22CA2110 Peo v Woodford 08-15-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA2110

El Paso County District Court No. 21CR5711

Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Tyler Madison Woodford,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE

Dunn and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 15, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General,

Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ainsley Bochniak, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for

Defendant-Appellant

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¶ 1 Defendant, Tyler Madison Woodford, appeals the trial court’s

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶ 2 An August 2021 altercation between Woodford and the victim

led to Woodford being charged with second degree assault, second

degree kidnapping, menacing, third degree assault, and

harassment.

¶ 3 In November 2021, the court appointed the public defender’s

office to represent Woodford (plea counsel). In May 2022, Woodford

appeared with his plea counsel for an arraignment hearing where

he submitted a plea agreement that included a stipulated

twenty-four-month probation sentence.

¶ 4 Before Woodford’s case was called on the record, a defendant

in an unrelated case intended to enter a guilty plea. And before the

court advised the defendant in the unrelated case of their rights

related to the plea, it inquired of all counsel in the courtroom

whether any other defendants anticipated entering pleas.

Woodford’s plea counsel indicated that Woodford would be entering

a plea. The court asked Woodford to listen to the advisement of

rights being given to the other defendant.

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¶ 5 The court told Woodford to “please listen carefully” and that

“these are the rights that you . . . give up by pleading guilty” before

it proceeded to provide a Crim. P. 11 advisement on the record to

the defendant in the unrelated case.

¶ 6 Approximately fifty minutes after providing the advisement in

the unrelated case, the court called Woodford’s case on the record

and began reviewing the terms of the fifteen-page written plea

agreement with him, his plea counsel, and the prosecutor. The plea

agreement was signed by Woodford, his plea counsel, and the

prosecutor, and as relevant here, it stated that

• Woodford “wish[ed] to plead guilty to” menacing, a class 5

felony;

• he understood the nature of the charge, the elements of

the offense to which he was pleading guilty, and the

effect of the plea;

• he unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly placed or

attempted to place the victim in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury by use of a deadly weapon — namely, a

handgun — in violation of section 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2023;

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• he would be sentenced to twenty-four months of

supervised probation, be required to complete an anger

management course and forty-eight hours of community

service, and be required to pay court costs, restitution,

and any applicable surcharges;

• if he was granted probation, a possible penalty and

condition of probation could be a sentence of up to ninety

days in the county jail;

• he was waiving certain rights, which included his right to

a trial by jury on all issues;

• he had been advised, and he understood, that he didn’t

need to make any statement and that any statement he

made may be used against him; that his plea agreement

“must be voluntary and must not be the result of any

undue influence, coercion, or force by anyone”; and that

he had the right to enter a “not guilty” plea to any offense

charged against him;

• he “under[stood] that the Court [would] not be bound by

any representations or promises made to [him]

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concerning penalties to be imposed or the granting or

denial of probation”;

• he “agree[d] that [his] plea [was] final,” that “[o]nly the

judge [had] the power to reject [the plea] agreement

later,” and that “[o]nce [he] [pleaded] guilty in court, [he]

[would] not be allowed to change [his] mind”; and

• he “read and under[stood] [the] entire document” and

“discussed the document and [his] plea fully with [his]

lawyer.”

¶ 7 In addition to the written plea agreement, there was a colloquy

between the court, Woodford, and his plea counsel regarding the

terms of the plea and the rights Woodford was waiving by pleading

guilty.

¶ 8 Before the court accepted the plea agreement, the prosecutor

noted that the court had discretion to impose a ninety-day jail

sentence if it granted Woodford probation, despite the parties’

stipulated sentence. The prosecution raised this issue after the

victim, who had previously been unreachable, appeared at the

hearing and gave a statement to the court opposing the terms of the

plea agreement. When the court asked Woodford’s plea counsel for

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his position on the discretionary imposition of a ninety-day jail

sentence, he responded, “Judge, I’m going to need a moment with

Mr. Woodford.”

¶ 9 Plea counsel stepped into the hallway to discuss the potential

penalty with Woodford. When Woodford’s case was recalled on the

record, his plea counsel agreed that the plea agreement gave the

court discretion to impose a ninety-day jail sentence as a condition

of probation and indicated that he had reviewed that possibility

with Woodford, albeit not carefully, because the issue didn’t usually

arise with stipulated probation sentences.

¶ 10 The court then turned to Woodford and asked, “Mr. Woodford,

after hearing all of this, is that your understanding of your plea

agreement?” Woodford responded affirmatively and the court

proceeded with its colloquy, which included the following:

THE COURT: All right[,] . . . Mr. Woodford, did

you sign the plea agreement? Is that your

signature on the signature line at the back?

MR. WOODFORD: It is.

THE COURT: By signing the plea agreement,

are you representing to the Court that you’ve

gone through it line by line with your lawyer,

that you understand everything in the plea

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agreement, and that you agree to everything in

the plea agreement?

MR. WOODFORD: Yes.

THE COURT: [H]as anybody promised you

anything to get you to plead guilty, other than

what is set out in writing in this plea

agreement?

MR. WOODFORD: No.

THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or

threatened you in any way to get you to plead

guilty?

MR. WOODFORD: No.

THE COURT: Is this plea agreement what you

want to do?

MR. WOODFORD: I suppose so, yes.

THE COURT: Whenever someone answers

something that’s a little bit along the lines of “I

suppose so[”] or “I think so,” I usually pause

because . . . I have to [go] through [a] couple

more details, but in the end I’ll be asking you

whether you plead guilty to [menacing], and I

want to make sure that you have all the time

that you need to make sure that this is what

you want to do because once you enter your

plea of guilty you can’t take it back. So, if you

need any more time, I’m very happy to give it

to you. I’m happy to pause the proceeding

now and give you a few minutes, or even have

you come back in the afternoon if you prefer,

[be]cause the most important thing to me in

every plea agreement is that the person who

[is] entering a plea — that has such a big

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impact on their life — . . . has taken all the

time that they need to think it through.

MR. WOODFORD: I suppose this is the best

outcome I could really hope for, so we’ll

proceed.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. When you

plead guilty[,] you give up certain rights[.]

[W]ere you listening carefully when I went

through those with another defendant?

MR. WOODFORD: Yes, I was.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you confident that

you understand all the rights that you’re giving

up by pleading guilty?

MR. WOODFORD: I am.

THE COURT: And with that understanding do

you want to proceed with this plea?

MR. WOODFORD: Yes, sir.

¶ 11 The court accepted the plea agreement and set Woodford’s

sentencing hearing in July 2022. At the sentencing hearing, a

different public defender appeared on Woodford’s behalf. The new

public defender informed the court that Woodford wanted to

withdraw his guilty plea because of his concerns with plea counsel’s

advice. Due to the potential conflict created by Woodford’s claims

about plea counsel’s advice, the court appointed alternate defense

counsel (ADC).

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¶ 12 ADC timely filed a motion under Crim. P. 32(d) (the motion)

requesting the withdrawal of Woodford’s guilty plea and asserting

that (1) it was unclear from the arraignment hearing record whether

the court’s advisements to Woodford under Crim. P. 5 and 11 were

sufficient; (2) “[a]ssuming, without conceding, the advisement was

correct, and that Mr. Woodford was present for the advisement, Mr.

Woodford . . . did not understand the advisement at the time he was

entering a plea”; and (3) Woodford had “fair and just” reason to

withdraw his plea because he detrimentally relied on the incorrect

legal advice of his plea counsel.

¶ 13 After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the court

found Woodford’s assertions were “insufficient to constitute a fair

and just reason to withdraw the plea” and denied the motion. The

court later sentenced Woodford to twenty-four months of probation

and ninety days in jail but suspended the jail sentence. This appeal

followed.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 14 We review de novo a defendant’s challenge to the

constitutional validity of their guilty plea. See Brooks v. People,

2019 CO 75M, ¶ 6. But we give deference to the trial court’s

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findings of fact unless they are unsupported in the record.

Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1254 (Colo. 2011). And

when a trial court denies a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty

plea under Crim. P. 32, we review such denial for abuse of

discretion. Crumb v. People, 230 P.3d 726, 730 n.3 (Colo. 2010).

III. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 15 A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if done “voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently,” with the defendant having sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of

the plea. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). And to

“facilitate a more accurate determination of the constitutional

validity of guilty pleas,” Crim. P. 11 outlines various determinations

a trial court must make before accepting a guilty plea. People v.

Leonard, 673 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Colo. 1983). One such required

determination is that a defendant has been advised of the possible

penalties associated with the entry of their guilty plea. Craig v.

People, 986 P.2d 951, 963 (Colo. 1999); see Crim. P. 11(b)(4).

¶ 16 Rule 11 also requires the trial court to ensure that the

defendant is advised of “all the rights set forth in [Crim. P.] 5(a)(2).”

Crim. P. 11(b); see Leonard, 673 P.2d at 40. And, as relevant here,

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under Crim. P. 5(a)(2), the trial court is required to ensure the

defendant’s understanding of the following: the right against

self-incrimination, that their plea must be voluntary, the nature of

the charges, and the right to a jury trial. See Sanchez-Martinez,

250 P.3d at 1254-55.

¶ 17 While “[a] presumption of regularity and validity attaches to a

judgment of conviction resulting from a guilty plea,” Patton v.

People, 35 P.3d 124, 131-32 (Colo. 2001), a trial court “must

comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule 11, or we will

conclude the guilty plea is void,” Sanchez-Martinez, 250 P.3d at

1255.

¶ 18 If, after the trial court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea but

before the sentence is imposed, a defendant demonstrates a “fair

and just reason” for withdrawing their guilty plea, then the trial

may permit such withdrawal under Crim. P. 32(d). People v.

Chippewa, 751 P.2d 607, 609 (Colo. 1988) (quoting People v.

Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 559 (Colo. 1981)).

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IV. Discussion

A. The Trial Court’s Crim. P. 5 and Crim. P. 11 Advisements were

Adequate

¶ 19 Woodford asserts his plea cannot stand because the record is

insufficient to show that the court’s advisement was appropriate

since there is no written advisement in the court file and the court’s

verbal advisement only exists in the record of the unrelated case.

The People contend that we must “presume that the trial judge did

not commit error absent affirmative evidence otherwise.” LePage v.

People, 2014 CO 13, ¶ 15. We agree with the People.

¶ 20 At the hearing on the motion, the trial court “supplemented”

the record by informing the parties that it had reviewed in its

entirety the plea colloquy that occurred on the record of the

unrelated case and determined that the colloquy “covered all the

bases for an appropriate advisement of rights.” The court also

noted that ADC could further supplement the record by obtaining

the transcript from the unrelated case.

¶ 21 Woodford contends here, as he did before the trial court, that

the record is insufficient to show that he was adequately advised

under Rules 5 and 11. But it was his burden to settle and

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supplement the record. See C.A.R. 10(f), (g); People v. Ray, 2012

COA 32, ¶ 6 (“If a party believes that the appellate record is

incomplete or inaccurate, it must correct the deficiency under

C.A.R. 10.”). He did neither.

¶ 22 Despite the trial court informing ADC that they could request

the transcript from the unrelated case to supplement the record in

Woodford’s case, the record doesn’t reflect that a transcript was

ever requested or provided to the trial court. See § 24-72-304(1),

C.R.S. 2023 (regarding public access to criminal justice records);

Chief Justice Directive 05-01, Access to Court Records (amended

Feb. 2024) (regarding public access to court records). And the

record in the trial court needed to be settled before the record here

could be supplemented. See C.A.R. 10(f), (g). Thus, we presume

the regularity of the trial court’s advisement. See LePage, ¶ 15; see

also United States v. Aguilar-Vera, 698 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir.

2012) (noting that, while Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 doesn’t strictly prohibit

collective advisements, a trial court’s advisement procedure must

be sufficient to show that each defendant pleaded voluntarily and

understood the consequences of such plea). This is especially so

because the trial court made an additional record about the

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advisement colloquy and because the written plea agreement —

which Woodford signed — included the substance of the

advisements required under Rules 5 and 11.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the

Motion

¶ 23 Next, Woodford contends that, because plea counsel was

ineffective, he established a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing

his guilty plea and the trial court abused its discretion and

subverted justice by not allowing him to do so. We aren’t

persuaded.

¶ 24 In his motion and during the evidentiary hearing on the

motion, Woodford argued that his plea counsel lacked knowledge of

the contents of the plea, demonstrated ignorance of criminal

sentencing procedures, failed to advise him before the arraignment

hearing that his county court cases weren’t a part of the plea

agreement, and advised him that if the court sentenced him to

probation with a jail sentence, he could withdraw his plea

agreement.

¶ 25 “Ineffective assistance of counsel at the time a guilty plea is

entered may constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea

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prior to sentencing.” Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 21.

Woodford asserted that he “detrimentally relied on the incorrect

legal counsel of his attorney,” who he alleged “demonstrated both a

lack of knowledge of the contents of the plea and ignorance of

criminal sentencing procedure in general.” But Woodford has failed

to satisfy the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): to

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must show that (1) legal counsel’s performance was deficient and

(2) said deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. When a

defendant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel related to a plea

agreement, he must demonstrate that “but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶ 35 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 503 (Colo.

App. 2003).

¶ 26 The court did not find credible Woodford’s testimony that he

didn’t understand the terms of the plea agreement and that his plea

counsel incorrectly advised him that he could withdraw his plea

after sentencing. The court found that Woodford’s plea counsel was

15

“generally competent,” that he had several years of experience, and

that counsel had “handled hundreds and hundreds of

cases . . . and dozens and dozens of plea colloquies.” Furthermore,

the court found with record support that even if it had found

credible Woodford’s testimony that his plea counsel gave him

incorrect advice, that wouldn’t be a fair and just reason to allow

Woodford to withdraw his plea because Woodford’s assertion that

he didn’t understand the terms of the plea agreement “is rebutted

so thoroughly by the proceedings on the record at the plea

colloquy.”

¶ 27 And even assuming that plea counsel’s performance was

deficient, Woodford hasn’t proved the second Strickland prong —

that he was prejudiced by plea counsel’s deficient performance —

because there was no evidence presented that he would have

rejected his plea counsel’s purportedly incorrect advice and gone to

trial. People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 20 (defendant must

demonstrate through objective evidence that they would have

insisted on going to trial if they had been properly advised). To the

contrary, Woodford stated at the time of his plea that the plea was

the “best outcome [he] could really hope for.”

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¶ 28 Thus, the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying the

motion due to plea counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.

V. Disposition

¶ 29 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE YUN concur.