People v. Medina

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY May 7, 2026 2026 COA 36 No. 24CA2021, People v. Medina — Criminal Law — Postconviction Remedies — Punishment for Habitual Criminals In this postconviction proceeding, a division of the court of appeals considers, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, whether the rule announced in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 835 (2024) — which requires that a jury, rather than a judge, determine whether a defendant committed prior offenses on separate occasions for purposes of habitual sentencing — may be applied retroactively to cases that became final before the rule’s announcement. Applying the framework established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1989), the division concludes that, to the extent that Erlinger announced a new rule of constitutional law, the rule is neither substantive nor a watershed rule of procedure and, thus, it does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The division therefore affirms the postconviction court’s denial of the defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which was both untimely and successive.

The division also rejects the defendant’s claim alleging a violation of his speedy trial rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act. Applying the law of the case doctrine, the division declines to consider this issue, which was previously rejected by two prior divisions of the court.

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 36

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2021 Jefferson County District Court No. 14CR3044 Honorable Chantel Contiguglia, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delano Marco Medina, Defendant-Appellant.

ORDERS AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Delano Marco Medina, Pro Se ¶1 The United States Supreme Court held in Erlinger v. United States that for purposes of sentencing a defendant under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act — which increases prison terms for defendants who previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions — the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury, rather than a judge, to decide whether the defendant’s prior offenses were committed on separate occasions. 602 U.S. 821, 835 (2024). The Colorado Supreme Court has held that this rule applies to Colorado’s habitual criminal sentencing statute, such that a jury, rather than a judge, must decide whether a defendant’s prior felony convictions arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes. People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, ¶ 24; see § 18-1.3-801(1)(b)(I), (1.5), (2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025.1 ¶2 In this appeal, defendant, Delano Marco Medina, asks us to consider, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, whether this rule may be applied retroactively to cases that became final before the rule was announced. We hold that it cannot. Therefore, we

conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Medina’s untimely and successive postconviction motion raising the issue.

¶3 Medina also challenges the postconviction court’s order denying his motion to dismiss all the charges against him based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), §§ 16-14-101 to -108, C.R.S. 2025. We decline to consider his challenge, which two prior divisions of this court have already rejected.

¶4 Accordingly, we affirm both orders.

I. Background ¶5 Following an incident in which Medina pursued and fired a gun toward someone he claimed had threatened his girlfriend, Medina was charged with attempted first degree assault, two counts of felony menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and seven habitual counts. Not long after the initial charges were filed, Medina was arrested and held in another county of the state on charges and warrants issued in other cases.

¶6 In December 2014, Medina submitted a request under the UMDDA, which allows a person in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to request the final disposition of any untried charges pending against them in the state. See § 16-14-102(1), C.R.S. 2025. But the district attorney in this case initially didn’t receive the request, and while Medina sent a copy of the request to the DOC, he wasn’t in DOC custody at the time. He entered DOC custody in mid-March 2015, and the DOC forwarded his request to the district attorney in late April. The district attorney received it in early May. Medina’s trial was set for mid-August of that year.

¶7 A few weeks before trial, Medina filed a motion to dismiss the charges, asserting that the court had lost jurisdiction over the case because it hadn’t gone to trial within the statutory deadline of 182 days after he submitted his UMDDA request. See § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. 2025. The trial court denied the motion.

¶8 The trial proceeded, and a jury convicted Medina on all the substantive charges. The trial court then found Medina guilty of all the habitual charges, adjudicated him a habitual criminal, and sentenced him to forty-four years in the custody of the DOC.

¶9 Medina appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that his right to a speedy trial under the UMDDA had been violated. A division of this court rejected his argument and affirmed the judgment. See People v. Medina, slip op. at ¶ 22 (Colo. App. No. 15CA1681, May 23, 2019)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 22, 2019) (Medina I). The division concluded that because Medina had only substantially (not strictly) complied with the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, he had to establish that the prosecution had actual notice of his UMDDA request. Id. at ¶¶ 17- 19; see People v. McKimmy, 2014 CO 76, ¶ 24. And because the prosecution didn’t have actual notice until May 2015 and the trial was held less than 182 days later, the trial was timely. Medina I, slip op. at ¶ 20; see § 16-14-104(1). The division also concluded that, to the extent that the DOC had failed to timely submit Medina’s UMDDA request to the prosecution, Medina hadn’t suffered any prejudice because the trial occurred within 182 days of when the court and the prosecution would’ve received the request had the DOC sent it in a timely manner. Medina I, slip op. at ¶¶ 9, 21; see Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Colo. 1987).

¶ 10 Then, in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, Medina again invoked the UMDDA, presenting additional evidence that he claimed established that he was in DOC custody at the time he made his UMDDA request. The postconviction court denied the motion. Another division of this court affirmed the denial, concluding that the evidence Medina had presented either wasn’t new or didn’t support his claim. People v. Medina, slip op. at ¶¶ 17-22 (Colo. App. Nos. 21CA0604 & 21CA0704, Jan. 25, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Medina II).

¶ 11 Thereafter, Medina filed the two motions now at issue. First, he filed another motion to dismiss all charges, once again arguing that his UMDDA rights were violated, but this time raising the issue under Crim. P. 35(a). The postconviction court summarily denied the motion. And second, he filed a motion to dismiss the habitual charges, arguing that, under Erlinger — which was announced after the Medina II decision — his conviction on the habitual charges was unconstitutional because a judge, rather than a jury, had made the determination that his prior convictions arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes. The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that Erlinger didn’t apply retroactively.

¶ 12 Medina now appeals the postconviction court’s orders denying his two motions to dismiss.

II. UMDDA Challenge ¶ 13 Medina first contends that his sentence is illegal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to violation of the UMDDA.

Applying the law of the case doctrine, we decline to address this issue, as it has already been resolved by two divisions of this court.2 ¶ 14 We review a court’s summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion de novo. See People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20. We likewise review de novo the question whether a prior ruling by a court constitutes the law of the case. People v. Misenhelter, 214 P.3d 497, 500 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 234 P.3d 657 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 15 The law of the case doctrine rests on the principle that “when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter.” Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Colo. App. 1982) (quoting United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198 (1950)). This doctrine applies to attempts to relitigate an appellate court’s holdings and the rulings logically necessary to those holdings. People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1983).

It also applies to successive postconviction motions brought under Crim. P. 35(a). People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 16 Although one division of this court is not bound by the decision of any other division, see People v. Williams, 2025 COA 26, ¶ 14, we generally apply the law of the case doctrine to refuse to revisit issues resolved by another division in the same case unless “the previous decision is no longer sound because of changed conditions or law, or legal or factual error” or applying “the prior decision would result in manifest injustice,” Cummings v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2021 COA 122, ¶ 12 (quoting Saint John’s Church in Wilderness v. Scott, 2012 COA 72, ¶ 9).

¶ 17 Here, while Medina’s UMDDA argument is framed differently than before, the substance of his argument is virtually the same as it was in his earlier appeals. Again, he argues that he was in DOC custody when he made his UMDDA request and that the 182-day statutory deadline expired before the time of trial. And while he claims the previous decisions didn’t address some of his specific arguments, the divisions in those cases nonetheless rejected his UMDDA claim and fully explained their reasons for doing so.

¶ 18 We decline to reconsider this issue. Medina hasn’t shown that the previous divisions’ decisions are no longer sound due to changed conditions, new law, or legal or factual error, nor has he shown that applying those decisions would result in manifest injustice. See Cummings, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we treat the decisions as the law of the case and do not revisit them.

III. Erlinger Challenge ¶ 19 Medina also contends that his habitual sentence is illegal under Erlinger because a judge, rather than a jury, made the determination that his prior convictions arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes. While the rule set forth in Erlinger does apply to habitual sentences like Medina’s, see Gregg, ¶ 24, in this case, unlike in Gregg, Medina’s conviction was final before Erlinger was announced. And we agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that Erlinger cannot be applied retroactively on collateral review. Accordingly, we conclude that Medina’s challenge was properly denied, as it is both untimely and successive.3 A. Procedural Bars to Review ¶ 20 The People assert that Medina’s postconviction motion based on Erlinger was untimely under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I) and section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025, because he didn’t file it within three years

after his conviction became final and didn’t identify an applicable exception to the limitation period. However, “[a] reviewing court has the discretion to address the merits of an untimely motion for postconviction relief if the motion is premised on newly arising authority of constitutional magnitude” that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. People v. Rainer, 2013 COA 51, ¶ 28, rev’d on other grounds, 2017 CO 50.

¶ 21 Similarly, the People assert that Medina’s Erlinger challenge is successive because he could’ve raised it in his direct appeal or his earlier Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII). But again, we may address “[a]ny claim based on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable,” so long as the rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c).

¶ 22 Therefore, to determine whether we can address the merits of Medina’s claim, we must assess whether Erlinger established a new rule of constitutional law that can be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Rainer, ¶ 29; Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c).

B. The Teague Framework ¶ 23 We apply the test set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1989), to determine whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 983 (Colo. 2006). This analysis presents a question of law that we review de novo. See People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7. Under the Teague test, we examine (1) whether the defendant’s conviction is final; (2) whether the rule is in fact new; and (3) whether the rule meets either of the two exceptions to the general bar precluding retroactive application of new rules to cases that were final before the rules were announced. Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. The two exceptions are when the new rule is substantive in nature and when it is a watershed procedural rule. Id. at 986; Cooper, ¶ 8.4 ¶ 24 Here, there is no question as to the finality of Medina’s conviction. The conviction became final when the mandate was

issued in his direct appeal. See Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. Thus, we turn to consideration of the rule announced in Erlinger.

C. Whether Erlinger Announced a New Constitutional Rule ¶ 25 We first conclude that Erlinger announced a new rule of constitutional law.

¶ 26 “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Thus, a rule is not new if it “was dictated by then-existing precedent” and “was apparent to all reasonable jurists” at the time. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413 (2004) (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)).

¶ 27 Under this test, Erlinger announced a new rule because it broke new ground.

¶ 28 In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that when recidivism is treated as a sentence enhancer, a judge can find the fact of a prior conviction rather than submitting the issue to a jury. 523 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1998). Then, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). And in Blakely v. Washington, the Court held that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”

542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis omitted).

¶ 29 In the wake of these and other related decisions, all twelve federal circuit courts held that judges may make the determination of whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). But the United States Supreme Court disagreed in Erlinger, concluding that to comply with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, juries — not judges — must make such determinations. 602 U.S. at 835.

¶ 30 Thus, the rule announced in Erlinger was neither dictated by pre-existing precedent nor apparent to all reasonable jurists. See Beard, 542 U.S. at 413. Accordingly, it was a new constitutional rule. See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 352 (2013) (a decision announced a new rule when it “answered a question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach that [the Supreme Court] had left open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions”).

D. Whether Erlinger Meets Either Teague Exception ¶ 31 But while Erlinger did announce a new constitutional rule, we conclude that the rule doesn’t meet either Teague exception, as it is neither a substantive rule nor a watershed procedural rule.

¶ 32 As to the first exception, rules are substantive if they “forbid[] ‘criminal punishment of certain primary conduct’” or “prohibit[] ‘a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).

In other words, “[a] rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004). “In contrast, rules that regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability are procedural.” Id. Procedural rules “alter ‘the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable.’” Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 129 (2016) (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353). “Rules that allocate decisionmaking authority” between a judge and a jury “are prototypical procedural rules.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353.

¶ 33 The rule announced in Erlinger is procedural, not substantive.

It doesn’t alter the range of conduct or the class of persons the law punishes. See id. Rather, it solely affects the manner of determining a defendant’s punishment by allocating decision- making authority between a judge and a jury on an issue affecting habitual sentencing. See id.; see also People v. Johnson, 142 P.3d 722, 725 (Colo. 2006) (the rule announced in Blakely was procedural); People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 498 (Colo. App. 2002) (the rule announced in Apprendi was procedural). See generally United States v. Charles, 813 F. Supp. 3d 200, 203 (D. Mass. 2025) (“There is no question that Erlinger’s rule is procedural.”).

¶ 34 The second, watershed exception is “extremely narrow,” People v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, ¶ 56 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352), and applies only when a rule of criminal procedure “implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,” Johnson, 142 P.3d at 726 (quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 417). “[I]n order to be considered watershed, the new rule must be more than ‘fundamental’; it ‘must be one “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”’” Edwards, 129 P.3d at 986-87 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352).

¶ 35 As the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, the watershed exception doesn’t apply to the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) — which is that only a jury, not a judge, may find an aggravating circumstance necessary to impose the death penalty — because “the type of judicial factfinding in question [does] not create an impermissible risk of injustice.” Edwards, 129 P.3d at 987 (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. at 356). For similar reasons, and because the issue involved sentencing procedures as opposed to a determination of innocence or guilt, the Colorado Supreme Court later determined that Blakely, too, doesn’t fall within the exception. Johnson, 142 P.3d at 727-28. And a division of this court also held that Apprendi doesn’t fall within the exception.

Bradbury, 68 P.3d at 499.

¶ 36 Given that all these cases raise similar issues concerning the allocation of decision-making authority between a judge and a jury, if Ring, Apprendi, and Blakely don’t qualify as cases announcing watershed procedural rules, it’s difficult for us to understand how Erlinger could. And Medina doesn’t offer any arguments that might support such a distinction. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule announced in Erlinger isn’t a watershed procedural rule.

E. Conclusion ¶ 37 Because neither of the Teague exceptions to the bar on retroactivity applies, we conclude that the rule announced in Erlinger does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The postconviction court thus properly denied Medina’s Erlinger motion, as the motion was both untimely and successive. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), (VII); § 16-5-402(1).5 Therefore, we don’t address the merits of Medina’s claim challenging his habitual sentence.

IV. Disposition ¶ 38 The orders are affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

But that doesn’t help his case. Apprendi was announced in 2000, long before Medina’s case became final, so it doesn’t enable him to overcome the procedural bars to his untimely and successive postconviction claim. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), (VII); § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025.