Frain v. Modern Woodmen of America
Frain v. Modern Woodmen of America
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
Action to recover on a life insurance policy. There are no disputed facts.
June 8, 1909, Edward F. Ford became a beneficial member of Centennial Camp No. 9743, at Denver, Colorado, of the defendant society, and there issued to him on that date a benefit certificate for the sum of $2,000.00 payable to his mother. November 24, 1910, she died and March 1, 1911, the insured surrendered the original certificate or policy, and received another in lieu thereof in which Catharine Frain, plaintiff herein, was named as beneficiary. This last certificate, being the one involved in this action, provides among other things: “That all the conditions contained in this certificate and the by-laws of this society, as the same now exist, or may be hereafter modified, amended or enacted, shall be fully complied with”; “If the above named member shall, at any time after the issuance of this certificate, enter upon any of the prohibited or hazardous occupations mentioned in the by-laws of this society as the same now exist o.r may be hereafter modified, amended or enacted, the entrance into said employment shall limit or extinguish the liability of the society upon this certificate in accordance with the by-laws thereof.”
Section-15 of the by-laws provides: “A person engaged or employed in any of the following occupations shall not become a beneficial member of this society, viz: * * * railroad brakeman on all trains except passenger trains using air brakes only.”
Section 18 provides: “Any beneficial member in good standing who may hereafter desire to enter upon any of the occupations designated in this section, and continue his certificate in full force and effect, including the hazards of said
It is further provided by the by-laws that engaging-in or entering on or continuing in the employment of railroad brakeman, on trains except passenger trains equipped with air brakes, by any beneficial member of the society, shall totally exempt it from any liability to such member or his beneficiaries on account of his death directly traceable to the employment in such hazardous or prohibited occupation; this provision, however, does not apply to a beneficial member who shall have complied with the provisions of section 18.
When Ford took out his policy of insurance, his occupation was that of a grocery clerk, and in his application he agreed if he became a brakeman on a train other than a passenger train using air brakes, he would recognize the full force and effect of the society’s by-laws extinguishing its liability upon the certificate of any member engaged in such occupation. His work continued to be that of a clerk until immediately prior to January 31, 193L2, on which date he en
January 31, 1912, the local Camp Clerk at Denver was notified that Ford was engaged in his new occupation, by the son of plaintiff, who, on that date paid the usual assessment due on the certificate, and offered to pay any additional .amount required by reason of the hazardous occupation of the insured, but the clerk of the camp not being advised as to what the increased assessment should be, declined to take any additional amount, but received the assessment due on the ordinary certificate, as usual, and issued a receipt therefor. No application was ever made by the insured under the by-laws of the order, for a “Hazardous Occupation Certificate,” and no increased rate was ever paid on that account.
On February 2, 1912, Ford was killed accidentally while engaged as a brakeman on a work train in California. On proof of death being furnished the company refused payment and denied its liability under the certificate. This action was instituted, and the cause tried to the court without a jury. The finding was in favor of the defendant and plaintiff brings the case here on error.
Only two questions are presented and argued by plaintiff in error: 1. That the cause of death is not shown to be directly traceable to the prohibited occupation, the proof showing that death was caused by loss of blood, shock from an operation and injuries received from falling off a train. 2. If it be true that the death of the insured is directly traceable to the hazardous employment, the defendant must be held to have waived the provisions of its by-laws, now relied on, .and is estopped from claiming a forfeiture or exemption from payment.
1. ■ The first question must be resolved against the plaintiff. Not only is it alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer “That on February 2, 1912, said Edward F. Ford was killed in an accident while engaged as a brake
2. It is the contention of plaintiff in error that the defendant, by its local Camp Clerk, having received the ordinary assessment and retained it with knowledge of the fact that Ford was engaged as a railroad brakeman, is now estopped from declaring a forfeiture, it having waived its right to a defense based upon the ground that the insured was engaged in a hazardous occupation not covered by the terms of his certificate. We have no quarrel with the law cited in support of this proposition. Unquestionably an insurance company may be estopped from setting up a forfeiture, by the collection and retention of premiums or assessments with full knowledge, directly or impliedly, of the facts and conditions undér which it seeks to defend, whereby the insured is led to rely upon an assumption that it had waived its right of forfeiture under the contract; but we have nothing of that kind here. The record is barren of any evidence bringing the case within, such a rule. The insured paid the usual and' ordinary assessment, through his agent, who notified the clerk of the local camp of the change in employment, and offered to pay any increased assessment
We are of the opinion that under the facts and circumstances of this case, there was clearly no waiver of the right to insist on the exemption from liability, under the terms of the contract, and defendant cannot be held liable for the payment of this loss. Among the authorities sustaining this view are: Showalter v. Modern Woodmen, 156 Mich. 390, 120 N. W. 994; Modern Woodmen v. Talbot, 76 Neb. 621, 107 N. W. 790; Crites v. Modern Woodmen, 82 Neb. 298, 117 N. W. 776; Abell v. Modern Woodmen, 96 Minn. 494,105 N. W.
The judgment of the lower court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Decision en banc.
Mr. Justice Scott dissents.
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