Alejandro Badia Martinez v. Juan Baltazar, Warden of the Denver Contract...

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No. 26-cv-01313-NRN ALEJANDRO BADIA MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, acting in his official capacity; KELEI WALKER, Field Office Director or Acting Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, acting in her official capacity; TODD LYONS, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, acting in his official capacity; MARKWAYNE MULLEN, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security, acting in his official capacity; TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General of the United States, acting in his official capacity; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW; and DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Respondents.

ORDER

N. REID NEUREITER United States Magistrate Judge This case is before the Court on Alejandro Badia Martinez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner is a detainee at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado. ECF No. 1 ¶ 3.

He contends that the Respondents are improperly subjecting him to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Instead, he says, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his detention. Because this is a fundamentally legal debate, there is no need for a hearing on the Petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition.

BACKGROUND This case is one of numerous cases in this District and across the country seeking habeas relief for immigrants detained within the United States and denied bond hearings under a new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. E.g., Olivas v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00777-NRN, 2026 WL 672897 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2026), Vasquez Gomez v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-00489-NRN, 2026 WL 482677 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2026); Diaz Marquez v. Baltasar, No. 26-cv-00293-CYC, 2026 WL 370864 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2026); Abarca v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-04086-CYC, 2026 WL 309198 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026); Hernandez-Redondo v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-03993-2 PAB, 2026 WL 290989 (D. Colo. Feb.

4, 2026); Jimenez Facio v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03592-CYC, 2025 WL 3559128 (D.

Colo. Dec. 12, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Batz Barreno v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-03017-GPG- TPO, 2025 WL 3190936 (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2025); Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv- 03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025); see also ECF No. 1 at 11–16 n.2 (citing many more cases nationwide).

Petitioner is a Cuban citizen who entered the United States near San Luis, Arizona on April 16, 2022 to seek asylum. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5. He was detained by Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) and released from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody under an Order of Release on Recognizance on April 18, 2022. Id. ¶ 1.

While in removal proceedings, Petitioner has reported as instructed to ICE and presented himself to immigration court as required. Id. ¶ 2. He has never been charged with or convicted of any crime. Id. ¶ 3. On January 13, 2026, after leaving a gas station without his headlights on, Petitioner was pulled over by a law enforcement officer and subsequently detained. Id. He has been held without bond since. Id. ¶ 6.

Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 21. Petitioner asks that he either be released from custody or granted a bond hearing within seven days. Id. at 22 Respondents maintain that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Respondents’ statutory interpretation has been rejected by this Court as well as several other judges in this District. See Vasquez Gomez, 2026 WL 482677, at *2; Jimenez Facio, 2025 WL 3559128, at *2 (recognizing that “every decision in this District addressing the issue” has determined that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to persons, like Petitioner, who have already been residing in the United States for years). Indeed, Respondents concede that until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court’s prior ruling on this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if the Court adheres to that decision, as the facts of this case are not materially distinguishable from that case for purposes of the Court’s decision on the legal issue of whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

ECF No. 9 at 3–4.

ANALYSIS A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes “[c]hallenges to immigration detention.”

Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). The individual in custody bears the burden of proving that their detention is unlawful. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). To meet that burden, Petitioner argues, in part, that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to him; “that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing for discretionary detention); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing framework for requesting a bond determination); and that he has received no such hearing.

As this Court and others in this District have repeatedly found in similar cases, Petitioner has met his burden showing that his continued detention without a bond hearing is unlawful. See Diaz Marquez, 2026 WL 370864, at *1 (“The Court remains firmly convinced that it and the other judges in the District who have addressed this issue have correctly decided those cases.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has a statutory right to a bond hearing that has not been provided, in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights, see Jimenez Facio, 2025 WL 3559128, at *3 (“Resolution of the due-process question may be unnecessary[,] . . . [b]ut to the extent it is, ‘the Court agrees with other courts that have, against substantially similar factual backgrounds, concluded that detention without a bond hearing amounts to a due process violation.’”) (quoting Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25- cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025)); and the INA, see Abanil v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-4029-WJM-STV, 2026 WL 100587, at *6 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026) (“The Court joins its colleagues in this District and those courts across the country that have concluded Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is contrary to the INA’s plain text. As a consequence, the Court also concludes that Garcia Abanil’s detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the INA, and that he is instead properly considered to be detained under § 1226(a).”).1 Moreover, the Court rejects Respondents’ reliance on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). As this Court has repeatedly held, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is not binding authority in this District, and, as to persuasiveness, the Court respectfully finds in Judge Douglas’s dissent a more rigorous and compelling legal analysis of the relevant statutory provisions. See Vasquez Gomez, 2026 WL 482677, at *2; Singh v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 352870, at *3–6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (explaining in detail why Buenrostro-Mendez does not compel a contrary outcome).

Respondents also reference the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Avila v. Bondi. --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), and decisions of “some district courts in this circuit have agreed with [their] interpretation of the statute.” ECF No. 9 at 3. But “they present no argument for why these non-binding decisions require the Court to reverse itself on this legal question.” Gregorio Martinez Torres v. Bondi, No. 26-cv- 01062-CYC, 2026 WL 860425, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2026). Rather, Respondents concede that “until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court's prior ruling on this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if the Court adheres to that

1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s other arguments. See Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-0276-WJM-TPO, 2026 WL 304362, at *1 n.1 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026) (“Because the Court concludes that section 1226(a) controls here, it need not base its Order on whether Alvarez Hernandez’s other arguments are availing.”); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). decision . . . .” ECF No. 9 at 3–4. Having reviewed the cited decisions, the Court finds no reason to reverse itself.

Lastly, Petitioner requests attorney fees and costs. ECF No. 1 at 14. But D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3(a) requires that “a motion for attorney fees . . . be supported by affidavit,” and no such affidavit supported the request. Further, “a motion involving a contested issue of law shall . . . be supported by a recitation of legal authority in the motion.” D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d). As a result, the Court denies this portion of the Petition without prejudice. If the Petitioner chooses to file a motion for attorney fees, it must comply with all applicable rules and provide legal authority for the request. See L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1187 (D. Colo. 2024).

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED IN PART as follows.

It is further ORDERED that 1) Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of this Order. At the bond hearing, Respondents bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified due to dangerousness or flight risk. See Abanil, 2026 WL 100587, at *8 (“[T]the weight of authority in this District is clear: it is the Government’s burden to ‘justify[ ] a noncitizen’s continued detention at a bond hearing.’” (quoting Arauz v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03260-CNS, 2025 WL 3041840, at *4 n.3 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025)); Espinoza Ruiz v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03642- CNS, 2025 WL 3294762, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2025) (ordering that the Government would carry the burden for bond hearing under § 1226(a)); Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 (“During such [bond] hearing, the Respondents bear the burden of justifying detention.”). If Respondents to not do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from detention; 2) Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); and 3) Respondents shall file a status report within three days of Petitioner’s bond hearing, stating whether he has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial.

Dated: April 6, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

N. Reid Neureiter United States Magistrate Judge