Grundel v. People
Cases that cite this one
27 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Taylor v. State (Ind. 1954)
- People v. Luu (Colo. App. 1998)
- People Ex Rel. Carroll v. District Court of the Second Judicial District (Colo. 1940)
- People v. Gould (Colo. App. 1992)
- Despain v. State (Wyo. 1989)
- People v. Ray (Colo. 1977)
- State v. Lee Lim (Utah 1932)
- United States v. William John Yehling (10th Cir. 2006)
- People v. Wortham (Colo. App. 1996)
- People v. Patrick (Colo. App. 1976)
- Boykin v. State (Okla. Crim. App. 1948)
- Dawson v. Sisk (Iowa 1942)
- Ex Parte Tucker (Okla. Crim. App. 1942)
- Ex Parte Coley (Okla. Crim. App. 1939)
- Mackelprang v. Walker (Utah 1929)
- In re Nottingham (Colo. 1928)
- In re the Application of Grove for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Idaho 1927)
- Warner v. State (Ind. 1924)
- Collins v. State (Okla. Crim. App. 1923)
- Egbert v. Tauer (Ind. 1921)
- Smith v. State (Ind. 1919)
- Martin v. People (Colo. 1917)
- Miner v. United States (3d Cir. 1917)
- Ex Parte United States (Supreme Court of the United States 1916)
- State v. Radcliffe (Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County, Civil Division 1915)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the absence of a permissive statute, the indefinite postponement of sentence upon one convicted of crime deprives the court of jurisdiction to pronounce sentence at a subsequent term. Such postponement is, in effect, a discharge of the prisoner, and therefore ousts the court after the expiration of the term of further authority over him. — People v. Allen, 155 Ill. 61; Commonwealth v. Maloney, 145 Mass. 205; 25 Enc. Law (2d ed.), 314; In re Flint (Utah), 71 Pac. 531; Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 296; People v. Barrett, 202 Ill. 287; U. S. v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748.
By the order entered at the August term, no definite time was fixed within which sentence should be pronounced. The defendants were released upon their own recognizance. Whether or not they would ever be called to the bar for sentence was contingent upon the action of- the prosecuting officer. Three years and three months elapsed before such action was taken. This delay, unexplained, in connection with the order under which they were released, was equivalent to an indefinite postponement of sentence. There is no statute which permits this practice, and hence, the court was without jurisdiction to pronounce judgment against them.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the proceedings against the defendants.
Reversed and remanded.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.