Wind v. McDonald

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer Civil Action No. 23-cv-01011-PAB-MDB GREGORY CARL WIND JR., Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. MCKINNEY (33312), ADAMS COUNTY, and NATHAN MCDONALD (18543), Defendants. _____________________________________________________________________ ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION _____________________________________________________________________ This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 83]. The recommendation states that objections to the recommendation must be filed within fourteen days after its service on the parties.

Docket No. 83 at 3-4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The recommendation was served on January 29, 2024. No party has objected to the recommendation.

In the absence of an objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge’s recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”). In this matter, the Court has reviewed the recommendation to satisfy itself that there is “no clear error on the face of the record.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes. Based on this review, the Court has concluded that the recommendation is a correct application of the facts and the law.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 83] is ACCEPTED. It is further ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment on Defendant Nathan McDonald [Docket No. 76] is DENIED.

DATED February 27, 2024.

BY THE COURT:

PHILIP A. BRIMMER Chief United States District Judge

1 This standard of review is something less than a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which in turn is less than a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).