ORDER ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES

In this action, Plaintiff brought claims against Defendants for negligence and under several federal statutes, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The Court previously dismissed all of Plaintiffs claims, but granted leave for her to amend her claims under § 504 and the ADA. (ECF No. 39 at 33.) Plaintiff has since filed a Second Amended Complaint, and her § 504 claim remains pending. (See ECF No. 43.)

Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. (ECF No. 41.) Defendants seek an award of fees and costs pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-17-201, which provides for an award of attorneys’ fees in certain tort suits if the “action is dismissed ... under rule 12(b) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.” This provision also applies to Colorado tort claims pending in federal court that are dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). See Infant Swimming Research, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, LLP, 335 Fed.Appx. 707, 715 (10th Cir. 2009).

However, by its own terms § 13-17-201 applies only when the entire “action is dismissed,” not when only some claims are dismissed. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201 (emphasis added). “[T]he statute does not apply if an action contains both tort and non-tort claims and the defendant obtains [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)] dismissal of only the tort claims.” Dubray v. Intertribal Bison Co-op., 192 P.3d 604, 607 (Colo. App. 2008); see also Infant Swimming Research, 335 Fed.Appx. at 716 (“complete dismissal of all claims” is a “requirement” for fee awards under § 13-17-201). Defendants are therefore not entitled to fees or costs under § 13-17-201 in this case.1

*1094Confusingly, Defendants also claim entitlement to fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (See ECF No. 41 at 6-7.) They make no argument how they are the “prevailing party” under that provision, given that Plaintiffs § 504 claim remains pending. They also cite no authority for awarding fees to a defendant in similar circumstances. In any ease, award of fees under § 1988(b) is “in [the Court’s] discretion,” and Defendants offer no good reason the Court should award fees in this situation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); see also, e.g., Murphy v. Samson Res. Co., 954 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1299 (N.D. Okla. 2013) (“Courts apply a dual standard for awarding fees in civil rights actions ... liberal awards for prevailing plaintiffs and limited awards for prevailing defendants.” (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978))).

For the reasons set forth, Defendants’ Motion For Attorney Fees and Costs (ECF No. 41) is DENIED.