Peo v. Strong-Dalton
Peo v. Strong-Dalton
Peo v. Strong-Dalton
Opinion
22CA0149 Peo v Strong-Dalton 08-01-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0149
Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR2540
Honorable Robert Lochary, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Matthew Martin Strong-Dalton,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Tow and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 1, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, M. Shelby Deeney, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Matthew Martin Strong-Dalton, appeals the
revocation of his deferred judgment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In June 2020, a car wash replaced some equipment and
stacked the old items in its parking lot. Surveillance video showed
a car registered to Strong-Dalton arrive and two men take the old
equipment. The prosecution charged Strong-Dalton with class 4
felony theft in connection with this incident. In December 2020, he
entered into a plea agreement to a class 5 felony charge of first
degree criminal trespass of a dwelling. Strong-Dalton and the
prosecution stipulated to a two-year deferred judgment and
sentence under the supervision of probation.
¶ 3 As part of his deferred judgment, Strong-Dalton was, as
relevant here, required to not commit any further offenses, “refrain
from any use of alcohol or unlawful use or possession of controlled
substance,” “submit to monitored drug and alcohol scans,” and pay
restitution to the car wash. In February 2021, the probation
department filed a revocation complaint, alleging that Strong-Dalton
had failed to submit an oral swab drug test, tested positive for an
illicit substance, and picked up a new criminal charge. To resolve
2
this complaint, the parties agreed that Strong-Dalton would admit
to the technical violations of his deferred judgment conditions to
make a record of them but that the court would not revoke the
deferred judgment.
¶ 4 Then, in September 2021, probation filed another revocation
complaint, alleging that Strong-Dalton had again violated the terms
and conditions of his deferred judgment and sentence. As grounds
for revocation, the probation officer alleged that Strong-Dalton had
failed to submit nine oral swabs for drug testing since late April
2021, hadn’t provided verification of his employment or schooling,
and had failed to enter into a payment agreement or make
restitution payments. But prior to the revocation hearing,
Strong-Dalton connected with the owner of the car wash, reached a
settlement, and resolved the outstanding restitution he owed.
¶ 5 The prosecution then moved forward with the revocation
hearing solely on the grounds of failure to submit the required drug
tests. At the hearing, the prosecutor called Strong-Dalton, who
acknowledged that he had “had a string of missed tests.” He
explained that he had experienced a death in his family in May and
another family death prior to that. He also explained that he had
3
had to put his dog down two days before the hearing.
Strong-Dalton testified that he “fell into a deep depression being
unemployed. [He] kind of gave up for a while.” On
cross-examination, Strong-Dalton offered to do a hair follicle test to
demonstrate his sobriety.
¶ 6 The trial court found credible Strong-Dalton’s testimony that
he suffered a family tragedy that made things difficult and
commended him on completing the ultimate goal of making the
victim whole. However, the court also found that the prosecution
met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that Strong-Dalton missed oral swabs on at least the three different
dates cited in the complaint and determined that “accordingly,
pursuant to operation of law, the deferred judgment and sentence is
revoked.”
¶ 7 The trial court then proceeded to sentencing and, ultimately,
declined to impose any further sentence. In doing so, it noted that
— because of a different case — Strong-Dalton would still be under
supervision until the next May. Giving credence to his equitable
argument that he had satisfied the primary purpose of the deferred
4
judgment by resolving restitution, the court closed the case with no
further sanction.
II. Analysis
¶ 8 Strong-Dalton argues that the trial court erred by (1) violating
his due process rights when it failed to find that he had the ability
to pay for his drug tests and (2) finding that he failed to comply with
the conditions of his deferred judgment. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 9 A deferred judgment is a privilege. McCulley v. People, 2020
CO 40, ¶ 12. As an alternative to a traditional guilty plea, it allows
a defendant to plead guilty but defers entry of the judgment and
sentence for a specified period of time. Williams v. People, 2019 CO
101, ¶ 20. The district attorney may enter a written stipulation
requiring the defendant to comply with certain conditions, similar
to those permitted as part of probation. Id. (citing § 18-1.3-102(2),
C.R.S. 2023).
¶ 10 If the defendant complies with these conditions throughout the
deferral period, then the court must withdraw the guilty plea and
dismiss the charges underlying the deferred judgment. Id. at ¶ 21.
“But, if the defendant violates ‘any condition regulating the conduct
5
of the defendant,’ the court ‘shall enter judgment and impose
sentence upon the guilty plea.’” Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting
§ 18-1.3-102(2)). The violation need only be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Adair v. People, 651 P.2d 389,
391 (Colo. 1982). And “a trial court does not have discretion in
revoking a deferred judgment once it finds that the defendant has
violated the terms of a deferred judgment and sentence.”
1
People v.
Wilder, 687 P.2d 451, 453 (Colo. 1984).
¶ 11 Whether a defendant violated the terms of the deferred
judgment is a question of fact for the trial court to resolve. See
Adair, 651 P.2d at 391. Strong-Dalton challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the court’s finding. In such a case, we
review the record de novo to determine whether sufficient evidence
supported the trial court’s finding. See id.; see also Dempsey v.
People, 117 P.3d 800 (Colo. 2005).
¶ 12 Strong-Dalton also asserts that his due process rights have
been violated. This presents a question of law, see People v. Nave,
1
The exception to this mandatory imposition rule is not argued or
applicable to Strong-Dalton’s claim. See § 18-1.3-102(2), C.R.S.
2023.
6
689 P.2d 645, 647 (Colo. App. 1984), which we review de novo, see
B. Strong-Dalton’s Due Process Claim
¶ 13 Strong-Dalton argues that the trial court violated his due
process rights when it revoked his deferred judgment because it
was required to first find whether he had the ability to pay for his
required drug testing. We discern no error.
2
¶ 14 As part of this assertion, Strong-Dalton points us to case law
demonstrating that a deferred judgment revocation receives the
same procedural safeguards as a parole or probation revocation.
See Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 15 (“A defendant facing
revocation of a deferred judgment is entitled to the same procedural
safeguards as a defendant facing revocation of parole or
probation.”); People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408, 414 (Colo. 2010) (there
are minimum requirements revocation hearings must follow to
comply with due process).
2
The People and Strong-Dalton dispute whether he preserved his
due process claim. But because we discern no error, we need not
resolve this dispute.
7
¶ 15 In doing so, Strong-Dalton first contends that “violations of
probation must be voluntary” and argues that the trial court did not
make a finding of voluntariness. It’s true that “the trial court [could
not] revoke probation and impose imprisonment without first
determining whether [Strong-Dalton] failed to comply with
probation willfully or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to
acquire resources to comply with probation.” Sharrow v. People,
(1983)). But here the trial court did not impose imprisonment or
any other deprivation of freedom. So the voluntary or willful finding
requirement that Strong-Dalton relies on is inapplicable to this
Colo. 488, 490, 594 P.2d 578, 579 (1979).
¶ 16 Strong-Dalton next argues that before revoking his deferred
judgment, the court first had to determine whether he had an
ability to pay for his drug testing. But Colorado law treats payment
conditions, such as restitution, differently than nonpayment
conditions, such as drug testing.
[U]nlike the failure to discharge a fine or
restitution . . . a defendant’s indigency will not
always be relevant where, as here,
8
nonpayment conditions of probation are
alleged to have been violated. Therefore, when
the condition of probation allegedly violated is
not a required payment, the trial court is
under no obligation to inquire sua sponte
about the reasons for the defendant’s alleged
failure to comply with probation. Rather, it is
incumbent on the defendant to assert that his
lack of financial means prevented him from
complying with a nonpayment condition of
probation.
Sharrow, ¶ 44 (emphasis added).
¶ 17 The trial court found that Strong-Dalton successfully
completed restitution, which was the payment provision of his
deferred judgment. But as he admitted during the revocation
hearing, he didn’t complete his nonpayment condition of drug
testing — not because of an inability to pay, but because “[he] had a
death in the family. [He] fell into a deep depression being
unemployed. [He] kind of gave up for a while.” Strong-Dalton never
asserted “that his lack of financial means prevented him from
complying with a nonpayment condition of probation.” Id.
¶ 18 Additionally, the record demonstrates that the probation
officer had funding available for Strong-Dalton, was “more than
happy to provide funding for [him],” and did submit funding
requests for his drug testing. However, Strong-Dalton began
9
missing tests regardless. So even if he had claimed an inability to
pay for the tests, the record wouldn’t support his claim.
3
¶ 19 Because Strong-Dalton didn’t assert that his lack of financial
means prevented him from complying with the nonpayment
condition of his deferred judgment, and because the record doesn’t
support that conclusion in any case, we conclude that the trial
court did not violate his due process rights.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
to Support Revocation
¶ 20 We now turn to Strong-Dalton’s argument that the trial court
erred by revoking his deferred judgment because there is
insufficient evidence to show that he violated its terms and
conditions. We disagree.
¶ 21 In support of this argument, Strong-Dalton points to his
probation officer’s testimony that drug testing was not ordered by
the court. As the People point out, it is somewhat unclear what the
3
Additionally, we note that the availability of funding for drug
testing wholly undercuts Strong-Dalton’s argument that his failure
to drug test was involuntary. See Williams v. People, 454 P.3d 219,
228 n.7 (Colo. 2019) (explaining that “in proving that a defendant
has the ability to pay and failed to make a good-faith effort to pay,
the prosecution necessarily establishes that any failure to pay
was willful or at least unreasonable”).
10
probation officer was referring to in his testimony on this point.
But regardless, the testimony can’t overcome the plain language of
the executed deferred judgment agreement in the record. In it,
Strong-Dalton agreed to the terms and conditions of his deferred
judgment, including requirements that he would “refrain from any
use of alcohol or unlawful use or possession of a controlled
substance without a prescription” and that he would “submit to
monitored drug and alcohol scans.” And as noted above,
Strong-Dalton testified that he “had a string of missed tests.”
¶ 22 Thus, this record shows that sobriety monitoring was a
condition of the deferred judgment agreement. And Strong-Dalton’s
own testimony is direct relevant evidence that, “when viewed as a
whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is
substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable
mind that [he violated his deferred judgment agreement].” McCoy v.
People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence
to support the court’s finding that he violated his deferred judgment
agreement, and thus to support revocation.
¶ 23 Strong-Dalton’s final contention is equitable: he argues that he
substantially complied with the deferred judgment because he met
11
the ultimate goal of making the victim whole. The trial court
recognized this and exercised its discretion during sentencing when
it declined to impose any further sentence on Strong-Dalton and
noted his successful payment of restitution.
4
See People v. Muckle,
107 P.3d 380, 380 (Colo. 2005) (“Traditionally, the trial court has
broad discretion at sentencing.”). Regardless, “if the defendant
violates ‘any condition regulating the conduct of the defendant,’ the
court ‘shall enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty
plea.’” Williams, ¶ 22 (emphasis added) (quoting § 18-1.3-102(2)).
Given the facts of this case, Strong-Dalton’s equitable argument
doesn’t change our conclusion that the court didn’t err by revoking
his deferred judgment.
III. Disposition
¶ 24 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.
4
While we don’t think Strong-Dalton challenges that sentencing
decision in his favor, we also see no basis to disturb it if he were.
See DeBella v. People, 233 P.3d 664, 666 (Colo. 2010).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.