People v. Rapini
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Schubert v. People (Colo. 1985)
- JS Dillon & Sons Stores Company v. Carrington (Colo. 1969)
- Game and Fish Commission v. Feast (Colo. 1965)
- Marshall v. City of Golden (Colo. 1961)
- BD. OF CTY. COM. CTY. OF LOGAN v. Vandemoer (Colo. App. 2008)
- Mountain City Meat Co. v. Oqueda (Colo. 1996)
- People v. Milnes (Colo. 1974)
- State Ex Rel. Department of Institutions v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission Ex Rel. McAllister (Colo. 1974)
- People v. Sneed (Colo. 1973)
- People v. Sneed (Colo. 1973)
- Schippers v. Colorado State Personnel Board (Colo. 1972)
- Schippers v. Colorado State Personnel Board (Colo. 1972)
- General Motors Corporation v. Blevins (United States District Court for the District of Colorado 1956)
- Commonwealth v. Ford (Fayette County Court 1945)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Concurring Opinion
specially concurring.
I concur in the result. I think the comment on former jeopardy should be omitted. The district attorney’s concession does not bind this or the trial court, and does not bind the district attorney, should he later conclude differently. To hold this former jeopardy is a plain nullification of section 18, article II, of our Constitution on the subject, and every decision to the contrary, if such there be, should be overruled.
Mr. Chief Justice Francis E. Bouck concurs herein.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendants in error, to whom we hereinafter refer as defendants, were charged in a two-count information filed in the district court of Garfield county with law violations on separate dates, as follows: That they “did unlawfully move a certain vehicle, to-wit, a binder, on a State Highway within said county, which said vehicle and binder was then and there equipped with flanges, cleats, and metal protuberances on the tires and wheels which was then and there in contact with the surface of said highway and said flanges, cleats, and metal protuberances being then and there of such a nature that the same did injure the highway.” The information was based upon section 149(c), chapter 164, Session Laws of 1935 (section 264[c], chapter 16, ’35 C.S.A.), which is as follows: “No tire on a vehicle moved on a highway shall have on its periphery any block stud, flange,
After the jury was sworn to try the case, and the people had called their first witness to the stand, counsel for defendants objected'to the introduction of any testimony for the reasons: (1) That the information did not charge an offense under the laws of the state of Colorado; and (2) that the facts set forth as constituting the offense did not constitute a crime under the laws of this state. This objection was sustained, • and on motion of said counsel the court instructed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. Counsel for the people excepted to the rulings and judgment of the court and, pursuant to section 500, chapter 48, ’35 C.S.A., the people are here by writ of error, seeking a review of the judgment.
Two of the assigned errors which we will consider are:
“(3) The Court erred in holding and deciding that binders are exempted as implements of husbandry, from the operation of Section 264(c) of Chapter 16,1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated; Laws 1935, Ch. 164, Sec. 149 (c).
“(4) The Court erred in holding and deciding that implements of husbandry are exempted from the operation of the Statutes of this State which require vehicles to be devoid of cleats or protuberances in order to avoid injury to the pavement.”
The contention of counsel for defendants that a binder is not a vehicle within the meaning of section 149(c) is without merit. A sufficient answer thereto is the definition found in section 1(a), chapter 122, S.L. ’31, as follows: “(a) ‘Vehicle.’ Every device * * * drawn upon a public highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks”; and the definition in section 3(d), chapter 164, of the 1935 law, reading: “(d) Implement of Husbandry. — Every vehicle which is designed for agricultural purposes and exclusively used by the owner thereof in the conduct of his agricultural operations exclusive of transportation.” A binder — farm machinery —which concededly is an implement of husbandry, also is a “vehicle” within the meaning of section 149(c), supra. In construing said section we find no substantial ambiguity. The granting of the motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty was error.
Counsel for the people suggests that in construing a statute the practical construction given to it by public officers charged with its enforcement, in case of doubt, is entitled to consideration. Citing Hessick v. Moynihan, supra. In line with this suggestion he states that signs bearing the words “Vehicles with Lugs or Flanges Prohibited,” or of similar import, are found on many of the more improved highways in the state. Counsel for defendants urges, that since there was no evidence introduced in the case (although his motion prevented such a course), this discussion is beside the question. In view of our construction of section 149(c), supra, we deem it unnecessary to take judicial notice of traffic signs on public highways, but this should not lead to the conclusion that we do not know of their existence. We, in compaon with other travelers, solely in the interest of
Counsel for- defendants further argues that if we sustain the construction for which counsel for the people contends — which we do — then the act as related to the subject matter under discussion violates section 21, article V, of the state Constitution, since neither highways nor farm machinery are mentioned in the title. The title of the 1931 act is as follows: “An act relating to motor and other vehicles, providing a penalty for the violation thereof and repealing all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith.” The title of the-1935 act is: “An act relating to motor and other vehicles, amending chapter 122 of the Session Laws of Colorado for the year 1931 and repealing all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith.” It will be noted that both are acts “relating to motor and other vehicles.” Is a binder such “other vehicle”? It is not questioned that a binder, which is a farm machine, is an “implement of husbandry,” the statutory definition of which we have hereinbefore quoted. The definition of the term “vehicle,” also is set out above. A binder, being a farm machine, and an implement of husbandry, is therefore a “vehicle” within the meaning of the title of the act. In Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P. (2d) 1098, we said: “In the title, particularity is neither necessary nor desirable; generality is commendable.”
That portion of the legislation here involved is necessarily incidental to, and included in, the general subject expressed in the title of the act, which, as already stated, deals generally with all vehicles operated on the public highway. Since implements of husbandry, such as binders, may be considered to be “vehicles,” as expressed in the title, the constitutional provision is not violated. There is no merit to the contention of unconstitutionality.
Mr. Chief Justice Francis E. Bouck and Mr. Justice Burke concur specially.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.