Peo in Interest of BH
Peo in Interest of BH
Peo in Interest of BH
Opinion
23CA2126 Peo in Interest of BH 08-29-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA2126
El Paso County District Court No. 22JV30200
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of B.H. and R.H., Children,
and Concerning T.H. and T.L.L.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
J. Jones and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 29, 2024
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant T.H.
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant T.L.L.
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¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, T.H. (father) and
T.L. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child
legal relationships with B.H. and R.H. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect regarding the then-eleven-
month-old and one-month-old children. The Department alleged
concerns about mother’s mental health, father’s aggressive behavior
toward one of the children, and both parents’ substance use. The
juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to the Department,
and the Department placed the children in foster care.
¶ 3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or
neglected. The court adopted substantially similar treatment plans
for both parents requiring them to regularly attend family time,
address substance abuse issues, develop parental protective
capacities, become self-sufficient, participate in life skills training,
and engage in mental health treatment. Father’s treatment plan
also required him to cooperate and communicate with the
Department. And, although mother’s treatment plan didn’t require
2
her to cooperate with the Department, the court ordered her to do
so.
¶ 4 The Department later moved to terminate both parents’ legal
relationships with the children. About three months later, following
an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.
II. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 5 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them
and reunite their family. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been
successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or
condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-
604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 7 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department of human services made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
3
See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest
of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”
means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in
out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services
provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 8 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide
screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the
provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;
information and referral services to available public and private
assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.
§ 19-3-208(2)(b). And if funding is available, section 19-3-208
requires a department to provide services such as transportation,
diagnostic and mental health services, and drug and alcohol
services. § 19-3-208(2)(d). However, services must be provided only
if they are determined to be necessary and appropriate based on the
individual case plan. § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d).
¶ 9 In deciding whether a department satisfied its reasonable
efforts obligation, the juvenile court should consider whether the
provided services were appropriate to support the parent’s
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treatment plan. S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. However, the parent is
ultimately responsible for using those services to obtain the
assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan. People in
Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And
when a parent voluntarily absents themself from a proceeding, a
department need not persist with futile efforts. See People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12. Moreover, a juvenile court
may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment as
a factor in determining whether a department made reasonable
efforts. See id.
¶ 10 Whether a department of human services satisfied its
obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and
law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we
review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review
de novo the court’s legal determination as to whether the
department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
B. Analysis
¶ 11 The parents argue that the caseworker never referred them to
mental health or substance abuse treatment and that the
Department didn’t provide transportation to family time or
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treatment. Additionally, father argues that the Department failed to
provide him with a phone or set up virtual visits when he requested
them. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 12 In its ruling, the juvenile court said that it had heard “quite a
bit about reasonable efforts” and considered that testimony
“critically.” The court found that the Department made reasonable
efforts because it had done what it could to help the parents “have
access to resources, to succeed to get through the treatment plan,
[and] to try to support and engage [them].” The court noted that the
caseworker had tried to coordinate with the other caseworker
assigned to mother’s open case in Pueblo to “make sure that things
were provided to th[e] family.” The court found that the caseworker
regularly emailed the parents “to get them involved” and to “let
them know about staffings and services.” The court also found that
the Department provided a phone to the parents, referred them to
life skills training, provided them information about veteran’s
housing, offered them substance abuse and mental health
treatment, organized their transportation to life skills training and
treatment, and set up family time by making several referrals to
different visitation providers.
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¶ 13 The record supports these findings.
¶ 14 In general, the record shows that the Department worked with
the parents’ teams and the caseworker assigned to mother’s Pueblo
case to coordinate services, but the parents didn’t engage. In
particular, the caseworker testified that the Department had
biweekly meetings at which the team, including the Pueblo
caseworker, would discuss the parents’ treatment plans and
determine which services needed to be set up. The caseworker
testified that she regularly and repeatedly sent email reminders
about the meetings to the email addresses provided by the parents,
but they didn’t attend those meetings. And the caseworker said
that during those meetings, she asked the professionals on the
parents’ teams what else she could do to support the parents, and
then she followed up on everything the parents’ teams asked her to
do.
¶ 15 It’s true, as the parents point out, that the caseworker didn’t
make referrals to mental health or substance abuse treatment for
either parent except for one referral for mother at the beginning of
the case. The caseworker testified that at the beginning of the case,
she made a referral for mother to get a mental health evaluation at
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Bright Space Counseling. But after that was closed due to Medicaid
issues, the caseworker, along with mother’s team, determined that
the best place for mother to receive treatment would be at a facility
called Crossroads, which provided both substance abuse and
mental health services. The caseworker contacted Crossroads and
gave mother all the information she needed to begin treatment
there. As to father, the caseworker testified that after he told her he
wanted to attend treatment at Health Solutions, she called the
provider to determine what would be necessary for him to do so and
then emailed that information to him on the same day.
¶ 16 Even though the caseworker didn’t make any additional
referrals for mental health or substance abuse treatment, she
contacted both providers and they told her that referrals were
unnecessary because the parents could simply make an
appointment or walk in to receive treatment using their Medicaid
benefits. And yet, after she provided this information to the
parents, they never went to Crossroads or Health Solutions, and
instead, started going to a methadone clinic called Behavioral
Health Group (BHG). At that point, the caseworker requested that
both parents sign releases so that she could speak to the providers
8
at BHG. Mother never signed a release but father did, and the
caseworker was able to confirm that he was regularly receiving
methadone and attending individual therapy at BHG. Thus, the
caseworker testified, in sum, that because the parents told her that
they were receiving treatment at BHG, and because BHG provided
both substance abuse and mental health treatment, she determined
that additional referrals weren’t necessary. See § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d)
(services must only be provided if they are determined to be
“necessary and appropriate”); see also A.V., ¶ 12 (noting that a
department is not required to make futile efforts).
¶ 17 Next, the record indicates that the Department facilitated
transportation for the parents to attend family time and life skills
training. Father testified that the Department “put [him] in contact
with Medride.” The caseworker testified that by the time the
parents needed transportation to family time, Medride was already
set up. Notably, the caseworker, along with the parents’ teams,
decided that it would be best to refer the parents to life skills
training at the same facility as family time so that Medride could
provide transportation to both. The caseworker said that the
parents agreed to utilize Medride to get to family time. And the
9
caseworker testified that while the Department was ordered to
provide bus tickets to the parents to make sure they could attend
family time, the bus “was not an issue” because the parents had
transportation through Medride.
¶ 18 We also reject father’s arguments that the Department failed
to make reasonable efforts because the caseworker didn’t provide
him with a phone or set up virtual visits when he requested them.
First, the caseworker testified that when the Department provided a
phone to mother, father didn’t need a phone because he already
had one. The caseworker also testified that father gave her several
different phone numbers throughout the case and never asked her
to provide him with a phone. Second, the caseworker testified that
when father requested virtual visits, she made a referral to set them
up. However, the visitation provider attempted to contact father at
least six times, and he didn’t respond, so the provider closed the
referral. Thereafter, father asked the caseworker to make another
referral, which she did, and then the virtual visits were set up
within the same month father requested the second referral.
¶ 19 Lastly, although the juvenile court found that the
Department’s efforts were reasonable, it also found that the
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Department’s “ability to provide reasonable efforts was tempered by
the parents’ willingness to engage” and that when the caseworker
“tried to set [services] up,” the parents “would refuse treatment.”
The record supports these findings as well. The caseworker
testified that mother didn’t regularly communicate with her
throughout the case despite the caseworker’s attempts to call,
email, and meet with her. The caseworker said that she never had
any contact with mother “outside of speaking to [father] as well”
and that she had never been able to meet with mother in person.
As to father, the caseworker testified that he communicated with
her more than mother but that his communication was “sporadic,”
and when she would speak with him about setting up services, he
would “blame” mother and state that he didn’t need services or
want any referrals. The caseworker testified that their
conversations never “got past” father objecting to services and
directing her to speak with his attorney. And the caseworker
testified that she was unable to fully evaluate the parents’ needs
because of their lack of communication with her. During a review
hearing about three months after the juvenile court adopted the
parents’ treatment plans, mother’s counsel said on record that the
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caseworker was “doing everything she [could] . . . to look at
engagement with the parents” and that the “resources” and “tools”
were available, but they were missing the “last piece,” which was
action on mother’s part. And father’s counsel said that although
father had expressed interest in attending inpatient rehabilitation,
the team was waiting on “more contact” from father.
¶ 20 Accordingly, because the juvenile court’s findings are
supported by the record, we won’t disturb its determination that the
Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation.
III. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 21 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by concluding
that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. He
argues that the Department failed to sufficiently investigate whether
a family friend, M.C., was an appropriate placement for one of the
children. We discern no error.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 22 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives
are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less
drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary
12
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,
¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider other factors, including
whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial
to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the
child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38.
And a juvenile court may consider whether the placement provider
favors adoption over an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR).
S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 920.
¶ 23 To aid the court in determining whether there is a less drastic
alternative to termination, a department must evaluate a
reasonable number of persons the parent identifies as placement
options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App.
2004). But a department isn’t obligated to “independently identify
and evaluate other possible placement alternatives.” People in
Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 24 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best
interests. A.M., ¶ 27. “[L]ong-term or permanent placement with a
family member or foster family, short of termination, may not be a
13
viable less drastic alternative if it does not provide adequate
permanence that adoption would provide or otherwise meet a child’s
needs.” A.R., ¶ 41. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must reject the alternative and order termination. A.M.,
¶ 32.
¶ 25 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but instead finds that termination is in the child’s best
interests, we must affirm the court’s decision if the record supports
its findings and legal conclusions. People in Interest of B.H., 2021
CO 39.
B. Analysis
¶ 26 The juvenile court considered whether there were any less
drastic alternatives to termination that would be in the children’s
best interests but ultimately determined there weren’t. The court
found that the Department made reasonable efforts to locate kin
placements, including M.C. However, the court found that M.C.
wasn’t a viable less drastic alternative because M.C. couldn’t take
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both children and it “would not be in the best interest[s] of these
[children] to split them up.” And the court found that while the
Department looked into “a lot of other family members,” including
family on both the paternal and maternal sides, none of them were
willing and able to take the children.
¶ 27 The juvenile court also found that although the children knew
their parents as “fun people that they can talk to on the virtual
visits,” these were not “real parental relationship[s] where [the
children] would turn to their parents to meet [their] needs.” The
court found that the parents weren’t fit and couldn’t take “care of
the two little girls.” Relatedly, the court determined that adoption,
not an APR, was in the children’s best interests based on “their age
and their mental, physical, and emotional needs.” The court found
that an APR could “set them up” for “potential trauma” if the case
were reopened for modification in the future. Thus, the court found
that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best
interests.
¶ 28 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified
that when the case was opened, the Department conducted a family
search and engagement, but no placement options were discovered
15
from that search. The caseworker said that she received M.C.’s
contact information about two months before the termination
hearing. Contrary to father’s argument, the caseworker testified
that she called M.C. twice and texted her multiple times before she
responded that she could only take one of the children. Thus, the
caseworker opined that M.C. wasn’t appropriate as a less drastic
alternative because the children have “a significant bond to each
other” and splitting them up wouldn’t be in their best interests.
The caseworker also testified that she reached out to both of
father’s adult children, but one of them had six children of his own,
so he couldn’t be a placement option. The other told the
caseworker that she would think about whether she could be a
placement option but then never followed up. Additionally, the
caseworker spoke to the children’s maternal grandmother who said
that she was unable to take the children because of her living
situation. The caseworker also reached out to another maternal
family member and his wife to explore them as a placement option,
but they didn’t respond. The caseworker said that she “explored”
all names that were given to her and that none of those people had
16
expressed a desire or willingness to be a placement for both
children.
¶ 29 Next, the caseworker testified that the children had specific
ongoing mental health and medical needs; specifically, one child
needed ongoing speech therapy, and both needed occupational
therapy. The caseworker opined that neither parent was capable of
meeting the children’s needs because neither parent had
demonstrated sobriety and because mother wasn’t mentally stable.
The caseworker opined that an APR would put the children’s safety
at risk. Further, although the court didn’t make any findings about
the foster parents’ preference, the caseworker testified that when
she had discussed permanency with them, they said that they
wanted to adopt the children.
¶ 30 Lastly, the expedited permanency planning provisions apply
when, as here, a child is less than six years old at the time of the
filing of the petition in dependency or neglect. § 19-1-123(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2024. Thus, the juvenile court was required to place the
children in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. § 19-3-
702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
17
¶ 31 By the time of the termination hearing, the children had been
out of the home for approximately fifteen months. The caseworker
didn’t specifically refer to the children’s young ages as a reason that
termination was in their best interests, but she opined that they
needed a stable and permanent home which could only be assured
through termination and adoption. Section 19-1-102(1.6), C.R.S.
2024, supports the caseworker’s opinion, as it provides that
“children undergo a critical bonding and attachment process prior
to the time they reach six years of age” and recognizes that “a child
who has not bonded with a primary adult during this critical stage
will suffer significant emotional damage which frequently leads to
chronic psychological problems and antisocial behavior when the
child reaches adolescence and adulthood.” § 19-1-102(1.6).
¶ 32 Therefore, because the record supports the juvenile court’s
finding that no less drastic alternative to termination was in the
children’s best interests, we discern no basis for reversal.
IV. Disposition
¶ 33 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.