Peo v. Shukurov
Peo v. Shukurov
Peo v. Shukurov
Opinion
22CA0464 Peo v Shukurov 09-05-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0464
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CR3687
Honorable Joseph Whitfield, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Furkatjon A. Shukurov,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Tow and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 5, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Furkatjon A. Shukurov, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of second
degree assault (strangulation) and third degree assault. He
contends that the trial court reversibly erred by (1) denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained from officers’ entry into and
search of his home; (2) denying his motion to suppress statements
he made to officers at his home; (3) denying his for cause challenge
to a juror; and (4) allowing two witnesses to opine on the
truthfulness of the victim’s testimony. We disagree with those
contentions and therefore affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶ 2 One night, the victim — Shukurov’s wife — called 911 and
reported that Shukurov had “beat” her with his hands about two
hours before and was still in the home with her and their children.
She said that she wasn’t hurt and didn’t want an ambulance sent
because she didn’t want to wake the children.
¶ 3 Three police officers arrived at Shukurov’s home, knocked on
the front door, and announced, “Sheriff’s office. Step outside.”
When Shukurov opened the door, one of the officers ordered him to
stand against the wall and performed a pat down. Nothing was
2
discovered in the pat down. Another officer asked Shukurov —
whose first language is Russian — if he “underst[oo]d English pretty
well.” He nodded and said, “Yeah, yeah.” The officer then asked,
“Is it okay if we all go inside and talk?” Shukurov nodded again;
motioned to the door; and said, “Yeah, yeah.” The officers followed
him inside. One officer went through the home while two others
stayed with Shukurov. At some point, a fourth officer also arrived
and briefly went through the home.
¶ 4 With the aid of Russian translators, the officers interviewed
Shukurov and the victim in different rooms for about fifteen to
twenty minutes each.
¶ 5 The victim told officers that Shukurov had struck her in the
leg and arm, choked her, and threatened to kill her. Officers
documented several injuries, including bruises on her arm and leg
(one of which appeared in the shape of a knuckle), a cut on her
neck, and pieces of her hair that she said Shukurov had pulled out.
¶ 6 Shukurov denied the assault. He said he and the victim had
had an argument, but he hadn’t struck her. Officers observed
scratches on Shukurov’s face and neck, which he said he’d gotten
3
when he climbed a ladder at work and scratched himself on some
branches.
¶ 7 After interviewing both parties, the officers instructed
Shukurov to stand up and face the wall, placed him in handcuffs,
and took him out to a patrol car. As they were doing so, Shukurov
cried and said “last time” a few times. He also said something to
the effect of “I won’t hit my wife anymore.”
¶ 8 Before trial, Shukurov filed three motions to suppress, arguing
that (1) the officers’ entry into his home was illegal and, therefore,
all evidence, observations, and statements obtained from that entry
were inadmissible; (2) the statements he made to officers at his
home should be suppressed because they were obtained in violation
he made to officers should be suppressed because they were
involuntary. After a hearing, the trial court denied all three
motions.
¶ 9 At trial, the victim recanted her previous allegations that
Shukurov had assaulted her. Instead, she testified that her injuries
occurred when she “fell down the stairs” and that she’d called 911
in a “nervous breakdown” due to medications she’d taken that day.
4
¶ 10 Following a four-day trial, the jury found Shukurov guilty as
charged. He was sentenced to a ninety-day term in jail followed by
three years of probation.
II. Search & Seizure
¶ 11 Shukurov challenges the trial court’s denial of his first motion
to suppress, which related to the officers’ entry into and search of
his home. Specifically, Shukurov contends that the court erred by
concluding that (1) the pat down was legal; (2) officers had valid
consent to enter his home; and (3) the search was appropriate in
scope. We are not persuaded.
¶ 12 Our review of a suppression order presents a mixed question
of fact and law. People v. Berdahl, 2019 CO 29, ¶ 18. We defer to
the trial court’s factual findings, such as findings of historical facts
underlying the issue of consent to search, if they are supported by
¶ 34. But we assess de novo the legal effect of those facts, such as
whether a search was constitutional. Berdahl, ¶ 18; see also People
5
A. The Pat Down
¶ 13 Shukurov initially argues that officers illegally patted him
down when they arrived at his home and that this illegal pat down
influenced his response when, soon thereafter, they asked to go
inside. We disagree that the pat down was illegal.
¶ 14 Patting down a suspect for weapons is a type of investigatory
stop — an intermediate form of governmental intrusion, falling in
between a consensual encounter and an arrest. See People v. King,
(Colo. App. 2000).
¶ 15 To subject a person to an investigatory stop, three conditions
must be met: (1) there must be a specific and articulable basis in
fact for suspecting criminal activity; (2) the purpose of the stop
must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the stop
person during the stop, an officer must also have a reasonable
basis to suspect that the person might be armed and dangerous.
People v. Martinez, 801 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo. 1990).
6
¶ 16 Shukurov challenges only the final requirement: the existence
of a reasonable basis to suspect he might’ve been armed and
dangerous. We conclude that this requirement was satisfied.
¶ 17 As the trial court explained, officers learned from the 911
dispatcher that Shukurov had allegedly “beaten his wife” and
“threat[ened] . . . to kill his wife” two hours earlier. The officer who
later conducted the pat down also recalled hearing over the radio
from dispatch about a previous law enforcement contact where
Shukurov was armed with a handgun and was uncooperative.
¶ 18 This information supports a reasonable belief that Shukurov
may have been armed and dangerous. See People v. Mascarenas,
972 P.2d 717, 721 (Colo. App. 1998) (officers had a sufficient basis
to pat down a domestic violence suspect, in part because they
“knew that domestic violence situations were particularly
dangerous”); People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 26 (“[I]nformation
regarding the possibility that [the defendant] was carrying a
handgun” provided support for a pat down.); see generally People v.
Chavez, 240 P.3d 448, 451 (Colo. App. 2010) (“When officers
respond to a domestic abuse call, they understand that ‘violence
may be lurking and explode with little warning.” (quoting United
7
States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005))) (alteration
omitted). Thus, the officers “were permitted to conduct a minimally
intrusive frisk or pat-down search of [Shukurov] for safety
purposes.” People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 47, ¶ 41.
¶ 19 We reject Shukurov’s arguments to the contrary. He notes
that one of the other responding officers didn’t recall any
information from dispatch about a prior encounter involving a gun.
But that’s irrelevant, as one officer testified to hearing the
information, and the trial court accepted that testimony as true. He
also suggests that it should’ve been obvious to the officers once they
interacted with him that he didn’t have a weapon, as he was
compliant with their requests, didn’t make any furtive gestures, and
wore tight-fitting clothes that revealed various places where a
weapon could’ve been lodged. But given the other circumstances
suggesting the possibility of a weapon, as well as the other places
where one could’ve been hidden, it was still reasonable to fear that
he might’ve been armed and dangerous.
8
B. Consent to Enter the Home
¶ 20 Shukurov also argues that he didn’t voluntarily consent to the
officers’ entry into his home, and thus the intrusion into his home
was illegal. We disagree.
¶ 21 Police may enter and search a person’s home without a
warrant if the person freely and voluntarily consented to it. People
v. Stone, 2021 COA 104, ¶¶ 35-36. To assess whether a person’s
consent was voluntary, we apply an objective test based on the
totality of the circumstances. Berdahl, ¶ 23. Relevant factors
include the defendant’s age, education, and intelligence; the
duration, location, and circumstances of the search; the defendant’s
state of mind; and any other factors that could’ve affected the
defendant’s free and unconstrained choice in consenting. Id.
¶ 22 Like the trial court, we conclude that Shukurov voluntarily
consented to the officers entering his home. As the court found, the
officers “casual[ly] knock[ed]” on Shukurov’s door when they
arrived, and “[n]o weapons or tasers were drawn.” See Chavez-
Barragan, ¶ 48 (consent to a search was voluntary where officers
were “polite” and didn’t act “threateningly”). When asked, after the
pat down, if they could “all go inside and talk,” Shukurov nodded;
9
motioned to the door; and said, “Yeah, yeah.” See People v. Bostic,
148 P.3d 250, 254 (Colo. App. 2006) (consent to entry into a motel
room was voluntary where officers “asked . . . whether they could
speak with [the defendant] inside,” and “she stepped back, held the
door open, . . . allowed the officers into the room . . . [and]
responded ‘sure’”) (alteration omitted).
¶ 23 Although Shukurov’s first language is Russian, we agree with
the trial court that any language barrier didn’t invalidate his
consent. The record supports the court’s finding that, in their
initial contact without a Russian interpreter, “[Shukurov] appeared
to understand them.” See Chavez-Barragan, ¶ 55 (consent to a
search was voluntary where the defendant “spoke English well
enough to reliably communicate with [the officer]”). Indeed, when
asked if he understood English “pretty well,” Shukurov nodded and
responded, “Yeah, yeah.” And as the court noted, Shukurov
“state[d] in English that he d[id] not mind if the officers c[a]me
inside.”
¶ 24 Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that officers used
any language barrier to coerce Shukurov into consenting. See
People v. Munoz-Gutierrez, 2015 CO 9, ¶ 34 (consent to a search
10
was voluntary where “[t]here [wa]s no record that [officers] used the
language barrier to coerce or attempt to trick [the defendant] into
providing consent”). In fact, as the trial court observed, officers
contacted a Russian translator when speaking to Shukurov in
greater detail inside. But even with the assistance of a translator,
“[Shukurov] never indicated not wanting to speak to the deputies,
or that they were not permitted to be in his residence.”
¶ 25 Therefore, the totality of circumstances indicates that
Shukurov voluntarily consented to officers entering his home.
C. The Scope of the Search
¶ 26 As his last argument concerning officers’ entry into his home,
Shukurov argues that even assuming that he consented to the
officers’ entry into his home, the officers unlawfully searched his
home beyond the scope of his limited consent. More specifically, he
argues that, at most, he consented to going inside to talk with the
three officers who initially came to his door — not to the officers’
search of his entire home or to the entry of a fourth officer into his
home. Again, we disagree. Even if Shukurov’s consent was so
limited, once the officers were inside, exigent circumstances
11
justified their broader search of the home to ensure the safety of the
victim and the children.
¶ 27 Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement, “[a] prompt and limited warrantless search of a scene
at which violence has occurred may . . . be necessary to determine
if there are any injured parties.” People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d
1282, 1285 (Colo. 1989). As relevant here, this exception applies
where there is probable cause of criminal activity and “a colorable
claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” People
v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006). The scope of such a
see also Thompson, 770 P.2d at 1285.
¶ 28 Domestic violence often gives rise to exigent circumstances
because “violence may be lurking and explode with little warning,”
and “‘[t]he signs of danger may be masked’ by a battered victim’s
Martinez, 406 F.3d at 1164; and then quoting Fletcher v. Town of
Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999)).
¶ 29 For example, in Chavez, a division of this court found exigent
circumstances based on a 911 call reporting a physical altercation
12
between the caller’s mother and the defendant. Id. at 452. “True
911 calls,” the division explained, “by their very nature, involve
emergencies.” Id. The exigency apparent from the daughter’s 911
call was heightened by officers’ observations when they arrived on
the scene — a dark home and no response to their repeated knocks
on the front door. Id. Thus, the division found the warrantless
entry and search of the home was justified. Id.
¶ 30 Here, too, the victim’s 911 call, combined with officers’
observations upon arrival, established both probable cause of a
crime and a colorable claim of an emergency threatening the
victim’s (and potentially the children’s) safety. From the 911 call,
the officers learned that Shukurov allegedly beat and threatened to
kill his wife. The victim had told the dispatcher that Shukurov was
still there, as were their children; that he’d beaten her before; and
that she “d[id]n’t know how to protect [her]self.” As in Chavez, the
nature of the 911 call, in and of itself, may have created exigent
circumstances. But even if it didn’t, the exigency was heightened
by officers’ observations as they entered the home with Shukurov’s
consent and observed scratches on his face and neck. Thus, a
limited warrantless search was justified.
13
¶ 31 Shukurov challenges the trial court’s finding that the victim
was in the front room as officers entered the home. Although one of
the responding officers testified at the suppression hearing that the
victim “was walking into the front room” as they entered the home,
the body camera footage indicates that, in fact, she was in the back
part of the home and not immediately visible when the officers went
inside. But even assuming she was not immediately visible, the
officers were justified in trying to locate her (and the children), given
Shukurov’s visible injuries and her statement that he’d beaten and
threatened to kill her.
¶ 32 Shukurov also argues, citing People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421,
427 (Colo. 2004), that there was no exigency because the victim had
indicated on the 911 call that the incident had occurred two hours
before and that she wasn’t injured. But in Allison, the warrantless
search following an alleged domestic violence incident occurred only
after the defendant and victim had both come out of the home,
there was no indication that anyone else was inside, and “no
immediate crisis remained.” Id. at 427. Here, by contrast, officers
had reason to know that the victim had been beaten and threatened
with her life and that she and the couple’s children were still inside
14
the home. Officers also didn’t have to credit the victim’s statements
that the incident was over and that she wasn’t injured, particularly
given her indication that Shukurov was still in the home with her.
See Thompson, 770 P.2d at 1286 (officers could’ve believed that the
victim’s statements that the defendant was “gone” and “[e]verything[
was] okay” “were made under duress because the [defendant] was
still present”); see also Chavez, 240 P.3d at 451.
¶ 33 Finally, Shukurov doesn’t contest the fact that once officers
found the visibly injured victim, they were justified in staying with
her to interview her, assess her injuries, and protect her from any
further violence. Accordingly, the scope of the search was properly
limited by the exigent circumstances justifying it.
III. Miranda & Voluntariness
¶ 34 Shukurov next challenges the trial court’s denial of his other
two motions to suppress, which related to his statements to officers
at his home. Specifically, he contends that (1) the officers’
questioning constituted custodial interrogation, violating his
Miranda rights; and (2) his post-arrest statements were involuntary.
We disagree with both contentions.
15
A. Custodial Interrogation
¶ 35 Like the trial court, we conclude that the interview in
Shukurov’s home didn’t constitute custodial interrogation because
he wasn’t in custody. Accordingly, Shukurov’s statements during
the interview weren’t obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
¶ 36 Whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes is a
mixed question of law and fact. People v. Bohler, 2024 CO 18, ¶ 17.
We rely on undisputed facts in the record and defer to the trial
court’s factual findings when they’re supported by the record,
although we may independently review recordings, including police
bodycam footage. Id. But we review de novo the legal question
whether those facts, taken together, establish that the person was
in custody. People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 16.
¶ 37 To uphold the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, officers must provide certain warnings before a
custodial interrogation. Bohler, ¶ 18. “Custody for Miranda
purposes depends on whether a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would believe they were in police custody ‘to a
degree associated with a formal arrest.’” Id. at ¶ 19 (quoting People
v. Cline, 2019 CO 33, ¶ 2). To determine if a defendant was in
16
custody at the time of a police encounter, we consider (1) the time,
place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during
the encounter; (3) the words an officer spoke to the defendant;
(4) the officer’s tone of voice and demeanor; (5) the length and mood
of the encounter; (6) whether officers placed any limitation of
movement or other form of restraint on the defendant; (7) the
officer’s response to any questions the defendant asked; (8) whether
directions were given to the defendant; and (9) the defendant’s
verbal or nonverbal response to such directions. Id.
¶ 38 Based on the trial court’s findings on these factors, which are
supported by the record, as well as our own independent review of
the bodycam footage, we conclude that Shukurov wasn’t in custody
at the time he spoke with officers in his home.
¶ 39 As the trial court found, the time, place and purpose of the
encounter weighs against a finding of custody. Officers arrived at
Shukurov’s and the victim’s shared residence — a neutral, familiar
location — in response to the victim’s report of domestic violence.
See People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 27 (“[A] neutral or familiar
location such as the suspect’s home can weigh against a finding of
17
custody.”). And, as the court found, “[t]he purpose was to respond
to the victim’s call for help to 911.”
¶ 40 The number of persons present during the encounter also
weighs against a finding of custody. Although four officers entered
Shukurov’s home, only one officer interviewed him; the others were
talking to the victim or engaging in other tasks and, at most, briefly
spoke to him. See Pleshakov, ¶ 30 (the defendant wasn’t in custody
because, “[a]lthough there were four officers present at the scene,
[one officer and the defendant] conversed alone while the remaining
officers engaged in other tasks”).
¶ 41 The words used by the officer who interviewed Shukurov
further indicate that Shukurov wasn’t in custody. As the trial court
found, the officer used a “simple question and answer technique,
nothing untoward or out of the ordinary,” and his questions were
“consistent with the investigation of an alleged domestic assault
that occurred two hours prior.”
¶ 42 Likewise, the tone of voice and demeanor of the officer who
interviewed Shukurov indicates that Shukurov wasn’t in custody.
The court found, and the bodycam video confirms, that the officer’s
tone was “conversational” and his demeanor was “calm,” “other
18
than elevating his voice to control the situation when [Shukurov]
yelled at the victim during the contact.” See Davis, ¶ 34 (the
defendant wasn’t in custody where “the mood of [the] interrogation
was calm and conversational”).
¶ 43 The same is true of the length and mood of the encounter. As
the court found, “[t]he questioning lasted 15-20 minutes,” and none
of the officers made any “threats” to Shukurov. In all, the officers
were in Shukurov’s home less than forty-five minutes before they
defendant wasn’t in custody where questioning “took no more than
fifteen to twenty minutes” and officers didn’t “threaten or accuse”
the defendant).
¶ 44 The factor of restraints or limitations on movement is relatively
neutral. While the officers locked the front door and one of them
told another not to let Shukurov go anywhere, it’s unclear whether
Shukurov was aware of those actions or statements. Cf. People v.
Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 468 (Colo. 2002) (“[A]n officer’s unarticulated
plan has no bearing on the question of whether a suspect was ‘in
custody’ at a particular time.” (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. 318, 323 (1994))). Certainly, as the trial court found,
19
Shukurov “was not restrained and not in handcuffs.” See Allman,
¶ 49 (the defendant wasn’t in custody where he “was not restrained
or limited in movement”). And while he was told to sit on the couch
in his front room, to later move to another part of the couch, and to
stay still, “direction to sit down [i]s a minor restraint at most.”
Bohler, ¶ 30.
¶ 45 Officers responded positively to Shukurov’s questions and
requests, which weighs against a finding of custody. When
Shukurov requested water, an officer retrieved some for him. And
when Shukurov asked if he was being arrested, an officer told him
that he wasn’t being arrested at that time. Cf. Pleshakov, ¶ 31 (“A
reasonable person would not perceive [an officer’s statement that he
believed he had enough information to obtain a warrant] to be the
functional equivalent of an arrest.”); People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012
CO 51, ¶ 10 (“[T]hreatening, no matter how confidently, to charge [a
defendant] with a crime at some point in the future does not, by
itself, constitute [an arrest] . . . .”). The officer also explained that
Shukurov has “a lot of rights,” even though he’s a “suspect of
something,” and that the officers “need to make sure everybody’s
rights are being respected here.”
20
¶ 46 Finally, officers’ directions and Shukurov’s response to those
directions weigh slightly against a finding of custody. Although the
officers requested in a nonthreatening way that Shukurov sit on the
couch in the front room, move his position to another side of the
couch, stay put, and not talk to the victim, the trial court found
that these were merely efforts to “separate the parties,” “divide [the
officers’ attention between them,” and prevent the “victim [from]
being intimidated.” See Bohler, ¶ 33 (the defendant wasn’t in
custody where “requests did not feature force, threats of negative
consequences for not complying, or an aggressive tone” and “were
related to immediate safety, which does not indicate custody”).
Shukurov for the most part complied, though he did try several
times to speak to the victim, sometimes yelling toward her in the
the defendant ignored an officer’s request to stop using her phone
cut against a finding of custody).
¶ 47 These facts are far different from those in People v. Minjarez,
81 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2003), on which Shukurov relies. In that case,
the supreme court concluded the defendant was in custody when
officers had him brought into a private room in the hospital where
21
his child was being treated; interviewed him for forty-five minutes,
and for much of that time created “a highly confrontational and
accusatory atmosphere that was clearly aimed at obtaining a
confession”; asked questions “designed essentially to force
agreement from the defendant”; and “confronted the defendant with
the evidence against him and with [the questioner’s] own belief in
[his] guilt.” Id. at 351, 356. Here, by contrast, Shukurov was
interviewed in his own home in a far more conversational and less
confrontational manner.
¶ 48 On balance, the totality of the circumstances in this case
indicates that Shukurov was not in custody for purposes of Miranda
when he was interviewed in his home.
B. Voluntariness
¶ 49 We also conclude that the only statements Shukurov
challenges on the basis of voluntariness — “last time” and “I won’t
hit my wife anymore” — were, in fact, voluntary. Although
Shukurov was in custody by the time he made these statements,
the statements were spontaneous and not the result of any
interrogation. Thus, the introduction of the statements at trial
didn’t violate Shukurov’s Miranda rights.
22
¶ 50 Whether a suspect’s statement was voluntary is a mixed
question of law and fact. People v. Sanders, 2023 CO 62, ¶ 10. We
defer to the trial court’s underlying factual findings if they are
supported by the record, but we review de novo the ultimate legal
question of whether a statement was voluntary. Effland v. People,
240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 51 To be voluntary, a statement must be the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice and cannot have been the
product of coercive government conduct that overbore the suspect’s
will. Sanders, ¶ 14. Voluntariness is determined by considering
the totality of the circumstances under which a statement was
made, including such factors as (1) whether the defendant was in
custody or free to leave and was aware of that fact; (2) whether the
defendant was advised of, understood, and waived their Miranda
rights before any interrogation; (3) whether the defendant had the
opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else before the
interrogation; (4) whether the challenged statement was made
during the course of an interrogation or was volunteered;
(5) whether any overt or implied threats or promises were directed
to the defendant; (6) the method and style of questioning and the
23
length and place of the interrogation; and (7) the defendant’s mental
and physical condition, educational background, employment
status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal
justice system. People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1991).
¶ 52 Based on the trial court’s findings on these factors, which are
supported by the record, we conclude that the challenged
statements were voluntary.
¶ 53 The facts that Shukurov was in custody, hadn’t received
Miranda warnings, didn’t have the chance to confer with anyone
before he made the statements, and had expressed a fear of law
enforcement weigh against a finding of voluntariness.
¶ 54 However, the other factors indicate that Shukurov’s post-
arrest statements were voluntary. Most critically, as the trial court
found, with record support, although Shukurov continued to talk
after he’d been handcuffed and arrested, his post-arrest statements
were “spontaneous and not in response to questions from law
enforcement. No statements were elicited from him once he was in
custody.” The body camera recording shows Shukurov repeatedly
saying “last time,” though officers weren’t questioning him but were
merely seeking to locate his shoes at the time. And the officer who
24
heard Shukurov say, “I won’t hit my wife anymore,” testified at the
suppression hearing that Shukurov said it “three or four times” and
that it was not “in response to any question or any statement” the
officer had made. See People v. Wood, 135 P.3d 744, 752 (Colo.
2006) (“A defendant’s spontaneous utterances will not be excluded
¶ 55 Additionally, nothing leading up to Shukurov being placed in
custody suggests that his post-arrest statements were coerced. As
the trial court found, the officers made “no threats or promises”; the
“method and style were [a] simple question and answer technique”;
“[t]here [was] no showing that the deputies acted coercively”; and
the interview lasted for fifteen to twenty minutes and occurred in
Shukurov’s home — all of which weigh in favor of voluntariness.
The court acknowledged that “[Shukurov] appeared sad and upset
at times” but found that, “given the circumstances,” his reaction
was “not unusual” and didn’t lead “to the contact becoming
coercive, overbearing, or unconstitutional.” See People v. Pearson,
725 P.2d 782, 784 (Colo. 1986) (a defendant’s emotional distress
isn’t in and of itself a sufficient basis to conclude that their
statement is involuntary).
25
¶ 56 In light of these factors, this case is nothing like People v.
Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1982), which Shukurov cites. There,
following the defendant’s arrest and Miranda advisement, an officer
continued talking with the defendant, ultimately “bec[o]m[ing] more
accusatory,” “question[ing] [the defendant] closely about the details
of [the defendant’s] story,” saying he would “tear [the defendant’s]
story up in court,” and insisting that he “wanted the truth about
the situation and not a lie.” Id. at 231-32. In this case, the
challenged statements weren’t made in response to any continued
questioning by the officers. Nor was the questioning in this case
ever as accusatory as that described in Raffaelli.
¶ 57 Therefore, we conclude that Shukurov’s post-arrest statements
were voluntary and were properly admitted at trial.
IV. For Cause Juror Challenge
¶ 58 Shukurov also contends that the trial court erred by denying
his for cause challenge to a juror who sat on the jury. We disagree.
¶ 59 During voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire,
If a woman comes to court and accuses a man
of being physically violent with her on one
incident, . . . and during the course of that you
hear evidence that the same man has been
physically violent with her in the past, can I
26
get a show of hands of who here thinks that
means he’s probably a little more likely to have
done it this time.
¶ 60 Several potential jurors raised their hands, including Juror F.
Defense counsel asked Juror F why he raised his hand, and the
following exchange ensued:
[Juror F]: Well, where there’s smoke there’s
fire. I’m an aircraft mechanic. When an
aircraft has a history and it gets the same
problem over and over again, you have to
figure it out, and when things keep happening
again, there is a problem. It’s not just a one-
time anomaly.
. . . .
[Defense counsel]: [F]air to say there is sort of
a mechanical way to look at this issue?
[Juror F]: Yeah. I mean, it depends upon the
evidence presented. That is what it comes
down to, that is the way I have to figure out
stuff in my life, in my job.
[Defense counsel]: So if you heard a rule from
a judge in a criminal case in court that said
you’re not allowed to use the fact that someone
has done something before in any way to
decide whether they have done it this time,
does that make a lot of sense to you?
[Juror F]: It does, but it would depend upon
had the person been convicted of that before,
too.
27
[Defense counsel]: Okay. Let me ask you this.
If the judge told you you could use that
evidence for a specific purpose but not for
deciding whether the person did it this time,
does that make sense?
[Juror F]: It makes sense, but, I mean, to be
completely honest with you, it’s going to be in
the cobwebs in the back of your mind. I think
that’s just human nature.
. . . .
[Defense counsel]: I think a lot of people feel
that way, and I fully recognize that sometimes
what we lawyers ask you to do in court is
inconsistent with what is normal to being a
human being, if that’s fair.
[Juror F]: I get it. I get it. . . . I mean, every
person in this potential jury pool, I mean, they
would just do the best they could to comply
with the judge’s instructions. I guess that’s
the way it would be.
¶ 61 Defense counsel challenged Juror F for cause, arguing that
“[i]t doesn’t sound like he can unequivocally follow the [c]ourt’s
[CRE] 404(b) instruction.” The court denied the challenge.
¶ 62 We review a trial court’s ruling on a for cause juror challenge
court abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair or is contrary to law. See id.
28
¶ 63 Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair and impartial
jury, which may be violated by seating a biased juror. People v.
Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 14. In furtherance of that right,
section 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2024, requires a court to grant a
challenge for cause to a prospective juror who “evinc[es] enmity or
bias toward the defendant or the state” unless the court is
“satisfied” that the prospective juror “will render an impartial
verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury
at the trial.” See also Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 16. Moreover, a
prospective juror should be excused if it appears doubtful that they
will be governed by the court’s instructions. Morgan v. People, 624
P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo. 1981).
¶ 64 We conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by
denying the challenge to Juror F. The court acknowledged Juror
F’s hesitation about prior act evidence but found, based on the
entirety of the juror’s statements, that he could render an impartial
verdict according to the law:
[T]he [c]ourt did hear the statements made in
regards to where there is smoke there is fire,
but nonetheless the [c]ourt also heard more
than that. [Juror F] said it depends on the
evidence presented, . . . [which] is exactly what
29
the [c]ourt expects. We expect the parties to
consider the evidence and that it would
depend on that. He is right, something [a]s
vague as cobwebs in the back of my mind does
not give the [c]ourt pause. I am mindful [of]
what he said, but I am mindful of the totality
of what he said, not just one statement or
another, and his hypothetical, if you will, was
somewhat rebutted when he explained that he
would rely on the evidence. So it goes past
404(b). It’s actually what evidence is
presented and he said that. So the [c]ourt has
confidence that not only would he do his best
to [do] that but that he could do that, everyone
could. And he said that — he pointed to
himself, too, and would do the best job they
could. No one can ask any more of a juror in
that scenario.
¶ 65 Thus, the court thoroughly explained why it was satisfied that
Juror F could render an impartial verdict.
¶ 66 And the record supports the court’s discretionary decision.
Although Juror F initially suggested that he thought evidence of
prior domestic violence incidents would make it more likely that a
defendant was guilty of domestic violence, he later indicated that it
“depends upon the evidence presented” and, more importantly, that
“every person in th[e] potential jury pool” — including himself —
“would just do the best they could to comply with the judge’s
instructions.” See People v. Wilson, 2014 COA 114, ¶ 11 (“A trial
30
court abuses its discretion in this [for cause juror challenge] context
only if there is no evidence in the record to support its decision.”);
see also People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M-2, ¶ 8 (“If the potential
juror indicates that she can set aside [her preconceived] beliefs and
make a decision based on the evidence and the court’s instructions
on the law, she may still sit on the jury.”); People v. Oliver, 2020
COA 97, ¶ 18 (“Where a potential juror states that he will try to
follow the court’s instructions despite any preconceived notions,
that juror may nonetheless sit on the jury.”).
V. Witness Testimony
¶ 67 Lastly, Shukurov contends that the trial court erred by
allowing one of the responding officers and a paramedic to comment
on the victim’s truthfulness. We discern no reversible error.
¶ 68 On redirect examination of the officer, the prosecutor asked,
“In your thirteen years in law enforcement, were the marks on [the
victim’s] thigh consistent with being punched?” Defense counsel
objected, but the court overruled the objection. The officer
responded, “Yes, absolutely.”
¶ 69 Then, on redirect examination of the paramedic, the
prosecutor asked, “Did anything about the visible injuries that you
31
observed seem inconsistent with how [the victim] told you she
obtained them?” Again, defense counsel objected, but the court
overruled the objection. The paramedic responded, “No.”
¶ 70 According to Shukurov, by testifying that the victim’s injuries
were consistent with her original allegations of domestic violence,
these witnesses improperly bolstered her credibility.
¶ 71 One witness may not give opinion testimony that another
witness was telling the truth on a specific occasion. People v.
Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1081 (Colo. 2009); see also CRE 608. This
prohibition includes indirect as well as direct implications of a
witness’s truthfulness. Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 32.
¶ 72 Shukurov acknowledges that in People v. West, a division of
this court concluded that testifying that a victim’s testimony is
“consistent with” certain evidence isn’t improper bolstering. 2019
COA 131, ¶¶ 37, 43. However, he urges us to depart from West
because another division of this court more recently concluded that
its “reasoning . . . is at odds with Colorado Supreme Court
precedent.” People v. Daley, 2021 COA 85, ¶ 90 (declining to apply
West); see also People v. Bobian, 2019 COA 183, ¶¶ 43-49 (Berger,
J., specially concurring) (expressing disagreement with West).
32
¶ 73 We needn’t weigh in on the propriety of West, though, because
we conclude that any error in allowing the witnesses to testify that
the victim’s injuries were consistent with her statements at the
scene was harmless. For the same reason, we also don’t weigh in
on the People’s argument that the defense opened the door to the
challenged testimony through its cross-examinations.
¶ 74 We apply the harmless error standard to determine if any
preserved nonconstitutional errors in the admission of evidence
warrant reversal. Venalonzo, ¶ 48. Under this standard, we reverse
only if the error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the
fairness of the trial proceedings. Id.
¶ 75 We conclude that any error in the admission of the challenged
statements was harmless for six reasons.
¶ 76 First, the challenged statements were brief, particularly
considering the total length of each witness’s testimony. The
transcript of the officer’s testimony spans about eighty pages over
the course of two days. The challenged portion consists of a single
question and answer. Similarly, the paramedic’s testimony spans
over thirty pages, but the challenged portion consists of a single
question and answer. And the challenged statements weren’t
33
directly referenced in the closing arguments. See People v. Gaffney,
769 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Colo. 1989) (erroneous admission of
truthfulness testimony was harmless, in part because it consisted
of a “passing remark . . . during a lengthy direct examination”);
Daley, ¶ 98 (erroneous admission of testimony about the
consistency of the victim’s statements was harmless, in part
because it was “brief and fleeting”).
¶ 77 Second, the witnesses didn’t directly opine that the victim’s
testimony was truthful or untruthful, instead saying only that her
injuries were consistent with her statements on the scene. See
Gaffney, 769 P.2d at 1088 (erroneous admission of truthfulness
testimony was harmless, in part because it was not as direct as “the
prosecuting attorney ask[ing] [an] expert witness to offer an opinion
on whether a [victim] was truthful on a particular occasion”).
¶ 78 Third, both witnesses testified as lay witnesses, which further
“mitigate[d] the potential power of [their] remark[s].” People v.
Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 18 (Colo. 1999) (erroneous admission of a
social worker’s testimony that the victim’s statements were
“sincere” didn’t rise to the level of plain error, in part because the
social worker testified as a lay witness).
34
¶ 79 Fourth, the victim herself testified before the officer and the
paramedic, which “provid[ed] the jury with a full opportunity to
judge her credibility in light of her demeanor” and her prior
didn’t amount to plain error where “[the victim] herself testified and
was vigorously cross-examined prior to the [challenged testimony]”).
¶ 80 Fifth, the testimony “was not without corroboration.” Gaffney,
769 P.2d at 1089 (erroneous admission of truthfulness testimony
was harmless, in part because the testimony was corroborated by
physical findings and other testimony); see also Eppens, 979 P.2d
at 19 (erroneous admission of truthfulness testimony didn’t amount
to plain error, in part because the statements were corroborated by
other evidence). Indeed, the jury heard the victim’s statements in
her 911 call, saw the video of the victim’s statements at the scene,
heard other witnesses recount her statements at the scene, and
received photos of her injuries. The jury also heard descriptions of
the injuries from other witnesses — including unchallenged
testimony from one of the responding officers that a bruise on the
victim’s leg appeared like “somebody’s knuckles from their hand”
35
and that the cut on the victim’s neck was consistent with the width
of the chain she was wearing at the time.
¶ 81 And sixth, the court gave the jury detailed instructions on
evaluating witness credibility. The court told the jurors that they
“are the sole judges of the credibility of . . . each witness . . . [and] of
the weight to be given to the witness’s testimony.” It also instructed
them to consider, among other things, each witness’s “knowledge,
motive, state of mind, demeanor, and manner while testifying,” as
well as each witness’s “ability to observe,” “the strength of [their]
memory,” and “how that person obtained [their] knowledge.” This
instruction further mitigated any harm that might’ve resulted from
of a doctor’s testimony that the victim’s statement to him was “very
believable” was harmless, in part because “the trial court had
cautioned the jury that it was their prerogative to determine what
weight and credit to give [the victim’s] statement to the doctor”).
VI. Disposition
¶ 82 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE KUHN concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.