
zoning compliance officers to inspect. After the inspection, the
County notified Sweet that her storage of specified items on the
subject property violated several sections of the Douglas County
Zoning Resolution (the DCZR). Despite the notice, Sweet continued
accumulating prohibited objects on the subject property, placed
shipping containers and a greenhouse-type structure within the
minimum setbacks, and erected a fence that encroached on the
County’s right-of-way.
¶ 3 After Sweet failed to cure the violations of the DCZR, the
County filed a six-count complaint against her, in which it
requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as an
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award of civil penalties. In November 2020, the trial court entered a
preliminary injunction and set the matter for trial. The County
subsequently filed a contempt motion after Sweet refused to comply
with the preliminary injunction.
¶ 4 In March 2021, after a one-day bench trial, the court found in
the County’s favor, granted the County’s request for a permanent
injunction, and awarded civil penalties against Sweet. As relevant
here, the injunction
(1) barred Sweet from using the subject property as a
storage area for junk and ordered her to remove all junk,
trash, and rubbish from the subject property;
(2) enjoined her from storing inoperable vehicles or
unconcealed operable vehicles with expired license plates
on, and ordered her to remove such vehicles from the
subject property;
(3) enjoined her from locating structures within the
minimum setbacks of the subject property and ordered
her to remove the offending structures;
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(4) required her to remove all unpermitted structures from
the subject property and not use structures for which no
building permits were obtained from the County; and
(5) enjoined her from constructing any fence or wall that
obstructs the public right-of-way and ordered her to
remove all obstructing fencing and walls.
¶ 5 Sweet appealed the trial court’s orders imposing the
permanent injunction and the civil penalties. While the appeal was
pending, the trial court found Sweet guilty of contempt, sentenced
her to thirty days in jail, and imposed daily fines until she complied
with the permanent injunction. The court stayed the jail sentence
until the appeal concluded.
¶ 6 In July 2022, a division of this court held that Sweet’s claims
were without merit and affirmed the trial court’s permanent
injunction and award of penalties. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.
Sweet, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0671, July 28, 2022) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Sweet I). The Colorado Supreme Court
denied Sweet’s certiorari petition.
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B. Post-Appeal History
¶ 7 In March 2023, the mandate issued in Sweet I. After receiving
the mandate, the trial court imposed Sweet’s thirty-day jail
sentence. The County subsequently filed motions seeking orders to
impose per diem penalties and to certify the contempt penalties as a
civil judgment.
¶ 8 Sweet served her thirty-day jail sentence in April 2023. In
May 2023, she filed a certiorari petition with the United States
Supreme Court in Sweet I. But she did not obtain a stay from the
trial court or the United States Supreme Court while she pursued
that petition. See C.A.R. 8(a)(1)(A) (a party must ordinarily move in
the district court to stay a judgment or order from a district court
pending appeal).
¶ 9 In August 2023, the trial court set a hearing on the County’s
pending motions. Sweet argued at the hearing that the court
lacked jurisdiction due to the pendency of her certiorari petition.
The court informed her that it retained jurisdiction in the absence
of a stay.
¶ 10 Shortly thereafter, Sweet walked out of the hearing. After she
left, the trial court heard testimony about the continued DCZR
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violations, made detailed findings, and imposed additional daily
fines for Sweet’s continued violations of the permanent injunction.
The court granted the County’s motions.
¶ 11 Sweet appeals the orders imposing per diem fines and
certifying the fines as a civil judgment. She raises a myriad of
issues that we address below.
II. Jurisdictional Claims
¶ 12 Sweet challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in
two ways. First, she argues that the court was without jurisdiction
because of a temporary COVID-19 order from the Colorado
Supreme Court that significantly limited court proceedings during
the initial months of the pandemic. Second, she argues the court
lost jurisdiction over the case while her petition to the United States
Supreme Court was pending. We reject both contentions.
¶ 13 We review de novo whether a court has subject matter
of 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chief Justice
Coats entered an order that temporarily halted jury trials in
Colorado. Sweet argues, as a consequence of this order, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter when it commenced in
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June 2020. Sweet ignores that the order did not stop all
proceedings; rather, it only temporarily halted jury trials. Moreover,
neither the initial order nor any subsequent Chief Justice order
deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Those orders
simply modified the protocols for certain proceedings.
¶ 14 We also summarily reject Sweet’s contention that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction because of the pendency of her certiorari
petition to the United States Supreme Court. Neither the filing of
an appeal nor a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court
automatically stays execution on a judgment. In re Marriage of
McCue, 645 P.2d 854, 855 (Colo. App. 1982) (“[A] trial court retains
jurisdiction in order to enforce a judgment it has rendered where,
as here, the judgment has not been stayed.”). Moreover, the trial
court regained full jurisdiction in March 2023, after the mandate
issued in Sweet I. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction when it
issued the orders that Sweet challenges in this appeal.
III. Contempt Claims
¶ 15 Sweet raises several claims that the trial court abused its
discretion by issuing the contempt orders due to procedural errors
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that she contends violated her constitutional rights. We are
unpersuaded.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
1. Contempt
¶ 16 We review orders imposing contempt sanctions for an abuse of
court abuses such discretion when its ruling is “manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People ex rel. State Eng’r v.
Sease, 2018 CO 91, ¶ 24.
¶ 17 Trial courts may use their contempt powers to vindicate the
see also C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1) (“The court may impose a fine or
imprisonment or both if the court expressly finds that the person’s
conduct was offensive to the authority and dignity of the court.”).
Under C.R.C.P. 107, there are two types of contempt — direct and
indirect — and two types of sanctions, remedial and punitive. In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.C.B., 2022 COA 3, ¶ 21.
Direct contempt involves conduct that occurs in the judge’s
presence. Indirect contempt occurs when a party violates a court
order outside the judge’s presence. Id. at ¶ 22. As part of its
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inherent authority, the court has the power to enforce obedience to
its orders through contempt sanctions. People v. McGlotten, 134
P.3d 487, 489-90 (Colo. App. 2005).
2. Zoning Violations
¶ 18 Section 30-28-124.5, C.R.S. 2023, gives the County broad
discretion to address zoning violations:
It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct,
alter, or use any building, structure, or land in
violation of any regulation in, or of any
provisions of, any zoning resolution or any
amendment thereof, enacted or adopted by the
board of county commissioners . . . . [A]ny
person, firm, or corporation violating any such
regulation . . . may be subject to the
imposition . . . of a civil penalty in an amount
of not less than five hundred dollars nor more
than one thousand dollars. It is within the
discretion of the county attorney to determine
whether to pursue the civil penalties set forth
in this section, the remedies set forth . . . in
section 30-28-124, or both . . . . Each day
after the issuance of the order of the county
court during which such unlawful activity
continues shall be deemed a separate violation
and shall, . . . be the subject of a continuing
penalty in an amount not to exceed one
hundred dollars for each such day. Until paid,
any civil penalty ordered by the county court
and assessed under this subsection (1) shall,
as of recording, be a lien against the property
on which the violation has been found to exist.
In case the assessment is not paid within
thirty days, it may be certified by the county
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attorney to the county treasurer, who shall
collect the assessment, together with a ten
percent penalty for the cost of collection, in the
same manner as other taxes are collected. The
laws of this state for assessment and collection
of general taxes, including the laws for the sale
and redemption of property for taxes, shall
apply to the collection of assessments
pursuant to this subsection (1). . . .
. . . .
In the event any building or structure is
erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, or
used or any land is used in violation of any
regulation . . . [,] the county attorney of the
county in which such building, structure, or
land is situated, in addition to other remedies
provided by law, may commence a civil action
in county court for the county in which such
building, structure, or land is situated, seeking
the imposition of a civil penalty in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
§ 30-28-124.5(1)-(2)(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 19 This statute authorized the County’s enforcement action and
the trial court’s resulting order. See also Pena v. Dist. Ct., 681 P.2d
953, 956 (Colo. 1984) (A trial court has the inherent powers “to
perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity,
independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective.”).
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B. Application
¶ 20 Sweet claims that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion by (1) entering the post-appeal orders; (2)
issuing an order that lacked objective standards; (3) wrongfully
interfering with her ability to file a certiorari petition with the
United States Supreme Court by incarcerating her for contempt;
and (4) failing to advise her of her right to counsel for the contempt
hearing. We reject each of these claims.
1. Post-Appeal Orders
¶ 21 Sweet contends that the trial court lost jurisdiction to issue
the post-appeal orders because the court had issued the permanent
injunction and contempt order more than two years before. To
support this contention, Sweet mistakenly relies on C.R.C.P. 59(j),
which requires trial courts to resolve motions for post-trial relief
within sixty-three days from the date of filing. Critically, however,
the trial court’s subsequent orders did not modify or alter the
judgment entered against Sweet; rather, they enforced the existing
permanent injunction. For this reason, the court did not act
without jurisdiction when it granted the County’s motions (1) for
accrued per diem penalties; (2) to certify the contempt penalties as
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a civil judgment; and (3) certifying the per diem penalties. Section
30-28-124.5 authorized these remedies.
¶ 22 We also discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
contempt findings and subsequent orders. A court has the
authority to use its contempt powers to enforce obedience with its
orders. McGlotten, 134 P.3d at 489-90. And given the ongoing
issues with Sweet’s noncompliance, the court did not abuse its
discretion by granting the County’s request for accrued per diem
penalties and certifying the contempt and per diem penalties as a
civil judgment pursuant to section 30-28-124.5.
2. Lack of Objective Standard
¶ 23 Sweet argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
finding her in contempt because the permanent injunction was too
vague to be enforceable. More specifically, she argues it provided
no objective standard that permitted her to cure the violations. In
the absence of an objective standard, she argues that she cannot
comply with the permanent injunction and the contempt finding
was therefore erroneous.
¶ 24 We decline to address this contention because it is untimely.
Sweet should have raised in Sweet I any argument regarding alleged
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vagueness in the permanent injunction. At the time of the
contempt proceedings, the permanent injunction was a final order,
and for the reasons previously stated, the court properly enforced it
through its contempt powers.
3. Jail Sentence
¶ 25 Sweet argues that the jail sentence that stemmed from the
trial court’s contempt finding violated her constitutional rights by
interfering with her ability to submit her certiorari petition to the
United States Supreme Court. Not so. Sweet timely filed her
certiorari petition. In the absence of any injury, we decline to
address this contention further.
4. Right to Counsel
¶ 26 Finally, Sweet asserts the trial court erred by failing to advise
her of her right to counsel for the contempt proceedings. However,
the record demonstrates that, at a hearing held in March 2021, the
court advised her on the motion and provided her with “a court
appointed application to be completed and returned to the Court
within seven days of the advisement date.” Although Sweet
apparently did not complete the application, the court clearly
advised her of her right to an attorney. Sweet also contends that
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the court did not advise her of her right to call and confront
witnesses. But the contempt order reflects that the court advised
her on the motion for contempt.
IV. Remaining Procedural Claims
¶ 27 Finally, Sweet asserts a hodgepodge of procedural arguments
that are largely undeveloped and unpreserved, including that (1) the
case against her was erroneously brought in the County’s name,
rather than in the name of the People of the State of Colorado; (2)
the county attorney misrepresented the evidence during the hearing
when he stated that the zoning compliance officer’s testimony was
uncontroverted; and (3) the DCZR was not enforceable because it
was merely a resolution.
¶ 28 Sweet’s argument that the contempt proceeding should have
been brought as a criminal matter in the name of the People rather
than as a civil matter is raised for the first time on this appeal.
Therefore, we decline to address the argument. See O’Connell v.
Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Colo. App. 2010) (in civil cases,
where an argument “was not presented in the trial court” and is
raised as a “new argument for the first time on appeal,” it is
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unpreserved and will not be addressed absent extraordinary
circumstances not present here).
¶ 29 As pertinent to Sweet’s claims regarding the county attorney’s
alleged misrepresentations, Sweet walked out of the courtroom at
the commencement of the August 2023 hearing, despite the trial
court’s warning that, by doing so, she was waiving her right to
participate. Sweet departed before the compliance officer testified
concerning the subject property, despite the court’s warning about
the consequences of leaving. Furthermore, we agree with the
County that the county attorney’s statement that the zoning
compliance officer’s testimony was uncontroverted is accurate
because Sweet offered no contrary evidence. In any event, Sweet’s
claim regarding the zoning compliance officer’s testimony is also
unpreserved and we decline to address it.
¶ 30 Finally, Sweet makes a vague argument that the DCZR was
unenforceable because it was a mere regulation. But she raised
that same argument in Sweet I and the division rejected it. We
therefore decline to address the argument further.
V. Disposition
¶ 31 The trial court’s orders are affirmed.
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JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE BERNARD concur.
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