Peo in Interest of GWT

24CA0914 Peo in Interest of GWT 11-21-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0914

Adams County District Court No. 22JV112

Honorable Emily Lieberman, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of G.W.T., L.W.T., and C.W.T., Children,

And Concerning S.R.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE BROWN

Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced November 21, 2024

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Deborah Kershner, Assistant County Attorney,

Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for

Appellant

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¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect action, S.R.M. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationships with G.W.T., L.W.T., and C.W.T. (the children). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 The Adams County Human Services Department (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging

concerns about the children’s exposure to domestic violence and

substances, resulting in their basic needs not being met. The

petition also alleged that the family had prior involvement with the

Department, including one court-involved and two voluntary cases.

The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶ 3 Eight months after the petition was filed, the Department

moved to terminate mother’s parental rights. Over the next year,

the termination hearing was continued and reset at least five times.

Almost two years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court

terminated mother’s parental rights after a contested hearing.

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rights and is not a party to this appeal.

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II. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 4 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding she

could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of

E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10.

¶ 6 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders

them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care

to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health

needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2). In determining whether a

parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a reasonable

time, “the court may consider whether any change has occurred

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during the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic

or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.” People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶ 7 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of each child. Id. at ¶ 25. A “reasonable

time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a parent has

made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is not required

to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time the petition

is filed, the action is subject to the expedited permanency planning

provisions, and the court must consider the child’s need to be

placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

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have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. See

id.; People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

¶ 9 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 10 The juvenile court determined that mother was unfit based on

her “long standing” substance dependence, domestic violence, and

mental health concerns. The court found that mother was “either

unwilling or unable to address the protective concerns that gave

rise to this matter.”

¶ 11 The juvenile court also determined that mother could not

become fit within a reasonable time because “these children cannot

wait any longer for permanency.” The court found that although

“there may have been enough to proceed to termination much

earlier in the case,” mother was given “a considerable extension of

time to work on . . . compliance with the treatment plan” but did

not take advantage of the extensions given to her. The court noted

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that “we are two years in and . . . there is no indication that

[mother] is at a place where she is ready or willing to do [the]

trauma work” needed so the children could be returned home. The

court found that mother had not addressed the concerns that kept

her from safely parenting and that “[u]nder no reasonable

circumstances can the welfare of the children be served by a

continuation of the parent-child legal relationship.”

¶ 12 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred because (1) she

complied with much of her treatment plan; (2) her prior involvement

with the Department led to reunification; and (3) allowing her more

time would not delay her children’s needs for permanency because

they were not in potentially permanent homes. We consider, and

reject, each contention in turn.

1. Compliance with the Treatment Plan

¶ 13 The record supports mother’s assertion that she complied with

portions of her treatment plan, which included objectives requiring

mother to engage in life skills services, apply for housing and

employment, address issues of domestic violence, stabilize her

mental health, address substance dependence, maintain and

strengthen her bond with the children, comply with probation, and

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refrain from further criminal activity. The caseworker testified that

mother obtained housing with the assistance of a municipal court

caseworker and resolved one of her probation cases. Mother also

began treatment with at least three different providers to address

substance dependence, domestic violence, and mental health

concerns.

¶ 14 But the record does not support mother’s other claims —

specifically that she stayed in communication with the Department,

engaged in intensive outpatient services through probation,

provided clean drug screens, and addressed her substance

dependence concerns. The caseworker testified that mother’s

communication with her was “intermittent.” There was no evidence

that mother stayed engaged in any intensive outpatient services.

The caseworker testified that mother was not compliant with her

substance testing through probation. Although mother reported

recent participation in a new treatment program, the caseworker

was unable to learn anything about the program even after

connecting with the program’s self-identified “CEO.” That person

told the caseworker that mother was providing clean UAs, but they

did not respond to the caseworker’s request for copies of the

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results, so the caseworker did not have any evidence that mother

was sober. And the caseworker testified she did not know whether

the program satisfied mother’s treatment plan requirements

because the CEO did not tell her what treatment needs they were

addressing with mother or how often.

¶ 15 In any event, the caseworker testified that mother’s failure to

address the key components of her treatment plan — domestic

violence, mental health, and her relationships with the children —

continued to raise child protection concerns. While it is true that

mother did not have any new domestic violence charges, the

caseworker testified that domestic violence concerns had not been

mitigated. The caseworker also testified that there were “no

behavioral or observable changes” to demonstrate success through

any of the treatment programs that mother attempted.

¶ 16 The juvenile court found that these unaddressed concerns,

particularly as related to mother’s mental health, impacted her

fitness and relationship with the children “significantly.” The court

found that “there are concerns that when [mother] is dysregulated,

she becomes emotionally accusatory towards the children and she’s

unable to meet their needs consistently when she can’t consistently

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regulate herself.” The court found that mother’s behaviors during

family time were “particularly concerning for these particular

children” because of their heightened needs.

¶ 17 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that mother was on the “high risk” track for family time because

she was unable to regulate during family time and made threats

that placed the children, staff, and herself in danger. The “high

risk” track required law enforcement or security personnel presence

at family time. The caseworker testified that all the children had

special needs and generally were “not able to regulate without

consistent support, adult intervention, and having more than one

adult to support them.” The caseworker testified that mother was

not able to provide an emotionally safe environment for any of the

children.

¶ 18 The family time supervisor testified that she had to intervene

in family time multiple times. Although there were times when

mother could regulate herself and help the children regulate, other

times she blamed the children for the Department’s involvement,

argued with staff, targeted the children, and contributed to the

children’s dysregulation. During one notable family time session,

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while the children were present, mother argued that she should be

able to hit one of the children as a punishment for not listening to

her.

¶ 19 The record belies mother’s assertion that her mental health

concerns were limited to her worries about the impending

termination of parental rights hearing. Independent of the

Department’s involvement, probation saw the need for mental

health services and attempted to assist mother with getting an

evaluation and treatment, but she did not follow through. Mother’s

expert at the termination hearing testified that she had significant

childhood adversity and that her post-traumatic stress disorder had

a “significant effect” on her everyday life. Although mother’s expert

discussed her trauma responses at some length, he never suggested

that mother’s reactions were caused by or limited to the stress of

the pending termination hearing.

¶ 20 Given this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court

erred by finding that mother did not successfully comply with her

treatment plan so as to render her a fit parent.

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2. Prior Successful Reunification

¶ 21 The juvenile court acknowledged that mother was a

respondent in an earlier dependency and neglect action where she

was able to engage and successfully complete her treatment plan.

But the court noted that “there was a theme that arose through

some of the testimony that [mother] doesn’t believe she needs

services and everything would be fine if the children were just

returned.” The court wondered if mother was unwilling to engage

with the core elements of her treatment plan because of her

“disagreement that this case should have ever been opened.”

¶ 22 In any event, mother does not allege that the services provided

during this case were deficient or otherwise explain why her earlier

successful reunification should have led the court to grant her more

time during this case. And as the juvenile court noted, prior

dependency and neglect cases, even those resulting in reunification,

must be considered in “determining unfitness.” § 19-3-604(2)(i).

3. Impact of More Time on Permanency

¶ 23 Finally, mother contends that giving her more time would not

have delayed the children’s permanency. But the juvenile court

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found, with record support, that mother had already been given

more time to engage with her treatment plan.

¶ 24 Mother had more than a year between when the Department

moved for termination and when the court held the hearing. First,

the caseworker advocated for mother to have more time to work on

her treatment plan. The hearing was continued again three months

later for the same reason. The hearing was then continued two

more times because new counsel was appointed and a final time to

allow father to appear in person.

¶ 25 Mother benefitted from each of these continuances, three of

which occurred after mother’s expert completed an evaluation

giving specific recommendations for mother’s engagement and

success. At termination, the caseworker testified that she

previously “asked the county attorney to withdraw her motion [for

termination because she] . . . believed [mother] had the capacity to

succeed . . . [but] it’s been ten months and there’s been no

progress.” As the court found, “it doesn’t appear that a whole

bunch at all was done” with the extra time given to mother.

¶ 26 The juvenile court also found that “these children cannot wait

any longer for permanency.” The record supports this finding. The

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caseworker testified that she was concerned about the children’s

mental and emotional health if they “continue[d] to languish in

foster care.” The caseworker testified that the children were

“indicating that they want to know where they’re going to be” and

opined that the children needed the permanency of adoption. At

least one of the children was struggling with attending family time

and asked not to be made to go.

¶ 27 Mother contends that because the children were not in

permanent placements at the time of termination, their need for

permanency was not resolved with the termination of her parental

rights. But the record suggests otherwise. The caseworker testified

that G.W.T. was in a potentially permanent home and that the other

children were going to transition to that home shortly after the

termination hearing. The record also suggests that termination of

mother’s parental rights would make permanent placement of the

children more viable.

¶ 28 Furthermore, a child’s placement is a different matter than a

child’s need for permanency. See A.M., ¶ 32 (a less drastic

alternative to termination must be rejected when termination is in

the child’s best interests); see also People in Interest of T.E.M., 124

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P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005) (“[P]ermanent placement with a

family member is dependent on the child’s best interests, as is the

determination whether to order permanent placement as an

alternative to termination . . . [which] may not be appropriate when

it does not provide adequate permanence or otherwise meet the

child’s needs.”) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when,

as was the case here, the juvenile court finds that the statutory

criteria for termination have been met, an ongoing relationship with

a parent is not beneficial to the children, and termination is in the

children’s best interests. See A.M., ¶ 36 (“The Children’s Code does

not support the conclusion that ‘a parent-child relationship should

be continued when it has been shown by clear and convincing

evidence that . . . the parent is unfit, an appropriate treatment plan

has been tried without success, and the conduct or condition of the

parent is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.’” (quoting

People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 637-38 (Colo. 1982))).

¶ 29 Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by

declining to grant mother more time to comply with her treatment

plan or by concluding that termination was in the children’s best

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interests even though they may not have been in permanent

placements.

III. Disposition

¶ 30 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.