In Interest of AJF
In Interest of AJF
In Interest of AJF
Opinion
23CA1318 In Interest of AJF 08-15-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1318
Archuleta County District Court No. 12JV35
Honorable Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge
In the Interest of A.J.F., a Child,
and Concerning N.F.,
Appellant,
and
L.L.S,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Navarro and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 15, 2024
Jones Law Firm, P.C., Patrick G. Barkman, John M. Duggan, Centennial,
Colorado for Appellant
The Law Firm of Lisa Ward, LLC, Lisa Ward, Durango, Colorado for Appellee
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¶ 1 N.F. (father) appeals the district court’s child support
enforcement order in favor of L.L.S. (mother). We affirm the order
but remand the case to allow the district court to determine
appellate attorney fees.
I. Background
¶ 2 In 2012, this case began as a paternity action filed in the
district court in Archuleta County, Colorado (the Colorado court).
In 2014, the parties, who were never married, stipulated to a
permanent parenting plan for A.J.F. (the child) that included child
support (the 2014 stipulation). The Colorado court adopted the
2014 stipulation as an order of the court. As relevant here, the
2014 stipulation required father to pay mother $2,535 monthly for
child support. It also stated that “[t]he child’s extraordinary
medical expenses, as defined in [section] 14-10-115(10)(h)(II),
[C.R.S. 2024,] shall be paid by the father.”
¶ 3 At the time of the 2014 stipulation, father “reside[d] part-time
in Pagosa Springs, Colorado, and part-time in Texas.” Father
registered the Colorado order in Texas. Father later became a
resident of Texas. Mother, who moved to California with the child,
registered the Colorado order with a California court and requested
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a modification of child support and parenting time based on the
parents’ relocations. In April 2016, the California court granted
mother sole legal and physical custody of the child but denied her
request to modify child support, finding that “California lacks in
personam jurisdiction over [father].” Mother asserted that a motion
to modify child support was filed in the Colorado court in March
2016.
¶ 4 In the meantime, the Archuleta County Child Support
Enforcement Unit, which had filed a motion to modify child support
in the Colorado court in June 2015, withdrew its motion and
notified that court that it believed Texas had jurisdiction over child
support and that the child support matter should be transferred
there. Father later filed a motion to modify child support in Texas
but was unable to effectuate service on mother, and the case was
subsequently closed.
¶ 5 In 2016, a Colorado magistrate ordered the parties to “submit
briefs on the issue of this court’s continuing jurisdiction, or lack
thereof [and] to hear [mother’s] request for modification of child
support.” The magistrate determined, according to section 14-5-
205(a)(2), C.R.S. 2024, that it could not exercise continuing,
3
exclusive jurisdiction to modify its previously entered child support
order. Neither party petitioned for district court review of this
determination.
¶ 6 Five years later, mother filed in this case a motion to enforce
the 2014 stipulation (motion to enforce). The motion to enforce
requested that the court require father to pay for the child’s medical
expenses to include “neurofeedback treatments and somatic
therapy” as well as “therapies which are recommended by
specialists to help control [the child’s] tic disorder such as piano,
singing, swimming and art classes.” Mother also argued that the
child’s disabilities required him to be in private school; she asserted
that the stipulation required father to pay the school’s tuition.
¶ 7 Father moved to dismiss the motion to enforce, arguing that
(1) mother’s motion was not an enforcement but an improper
modification, and (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the
2014 stipulation’s child support order. The magistrate, who
determined that mother’s motion was one to enforce, not to modify,
and that father conceded that the Colorado court has jurisdiction to
enforce, denied father’s motion. While the motion to enforce was
still pending, father filed another motion to dismiss in which he
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alleged that a Texas court should determine mother’s motion to
enforce because mother had allegedly moved to Texas with the
child. Father’s second motion to dismiss was denied.
¶ 8 The Colorado court ruled on the motion to enforce in January
2023. It concluded that (1) father was not liable for some of the
child’s extraordinary medical expenses, including neurofeedback,
because mother did not comply with notice, insurance, and
reasonable necessity rules in the 2014 stipulation; and (2) father
must pay for the child’s piano, swimming, art, and singing lessons
and private school tuition.
II. Jurisdiction
¶ 9 Father asserts that the Colorado court should not have
exercised jurisdiction over mother’s motion to enforce. He asserts
that Texas should have had jurisdiction. We disagree.
A. Mother’s Threshold Contentions
1. Preservation
¶ 10 Mother states that father did not cite the record indicating
where his argument was preserved. Nor could he, she argues,
because he did not preserve this argument. We disagree.
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¶ 11 True, father did not cite the record to support his claim. And
C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) requires that an argument section contain
appellant’s contentions and reasoning with citations to legal
authorities and the record. Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo.
Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40. A noncompliant
brief may be stricken and the appeal dismissed. See C.A.R. 38(a).
Nonetheless, even when an appellant’s brief fails to satisfy the
requirements of C.A.R. 28, we may exercise our discretion to
consider the appeal on the merits as long as we are able to discern
the issues presented for review. See Barr Lake Vill. Metro. Dist. v.
Colo. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 835 P.2d 613, 615 (Colo. App.
1992). Although father did not cite the record, because we can
discern the issue presented, we will consider the merits of his
appeal.
¶ 12 Regardless, father’s argument implicates the Colorado court’s
subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, it can be raised at any stage
in the proceedings. See People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119,
¶ 13.
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2. Waiver
¶ 13 Mother also argues that father waived his issue on appeal
when “he affirmatively asked the [Colorado] trial court to appoint a
parenting time coordinator, clearly invoking the court’s
jurisdiction.” But a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction cannot
681 (Colo. 2007).
B. Father’s Threshold Contentions
1. Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA)
¶ 14 Relying on People in Interest of M.C., 94 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Colo.
App. 2004), father contends that a Colorado court must satisfy the
requirements of the UCCJEA, specifically, section 14-13-206(2),
C.R.S. 2024, before it determines whether it has jurisdiction and
that the court here failed to do so. The court did not err.
¶ 15 In M.C., another division of this court applied the UCCJEA and
decided that a Colorado magistrate erred when it entered child-
custody orders without first communicating with a Texas court that
had already commenced a child-custody proceeding. 94 P.3d at
1223. Father does not explain how the court’s holding in M.C. or
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the UCCJEA apply to this case because the issues raised do not
involve custody of the child. We therefore see no need to require
the application of the UCCJEA, including section 14-13-206(2), in
(Colo. App. 1998) (provisions of an earlier version of the UCCJEA do
not apply in a case related solely to child support).
2. Enforcement or Modification of the 2014 Stipulation’s Child
Support Order
¶ 16 Father admits that Colorado “retains jurisdiction for
enforcement [of the 2014 stipulation].” He asserts that, instead of
enforcing its prior order, though, the Colorado court improperly
modified the child support portion of the magistrate’s order without
jurisdiction. But father did not preserve the argument that the
motion to enforce was a motion to modify. Although he initially
raised this argument, he did not seek review of it before the district
court. Thus, we will not address it. See Madalena v. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32, ¶ 50 (issues not raised before the trial court
will not be addressed on appeal).
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C. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 17 Colorado enacted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(Colo. App. 1997).
¶ 18 A provision and comment from the UIFSA, though not obvious
on their face, are helpful here. Pursuant to the UIFSA, “[a] tribunal
of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with
the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction [(CEJ)] to modify its child support order if the order is
the controlling order,” and “at the time of the filing of a request for
modification, this state is the residence of the obligor, the individual
obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued.”
§ 14-5-205(a)(1). Similarly, pursuant to section 14-5-205(a)(2),
when Colorado issues a child support order it has CEJ to modify
that order, even when no party resides in Colorado, if “the parties
[so] consent in . . . open court.” As we discuss below, sections 14-
5-205(a)(1) and (2) are inapplicable in this case.
¶ 19 Because Colorado’s statutory language for section 14-5-205 is
identical to that contained in section 205 of the Model UIFSA, in
construing its meaning, we are guided by the comments of the
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
In re Marriage of Hillstrom, 126 P.3d 315, 320 (Colo. App. 2005)
(using the comments from this conference to inform interpretation
of a different statute). The comment to section 205 of the Model
UIFSA acknowledges the retention of jurisdiction for enforcement of
a previous order: “Even if the parties and the child no longer reside
in the issuing state, the support order continues in existence and is
fully enforceable unless and until a modification takes place . . . .”
Unif. Interstate Fam. Support Act § 205 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n
2008).
¶ 20 This reasoning is consistent with Colorado case law. Courts
have the inherent power to enforce their own orders. Vogan v. Cnty.
of San Diego, 193 P.3d 336, 338 (Colo. App. 2008). We
acknowledge that, under some circumstances, Colorado has
declined jurisdiction when an out-of-state court could determine a
child support issue more easily and efficiently. See In re Marriage of
Mowrer, 817 P.2d 612, 614 (Colo. App. 1991) (court declined
jurisdiction over motion to modify child support when the initial
order entered in Arkansas had been registered in the Colorado
court, but a proceeding regarding visitation was pending in
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Arkansas); see also In re C.G.G., 946 P.2d 603, 605 (Colo. App.
1997) (court declined to determine child support issue for parents
residing in Colorado when initial order entered in Sweden, and the
parties had an opportunity to resolve the issue there).
¶ 21 Section 14-5-204, C.R.S. 2024, incorporates Model UIFSA
section 204’s acknowledgement that, in order to avoid competing
support orders, courts are “expected to take an active role in
seeking out information about support proceedings in another
state . . . concerning the same child” and, depending on the
circumstances, “should decide to defer to the other.” Unif.
Interstate Fam. Support Act § 204 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 2008).
¶ 22 Because the Colorado court has discretion to accept
jurisdiction in this matter, we review that determination for an
abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair manner or when it misapplies the law. In
re Marriage of Bergeson-Flanders, 2022 COA 18, ¶ 10.
D. Analysis
¶ 23 Father argues that the Colorado court should not have
exercised jurisdiction over mother’s motion to enforce because (1)
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neither party nor the child reside in Colorado; (2) father did not
consent to Colorado’s jurisdiction; and (3) the court’s order created
a “paradox by denying jurisdiction over child support but retaining
jurisdiction over issues that directly impact child support . . . .”
¶ 24 Mother does not contest father’s assertion that he did not
consent to Colorado’s CEJ over child support. Because (1) neither
party nor the child lived in Colorado at the time mother filed her
motion to enforce, and (2) mother does not contest father’s claim
that he did not consent to Colorado CEJ, Colorado would have been
required to decline jurisdiction had mother’s motion to enforce been
one seeking modification. See § 14-5-205(a)(1)-(2). But mother
sought to enforce, not to modify, the child support order contained
in the 2014 stipulation. According to the Model UIFSA, then, the
2014 stipulation’s child support order remains enforceable unless
and until a court modifies the child support. See Unif. Interstate
Fam. Support Act § 205 cmt. No such modification was requested
by mother in the Colorado court, nor has father successfully
obtained modification in the case he filed in the Texas court.
¶ 25 Father then asserts that the Colorado court should not have
retained jurisdiction over the child’s expenses because doing so
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“offends the very purpose behind UIFSA.” He alleges that the
court’s order “created at least two, and possibly three states with
enforceable or potentially enforceable orders: California, for child
custody and parenting time, Colorado for child expenses only, and
possibly Texas for modification and enforcement of child support.”
This argument, too, is unavailing for three reasons.
¶ 26 First, in making this argument, father cites Hillstrom, 126 P.3d
at 318, in which a division of this court stated that the “UIFSA
allows for only one enforceable order in a case at any time. This is
accomplished by limiting jurisdiction to modify the original order.”
Again, mother seeks to enforce — not to modify — the original
support order.
¶ 27 Second, in addition to subject matter jurisdiction, a court
must have personal jurisdiction over the parties in a UIFSA
proceeding. Colorado is the only court with jurisdiction over
mother’s motion to enforce because it is the only state with personal
jurisdiction over both parties. See id. at 322 (“[A] custodial parent
may . . . enforce a child support action . . . under [the] UIFSA,
provided that personal service can be obtained over the obligor.”);
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court’s adoption of the UIFSA confers subject matter jurisdiction,
and a responsive pleading can confer personal jurisdiction in a case
where child support overpayments triggered potential modification).
As previously discussed, father could not effectuate service on
mother in Texas, and the California court concluded that it did not
have personal jurisdiction over father in the case mother had filed
there.
¶ 28 Third, the Colorado court’s order does not create multiple
enforceable orders. Father does not deny in this appeal that,
according to the 2014 stipulation, mother is entitled to the payment
she seeks for the child’s expenses. Instead, father argues that his
payment of these expenses would entitle him to a modification of
child support — a modification, which he cannot now seek in
Colorado because of the magistrate’s 2016 determination that it
could not exercise CEJ over a motion to modify child support. But
father filing a motion to modify in another jurisdiction would not
create the multiple enforceable orders scenario that the UIFSA
seeks to avoid. Based on the comment to section 205 of the Model
UIFSA, we understand section 14-5-205(a) to mean that, in a case
where no parties reside in Colorado, the support order is
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enforceable unless and until a modification takes place. Unif.
Interstate Fam. Support Act § 205 cmt. When a modification takes
place, therefore, the modified child support order becomes the
“enforceable order.”
¶ 29 Because the Colorado court properly assumed jurisdiction
over mother’s motion to enforce, the court did not abuse its
discretion when it heard and ruled on the motion.
III. Attorney Fees
¶ 30 Mother asserts that father’s appeal lacked substantial
justification and requests attorney fees pursuant to section 13-17-
102(4), C.R.S. 2024. Father disputes mother’s assertion that his
claims were frivolous and irrelevant. Father’s appeal was
unsuccessful, but that does not mean it was not supported by
rational or plausible argument. See Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson,
request for attorney fees under title 13.
¶ 31 Mother also requests appellate attorney fees under section 19-
4-117, C.R.S. 2024 (In paternity matters, “[t]he court shall order
reasonable fees of counsel . . . to be paid by the parties in
proportions and at times determined by the court.”), and section
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14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024 (“[A]fter considering the financial resources
of both parties,” the court “may order a party to pay a reasonable
amount” in attorney fees for proceedings after the entry of
judgment.). Mother includes a factual and legal basis for her
request for fees as required. See Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA
58, ¶ 53. Because the district court is better equipped to determine
factual issues regarding the parties’ current financial resources, we
remand the case to the district court to address mother’s attorney
fees request under sections 19-4-117 and 14-10-119. See C.A.R.
39.1; Schlundt, ¶ 54.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 32 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE PAWAR concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.