McCartey v. School District No. 9
McCartey v. School District No. 9
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an.action in mandamus by defendant in error against plaintiffs in error to obtain an apportionment of the school funds of the county differing from that already made and being made under the act of 1921 as construed by the state superintendent of public instruction. Judgment was for the school district. The county superintendent brings error and asks that the writ be made a supersedeas.
The question before us is the proper interpretation of the prpvisions of chapter 214, L. 1921, sections 8446 to 8453, inclusive, C. L. 1921. So far as we are advised this act has not heretofore been before the courts, and little, if any, light is thrown upon it by any authority to which our attention has been directed. Section 8446, C. L. 1921, requires the board of directors of each school district to certify to the county superintendent the “number of teachers employed, or to be employed,” during the ensuing year,
Section 8452 provides, that if a five mill levy shall be insufficient to provide funds necessary to pay the minimum salary of $75.00 per month “to every public school teacher within that county, as aforesaid,” then upon a proper certification of the facts to the state superintendent, and that ■"official’s investigation and ascertainment of the necessity, the deficiency shall be made up out of the public school income fund of the state.
The board of directors of district number nine, which is the only district of the first class in La Plata county, listed forty-three teachers and certified that forty-one of them came, under the minimum salary provisions, and that the school would be in operation nine and one-half months. Under the county superintendent’s duty to certify to the county commissioners, she made such certificate' at the time required by law, but being doubtful of the rights claimed by number nine, she qualified her certificate “subject to the opinion of the state superintendent or a court decision.” Having investigated the facts she learned that one of the teachers, included in the forty-one, was a teacher of art, another of music, another of mechanical drawing, another of domestic science, and that another taught but two hours and forty minutes per day. These facts she communicated to the state superintendent, and upon the ruling of the latter held that these were teachers of special subjects and part time teachers and should not have been certified; also that the maximum period for which district number nine could claim participation in the fund for minimum salaries was nine months. She thereupon advised district number nine of the ruling of the state superintendent, called for a new certificate in conformity therewith, and she and the county treasurer proceeded with the administration of the fund accordingly. Such administration, district number nine sought to have modified by this action to conform to its claims under its certificate:
1. It is perfectly clear from an examination of this entire act that its chief purpose is to raise the educational standard in the weaker districts of the state and place the burden incident thereto upon the stronger districts and, in case of necessity, upon the state itself. The very heart of the act is said section 8451, and by its provisions the other sections must be interpreted. The requirement of said section 8446 for a certification of “the number of teachers employed, or to be employed,” in said school district, relates only to those entitled to the minimum salary provided in section 8451. The language of section 8452 which provides that if the levy be insufficient to pay the salary of $75.00 per month “to every public school teacher within that county, as aforesaid,” relates again to those entitled to minimum salaries as provided in the preceding section. Neither; said section 8451, nor any other portion of the act, defines “part time teachers, and teachers of special subjects.” Such a definition would be extremely difficult for the courts if we were without any guide, but that enigma is' solved for us by a statute in existence at the time of the passage of the act of 1921, with knowledge whereof, and in the light of which it must be presumed the General Assembly acted. Section 8335, C. L. 1921 (L. 1917 p. 116, § 1), confers certain powers upon boards in districts of the first class, among which are: “They may provide instruction in and employ special teachers for such special subjects as music, drawing, manual training, household economics, including the care of children, vocational and industrial subjects, and subjects for the training of such special teachers.”
Such subjects we must conclude the'Legislature had in
2. At the time of the passage of the act of 1891, there was no statute in the state which fixed the length of a standard school year. The argument here made for a year of nine months is based upon the custom followed in a great majority of the school districts of the state, and a provision of the laws of 1923, which it is contended established a new. maximum. We do not think the argument sound. The language last referred to is found in section 2, chap. 166, p. 566 L. 1923, and reads: “No greater amount shall be apportioned than is necessary to pay the above named salaries for a term of nine and one-half months.”
This is an amendment of section 4 of the act of 1921 (section 8449, C. L. 1921), and indicates, if it indicates anything, a limitation upon a term which theretofore might have been for a longer period. That school years of more than nine months were contemplated is indicated by the provisions of section 8289, C. L. 1921, in force at the time of the passage of the act here in question, and by which a district was permitted to use its general school fund for certain purposes if any portion thereof remained “after the payment of all expenses necessary to the support of a public school for a period of ten months.” Moreover, the act of 1921 required the school board to certify the length of the school year, without placing any limitation thereon, and further required the board to certify the amount of money necessary to pay the minimum salary “during the said portion of the year during which said schools are to be kept open,” from all which it seems clear to us that no maximum was established until the passage
The judgment of the district court is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony herewith.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- McCartey, Superintendent of Schools v. School District No. 9, La Plata County
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published