People v. Standard Home Co.
People v. Standard Home Co.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, brought by the people on the relation of the attorney general, to oust the Standard Home Company, a corporation, from doing business in this state, for failure to comply with the provisions of chapter 33, S. L. 1897, (secs. 950-974, R. S. 1908), entitled: “An Act relating to building and loan associations, and providing penalties for failure to comply therewith, and repealing all acts in conflict therewith.”
The Standard Home Company was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, and has complied with all the laws of the State of Colorado entitling it to do business here, unless the aforesaid act is applicable,, with which, it is conceded, the corporation has not complied. Therefore, the sole question involved is whether the defendant corporation is “doing a business in a form and character sim
Section 15 of the aforesaid act, (sec. 964, R. S. 1908), ' is as follows:
“Every corporation, company or association contemplating doing business in this state and having for a part of its title or name the words ‘Loan and Building Association/ ‘Building Association/ ‘Building and Loan Association/ ‘Saving and Loan Association/ or ‘Co-operative Bank, “‘Saving and Investment Company/ and every corporation, •company or association whose stock is payable'by an accumulating fund in regular or stated periodical installments; and every corporation, company or association doing a business in a form and character similar to that authorized to bé done by sec. 1 of this act, shall, if organized or incorporated in any state or territory other than the State of Colorado, be known in this act, as a foreign building and loan association.”
Section 1 of the act (sec. 950, R. S. 1908), referred to . in the above sec. 15, is as follows:
“Any association of not less than three persons hereafter incorporated under the laws of this state, which shall be organized within this state for the purpose of raising a fund by the collection of dues or stated payments from its members, to be loaned among its members, shall, in furtherance of such purpose, and after having complied with the requirements of this act, be authorized and empowered to levy, assess, and collect from its members such sums of money, by rates of stated dues, fines, interest on loans advanced, and premiums bid by members for the right of precedence in taking loans, as the corporation may provide for in its constitution or by-laws. Also, to acquire, hold*358 and convey all such real estate and personal property as may be legitimately pledged to it upon said loans, or may otherwise be transferred to it in the due course of its. business.”
The nature of the business proposed to be transacted by the defendant corporation as set forth in its charter, in general or specific terms, includes practically every character of business that may be carried on by a private corporation. Among that specially enumerated is the following: “To issue to any and all persons its Investment Contracts, on the participating plan or otherwise, in different denominations and classes, to be paid for on the weekly or monthly plan, to run for such period as may be provided.for in the said contracts respectively, said contracts to be issued with or without coupons attached thereto, and maturing at different periods and subject to redemption and cancellation by the company at or before maturity on a plan which shall be fully set forth in or on said investment contracts; to make a mutual profit in the legitimate management of its business, and to encourage economy by providing a plan for the investment of funds, either in large or small amounts, in its investment contracts, said investment contracts to be paid for by the investor, either in weekly or monthly installments, or both, and returning to the investor a liberal profit on his investment; to loan money at interest upon real and personal property, or upon the notes and securities of any public or private corporation, firm, partnership, company, person or persons.”
The nature of some of the business transacted by the corporation in this state, is as follows: it issues and sells contracts denominated, “Investment Home Purchasing Contracts.” Each contract is one of a series of one hundred of like tenor, and when there are one hundred contract holders in a series, no more contracts may be written and sold in that series, but a new series started. To become a
It is not necessary to determine whether the defendant company is technically a building and loan association. If the form and character of business conducted by it is similar to that authorized to be done by corporations organized under chapter 33, supra, it is amenable thereto. Considering the provisions of the charter and the contract heretofore mentioned, we think that the defendant corporation is subject to the provisions of the act. It is not only authorized to do, but is engaged in doing, a business in a form and character similar to that authorized to be done by sec. 1 of the act. A thing which is somewhat like, or resembles in many respects another thing, is similar thereto. The one purpose for which a corporate entity may be created, under the provisions of sec. 1 of the aforesaid legislative act, is to raise “a fund by the collection of dues or stated payments from its members, to be loaned among
But it is said that the persons to whom these contracts are sold, and loans made, are not members of the defendant corporation, and, therefore, are not of the class from whom funds may be collected or loaned by a corporation organized under the provisions of our statute. The contract holders of every contract series are members of that series, and constitute the entity that bears the expense and brings into existence the fund which may be loaned only to such members, and are in that sense members of the entity creating the loan fund. However, We think it immaterial whether the holders of these contracts are denominated members, stockholders or contract holders of the corporate entity. The substantial effect is the same and that is sufficient. It is so held in State, ex rel. Atkinson, Attorney General, v. Co-operative Home Builders, 47 Wash. 235, 91 Pac. 953, and in State, ex rel. v. The Standard Real Estate Loan Company, 80 Kan. 694, 103 Pac. 1006. In the former case, which .was a quo warranto proceeding, the defendant company was engaged in selling and issuing contracts quite similar to the contracts in the case at bar, and it was claimed, as here, that as the persons with whom the contracts were made and to whom loans were granted were not members of the corporation or association defendant therein, the requirements
This is an original proceeding in quo warranto, brought by the state to oust the defendant from doing business in the state as a foreign building and loan association without procuring a certificate of authority from the bank commissioner, as the law requires. (Gen. Stat. 1901, sec. 1421.) It is admitted that the defendant is doing business in the state, and that no such certificate has been procured, but the defendant denies that it is a building and loan association.
The legislature has prescribed a scheme for domestic concerns of this character, but it is not necessary that the plan of a foreign association be identical vnth that provided for in the statute to subject such association to the law requiring a license. Nor is it necessary that the scheme of the foreign association should conform to that of any other already in use, provided in essence and effect such association performs the functions and accomplishes the purposes for which building and loan associations are usually organized. That the defendant organization cléarly does. Its charter is studiously blind as to the object of its creation. The plan does appear, hoioever, in an ‘investment contract’ which the defendant issues and sells in the place of shares of stock. It is not necessary to encumber the reports with a copy of this instrument or a feature-by-feature analysis and discus*364 sion of its provisions. It is unique, presents a system differing in many formal respects from that of building and. loan associations generally, and eliminates altogether some of the incidents of ordinary plans. But the vital and essential features of even the type prescribed for Kansas associations appear, and the court finds that the defendant is a foreign building and loan association, has procured no certificate of authority to do business in this state from the bank commissioner, is therefore doing business in the state contrary to law, and ought to be ousted. Judgment accordingly.”
State, ex rel. v. Folk, 124 Tenn. 119, 135 S. W. 776, is relied upon by the defendant corporation, and it is said that the relator therein and the defendant company here are identical, and that the contract involved there was the same as here. While it is doubtless true that the contention is correct as to the corporation- and contracts involved, the caséis against the contention of defendant in error as to its rights in the premises. The question involved therein upon which the case was determined was the constitutionality of an amendment to the prior existing law entitled: “An Act to provide for the examination and supervision of building and loan associations doing business in the State of Tennessee.” Section 2 thereof declared that the name “Building and Loan Association” as used in the act should include all corporations, societies, organizations or associations doing business in the state under a building and loan charter, or engaged in a building and loan business. The amendatory act undertook to make the section read as follows: “That the name of ‘Building and Loan Association’ used in this act, shall include all corporations, societies, organizations or associations doing business in this state, under a building and loan charter, or engaged in a building and loan business, or engaged in seeking investments from the. citizens of the state by selling forms of stock, debentures, certificates, etc.,.
Judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.