Marriage of Beck
Marriage of Beck
Marriage of Beck
Opinion
23CA0820 Marriage of Beck 08-15-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0820
Jefferson County District Court No. 22DR30455
Honorable Russell Klein, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Thomas Albert Beck,
Appellant,
and
Tina Marie Beck,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 15, 2023
Peak Legal Services, LLC, Todd Narum, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
The Wollard Law Firm, PC, Eric D. Wollard, Wheat Ridge, Colorado, for
Appellee
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¶ 1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Thomas Albert
Beck (husband) and Tina Marie Beck (wife), husband appeals the
district court’s allocation of the marital estate. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The parties married in 1997. During the marriage, wife
sustained serious injuries in a car accident and received over
$600,000 from personal injury settlements related to that accident.
¶ 3 The parties later separated, and in 2019, husband moved to
Oklahoma to help his son start Whitewater Hash (a marijuana
wholesale business). Shortly after the business closed, husband
initiated the dissolution case.
¶ 4 After a hearing, the district court dissolved the marriage. In
allocating the marital estate, the court found that the parties’ home
was worth $775,000, they had used $410,000 from wife’s personal
injury settlement to purchase it, and they had used at least some of
the settlement proceeds to complete $240,000 in renovations to the
home. The court awarded the home to wife and, in dividing its
marital equity, the court ordered that wife first receive $410,000
and that the parties then equally divide the remaining $365,000.
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¶ 5 The court also found that husband dissipated $262,000 when
he used marital funds for Whitewater Hash and concealed what
happened to those funds. The court factored these funds into its
allocation of the marital estate and ordered that wife’s share of
these funds ($131,000) be offset against husband’s share of the
marital home.
¶ 6 As for the remaining marital assets, the court allocated to
husband about $30,000 more of the marital equity from their
vehicles, accepted the parties’ allocation of bank accounts, and
divided their personal property. And the court ordered wife to pay
husband approximately $16,000.
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II. Property Division
¶ 7 Husband contends that the district court’s property division
must be reversed because the court (1) improperly awarded wife a
disproportionate share of the marital estate by giving her
substantially more of the marital home’s equity and (2) incorrectly
1
To the extent husband suggests that the district court erred by
calculating this payment “[t]o equalize the parties,” he does not
develop any legal or factual argument in support of that suggestion.
We therefore do not address it. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29.
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found that he dissipated $262,000 in connection with Whitewater
Hash. We reject his contentions.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 8 The court has great latitude to equitably divide the marital
estate in such proportions as it deems just. See § 14-10-113(1),
the court’s decision absent a showing that it abused its discretion,
meaning that it acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair manner, or it misapplied the law. In re Marriage of Medeiros,
(explaining that, when reviewing the court’s decision, we consider
whether the decision fell within the range of reasonable options).
B. The Marital Home’s Equity
¶ 9 We are not persuaded that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding wife a disproportionate share of the marital
home’s equity.
¶ 10 A court’s division of the marital estate must be equitable based
on the facts and circumstances of the case; it does not need to be
equitable division, the court considers all relevant factors, which
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may include the spouses’ contributions to the acquisition of marital
property, the value of property set aside to each spouse, the
spouses’ economic circumstances, and any change to the value of
the spouses’ separate property. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d).
¶ 11 The funds from a personal injury settlement arising during the
marriage, as well as the assets acquired from that settlement, are
App. 1993). In dividing those marital assets, the court should
consider the effect the personal injury had on the marital estate,
which may include lost income, medical expenses, inability to meet
also In re Marriage of Fields, 779 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Colo. App. 1989).
¶ 12 The court found that most of the marital estate’s equity was
comprised of the marital home, which it found was worth $775,000.
In dividing the home’s equity, the court found that wife had suffered
significant injuries from her car accident, which restricted her
physical activity and prevented her from returning to her previous
lifestyle. It also found that her injuries precluded her from working
a full-time job and that she could not earn a regular income. The
court further found that wife had endured numerous medical
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procedures and will continue to incur medical expenses after the
dissolution. And it found that the parties used a significant portion
of wife’s personal injury settlement to purchase the marital home
and that these funds were designed to help address wife’s future
needs. After considering these and other relevant circumstances,
the court determined that wife was entitled to a greater share of the
home’s equity and allocated to her $592,500 and to husband the
remaining $182,500.
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings on wife’s economic
circumstances, ongoing medical needs, and contribution to the
acquisition of the marital home. Wife testified that she sustained
severe back injuries from the accident and that due to those
injuries, she could not work more than twenty hours per week and
would require accommodation from any future employer. She said
that her estimated economic losses over her lifetime from the
accident may exceed $1 million and that presently she only received
an annuity payment of $1,037 per month. Wife also testified that
she was constantly in pain, had undergone approximately twenty
surgeries and medical procedures, and required ongoing medical
care to treat her injuries. And she said that the parties purchased
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the marital home by using $410,000 of the proceeds from the
personal injury settlement and that they also relied on those funds
to pay for the home’s renovations. Given these circumstances, the
court acted within its discretion by allocating the home’s equity
disproportionately in wife’s favor. See § 14-10-113(1)(a), (c); Wright,
¶ 10 (affirming an unequal allocation supported by the record).
¶ 14 Husband argues that the court failed to consider his present
economic circumstances. Not so. In its ruling, the court found that
husband was unemployed and received $2,200 per month from his
social security benefits. It also noted that he had about forty years
of experience operating construction businesses and working in the
construction industry and that, before the dissolution proceeding,
he helped his son operate Whitewater Hash. Although husband
highlights other evidence that he believes established a financial
situation worse than wife’s, we presume that the court considered
all the evidence when it reached its decision. See In re Marriage of
Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989). And we may not set aside its
resolution of the conflicting evidence when, as here, the record
supports its decision. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141,
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App. 2009) (“[T]he court need not make specific findings as to each
statutory factor as long as the findings made are sufficient to allow
the reviewing court to determine that the decision is supported by
competent evidence.”).
¶ 15 Husband also argues that the court did not adequately
consider the effect wife’s injury had on the marital estate when it
above, the court considered the factors it found relevant, including
wife’s lost income, the restrictions on her earning potential, and her
that other factors, such as his financial support of the family
following the accident, could have led to a more equal allocation, it
was within the court’s sole discretion to weigh the relevant factors
when determining an equitable allocation of the marital estate, and
we must defer to its determination supported by the record. See
Powell, 220 P.3d at 959; see also Evans, ¶ 45.
¶ 16 We thus are not persuaded that the court abused its
discretion by allocating to wife a disproportionate share of the
marital home’s equity. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525,
538 (Colo. 1995) (“[A]n appellate court must not disturb the delicate
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balance achieved by the [district] court in [its] division of property
. . . unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”).
C. The Dissipated Funds
¶ 17 Husband next contends that the district court erred by finding
that he dissipated $262,000 related to Whitewater Hash because
the evidence did not establish that he used the funds for an
improper or illegitimate purpose in contemplation of the divorce.
We disagree.
¶ 18 Generally, a court values marital property as of the date of the
permanent orders hearing when the hearing precedes the entry of
the decree. § 14-10-113(5); see In re Marriage of Turner, 2022 COA
39, ¶ 15. But when the court finds that a party dissipates a marital
asset, that asset is valued as of the date it last existed. In re
Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996); see also
Hunt, 909 P.2d at 542 (noting that a court may consider a party’s
economic fault when allocating the marital estate). Dissipation can
occur when a party depletes a marital asset for improper or
illegitimate purposes in contemplation of the dissolution. See Finer,
995 (Colo. App. 1999). When a reasonable showing of dissipation is
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made, it becomes incumbent on the party who depleted the marital
asset to establish that it was depleted for a proper purpose. In re
Marriage of Martinez, 77 P.3d 827, 830 (Colo. App. 2003).
¶ 19 Whether a party dissipated marital property is a question of
fact, and we will uphold the court’s determination when the record
supports it. See id. at 830-31.
¶ 20 The court found that husband took $262,000 of the parties’
marital funds and put it into Whitewater Hash. The court found
that husband had a duty to disclose and respond to discovery
requests concerning the business and his use of these marital
funds. The court also found that husband had the ability to
provide this information, noting that he had access to the
business’s financial information, was involved in its operations, and
possessed “boxes” of documents related to the business. But, the
court found, husband had taken no steps to account for the
$262,000. The court acknowledged that husband submitted a
document purportedly showing the business’s financials, but it
found that this document was likely created “in an effort to prevent
the [c]ourt from making an adverse inference” against him and that
it had “no credible evidentiary value.” The court determined that,
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given husband’s conduct and his concealment of the financial
information concerning the depletion of these funds, he had
dissipated this $262,000.
¶ 21 Contrary to husband’s suggestion, the record supports the
court’s reasonable inference that he improperly depleted these
funds in contemplation of the divorce. Wife testified that husband
took these marital funds after the parties had separated and during
a time when they were discussing the dissolution of their marriage.
Indeed, wife said that husband told her that if she cooperated with
funding Whitewater Hash he would “give [her a] divorce.” Moreover,
the record reveals that within months of purportedly closing
Whitewater Hash, husband filed the dissolution petition. See In re
Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 27 (“[W]e must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”). And
given the court’s finding, supported by the evidence, that husband
failed to disclose financial information related to Whitewater Hash
and his use of the $262,000, the court could draw a negative
inference against him and find that he improperly depleted these
marital funds. See In re Marriage of Sgarlatti, 801 P.2d 18, 19
(Colo. App. 1990). From this evidence, the court reasonably
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concluded that husband improperly depleted the $262,000 in
contemplation of their divorce. See Martinez, 77 P.3d at 830-31; cf.
In re Marriage of Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. App. 1984)
(“Just as a spouse’s actions in contribution to and preservation of
the marital estate are relevant factors, . . . so are a spouse’s actions
in depletion of the marital estate.”) (citations omitted).
¶ 22 Still, husband argues that the business merely failed and that
his testimony showed that he used the funds for a proper purpose.
But the court disagreed, finding that his testimony and other
evidence concerning Whitewater Hash and his use of these funds
“was not credible.” We must defer to this finding. See In re
Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (recognizing that the
district court determines the credibility, weight, probative force, and
sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence); see also Martinez,
77 P.3d at 831 (noting that the district court was free to disbelieve a
party’s testimony that his expenditures of marital funds were not
improper dissipation in contemplation of the dissolution).
¶ 23 The district court therefore did not err by determining that
husband dissipated $262,000 of marital funds.
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III. Disposition
¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.